60 ideas
23027 | Ideals and metaphysics are practical, not imaginative or speculative [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
Full Idea: To T.H. Green an ideal was no creation of an idle imagination, metaphysics no mere play of the speculative reason. Ideals were the most solid, and metaphysics the most practical thing about a man. | |
From: report of T.H. Green (works [1875]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State I | |
A reaction: This is despite the fact that Green was an idealist in the Hegelian tradition. I like this. I see it not just as ideals having practical guiding influence, but also that ideals themselves arising out of experience. |
23030 | Truth is a relation to a whole of organised knowledge in the collection of rational minds [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
Full Idea: When we speak of anything as true or false, we do so on the ground of its relation to a whole of organised knowledge existing actually in no human mind, but prefigured in every mind which is possessed of reason. | |
From: report of T.H. Green (works [1875]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State I n1 | |
A reaction: This seems to be the super-idealist view of the coherence account of truth. I have no idea what 'prefigured' means here. |
15682 | Even fairly simple animals make judgements based on categories [Gelman] |
Full Idea: All organisms form categories: even mealworms have category-based preferences, and higher-order animals such as pigeons or octopi can display quite sophisticated categorical judgements. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 01 'Prelims') | |
A reaction: [She cites some 1980 research to support this] This comes as no surprise, as I take categorisation as almost definitive of what a mind is. My surmise is that some sort of 'labelling' system is at the heart of it (like Googlemail labels!). |
15691 | Children accept real stable categories, with nonobvious potential that gives causal explanations [Gelman] |
Full Idea: By five children assume that a variety of categories have rich inductive potential, are stable over outward transformations, include crucial nonobvious properties, have innate potential, privilege causal features, can be explained causally, and are real. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 06 'Intro') | |
A reaction: This is Gelman's helpful summary of the findings of research on childhood essentialising, and says the case for this phenomenon is 'compelling'. |
15700 | In India, upper-castes essentialize caste more than lower-castes do [Gelman] |
Full Idea: The notion of caste in India is more essentialized among upper-caste than lower-caste individuals. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 08 'Intro') | |
A reaction: In a book defending fairly innate essentialism in the human race, Gelman offers this point as a warning that large cultural ingredients can be involved. Racism is the classic difficulty with essentialism. |
15685 | Essentialism is either natural to us, or an accident of our culture, or a necessary result of language [Gelman] |
Full Idea: The two views contrasting with essentialism naturally emerging in childhood are the claim that essentialism is a historical accident emerging from Western philosophy, and that essentialism is an inherent consequence of naming things. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 01 'Background') | |
A reaction: Helpful. I take Idea 15682 to rule out the idea that it is just a feature of western culture. I can't conceive of early man surviving without essentialism. I don't think it rules out the naming view. Animals may do what emerges in us as full 'naming'. |
15684 | Children's concepts include nonobvious features, like internal parts, functions and causes [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Children incorporate a variety of nonobvious features into their concepts, including internal parts, functions, causes, and ontological distinctions. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 01 'Prelims') | |
A reaction: This remark sums up the general thesis of her book, which she supports with a wealth of first-hand evidence. It supports my view, that the desire and need for explanation is at the root of essentialist concepts. It's hard wired in us. |
15681 | Essentialism: real or representational? sortal, causal or ideal? real particulars, or placeholders? [Gelman] |
Full Idea: We map types of essentialism by asking is it in the world or in our representations, is it sortal or causal or ideal, and is it specific particulars or placeholders for the unknown? | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 01 'Prelims') | |
A reaction: I am struck by the way that this practising experimental psychologist gets to ask questions and make distinctions much more extensively than most armchair philosophers on the subject. She focuses on the representational, causal, placeholder view. |
15678 | Essentialism says categories have a true hidden nature which gives an object its identity [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Essentialism is the view that categories have an underlying reality or true nature that one cannot observe directly but that gives an object its identity. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 01 'Intro') | |
A reaction: I think the introduction of categories here is a misunderstanding. Does an uncategorisable thing therefore have no identity (even though it has properties)? If categories give objects their identity, what gives categories their identity? |
15683 | Sortals are needed for determining essence - the thing must be categorised first [Gelman] |
Full Idea: I suggest that sortals are likewise required for determining essence. One cannot answer the question 'What is the essence of this?' without supplying the sortal - of this 'what'. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 01 'Prelims') | |
A reaction: I remain baffled by this view. I take the category to be an inductive generalisation from other similar individuals. It can't get off the ground if you don't start with the individuals. Sortals are just a shorthand. |
