70 ideas
22246 | A train of reasoning must be treated as all happening simultaneously [Recanati] |
Full Idea: For logic purposes, a train of reasoning has to be construed as synchronic. | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files in Flux [2016], 5.2) | |
A reaction: If we are looking for a gulf between logic and the real world this is a factor to be considered, along with Nietzsche's observation about necessary simplification. [ref to Kaplan 'Afterthoughts' 1989, 584-5] |
16357 | Mental files are the counterparts of singular terms [Recanati] |
Full Idea: Mental files are the mental counterparts of singular terms. | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 3.3) | |
A reaction: A thoroughly satisfactory theory. We can build up a picture of filing merging, duplication, ambiguity, error etc. Eventually neuroscience will map the whole system, and we will have cracked it. |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
Full Idea: It seems unavoidable that the facts about logically necessary relations between levels of facts are themselves logically distinct further facts, irreducible to the microphysical facts. | |
From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C) | |
A reaction: I'm beginning to think that rejecting every theory of reality that is proposed by carefully exposing some infinite regress hidden in it is a rather lazy way to do philosophy. Almost as bad as rejecting anything if it can't be defined. |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
Full Idea: Logical supervenience, restricted to individuals, seems to imply strong reduction. It is said that where the B-facts logically supervene on the A-facts, the B-facts simply re-describe what the A-facts describe, and the B-facts come along 'for free'. | |
From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C) | |
A reaction: This seems to be taking 'logically' to mean 'analytically'. Presumably an entailment is logically supervenient on its premisses, and may therefore be very revealing, even if some people think such things are analytic. |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
Full Idea: The root intuition behind nonreductive materialism is that reality is composed of ontologically distinct layers or levels. …The upper levels depend on the physical without reducing to it. | |
From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], B) | |
A reaction: A nice clear statement of a view which I take to be false. This relationship is the sort of thing that drives people fishing for an account of it to use the word 'supervenience', which just says two things seem to hang out together. Fluffy materialism. |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
Full Idea: Jessica Wilson (1999) says what makes physicalist accounts different from emergentism etc. is that each individual causal power associated with a supervenient property is numerically identical with a causal power associated with its base property. | |
From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], n 11) | |
A reaction: Hence the key thought in so-called (serious, rather than self-evident) 'emergentism' is so-called 'downward causation', which I take to be an idle daydream. |
16360 | Identity statements are informative if they link separate mental files [Recanati] |
Full Idea: An identity statement 'A=B' is informative to the extent that the terms 'A' and 'B' are associated with distinct mental files. | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 4.1) | |
A reaction: Hence the information in 'Scott is the author of 'Waverley'' is information about what is in your mind, not what is happening in Scotland. This is Recanati's solution to one of Frege's classic puzzles. 'Morning Star' and 'Evening Star' files. Nice. |
6346 | The main epistemological theories are foundationalist, coherence, probabilistic and reliabilist [Pollock/Cruz] |
Full Idea: The most familiar epistemological theories are foundation theories, coherence theories, probabilistic theories, and reliabilist theories. | |
From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], Pref) | |
A reaction: A helpful list. Reliabilism is now the dominant externalist theory. Probability theories will centre on Bayes' Theorem (Idea 2798). The authors want an internalist theory that includes perceptions as well as beliefs. I currently favour coherence. |
6351 | Most people now agree that our reasoning proceeds defeasibly, rather than deductively [Pollock/Cruz] |
Full Idea: One of the most important modern advances in epistemology was the recognition of defeasible reasons; it is now generally acknowledged that most of our reasoning proceeds defeasibly rather than deductively. | |
From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §1.2) | |
A reaction: I agree totally. This is why fallibilism is clearly a correct position in epistemology (e.g. Ideas 2736 and 2755). Deduction is not the only grounds given for certainty - there are rationalist foundations (Descartes) and empiricist foundations (Moore). |
6374 | To believe maximum truths, believe everything; to have infallible beliefs, believe nothing [Pollock/Cruz] |
Full Idea: If we want an agent to believe as many truths as possible, this could be achieved by simply believing everything; if we want an agent to have only true beliefs, this could be achieved by believing nothing. | |
From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §6.6) | |
A reaction: I like this. It highlights the pragmatic need for a middle road, in which a core set of beliefs are going to be approved of as 'knowledge', so that we can get on with life. This has to be a social matter, and needs flexibility of Fallibilism. |
