31 ideas
15924 | Predicative definitions are acceptable in mathematics if they distinguish objects, rather than creating them? [Zermelo, by Lavine] |
Full Idea: On Zermelo's view, predicative definitions are not only indispensable to mathematics, but they are unobjectionable since they do not create the objects they define, but merely distinguish them from other objects. | |
From: report of Ernst Zermelo (Investigations in the Foundations of Set Theory I [1908]) by Shaughan Lavine - Understanding the Infinite V.1 | |
A reaction: This seems to have an underlying platonism, that there are hitherto undefined 'objects' lying around awaiting the honour of being defined. Hm. |
8250 | So-called 'free logic' operates without existence assumptions [Meinong, by George/Van Evra] |
Full Idea: Meinong has recently been credited with inspiring 'free logic': a logic without existence assumptions. | |
From: report of Alexius Meinong (The Theory of Objects [1904]) by George / Van Evra - The Rise of Modern Logic 8 | |
A reaction: This would appear to be a bold escape from the quandries concerning the existential implications of quantifiers. I immediately find it very appealing. It seems to spell disaster for the Quinean program of deducing ontology from language. |
17608 | We take set theory as given, and retain everything valuable, while avoiding contradictions [Zermelo] |
Full Idea: Starting from set theory as it is historically given ...we must, on the one hand, restrict these principles sufficiently to exclude as contradiction and, on the other, take them sufficiently wide to retain all that is valuable in this theory. | |
From: Ernst Zermelo (Investigations in the Foundations of Set Theory I [1908], Intro) | |
A reaction: Maddy calls this the one-step-back-from-disaster rule of thumb. Zermelo explicitly mentions the 'Russell antinomy' that blocked Frege's approach to sets. |
17607 | Set theory investigates number, order and function, showing logical foundations for mathematics [Zermelo] |
Full Idea: Set theory is that branch whose task is to investigate mathematically the fundamental notions 'number', 'order', and 'function', taking them in their pristine, simple form, and to develop thereby the logical foundations of all of arithmetic and analysis. | |
From: Ernst Zermelo (Investigations in the Foundations of Set Theory I [1908], Intro) | |
A reaction: At this point Zermelo seems to be a logicist. Right from the start set theory was meant to be foundational to mathematics, and not just a study of the logic of collections. |
10870 | ZFC: Existence, Extension, Specification, Pairing, Unions, Powers, Infinity, Choice [Zermelo, by Clegg] |
Full Idea: Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms: Existence (at least one set); Extension (same elements, same set); Specification (a condition creates a new set); Pairing (two sets make a set); Unions; Powers (all subsets make a set); Infinity (set of successors); Choice | |
From: report of Ernst Zermelo (Investigations in the Foundations of Set Theory I [1908]) by Brian Clegg - Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable Ch.15 |
13012 | Zermelo published his axioms in 1908, to secure a controversial proof [Zermelo, by Maddy] |
Full Idea: Zermelo proposed his listed of assumptions (including the controversial Axiom of Choice) in 1908, in order to secure his controversial proof of Cantor's claim that ' we can always bring any well-defined set into the form of a well-ordered set'. | |
From: report of Ernst Zermelo (Investigations in the Foundations of Set Theory I [1908]) by Penelope Maddy - Believing the Axioms I §1 | |
A reaction: This is interesting because it sometimes looks as if axiom systems are just a way of tidying things up. Presumably it is essential to get people to accept the axioms in their own right, the 'old-fashioned' approach that they be self-evident. |
17609 | Set theory can be reduced to a few definitions and seven independent axioms [Zermelo] |
Full Idea: I intend to show how the entire theory created by Cantor and Dedekind can be reduced to a few definitions and seven principles, or axioms, which appear to be mutually independent. | |
From: Ernst Zermelo (Investigations in the Foundations of Set Theory I [1908], Intro) | |
A reaction: The number of axioms crept up to nine or ten in subsequent years. The point of axioms is maximum reduction and independence from one another. He says nothing about self-evidence (though Boolos claimed a degree of that). |
9565 | Zermelo made 'set' and 'member' undefined axioms [Zermelo, by Chihara] |
Full Idea: The terms 'set' and 'is a member of' are primitives of Zermelo's 1908 axiomatization of set theory. They are not given model-theoretic analyses or definitions. | |
