22 ideas
| 20771 | Six parts: dialectic, rhetoric, ethics, politics, physics, theology [Cleanthes, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Cleanthes says there are six parts: dialectic, rhetoric, ethics, politics, physics, and theology. | |
| From: report of Cleanthes (fragments/reports [c.270 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.41 | |
| A reaction: This was a minority view, as most stoics agreed with Zeno and Chrysippus that there are three main topics. Nowadays there is little discussion of the 'parts' of philosophy, but the recent revival of meta-philosophy should encourage it. |
| 5311 | If observation goes up a level, we expect the laws of the lower level to remain in force [Wilson,EO] |
| Full Idea: When the observer shifts his attention from one level of organisation to the next, as from physics to chemistry, he expects to find obedience to all the laws of the levels below. | |
| From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: This seems to state a necessary condition of reduction, but not a sufficient one. Wilson points out that new phenomena emerge at higher levels. This principle is similar to Hume's argument against miracles. You don't easily overthrow basic laws. |
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| Full Idea: It seems unavoidable that the facts about logically necessary relations between levels of facts are themselves logically distinct further facts, irreducible to the microphysical facts. | |
| From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C) | |
| A reaction: I'm beginning to think that rejecting every theory of reality that is proposed by carefully exposing some infinite regress hidden in it is a rather lazy way to do philosophy. Almost as bad as rejecting anything if it can't be defined. |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| Full Idea: Logical supervenience, restricted to individuals, seems to imply strong reduction. It is said that where the B-facts logically supervene on the A-facts, the B-facts simply re-describe what the A-facts describe, and the B-facts come along 'for free'. | |
| From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be taking 'logically' to mean 'analytically'. Presumably an entailment is logically supervenient on its premisses, and may therefore be very revealing, even if some people think such things are analytic. |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| Full Idea: The root intuition behind nonreductive materialism is that reality is composed of ontologically distinct layers or levels. …The upper levels depend on the physical without reducing to it. | |
| From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], B) | |
| A reaction: A nice clear statement of a view which I take to be false. This relationship is the sort of thing that drives people fishing for an account of it to use the word 'supervenience', which just says two things seem to hang out together. Fluffy materialism. |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| Full Idea: Jessica Wilson (1999) says what makes physicalist accounts different from emergentism etc. is that each individual causal power associated with a supervenient property is numerically identical with a causal power associated with its base property. | |
| From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], n 11) | |
| A reaction: Hence the key thought in so-called (serious, rather than self-evident) 'emergentism' is so-called 'downward causation', which I take to be an idle daydream. |
| 5312 | A child first sees objects as distinct, and later as members of groups [Wilson,EO] |
| Full Idea: From a single-minded effort to move objects a child's activity grows into a detached reflection on the movements themselves. The objects are first perceived as distinct entities, and then as members of groups to be classified. | |
| From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: This does not, of course, prove anything about the philosophical problems of universals, but it does seem to pinpoint the stage in human development when 'universals' are perceived. The basis seems to be groups or sets, but how do we spot those? |
| 5309 | Beliefs are really enabling mechanisms for survival [Wilson,EO] |
| Full Idea: Beliefs are really enabling mechanisms for survival. | |
| From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: How does he know this proposition which he asserts so confidently? Obvious counterexamples seem to be utterly trivial beliefs, and self-destructive beliefs. What is the evolutionary value of low self-esteem? Still, you see his point. |
| 6028 | Bodies interact with other bodies, and cuts cause pain, and shame causes blushing, so the soul is a body [Cleanthes, by Nemesius] |
| Full Idea: Cleanthes says no incorporeal interacts with a body, but one body interacts with another body; the soul interacts with the body when it is sick and being cut, and the body feels shame and fear, and turns red or pale, so the soul is a body. | |
| From: report of Cleanthes (fragments/reports [c.270 BCE]) by Nemesius - De Natura Hominis 78,7 | |
| A reaction: This is precisely the interaction problem with dualism, or, as we might now say, the problem of mental causation. The standard Stoic view is that the soul is a sort of rarefied fire, which disperses at death. |
| 20831 | The soul suffers when the body hurts, creates redness from shame, and pallor from fear [Cleanthes] |
| Full Idea: Nothing incorporeal shares an experience with a body …but the soul suffers with the body when it is ill and when it is cut, and the body suffers with the soul - when the soul is ashamed the body turns red, and pale when the soul is frightened. | |
| From: Cleanthes (fragments/reports [c.270 BCE]), quoted by Nemesius - De Natura Hominis 2 | |
| A reaction: Aha - my favourite example of the corporeal nature of the mind - blushing! It is the conscious content of the thought which brings blood to the cheeks. |
| 5310 | Philosophers study the consequences of ethics instead of its origins [Wilson,EO] |
| Full Idea: Philosophers examine the precepts of ethical systems with reference to their consequences and not their origins. | |