15697 | Kind (unlike individual) essentialism assumes preexisting natural categories [Gelman] |
Full Idea: With kind essentialism the person assumes that the world is divided up into preexisting natural categories. Individual essentialism seems not to require any such commitment to kind realism. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 06 'Essentialism') | |
A reaction: This pinpoints my difficulty: how do we decide whether some category or attributed essence is part of a preexisting natural kind? Some natural kinds are self-evident, like water (roughly), but others need subtle teasing out. How is the teasing done? |
15687 | Kinship is essence that comes in degrees, and age groups are essences that change over time [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Kinship is essentialized, but admits of degrees, ...and people can be essentialist even about categories they do not view as fixed over time, such as age groupings. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 03 'Summary') | |
A reaction: Given my notion of essence are necessarily explanatory, I embrace both of these points. Being very athletic comes in degrees, and changes over times. |
15679 | Essentialism comes from the cognitive need to categorise [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Essentialism has its source in the cognitive requirement of categorization in certain domains - particularly as they affect the young learner. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 01 'Essentialist') | |
A reaction: I think the phenomenon is better understood as part of the cognitive requirement to understand and explain. Categorisation is just one way to aid explanation. Children try to understand (essentially) a new animal without categorisation. |
15698 | We found no evidence that mothers teach essentialism to their children [Gelman] |
Full Idea: We found no evidence that mothers teach essentialism to their children. ...Mothers teach children about kinds, not about essences, and mothers help children identify which categories are richly structured. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 07 'Conclusions') | |
A reaction: This is a psychologist who specialises in this topic. If you think essentialism is inculcated by a our culture, you will have to blame the fathers. |
15709 | Essentialism is useful for predictions, but it is not the actual structure of reality [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Essentialism is a reasoning heuristic that allows us to make fairly good predictions much of the time, but it should not be confused with the structure of reality. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 11 'Discussion') | |
A reaction: She particularly cites biology as the area where it might be inaccurate. I'm beginning to think that the operations of induction are the place to look for an good understanding of essentialism. |
15696 | Peope favor historical paths over outward properties when determining what something is [Gelman] |
Full Idea: People favor historical paths over outward properties when determining what something is. ...An object looking like a knife is less likely to be called 'a knife' if it is described as having been created by accident. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 06 'Essentialism') | |
A reaction: I like this because it talks, suggestively, of 'historical paths' rather than of 'origin'. Thus we might judge a person's identity by their traumatic experience rather than by their birth. This doesn't challenge necessity of origin, but affects labels. |
15707 | There is intentional, mechanical, teleological, essentialist, vitalist and deontological understanding [Gelman] |
Full Idea: The modes of understanding (or modes of construal) which have been proposed are intentional, mechanical, teleological, essentialist, vitalist (perhaps), and deontological. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 11 'Broadening') | |
A reaction: She cites psychological research to support this, and calls it 'a relatively small number' of modes. Compare Aristotle's four modes of cause/explanation. |
23044 | All knowledge rests on a fundamental unity between the knower and what is known [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
Full Idea: All knowledge is seen on ultimate analysis to rest upon the idea of a fundamental unity between subject and object, between the knower and that which there is to be known. | |
From: report of T.H. Green (works [1875]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State III | |
A reaction: I don't really understand this thought, but I think it embodies the essence of Hegelian idealism. If I know a tree in the wood, any 'unity' between us strikes as merely imaginary. If the tree isn't separate, what does 'knowing' it mean? |
15703 | Memories often conform to a theory, rather than being neutral [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Memory is notorious for conforming to theory (rather than memory being a neutral source of information). | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 09 'Theory') | |
A reaction: This observation by a psychologist is music to sceptics about objectivity. Memory is so fundamental to our basic epistemology that it could even be the nature of thought itself. |
604 | Knowledge is mind and knowing 'cohabiting' [Lycophron, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Lycophron has it that knowledge is the 'cohabitation' (rather than participation or synthesis) of knowing and the soul. | |
From: report of Lycophron (fragments/reports [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1045b | |
A reaction: This sounds like a rather passive and inert relationship. Presumably knowing something implies the possibility of acting on it. |
23034 | The ultimate test for truth is the systematic interdependence in nature [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
Full Idea: Systematic interdependence in the world of nature is the ultimate test of truth. | |
From: report of T.H. Green (works [1875]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State II | |