From: report of Ernst Zermelo (works [1920]) by Charles Chihara - A Structural Account of Mathematics 7.5 | |
A reaction: This looks like good practice if you want to work with sets, but not so hot if you are interested in metaphysics. |
3339 | For Zermelo's set theory the empty set is zero and the successor of each number is its unit set [Zermelo, by Blackburn] |
Full Idea: For Zermelo's set theory the empty set is zero and the successor of each number is its unit set. | |
From: report of Ernst Zermelo (works [1920]) by Simon Blackburn - Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy p.280 |
17832 | Zermelo showed that the ZF axioms in 1930 were non-categorical [Zermelo, by Hallett,M] |
Full Idea: Zermelo's paper sets out to show that the standard set-theoretic axioms (what he calls the 'constitutive axioms', thus the ZF axioms minus the axiom of infinity) have an unending sequence of different models, thus that they are non-categorical. | |
From: report of Ernst Zermelo (On boundary numbers and domains of sets [1930]) by Michael Hallett - Introduction to Zermelo's 1930 paper p.1209 | |
A reaction: Hallett says later that Zermelo is working with second-order set theory. The addition of an Axiom of Infinity seems to have aimed at addressing the problem, and the complexities of that were pursued by Gödel. |
13017 | Zermelo introduced Pairing in 1930, and it seems fairly obvious [Zermelo, by Maddy] |
Full Idea: Zermelo's Pairing Axiom superseded (in 1930) his original 1908 Axiom of Elementary Sets. Like Union, its only justification seems to rest on 'limitations of size' and on the 'iterative conception'. | |
From: report of Ernst Zermelo (Investigations in the Foundations of Set Theory I [1908]) by Penelope Maddy - Believing the Axioms I §1.3 | |
A reaction: Maddy says of this and Union, that they seem fairly obvious, but that their justification is of prime importance, if we are to understand what the axioms should be. |
13028 | Replacement was added when some advanced theorems seemed to need it [Zermelo, by Maddy] |
Full Idea: Zermelo included Replacement in 1930, after it was noticed that the sequence of power sets was needed, and Replacement gave the ordinal form of the well-ordering theorem, and justification for transfinite recursion. | |
From: report of Ernst Zermelo (On boundary numbers and domains of sets [1930]) by Penelope Maddy - Believing the Axioms I §1.8 | |
A reaction: Maddy says that this axiom suits the 'limitation of size' theorists very well, but is not so good for the 'iterative conception'. |
13015 | Zermelo used Foundation to block paradox, but then decided that only Separation was needed [Zermelo, by Maddy] |
Full Idea: Zermelo used a weak form of the Axiom of Foundation to block Russell's paradox in 1906, but in 1908 felt that the form of his Separation Axiom was enough by itself, and left the earlier axiom off his published list. | |
From: report of Ernst Zermelo (Investigations in the Foundations of Set Theory I [1908]) by Penelope Maddy - Believing the Axioms I §1.2 | |
A reaction: Foundation turns out to be fairly controversial. Barwise actually proposes Anti-Foundation as an axiom. Foundation seems to be the rock upon which the iterative view of sets is built. Foundation blocks infinite descending chains of sets, and circularity. |
13020 | The Axiom of Separation requires set generation up to one step back from contradiction [Zermelo, by Maddy] |
Full Idea: The most characteristic Zermelo axiom is Separation, guided by a new rule of thumb: 'one step back from disaster' - principles of set generation should be as strong as possible short of contradiction. | |
From: report of Ernst Zermelo (Investigations in the Foundations of Set Theory I [1908]) by Penelope Maddy - Believing the Axioms I §1.4 | |
A reaction: Why is there an underlying assumption that we must have as many sets as possible? We are then tempted to abolish axioms like Foundation, so that we can have even more sets! |
13486 | Not every predicate has an extension, but Separation picks the members that satisfy a predicate [Zermelo, by Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: Zermelo assumes that not every predicate has an extension but rather that given a set we may separate out from it those of its members satisfying the predicate. This is called 'separation' (Aussonderung). | |
From: report of Ernst Zermelo (Investigations in the Foundations of Set Theory I [1908]) by William D. Hart - The Evolution of Logic 3 |
17626 | The antinomy of endless advance and of completion is resolved in well-ordered transfinite numbers [Zermelo] |
