3 ideas
| 9548 | A mathematical object exists if there is no contradiction in its definition [Waterfield] |
| Full Idea: A mathematical object exists provided there is no contradiction implied in its definition. | |
| From: Robin Waterfield (Introduction to 'Hippias Minor' [1987], p.44), quoted by Charles Chihara - A Structural Account of Mathematics 1.4 | |
| A reaction: A rather bizarre criterion for existence. Not one, for example, that you would consider applying to the existence of physical objects! But then Poincaré is the father of 'conventionalism', rather than being a platonist. |
| 604 | Knowledge is mind and knowing 'cohabiting' [Lycophron, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Lycophron has it that knowledge is the 'cohabitation' (rather than participation or synthesis) of knowing and the soul. | |
| From: report of Lycophron (fragments/reports [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1045b | |
| A reaction: This sounds like a rather passive and inert relationship. Presumably knowing something implies the possibility of acting on it. |
| 18424 | If two people can have phenomenally identical experiences, they can't involve the self [Brogaard] |
| Full Idea: It is plausible that you and I can have perceptual experiences with the same phenomenology of two trees at different distances from us (perhaps at different times). ..So our perceptual experiences cannot contain you or me in the content of representation. | |
| From: Berit Brogaard (Perceptual Content and Monadic Truth [2009], p.223), quoted by Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh - The Inessential Indexical 08.2 | |
| A reaction: If you accept the example, which seems reasonable, then that pretty conclusively shows that perception is not inherently indexical. |