6355 | Direct realism says justification is partly a function of pure perceptual states, not of beliefs [Pollock/Cruz] |
Full Idea: We defend a version of direct realism, saying that justification must be partly a function of perceptual states themselves, and not just a function of our beliefs about perceptual states. | |
From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §1.5.3) | |
A reaction: Judgement suggests that perceptual states give good justification about primary qualities (like mass or shape), but not of secondary qualities (like smell or colour). Perceptions can be downright misleading. |
16374 | There is a continuum from acquaintance to description in knowledge, depending on the link [Recanati] |
Full Idea: It is not too difficult to imagine a continuum of cases between straightforward instances of knowledge by acquaintance and straightforward instances of knowledge by description, with more or less tenuous informational links to the referent. | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 12.2) |
6359 | Phenomenalism offered conclusive perceptual knowledge, but conclusive reasons no longer seem essential [Pollock/Cruz] |
Full Idea: Phenomenalism offered the prospect of explaining perceptual knowledge within a framework that recognised only conclusive reasons; once it is acknowledged that at least induction uses nonconclusive reasons, it is no longer needed. | |
From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §2.3.3.2) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure that that is the only motivation for phenomenalism, which seemed to be attempting to get as close to 'reality' as intellectual honesty would allow. I certainly favour the modern relaxed attitude to knowledge, which needn't be 'conclusive'. |
6366 | Perception causes beliefs in us, without inference or justification [Pollock/Cruz] |
Full Idea: Perception is a causal process that inputs beliefs into our doxastic system without their being inferred from or justified on the basis of other beliefs we already have. | |
From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §3.2.3) | |
A reaction: This topic is much discussed (e.g. by MacDowell). I don't see how something is going to qualify as a 'belief' if it doesn't involve concepts and propositions. The point that we are caused to have many of our beliefs (rather than judging) seems right. |
6362 | Sense evidence is not beliefs, because they are about objective properties, not about appearances [Pollock/Cruz] |
Full Idea: We think it is a mistake to suppose that the evidence of our senses comes to us in the form of beliefs; in perception, the beliefs we form are almost invariably about the objective properties of physical objects - not about how they appear to us. | |
From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §2.5.5) | |
A reaction: The tricky word here is 'evidence'. At what point in the process of perception does something begin to count as evidence? It must at least involve concepts (and maybe even propositions) if it is going to be thought about in that way. |
6371 | Bayesian epistemology is Bayes' Theorem plus the 'simple rule' (believe P if it is probable) [Pollock/Cruz] |
Full Idea: Bayesian epistemology is based upon the 'simple rule' (believe P if it is sufficiently probable) and Bayes' Theorem. | |
From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §4.3.1) | |
A reaction: For Bayes' Theorem, see Idea 2798. There is the question of whether the proposition is subjectively or objectively probable (I believe in ghosts, so any shadow is probably a ghost). There is also the problem of objective evidence for the calculation. |
6373 | Internalism says if anything external varies, the justifiability of the belief does not vary [Pollock/Cruz] |
Full Idea: Internalist theories make justifiability of a belief a function of the internal states of the believer, in the sense that if we vary anything but his internal states the justifiability of the belief does not vary. | |
From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §5.4.3) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a nice clear definition of internalism (and, by implication, externalism). It favours externalism. I know my car is in the car park; someone takes it for a joyride, then replaces it; my good justification seems thereby weakened. |
6353 | People rarely have any basic beliefs, and never enough for good foundations [Pollock/Cruz] |
Full Idea: We argue that all foundations theories are false, for the simple reason that people rarely have any epistemological basic beliefs, and never have enough to provide a foundation for the rest of our knowledge. | |
From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §1.5.3) | |
A reaction: Once surprising things start to happen in a film, we rapidly jettison our normal basic beliefs, to be ready for surprises. However, it seems to me that quite a lot of beliefs are hard-wired into us, or inescapably arise from the use of our senses. |
6361 | Foundationalism requires self-justification, not incorrigibility [Pollock/Cruz] |
Full Idea: What foundationalism requires is self-justification, which is weaker than incorrigibility. | |
From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §2.5.3) | |
A reaction: The writers oppose foundationalism, but this remark obviously helps the theory. Bonjour votes for a fallible rationalist foundationalism, and an fallible empiricist version seems plausible (because we must check for hallucinations etc.). |
6357 | Reason cannot be an ultimate foundation, because rational justification requires prior beliefs [Pollock/Cruz] |