Full Idea: Two opposite tendencies of thought, the idea of creative advance and of collection and completion (underlying the Kantian 'antinomies') find their symbolic representation and their symbolic reconciliation in the transfinite numbers based on well-ordering. | |
From: Ernst Zermelo (On boundary numbers and domains of sets [1930], §5) | |
A reaction: [a bit compressed] It is this sort of idea, from one of the greatest set-theorists, that leads philosophers to think that the philosophy of mathematics may offer solutions to metaphysical problems. As an outsider, I am sceptical. |
13487 | In ZF, the Burali-Forti Paradox proves that there is no set of all ordinals [Zermelo, by Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: In Zermelo's set theory, the Burali-Forti Paradox becomes a proof that there is no set of all ordinals (so 'is an ordinal' has no extension). | |
From: report of Ernst Zermelo (Investigations in the Foundations of Set Theory I [1908]) by William D. Hart - The Evolution of Logic 3 |
15897 | Zermelo realised that Choice would facilitate the sort of 'counting' Cantor needed [Zermelo, by Lavine] |
Full Idea: Zermelo realised that the Axiom of Choice (based on arbitrary functions) could be used to 'count', in the Cantorian sense, those collections that had given Cantor so much trouble, which restored a certain unity to set theory. | |
From: report of Ernst Zermelo (Proof that every set can be well-ordered [1904]) by Shaughan Lavine - Understanding the Infinite I |
18178 | For Zermelo the successor of n is {n} (rather than n U {n}) [Zermelo, by Maddy] |
Full Idea: For Zermelo the successor of n is {n} (rather than Von Neumann's successor, which is n U {n}). | |
From: report of Ernst Zermelo (Investigations in the Foundations of Set Theory I [1908]) by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics I.2 n8 | |
A reaction: I could ask some naive questions about the comparison of these two, but I am too shy about revealing my ignorance. |
13027 | Zermelo believed, and Von Neumann seemed to confirm, that numbers are sets [Zermelo, by Maddy] |
Full Idea: Zermelo was a reductionist, and believed that theorems purportedly about numbers (cardinal or ordinal) are really about sets, and since Von Neumann's definitions of ordinals and cardinals as sets, this has become common doctrine. | |
From: report of Ernst Zermelo (Investigations in the Foundations of Set Theory I [1908]) by Penelope Maddy - Believing the Axioms I §1.8 | |
A reaction: Frege has a more sophisticated take on this approach. It may just be an updating of the Greek idea that arithmetic is about treating many things as a unit. A set bestows an identity on a group, and that is all that is needed. |
9627 | Different versions of set theory result in different underlying structures for numbers [Zermelo, by Brown,JR] |
Full Idea: In Zermelo's set-theoretic definition of number, 2 is a member of 3, but not a member of 4; in Von Neumann's definition every number is a member of every larger number. This means they have two different structures. | |
From: report of Ernst Zermelo (Investigations in the Foundations of Set Theory I [1908]) by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics Ch. 4 | |
A reaction: This refers back to the dilemma highlighted by Benacerraf, which was supposed to be the motivation for structuralism. My intuition says that the best answer is that they are both wrong. In a pattern, the nodes aren't 'members' of one another. |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
Full Idea: It seems unavoidable that the facts about logically necessary relations between levels of facts are themselves logically distinct further facts, irreducible to the microphysical facts. | |
From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C) | |
A reaction: I'm beginning to think that rejecting every theory of reality that is proposed by carefully exposing some infinite regress hidden in it is a rather lazy way to do philosophy. Almost as bad as rejecting anything if it can't be defined. |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
Full Idea: Logical supervenience, restricted to individuals, seems to imply strong reduction. It is said that where the B-facts logically supervene on the A-facts, the B-facts simply re-describe what the A-facts describe, and the B-facts come along 'for free'. | |
From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C) | |
A reaction: This seems to be taking 'logically' to mean 'analytically'. Presumably an entailment is logically supervenient on its premisses, and may therefore be very revealing, even if some people think such things are analytic. |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
