Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lycophron, Henri Poincar and Eric T. Olson

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9 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry

10245	One geometry cannot be more true than another [Poincaré]
	Full Idea: One geometry cannot be more true than another; it can only be more convenient.
	From: Henri Poincaré (Science and Method [1908], p.65), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics
	A reaction: This is the culminating view after new geometries were developed by tinkering with Euclid's parallels postulate.

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / d. Actual infinite

15923	Poincaré rejected the actual infinite, claiming definitions gave apparent infinity to finite objects [Poincaré, by Lavine]
	Full Idea: Poincaré rejected the actual infinite. He viewed mathematics that is apparently concerned with the actual infinite as actually concerning the finite linguistic definitions the putatively describe actually infinite objects.
	From: report of Henri Poincaré (On the Nature of Mathematical Reasoning [1894]) by Shaughan Lavine - Understanding the Infinite

6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism

10180	Mathematicians do not study objects, but relations between objects [Poincaré]
	Full Idea: Mathematicians do not study objects, but relations between objects; it is a matter of indifference if the objects are replaced by others, provided the relations do not change. They are interested in form alone, not matter.
	From: Henri Poincaré (Science and Hypothesis [1902], p.20), quoted by E Reck / M Price - Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths §6
	A reaction: This connects modern structuralism with Aritotle's interest in the 'form' of things. Contrary to the views of the likes of Frege, it is hard to see that the number '7' has any properties at all, apart from its relations. A daffodil would do just as well.

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / a. Constructivism

9916	Convention, yes! Arbitrary, no! [Poincaré, by Putnam]
	Full Idea: Poincaré once exclaimed, 'Convention, yes! Arbitrary, no!'.
	From: report of Henri Poincaré (talk [1901]) by Hilary Putnam - Models and Reality
	A reaction: An interesting view. It mustn't be assumed that conventions are not rooted in something. Maybe a sort of pragmatism is implied.

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / d. Predicativism

18203	Avoid non-predicative classifications and definitions [Poincaré]
	Full Idea: Never consider any objects but those capable of being defined in a finite number of word ...Avoid non-predicative classifications and definitions.
	From: Henri Poincaré (The Logic of Infinity [1909], p.63), quoted by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics II.4

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism

604	Knowledge is mind and knowing 'cohabiting' [Lycophron, by Aristotle]
	Full Idea: Lycophron has it that knowledge is the 'cohabitation' (rather than participation or synthesis) of knowing and the soul.
	From: report of Lycophron (fragments/reports [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1045b
	A reaction: This sounds like a rather passive and inert relationship. Presumably knowing something implies the possibility of acting on it.

16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body

16236	Maybe our persistence conditions concern bodies, rather than persons [Olson, by Hawley]
	Full Idea: Instead of attributing person-like persistence conditions to bodies, we could attribute body-like persistence conditions to persons, …so human persons are identical with human organisms.
	From: report of Eric T. Olson (The Human Animal [1997]) by Katherine Hawley - How Things Persist 5.10
	A reaction: In the case of pre-birth and advanced senility, Olson thinks we could have the body without the person, so person is a 'phase sortal' of bodies. A good theory, which seems to answer a lot of questions. 'Person' may be an abstraction.

6669	For 'animalism', I exist before I became a person, and can continue after it, so I am not a person [Olson, by Lowe]
	Full Idea: According to 'animalism', I existed before I was a person and I may well go one existing for some time after I cease to be a person; hence, I am not essentially a person, but a human organism.
	From: report of Eric T. Olson (The Human Animal [1997]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.10
	A reaction: There is a very real sense in which an extremely senile person has 'ceased to exist' (e.g. as the person I used to love). On the whole, though, I think that Olson is right, and yet 'person' is an important concept. Neither concept is all-or-nothing.

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature

15877	The aim of science is just to create a comprehensive, elegant language to describe brute facts [Poincaré, by Harré]
	Full Idea: In Poincaré's view, we try to construct a language within which the brute facts of experience are expressed as comprehensively and as elegantly as possible. The job of science is the forging of a language precisely suited to that purpose.
	From: report of Henri Poincaré (The Value of Science [1906], Pt III) by Rom Harré - Laws of Nature 2
	A reaction: I'm often struck by how obscure and difficult our accounts of self-evident facts can be. Chairs are easy, and the metaphysics of chairs is hideous. Why is that? I'm a robust realist, but I like Poincaré's idea. He permits facts.