Full Idea: Reasoning, it seems, can only justify us in holding a belief if we are already justified in holding the beliefs from which we reason, so reasoning cannot provide an ultimate source of justification. | |
From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §2.1) | |
A reaction: This sounds slick and conclusive, but it isn't. If we accept that some truths might be 'self-evident' to reason, they could stand independently. And a large body of rational beliefs might be mutually self-supporting, as in the coherence theory of truth. |
6363 | Foundationalism is wrong, because either all beliefs are prima facie justified, or none are [Pollock/Cruz] |
Full Idea: Either no belief is prima facie justified or all beliefs are prima facie justified; …we regard this as a decisive refutation of foundationalism. | |
From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §2.5.5) | |
A reaction: The full text must he examined, but it is not at all clear to me how my belief that quantum theory is correct could be even remotely as prima facie justified as my belief that this is my hand. I don't think basic beliefs need be sharply divided off. |
6365 | Negative coherence theories do not require reasons, so have no regress problem [Pollock/Cruz] |
Full Idea: The regress argument has no apparent strength against negative coherence theories, because they do not require reasons for beliefs. | |
From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §3.2.3) | |
A reaction: A nice point. Such theories endorse Neurath's picture (Idea 6348). On the whole philosophers like positive support for their beliefs, so the rather passive picture of accepting everything unless it is undermined is not appealing. A fall-back position. |
6354 | Coherence theories fail, because they can't accommodate perception as the basis of knowledge [Pollock/Cruz] |
Full Idea: All coherence theories fail, because they are unable to accommodate perception as the basic source of our knowledge of the world. | |
From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §1.5.3) | |
A reaction: An interesting claim, which the authors attempt to justify. They say it is direct realism, because the perceptions justify, without any intervening beliefs. My immediate thought is that they might justify knowledge of primary qualities, but not secondary. |
6367 | Coherence theories isolate justification from the world [Pollock/Cruz] |
Full Idea: The Isolation Argument objects that coherence theories cut justification off from the world. | |
From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §3.2.4) | |
A reaction: I don't see this as a strong objection. Justification can be in the way beliefs cohere together, but the beliefs themselves consist of holding propositions to be true, and truth asserts a connection to the world (I say). |
6370 | Externalism comes as 'probabilism' (probability of truth) and 'reliabilism' (probability of good cognitive process) [Pollock/Cruz] |
Full Idea: There are two major kinds of externalist theory in the literature - probabilism (which expresses justification in terms of probability of the belief being true), and reliabilism (which refers to the probability of the cognitive processes being right). | |
From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §4.1) | |
A reaction: A useful clarification. Reliabilism has an obvious problem, that a process can be reliable, but only luckily correct on this occasion (a clock which has, unusually, stopped). A ghost is more probably there if I believe in ghosts. |
6358 | One belief may cause another, without being the basis for the second belief [Pollock/Cruz] |
Full Idea: If I fall flat on my back running to a class, my belief that I was late for class may cause me to have the belief that there are birds in the trees, but I do not believe the latter on the basis of the former. | |
From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §2.3.1) | |
A reaction: A nice example, which fairly conclusively demolishes any causal theory of justification. My example is believing correctly that the phone ring is from mother, because she said she would call. Maybe causation is needed somewhere in the right theory. |
6364 | We can't start our beliefs from scratch, because we wouldn't know where to start [Pollock/Cruz] |
Full Idea: We cannot forsake all of our beliefs and start over again, because then we could not know how to start. | |
From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §3.1) | |
A reaction: A point with which it is hard to disagree, but even Descartes agreed with it (Idea 3604). Presumably all your beliefs can take it in turn to be doubted, while others are held true, or you can whittle the beliefs which can't be abandoned down to a minimum. |
6352 | Enumerative induction gives a universal judgement, while statistical induction gives a proportion [Pollock/Cruz] |
Full Idea: Enumerative induction examines a sample of objects, observes they all have a property, and infers that they all have that property; statistical induction observes a proportion of the objects having the property, and infers that proportion in general. | |
From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §1.4.6) | |
A reaction: There is also induction by elimination, where it is either p or q, and observation keeps saying it isn't p. A small sample is very unreliable, but a huge sample (e.g. cigarettes and cancer) is almost certain, so where is the small/huge boundary? |
6372 | Since every tautology has a probability of 1, should we believe all tautologies? [Pollock/Cruz] |