| From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: He is interested in biological origins, but it strikes me that every moral theory has some account of the origins of morality, be it pure reason, or the love of pleasure, or human nature, or eternal ideas, or the will of God, or selfish desires. |
| 22187 | Genetic behaviours that have enhanced human success include aggression, rape and xenophobia [Wilson,EO, by Okasha] |
| Full Idea: Wilson claimed that many human behaviours, including aggression, rape, and xenophobia, had a genetic basis, and were adaptations favoured by natural selection because they enhanced the reproductive success of our ancestors. | |
| From: report of Edmund O. Wilson (Sociobiology [1975]) by Samir Okasha - Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) 7 | |
| A reaction: This led to the Sociobiology Wars, when E.O. Wilson was attacked by Richard Lewontin and Stephen Jay Gould. |
| 5313 | The rules of human decision-making converge and overlap in a 'human nature' [Wilson,EO] |
| Full Idea: The rules followed in human decision-making are tight enough to produce a broad overlap in the decisions taken by all individuals, and hence a convergence powerful enough to be labelled 'human nature'. | |
| From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: This is a nice empirical criterion for asserting the existence of human nature, and it seems right to examine decisions, rather than more thoughtless or conformist behaviour. Existentialists dream of new possibilities, but the old ways always seem best… |
| 5316 | We undermine altruism by rewarding it, but we reward it to encourage it [Wilson,EO] |
| Full Idea: By sanctifying altruism in order to reward it we make it less true, but by that means we promote its recurrence in others. | |
| From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.7) | |
| A reaction: So is my preference for not rewarding (or even noticing) altruism an anti-social tendency. The very conspicuous charity of sponsorship seems somehow inferior to the truly anonymous gift. Or super-altruism is very public, to encourage it in others? |
| 5318 | Pure hard-core altruism based on kin selection is the enemy of civilisation [Wilson,EO] |
| Full Idea: Pure hard-core altruism based on kin selection is the enemy of civilisation. | |
| From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.7) | |
| A reaction: By 'hard-core' he means suicidally self-sacrificing, rather than extensive. This seems a good thesis. It strikes me that the development of civil society is often impeded by family loyalty, such as in the case of the Mafia. |
| 5317 | The actor is most convincing who believes that his performance is real [Wilson,EO] |
| Full Idea: The actor is most convincing who believes that his performance is real. | |
| From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.7) | |
| A reaction: This is a key element of social contract theory. It shows why natural selection of truly altruistic traits might be beneficial to individuals, provided they are surrounded by possible recipricators. We trust those who are genuine and sincere. |
| 20662 | The biology of societies: kin selection, parenting, mating; status, territory, contracts [Wilson,EO] |
| Full Idea: Societies are ordered around six sociobiological principles: kin selection; parental investment; mating strategy; status; territorial expansion and defence; contractual agreement. | |
| From: Edmund O. Wilson (Consilience [1998], 19 'Intro'), quoted by Peter Watson - Convergence | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure I trust such a precise list. Personally I'm in society because I'm too frightend to drop out. So where is 'defence'? Still, I like attempts at assembling such a list. Politics needs grounding. |
| 5308 | The only human purpose is that created by our genetic history [Wilson,EO] |
| Full Idea: No species, ours included, possesses a purpose beyond the imperatives created by its genetic history. | |
| From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: This invites the question of what that purpose is perceived to be. Some people feel an imperative to play the piano all day, so presumably genetic history has created that feeling. Presumably we can also choose a purpose, even extinction. |
| 5314 | Cultural evolution is Lamarckian and fast, biological evolution is Darwinian and slow [Wilson,EO] |
| Full Idea: Cultural evolution is Lamarckian and very fast, whereas biological evolution is Darwinian and usually very slow. | |
| From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: An intriguing point, given how discredited Lamarckian evolution is. It links with the Dawkins idea of 'memes' - cultural ideas which spread very fast. Is biological evolution suddenly about to become Lamarckian, as culture influences biology? |
| 5315 | Over 99 percent of human evolution has been in the hunter-gatherer phase [Wilson,EO] |
| Full Idea: Selection pressures of hunter-gatherer existence have persisted for over 99 percent of human genetic evolution. | |
| From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: This seems a key point to bear in mind when assessing human nature. Hunter-gathering isn't just one tendency in our genetics; it more or less constitutes everything we are. |
| 5993 | The ascending scale of living creatures requires a perfect being [Cleanthes, by Tieleman] |
| Full Idea: Cleanthes tried to prove the existence of God, arguing that the ascending scale of living creatures requires there to be a perfect being. | |
| From: report of Cleanthes (fragments/reports [c.270 BCE]) by Teun L. Tieleman - Cleanthes | |
| A reaction: Not a very good argument. Even if you accept its basic claim, it is not clear what has to exist. A perfect tree? If the being transcends the physical (in order to achieve perfection), does it cease to be a 'being'? |
| 5320 | It is estimated that mankind has produced 100,000 religions [Wilson,EO] |
| Full Idea: Since the first recorded religion (in Iraq 60,000 years ago) it is estimated that mankind has produced in the order of one hundred thousand religions. | |
| From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.8) | |
| A reaction: If asked to guess the number, I would probably have said '200'! This staggering figure seems to argue both ways - it suggest a certain arbitrariness in the details of religions, but an extremely intense drive to have some sort of religious belief. |