A reaction: Green (or Muirhead) drifts between coherence as the nature of truth and coherence as the nature of justification. He it is the 'test' for truth, which was Russell's view. |
23029 | Knowledge is secured by the relations between its parts, through differences and identities [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
Full Idea: What gives reality and stability to our knowledge is the reality and stability of the relations established between its parts..…by the differences and identities with other things which have similarly achieved comparative fixity and substantiality. | |
From: report of T.H. Green (Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation [1882]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State I | |
A reaction: Although I don't sympathise with Green's idealist metaphysics, and nevertheless think that this internalist account of knowledge is correct. |
15708 | Inductive success is rewarded with more induction [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Inductive success is rewarded with more induction. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 11 'Broadening') | |
A reaction: I love this one. Neat, accurate, and central to how we understand the world. I take inductive success to be stored as labels, concepts, categories, words and general truths, which are then our resource for further attempts. |
15694 | Children overestimate the power of a single example [Gelman] |
Full Idea: We suggest that children overestimate the power of a single example. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 06 'The role') | |
A reaction: This conclusion arises from extensive psychological research. 'My grandma smoked, and she lived to be 97' - adults do this too. Wittgenstein says assuming other minds because of your own is induction from one example! |
15695 | Children make errors in induction by focusing too much on categories [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Because of their narrow focus, children's sensitivity to categories as the basis of induction is a reasoning bias that, though useful much of the time, results in systematic errors. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 06 'The role') | |
A reaction: This is the bad sense of 'essentialism' which worries its opponents. Presumably, though, my favoured scientific essentialism will be 'scientific', and avoid this problem. The relation between categories and induction needs to be clear. |
15692 | People tend to be satisfied with shallow explanations [Gelman] |
Full Idea: People tend to be satisfied with rather shallow explanations. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 06 'Is essentialism') | |
A reaction: She cites some psychological research to support this. Pretty obvious really. I take the so-called 'scientific method' to be nothing more than ceasing to be satisfied with such shallowness. |
15680 | Folk essentialism rests on belief in natural kinds, in hidden properties, and on words indicating structures [Gelman] |
Full Idea: The three components of essentialism as a folk belief are the idea that certain categories are natural kinds, the idea that some unobservable property causes the way things are, and the idea that words reflect real structures. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 01 'Prelims') |
15686 | Labels may indicate categories which embody an essence [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Labels may signal categories that are believed to embody an essence. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 02 'Privileged') | |
A reaction: This is quoted by her, as a summary of a substantial body of research which she endorses. I cite it because it pinpoints my own view. I take 'labels' to be basic to minds, as organisers of thought, and this ties essences to labels. Satisfying picture. |
15690 | Causal properties are seen as more central to category concepts [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Properties that enter into causally meaningful links are better remembered and are treated as more central to the category than properties that are not causally meaningful. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 05 'Causation2') | |
A reaction: This is a summary of considerable psychological research. This account not only sounds plausible, but would fit better withy why we form concepts and categories in the first place. We are trying to relate to the causations of nature. |
15688 | Categories are characterized by distance from a prototype [Gelman] |
Full Idea: On prototype views, categories are characterized by distance from a prototype. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 05 'Causation') | |
A reaction: Gelman observes that this view makes no reference to any causal features of things. This cuts them off from using underlying essences in the process of categorisation and concept-formation. How do you spot a prototype, with no category? |
15689 | Theory-based concepts use rich models to show which similarities really matter [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Theory-based approaches to categories are a response to the limitations of mere similarities holding the category together, and require knowledge-rich explanatory models to say which features are more central to a concept. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 05 'Causation1') | |
A reaction: I see a promising account in linking theory theory to essentialism. For a physical object (or even for a process) infer a structure, and then identify what is most important in that structure. That gives you your stable, agreed concept. |
15699 | Prelinguistic infants acquire and use many categories [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Language does not appear to be necessary for forming categories, since prelinguistic infants acquire many categories, and even use categories to form inferences about unknown properties. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 08 'Intro') | |