Full Idea: It follows from the probability calculus that every tautology has probability 1; it then follows in Bayesian epistemology that we are justified in believing every tautology. | |
From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §4.3.1.5) | |
A reaction: If I say 'a bachelor is a small ant' you wouldn't believe it, but if I said 'I define a bachelor as a small ant' you would have to believe it. 'Bachelors are unmarried' men is a description of English usage, so is not really a simple tautology. |
6360 | Scientific confirmation is best viewed as inference to the best explanation [Pollock/Cruz] |
Full Idea: The confirmation of scientific theories is probably best viewed in terms of inference to the best explanation. | |
From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §2.3.3.3) | |
A reaction: A simple claim, but one with which I strongly agree. 'Inference', of course, implies that there is some fairly strict logical thinking going on, which may not be so. I suspect that dogs can move to the best explanation. It is, though, a rational process. |
18409 | Indexicals apply to singular thought, and mental files have essentially indexical features [Recanati] |
Full Idea: I defend the applicability of the indexical model to singular thought, and to mental files qua vehicles of singular thought. Mental files, I will argue, possess the essential features of indexicals. | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 05.1) | |
A reaction: I love mental files, but am now (thanks to Cappelen and Dever) deeply averse to giving great significance to indexicals. A revised account of files will be needed. |
16354 | Indexicality is closely related to singularity, exploiting our direct relations with things [Recanati] |
Full Idea: Singularity and indexicality are closely related: for indexicals systematically exploit the contextual relations in which we stand to what we talk about. | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 2.2) | |
A reaction: Recanati builds a nice case that we may only have an ontology of singular objects because we conceptualise and refer to things in a particular way. He denies the ontology, but that's the bit that interests me. |
22247 | Indexicality is not just a feature of language; examples show it also occurs in thought [Recanati] |
Full Idea: People once took indexicality to be exclusively a property of language, ....but a series of examples seemed to establish that the thought expressed by uttering an indexical sentence is itself indexical (and is thus 'essential'). | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files in Flux [2016], 6.1) | |
A reaction: Perry's example of not realising it is him leaking the sugar in a supermarket is the best known example. Was this a key moment for realising that philosophy of thought is (pace Dummett) more important than philosophy of language? |
22248 | How can we communicate indexical thoughts to people not in the right context? [Recanati] |
Full Idea: Indexical thoughts create an obvious problem with regard to communication. How can we manage to communicate such thoughts to those who are not in the right context? | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files in Flux [2016], 7.1) | |
A reaction: One answer is that you often cannot communicate them. If I write on a wall 'I am here now', that doesn't tell the next passer-by very much. But 'it's raining here' said in a telephone call works fine - if you know the location of the caller. |
16371 | Files can be confused, if two files correctly have a single name, or one file has two names [Recanati] |
Full Idea: Paderewski cases are cases in which a subject associates two distinct files with a single name. Inverse Paderewski cases are cases in which there are two names but the subject associates them with a single file. | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 10.1) | |
A reaction: In the inverse there are two people with the same name, and someone thinks they are one person (with their combined virtues and vices). E.g. Einstein the famous physicist, and Einstein the famous musicologist. What a man! |
16373 | Encylopedic files have further epistemic links, beyond the basic one [Recanati] |
Full Idea: The reference of a file is the object to which the subject stands in the relevant epistemic relation. In the case of encylopedic entries there is an arbitrary number of distinct relations. The file grows new links in an opportunistic manner. | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 11.3) | |
A reaction: I'm not convinced by Recanati's claim that encylopedic files are a distinct type. My files seem to grow these opportunistic links right from their inception. All files seem to have that feature. A file could have four links at its moment of launching. |
16375 | Singular thoughts need a mental file, and an acquaintance relation from file to object [Recanati] |
Full Idea: The mental file framework rests on two principles: that the subject cannot entertain a singular thought about an object without possessing and exercising a mental file about it, and that this requires an acquaintance relation with the object. | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 12.3) | |
A reaction: I'm puzzled by the case where I design and build a completely new object. I seem to assemble a file, and only bestow singularity on it towards the end. Or the singularity can just be a placeholder, referred to as 'something'. […see p.158] |
16377 | Expected acquaintance can create a thought-vehicle file, but without singular content [Recanati] |
