Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Dean W. Zimmerman and Buddha (Siddhartha Gautama)

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12 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
     Full Idea: It seems unavoidable that the facts about logically necessary relations between levels of facts are themselves logically distinct further facts, irreducible to the microphysical facts.
     From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C)
     A reaction: I'm beginning to think that rejecting every theory of reality that is proposed by carefully exposing some infinite regress hidden in it is a rather lazy way to do philosophy. Almost as bad as rejecting anything if it can't be defined.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
     Full Idea: Logical supervenience, restricted to individuals, seems to imply strong reduction. It is said that where the B-facts logically supervene on the A-facts, the B-facts simply re-describe what the A-facts describe, and the B-facts come along 'for free'.
     From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C)
     A reaction: This seems to be taking 'logically' to mean 'analytically'. Presumably an entailment is logically supervenient on its premisses, and may therefore be very revealing, even if some people think such things are analytic.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
     Full Idea: The root intuition behind nonreductive materialism is that reality is composed of ontologically distinct layers or levels. …The upper levels depend on the physical without reducing to it.
     From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], B)
     A reaction: A nice clear statement of a view which I take to be false. This relationship is the sort of thing that drives people fishing for an account of it to use the word 'supervenience', which just says two things seem to hang out together. Fluffy materialism.
The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
     Full Idea: Jessica Wilson (1999) says what makes physicalist accounts different from emergentism etc. is that each individual causal power associated with a supervenient property is numerically identical with a causal power associated with its base property.
     From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], n 11)
     A reaction: Hence the key thought in so-called (serious, rather than self-evident) 'emergentism' is so-called 'downward causation', which I take to be an idle daydream.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
An immanent universal is wholly present in more than one place [Zimmerman,DW]
     Full Idea: An immanent universal will routinely be 'at some distance from itself', in the sense that it is wholly present in more than one place.
     From: Dean W. Zimmerman (Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory [1997], p.306)
     A reaction: This is the Aristotelian view, which sounds distinctly implausible in this formulation. Though I suppose redness is wholly present in a tomato, in the way that fourness is wholly present in the Horsemen of the Apocalypse. How many rednesses are there?
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
If only two indiscernible electrons exist, future differences must still be possible [Zimmerman,DW]
     Full Idea: If nothing existed except two electrons, which are indiscernible, it remains possible that differences will emerge later. Even if this universe has eternal symmetry, such differences are still logically, metaphysically, physically and causally possible.
     From: Dean W. Zimmerman (Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory [1997], p.306)
     A reaction: The question then is whether the two electrons have hidden properties that make differences possible. Zimmerman assumes that 'laws' of an indeterministic kind will do the job. I doubt that. Can differences be discerned after the event?
Discernible differences at different times may just be in counterparts [Zimmerman,DW]
     Full Idea: Possible differences which may later become discernible could be treated as differences in a counterpart, which is similar to, but not identical with, the original object.
     From: Dean W. Zimmerman (Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory [1997], p.307)
     A reaction: [compressed] This is a reply to Idea 10198, which implies that two things could never be indiscernible over time, because of their different possibilities. One must then decide issues about rigid designation and counterparts.
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
Individuals don't exist, but are conventional names for sets of elements [Buddha]
     Full Idea: There exists no individual, it is only a conventional name given to a set of elements.
     From: Buddha (Siddhartha Gautama) (reports [c.540 BCE]), quoted by Derek Parfit - The Unimportance of Identity p.295
     A reaction: I take this to arise from an excessively spiritual concept of a human being, which faces Descartes' problem of how to individuate non-physical minds, when they have no clear boundaries. Combine dualism with a bundle theory, and you have Buddhism.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
Neither 'moving spotlight' nor 'growing block' views explain why we care what is present or past [Zimmerman,DW]
     Full Idea: Neither the 'moving spotlight' nor the 'growing block' view of A-theory time can explain why we care so much about whether things (such as a headache) are present or past.
     From: Dean W. Zimmerman (The Privileged Present: A-Theory [2008], 3)
     A reaction: He goes on the defend Presentism as the best version of the A-series view. You can't deny that the past is more of a 'truthmaker' than the future, so it seems to have a firmer ontological status. Deeply weird.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
A-theorists, unlike B-theorists, believe some sort of objective distinction between past, present and future [Zimmerman,DW]
     Full Idea: To be an A-theorist is to believe in some sort of objective distinction between what is present and past and future. ..To be a B-theorist is to deny the objectivity of our talk about past, present and future.
     From: Dean W. Zimmerman (The Privileged Present: A-Theory [2008], 2)
     A reaction: The A/B distinction originates with McTaggart. All my intuitions side with the A-theory, certainly to the extent that the present seems to be objectively privileged in some way (despite special relativity).
29. Religion / C. Spiritual Disciplines / 3. Buddhism
The Buddha believed the gods would eventually disappear, and Nirvana was much higher [Buddha, by Armstrong,K]
     Full Idea: The Buddha believed implicitly in the gods because they were part of his cultural baggage, but they were involved in the cycle of rebirth, and would eventually disappear; the ultimate reality of Nirvana was higher than the gods.
     From: report of Buddha (Siddhartha Gautama) (reports [c.540 BCE]) by Karen Armstrong - A History of God Ch.1
     A reaction: We might connect this with Plato's Euthyphro question (Ideas 336 and 337), and the relationship between piety and morality on the one hand, and the gods on the other.
Life is suffering, from which only compassion, gentleness, truth and sobriety can save us [Buddha]
     Full Idea: Buddha taught that the only release from 'dukkha' (the meaningless flux of suffering which is human life) is a life of compassion for all living beings, speaking and behaving gently, kindly and accurately, and refraining from all intoxicants.
     From: Buddha (Siddhartha Gautama) (reports [c.540 BCE], Ch.1), quoted by Karen Armstrong - A History of God Ch.1
     A reaction: Christians are inclined to give the impression that Jesus invented the idea of being nice, but it ain't so. The obvious thought is that the Buddha seems to be focusing on the individual, but this is actually a formula for a better community.