Full Idea: The root intuition behind nonreductive materialism is that reality is composed of ontologically distinct layers or levels. …The upper levels depend on the physical without reducing to it. | |
From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], B) | |
A reaction: A nice clear statement of a view which I take to be false. This relationship is the sort of thing that drives people fishing for an account of it to use the word 'supervenience', which just says two things seem to hang out together. Fluffy materialism. |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
Full Idea: Jessica Wilson (1999) says what makes physicalist accounts different from emergentism etc. is that each individual causal power associated with a supervenient property is numerically identical with a causal power associated with its base property. | |
From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], n 11) | |
A reaction: Hence the key thought in so-called (serious, rather than self-evident) 'emergentism' is so-called 'downward causation', which I take to be an idle daydream. |
8719 | There can be impossible and contradictory objects, if they can have properties [Meinong, by Friend] |
Full Idea: Meinong (and Priest) leave room for impossible objects (like a mountain made entirely of gold), and even contradictory objects (such as a round square). This would have a property, of 'being a contradictory object'. | |
From: report of Alexius Meinong (The Theory of Objects [1904]) by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 6.8 | |
A reaction: This view is only possible with a rather lax view of properties. Personally I don't take 'being a pencil' to be a property of a pencil. It might be safer to just say that 'round squares' are possible linguistic subjects of predication. |
8971 | There are objects of which it is true that there are no such objects [Meinong] |
Full Idea: There are objects of which it is true that there are no such objects. | |
From: Alexius Meinong (The Theory of Objects [1904]), quoted by Peter van Inwagen - Existence,Ontological Commitment and Fictions p.131 | |
A reaction: Van Inwagen say this idea is 'infamous', but Meinong is undergoing a revival, and commitment to non-existent objects may be the best explanation of some ways of talking. |
8718 | Meinong says an object need not exist, but must only have properties [Meinong, by Friend] |
Full Idea: Meinong distinguished between 'existing objects' and 'subsisting objects', and being an object does not imply existence, but only 'having properties'. | |
From: report of Alexius Meinong (The Theory of Objects [1904]) by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 6.8 | |
A reaction: Meinong is treated as a joke (thanks to Russell), but this is good. "Father Christmas does not exist, but he has a red coat". He'd better have some sort of existy aspect if he is going to have a property. So he's 'an object'. 'Insubstantial'? |
7756 | Meinong said all objects of thought (even self-contradictions) have some sort of being [Meinong, by Lycan] |
Full Idea: Meinong insisted (à la Anselm) that any possible object of thought - even a self-contradictory one - has being of a sort even though only a few such things are so lucky as to exist in reality as well. | |
From: report of Alexius Meinong (The Theory of Objects [1904]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language Ch.1 | |
A reaction: ['This idea gave Russell fits' says Lycan]. In the English-speaking world this is virtually the only idea for which Meinong is remembered. Russell (Idea 5409) was happy for some things to merely 'subsist' as well as others which could 'exist'. |
15781 | The objects of knowledge are far more numerous than objects which exist [Meinong] |
Full Idea: The totality of what exists, including what has existed and what will exist, is infinitely small in comparison with the totality of Objects of knowledge. | |
From: Alexius Meinong (The Theory of Objects [1904]), quoted by William Lycan - The Trouble with Possible Worlds 01 | |
A reaction: This is rather profound, but the word 'object' doesn't help. I would say 'What we know concerns far more than what merely exists'. |
17613 | We should judge principles by the science, not science by some fixed principles [Zermelo] |
Full Idea: Principles must be judged from the point of view of science, and not science from the point of view of principles fixed once and for all. Geometry existed before Euclid's 'Elements', just as arithmetic and set theory did before Peano's 'Formulaire'. | |
From: Ernst Zermelo (New Proof of Possibility of Well-Ordering [1908], §2a) | |
A reaction: This shows why the axiomatisation of set theory is an ongoing and much-debated activity. |