Full Idea: On my view, actual acquaintance is not necessary to open a mental file; expected acquaintance will suffice; yet opening a mental file itself is not sufficient to entertain a singular thought-content. It only enables a thought-vehicle. | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 13.1) | |
A reaction: I'm not clear why I can't create a file with no expectation at all of acquaintance, as in a fictional case. Depends what 'acquaintance' means. Recanati longs for precise distinctions where they may not be available. |
16378 | An 'indexed' file marks a file which simulates the mental file of some other person [Recanati] |
Full Idea: Files function metarepresentationally if they serve to represent how other subjects think about objects in the world. ..An 'indexed' file has an index referring to the other subject whose files the indexed file stands for or simulates. | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 14.1) | |
A reaction: Presumably there is an implicit index on all files, which says in a conversation whether my interlocutor does or does not hold the same file-type as me. Recanati wants many 'types' of files, but I suspect there is just one file type. |
16387 | Reference by mental files is Millian, in emphasising acquaintance, rather than satisfaction [Recanati] |
Full Idea: The mental file account preserves the original, Millian inspiration of direct reference theories in giving pride of place to acquaintance relations and downplaying satisfaction factors. | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 17.3) | |
A reaction: I find this a very satisfying picture, in which reference links to the simple label of a file (which could be a number), and not to its contents. There are tricky cases of non-existents, fictional entities and purely possible entities to consider. |
16361 | A mental file treats all of its contents as concerning one object [Recanati] |
Full Idea: The role of a mental file is precisely to treat all the information as if it concerned one and the same object, from which it derives. | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 4.1) | |
A reaction: Recanati's book focuses entirely on singular objects, but we presumably have files for properties, generalisation, groups etc. Can they only be thought about if they are reified? Maybe. |
16358 | The reference of a file is fixed by what it relates to, not the information it contains [Recanati] |
Full Idea: What files refer to is not determined by properties which the subject takes the referent to have (information, or misinformation, in the file), but through the relations on which the files are based. | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 3.3) | |
A reaction: Maybe. 'Lot 22'. I can build up a hypothetical file by saying 'Imagine an animal which is F, G, H…', and build a reference that relates to nothing. Maybe Recanati overestimates the role of his 'epistemically rewarding' relations in file creation. |
16367 | There are transient 'demonstrative' files, habitual 'recognitional' files, cumulative 'encyclopedic' files [Recanati] |
Full Idea: A 'demonstrative' file only exists during the demonstrative relation to something; …a 'recognitional' file is based on 'familiarity' (a disposition to recognise); …an 'encylopedic' file contains all the information on something, however it is gained. | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 6.1-3) | |
A reaction: [picked as samples of his taxonomy, pp.70-73] I'm OK with this as long as he doesn't think the categories are sharply separated. I'm inclined to think of files as a single type, drifting in and out of different of modes. |
16368 | Files are hierarchical: proto-files, then first-order, then higher-order encyclopedic [Recanati] |
Full Idea: There is a hierarchy of files. Proto-files are the most basic; conceptual files are generated from them. First-order ones are more basic, as the higher-order encylopedic entries presuppose them. | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 6.3) | |
A reaction: This hierarchy might fit into a decent account of categories, if a plausible one could be found. A good prospect for exploring categories would be to start with mental file-types, and work outwards through their relations. |
16370 | A file has a 'nucleus' through its relation to the object, and a 'periphery' of links to other files [Recanati] |
Full Idea: I take a file to have a dual structure, with a 'nucleus' of the file consisting of information derived through the relevant epistemically rewarding relation, while the 'periphery' consists of information derived through linking with other files. | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 8.3) | |
A reaction: This sounds strikingly like essentialism to me, though what constitutes the essence is different from the usual explanatory basics. The link, though, is in the causal connection. If we naturally 'essentialise', that will control file-formation. |
22242 | Mental files are concepts, which are either collections or (better) containers [Recanati] |
Full Idea: Mental files are entries in the mental encyclopedia, that is, concepts. Some, following Grice, say they are information collections, but I think of them as containers. Collections are determined by their elements, but containers have independent identity. | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files in Flux [2016], Pref) | |
A reaction: [compressed] [Grice reference is 'Vacuous Names' (1969)] I agree with Recanati. The point is that you can invoke a file by a label, even when you don't know what the content is. |
22243 | The Frege case of believing a thing is both F and not-F is explained by separate mental files [Recanati] |