A reaction: She cites lots of research in support of this claim. The idea may come as a surprise to some people, but not to me. I take it that categorisation is what a brain is for, including animal brains. |
23035 | The good life aims at perfections, or absolute laws, or what is absolutely desirable [Green,TH] |
Full Idea: The differentia of the good life …is controlled by the consciousness of there being some perfection which has to be fulfilled, some law which has to be obeyed, something absolutely desirable whatever the individual may for the time desire. | |
From: T.H. Green (Prolegomena to Ethics [1882], p.134), quoted by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State II | |
A reaction: The 'perfection' suggests Plato, and the 'law' suggests Kant. The idea that something is 'absolutely desirable' is, I suspect, aimed at the utilitarians, who don't care what is desired. I'm no idealist, but have some sympathy with this idea. |
23032 | What is distinctive of human life is the desire for self-improvement [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
Full Idea: All that is distinctively human in the life of man springs not from the desire to possess this or that object, and so far to realise a better, but to be something more and better than he is. | |
From: report of T.H. Green (works [1875]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State II | |
A reaction: An example of Victorian optimism, I think. I'm guessing that people who are not motivated by this impulse are not behaving in a way that is 'distinctively human'. That said, this is an interesting aspect of human nature. |
23033 | Hedonism offers no satisfaction, because what we desire is self-betterment [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
Full Idea: Hedonism failed because it offered as an end of human aspiration an object in which the human spirit, pledged by its own nature to self-betterment, …could never find satisfaction. | |
From: report of T.H. Green (works [1875]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State II | |
A reaction: It is always both sad and amusing to see that 150 years ago someone wrote of a doctrine that is still with us that it has 'failed'. Nowadays they try to say the same of physicalism. His objection rests on optimism about humanity. |
23046 | States only have full authority if they heed the claims of human fellowship [Green,TH] |
Full Idea: The claim of the state is only absolutely paramount on the supposition that in its commands and prohibitions it takes account of all the claims that arise out of human fellowship. | |
From: T.H. Green (Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation [1882], §146), quoted by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State III | |
A reaction: He rejects the idea of the general will in ordinary political activity, so it is not clear how this condition could ever be met in practice. Hideous governments just pay lip service to 'human fellowship'. How could you tell whether they believe it? |
23045 | Politics is compromises, which seem supported by a social contract, but express the will of no one [Green,TH] |
Full Idea: Where laws and institutions are apparently the work of deliberate volition, they are in reality the result of a compromise, which while by a kind of social contract it has the acquiescence of all, expresses the will of none. | |
From: T.H. Green (works [1875]), quoted by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State III | |
A reaction: Politicians who claim to be enacting the 'will of the people' (e.g. when they won a referendum 52-48) are simply lying. Committees usually end up enacting one person's will, but often without realising what has happened. |
23050 | The ideal is a society in which all citizens are ladies and gentlemen [Green,TH] |
Full Idea: With all seriousness and reverence we may hope and pray for a condition of English society in which all honest citizens will recognise themselves and be recognised by each other as gentlemen. | |
From: T.H. Green (works [1875]), quoted by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State IV | |
A reaction: Call me old fashioned but, as long as we expand this to include ladies, I like this thought. Chaucer's knight (in his Prologue) should be our national role model. The true gentleman is an Aristotelian ideal. |
23052 | Enfranchisement is an end in itself; it makes a person moral, and gives a basis for respect [Green,TH] |
Full Idea: Enfranchisement of the people is an end in itself. …Only citizenship makes the moral man; only citizenship gives that respect which is the true basis of the respect for others. | |
From: T.H. Green (works [1875], iii:436), quoted by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State IV | |
A reaction: Should people respect their betters? If so, that is a sort of deferential respect which is different from the mutual respect between equals. That said, I wholly approve of this idea. |
23036 | The good is identified by the capacities of its participants [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
Full Idea: The modern idea of the good has developed in respect of the range of persons who have the capacity and therefore the right to participate in this good. | |
From: report of T.H. Green (works [1875]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State II | |
A reaction: Green is a notable Victorian liberal, starting from an idealist metaphysics. This is an intriguing view of liberal values. The concept of the good should be what suits persons with full capacity. Having the capacity bestows the right of access to it. Hm. |
23039 | A true state is only unified and stabilised by acknowledging individuality [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
Full Idea: In so far as society commits itself to the principle of individuality of its citizens does it realise the unity and stability that constitute it a true 'State'. | |
From: report of T.H. Green (works [1875]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State II | |
A reaction: This asserts the liberal vision of a state, rather than asserting a fact. A state consistently mostly of slaves still seems to be a state, and may achieve a lot. |
