9 ideas
| 10196 | The Axiom of Choice needs a criterion of choice [Black] |
| Full Idea: Some mathematicians seem to think that talk of an Axiom of Choice allows them to choose a single member of a collection when there is no criterion of choice. | |
| From: Max Black (The Identity of Indiscernibles [1952], p.68) |
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| Full Idea: It seems unavoidable that the facts about logically necessary relations between levels of facts are themselves logically distinct further facts, irreducible to the microphysical facts. | |
| From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C) | |
| A reaction: I'm beginning to think that rejecting every theory of reality that is proposed by carefully exposing some infinite regress hidden in it is a rather lazy way to do philosophy. Almost as bad as rejecting anything if it can't be defined. |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| Full Idea: Logical supervenience, restricted to individuals, seems to imply strong reduction. It is said that where the B-facts logically supervene on the A-facts, the B-facts simply re-describe what the A-facts describe, and the B-facts come along 'for free'. | |
| From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be taking 'logically' to mean 'analytically'. Presumably an entailment is logically supervenient on its premisses, and may therefore be very revealing, even if some people think such things are analytic. |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| Full Idea: The root intuition behind nonreductive materialism is that reality is composed of ontologically distinct layers or levels. …The upper levels depend on the physical without reducing to it. | |
| From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], B) | |
| A reaction: A nice clear statement of a view which I take to be false. This relationship is the sort of thing that drives people fishing for an account of it to use the word 'supervenience', which just says two things seem to hang out together. Fluffy materialism. |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| Full Idea: Jessica Wilson (1999) says what makes physicalist accounts different from emergentism etc. is that each individual causal power associated with a supervenient property is numerically identical with a causal power associated with its base property. | |
| From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], n 11) | |
| A reaction: Hence the key thought in so-called (serious, rather than self-evident) 'emergentism' is so-called 'downward causation', which I take to be an idle daydream. |
| 10194 | Two things can only be distinguished by a distinct property or a distinct relation [Black] |
| Full Idea: The only way we can discover that two things exist is by finding out that one has a quality not possessed by the other, or else that one has a relational characteristic that the other hasn't. | |
| From: Max Black (The Identity of Indiscernibles [1952], p.67) | |
| A reaction: At least this doesn't conflate relations with properties. Note that this idea is clearly epistemological, and in no way rules out the separateness of two objects which none of us can ever discern. Maybe the Earth has two Suns, which imperceptibly swap. |
| 10193 | The 'property' of self-identity is uselessly tautological [Black] |
| Full Idea: Saying that 'a has the property of being identical with a' is a roundabout way of saying nothing - a useless tautology - and means not more than 'a is a' | |
| From: Max Black (The Identity of Indiscernibles [1952], p.66) | |
| A reaction: This matter resembles the problem of the number zero, and the empty set, which seem to be crucial entities for logicians, but of no interest to a common sense view of the world. So much the worse for logic, I am inclined to say. |
| 10195 | If the universe just held two indiscernibles spheres, that refutes the Identity of Indiscernibles [Black] |
| Full Idea: Isn't it logically possible that the universe should have contained nothing but two exactly similar spheres? ...So two things would have all their properties in common, and this would refute the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles. | |
| From: Max Black (The Identity of Indiscernibles [1952], p.67) | |
| A reaction: [Black is the originator of this famous example] It also appears to be naturally possible. An observer at an instant of viewing will discern a relational difference relative to themselves. Most people take Black's objection to be decisive. |
| 19035 | General Relativity allows substantivalism about space-time - that it has independent properties [Hoefer] |
| Full Idea: General Relativity describes space-time in a way that allows it to exist with determinate properties not reducible to the properties and relations of its material contents. Hence nearly all physicists and philosophers writing on GR are substantivalists. | |
| From: Carl Hoefer (The Metaphysics of Space-Time Substantivalism [1996], p.5), quoted by Barbara Vetter - Potentiality 7.3 | |
| A reaction: I'm encouraged by this, as I instinctly favour substantivalism. Imagine removing all the objects from space-time, one by one. What happens as you approach the end of the task? Once they are removed, can they be replaced? |