23037 | People are improved by egalitarian institutions and habits [Green,TH] |
Full Idea: Man has bettered himself through institutions and habits which tend to make the welfare of all the welfare of each. | |
From: T.H. Green (Prolegomena to Ethics [1882], p.180), quoted by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State II | |
A reaction: I like this a lot. We underestimate how the best social values are promoted by the existence of enlightened institutions, rather than by preaching and teaching. Schools, law courts and churche embody their values. |
23051 | Equality also implies liberty, because equality must be of opportunity as well as possessions [Green,TH] |
Full Idea: Liberty was essential, not only as a means to equality, but as part of it. …because the opportunity which was to be equalised was not merely to have and to be happy, but to do and to realise. It was 'the right of man to make the best of himself'. | |
From: T.H. Green (Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation [1882]), quoted by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State IV | |
A reaction: This nicely identifies the core idea of civilised liberalism (as opposed to the crazy self-seeking kind). I think 'give people the right to make the best of themselves' makes a good slogan, because it implies ensuring that they have the means. |
23043 | All talk of the progress of a nation must reduce to the progress of its individual members [Green,TH] |
Full Idea: Our ultimate standard of worth is an ideal of personal worth. All other values are relative to personal values. To speak of any progress of a nation or society or mankind except as relative to some greater worth of persons is to use words without meaning. | |
From: T.H. Green (Prolegomena to Ethics [1882], p.193), quoted by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State II | |
A reaction: Note that, pre-verificationism, a Victorian talks of plausible words actually being meaningless. This is a good statement of the core doctrine of liberalism. |
23038 | People only develop their personality through co-operation with the social whole [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
Full Idea: In so far as the individual commits himself to the principle of co-operation in a social whole does he realise his end as individual personality. | |
From: report of T.H. Green (works [1875]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State II | |
A reaction: This makes for a very communitarian type of liberalism. The question is whether we create insitutions which suck our free citizens into a communal way of life, or whether that is a matter of their own initiative. |
23028 | The highest political efforts express our deeper social spirit [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
Full Idea: Political effort in all its highest forms is the expression of a belief in the reality of the social spirit as the deeper element in the individual. | |
From: report of T.H. Green (Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation [1882]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State I | |
A reaction: Although Green is rather literally spiritual, if we express it as a central aspect of human nature, this idea strikes me as correct. Writing in 2021, I am totally bewildered by the entire absence of any 'higher' forms of political expression. |
23054 | Communism is wrong because it restricts the freedom of individuals to contribute to the community [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
Full Idea: Green condemned pure communism, not in the name of any abstract rights of the individual, but of the right of the community itself to the best that individuals can contribute through the free and spontaneous exercise of their powers of self-expression. | |
From: report of T.H. Green (Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation [1882]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State IV | |
A reaction: Interesting. In a very authoritarian communist state it does seem that citizens are less able to contribute to the general good. But extreme liberty seems also to undermine the general good. Hm. |
23047 | Original common ownership is securing private property, not denying it [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
Full Idea: Common ownership in early societies is not the denial of a man's private property in the products of his own labour, but the only way under the circumstances of securing it. | |
From: report of T.H. Green (Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation [1882], §218) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State III | |
A reaction: This is announced with some confidence, but it is very speculative. I think there is some truth in Locke's thought that putting work into a creation creates natural ownership. But who owns the raw materials? Why is work valued highly? |
23042 | National spirit only exists in the individuals who embody it [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
Full Idea: A national spirit cannot exist apart from the individuals who embody it. | |
From: report of T.H. Green (Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation [1882]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State II | |
A reaction: We see this in football supporters. They are thrilled by the glory of a great victory, but the reality is just the thrill of the players, and the exuberance in each supporter's mind. There is no further entity called the 'glory'. Green was a liberal. |
23048 | The ground of property ownership is not force but the power to use it for social ends [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
Full Idea: It is not the power of forcible tenure but the power of utilisation for social ends that is the ground of the permanent recognition that constitutes a right to property. | |
From: report of T.H. Green (Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation [1882]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State III | |
A reaction: Tell that to the aristocratic owners of British grouse moors! This just seems to be wishful thinking. Does that mean that I have no right to property if my ends are not 'social'? |
23049 | Property is needed by all citizens, to empower them to achieve social goods [Green,TH] |
Full Idea: The rationale of property is that every one should be secured by society in the power of getting and keeping the means of realising a will which in possibility is a will directed to social good. | |
From: T.H. Green (Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation [1882], §220), quoted by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State III | |
A reaction: An interesting argument. If you want free citizens in a liberal society to be capable of achieving social good, you must allow them the right to acquire the means of doing so. |
23040 | If something develops, its true nature is embodied in its end [Green,TH] |
Full Idea: To anyone who understands a process of development, the result being developed is the reality; and it is its ability to become this that the subject undergoing development has its true nature. | |
From: T.H. Green (works [1875], iii: 224), quoted by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State II | |
A reaction: Although this contains the dubious Hegelian idea that development tends towards some 'end', presented as fixed and final, it still seems important that anything accepted as a 'development' is the expression of some natural potential. |
15693 | One sample of gold is enough, but one tree doesn't give the height of trees [Gelman] |
Full Idea: We can confidently determine the chemical composition of gold from just a single sample, but we cannot determine the height of trees from just a single tree. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 06 'The role') | |
A reaction: The tricky word here is 'confidently'. If you meet one Latvian who is nice, do you assume they are all nice? At what point do you decide gold etc. really are natural kinds, where one sample tells all? Evolution of species... |
15701 | Nouns seem to invoke stable kinds more than predicates do [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Children judged personal characteristics as more stable when they were referred to by a noun ('She is a carrot eater') than by a verbal predicate ('She eats carrots whenever she can') | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 08 'Naming') | |
A reaction: This fits with my feeling that 'labels' are the basis of how the mind works. The noun invokes a genuine category of thing, where a predicate attaches to some preselected category ('she'). Gelman says names encourage inductions. |
15705 | Essentialism encourages us to think about the world scientifically [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Essentialism encourages a 'scientific' mindset in thinking about the natural world, a belief that intensive study of a natural domain will yield ever more underlying properties. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 11 'Intro') | |
A reaction: Maybe scientists must be committed to essences, the way mathematicians must be committed to numbers? This idea spendidly opposes the doubts expressed by Popper. |
15702 | Essentialism doesn't mean we know the essences [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Essentialism does not entail that people know what the essence is. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 09 'Theory') | |
A reaction: This is a fundamental and (I would say) fairly obvious point, but it needs to be made to the more passionate opponents of essentialism. |
15704 | Essentialism starts from richly structured categories, leading to a search for underlying properties [Gelman] |
Full Idea: If my speculations are correct, then essentialism starts out strictly as a belief that many categories are richly structured kinds, then additionally becomes a search for underlying inherent properties. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 10 'Figuring') | |
A reaction: This is her summary of extensive essentialist research among children. She favours the priority of kinds and categories. We actually change taxonomies on the basis of revisions in our accounts of essence. Science negotiates. |
15706 | A major objection to real essences is the essentialising of social categories like race, caste and occupation [Gelman] |
Full Idea: One major argument against the view that essences are real is the rampant essentializing of categories that are socially constructed (such as race, caste and occupation). | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 11 'Is essentialism') | |
A reaction: You can't argue with that. It raises the question of whether the approach of scientific essentialism has any value in the social, rather than physical, sciences. We jokingly essentialise groups of people such as referees or Oxonians. |
23031 | God is the ideal end of the mature mind's final development [Green,TH] |
Full Idea: God is a subject which is eternally all that the self-conscious subject as developed in time has the possibility of becoming. | |
From: T.H. Green (works [1875]), quoted by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State I | |
A reaction: [Ethics p.197] Reminiscent of Peirce's account of truth, as the ideal end of enquiry. If God is a human ideal, we either limit God, or exaggerate our powers of idealisation. |
23041 | God is the realisation of the possibilities of each man's self [Green,TH] |
Full Idea: God is identical with the self of every man in the sense of being the realisation of its determinate possibilities.…In being conscious of himself man is conscious of God and thus knows that God is, but only in so far as he knows what he himself really is. | |
From: T.H. Green (works [1875], iii:226-7), quoted by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State II | |
A reaction: Does this, by the transitivity of identity, imply the identity of all individual men? Do we all contain identical possibilities, which converge on a unified concept of God? I always take the monotheistic God to far exceed mere human possibilities. |