Full Idea: Frege's Constraint says if a subject believes an object is both F and not-F (as in 'Frege cases'), then the subject thinks of that object under distinct modes of presentation. Having distinct mental files of the object is sufficient to generate this. | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files in Flux [2016], Pref) | |
A reaction: [compressed] When you look at how many semantic puzzles (notably from Frege and Kripke) are solved by the existence of labelled mental files, the case for them is overwhelming. |
16381 | The content of thought is what is required to understand it (which involves hearers) [Recanati] |
Full Idea: As Evans emphasises, what matters when we want to individuate semantic content is what would count as a proper understanding of an utterance; but 'understanding' defines the task of the hearer. | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 16.2) | |
A reaction: [cites Evans 1982: 92, 143n, 171] I like to place (following Aristotle) understanding at the centre of all of philosophy, so this seems to me an appealing idea. It makes misunderstandings interesting. |
16365 | Mental files are individual concepts (thought constituents) [Recanati] |
Full Idea: I want mental files (properly speaking) to serve as individual concepts, i.e. thought constituents. | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 5.3) | |
A reaction: This is why the concept of mental files is so neat - it gives you a theory of reference and a theory of concepts. I love the files approach because it precisely fits my own introspective experiences. Hope I'm not odd in that way. |
16356 | There may be two types of reference in language and thought: descriptive and direct [Recanati] |
Full Idea: A widely held view, originating with Russell, says there are two types of reference (both in language and thought): descriptive reference, and direct reference. | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 3.2) | |
A reaction: I would rather say is there is just one sort of reference, and as many ways of achieving it as you care to come up with. With that view, most of the problems vanish, as far as I can see. People refer. Sentences are nothing but trouble. |
16393 | In super-direct reference, the referent serves as its own vehicle of reference [Recanati] |
Full Idea: In super-direct reference, the sort of thing Russell was after, there is no mode of presentation: the referent itself serves as its own vehicle, as it were. | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 18.2) | |
A reaction: To me this is a step too far, because reference is not some physical object like a chair; it is a mental or linguistic phenomenon. Chair's don't refer themselves; it is people who refer. |
16386 | Direct reference is strong Millian (just a tag) or weak Kaplanian (allowing descriptions as well) [Recanati] |
Full Idea: There are two notions of direct reference, the strong Millian notion (where the expression is like a 'tag' with no satisfaction mechanism), and the weaker Kaplanian notion (where reference is compatible with carrying a descriptive meaning). | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 17.3) | |
A reaction: I immediately favour the Millian view, which gives a minimal basis for reference, as just a 'peg' (Marcus) to hang things on. I don't take a Millian reference to be the object itself. The concept of a 'tag' or 'label' is key. Mental files have tags. |
16372 | Sense determines reference says same sense/same reference; new reference means new sense [Recanati] |
Full Idea: To say that sense determines reference is to say that the same sense cannot determine distinct referents - any distinction at the level of reference entails a corresponding distinction at the level of sense. | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 10.2) | |
A reaction: Does 'the sentry at the gate' change its sense when the guard is changed? Yes. 'The sentry at the gate will stop you'. 'The sentry at the gate is my cousin'. De re/de dicto reference. So changes of de re reference seem to change the sense? |
16388 | We need sense as well as reference, but in a non-descriptive form, and mental files do that [Recanati] |
Full Idea: My view inherits from Frege 'modes of presentation'. Reference is not enough, and sense is needed. …We must make room for non-descriptive modes of presentation, and these are mental files. | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 18.1) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Recanati aims to avoid the standard Kripkean criticisms of descriptivism, while being able to handle Frege's puzzles. I take Recanati's mental files theory to be the most promising approach. |
16359 | Sense is a mental file (not its contents); similar files for Cicero and Tully are two senses [Recanati] |
Full Idea: What plays the role of sense is not information in a file, but the file itself. If there are two distinct files, one for 'Cicero' and one for 'Tully', then there are two distinct (non-descriptive) senses, even if the information in both files is the same. | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 3.4) | |
A reaction: This may be the best idea in Recanati's book. A sense might be a 'way of coming at the information', rather than some set of descriptions. |
16355 | Problems with descriptivism are reference by perception, by communications and by indexicals [Recanati] |
Full Idea: Three problems with Frege's idea of descriptions in the head are: reference through perception, reference through communicative chains, and reference through indexicals. | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 3.1) | |
A reaction: In the end reference has to occur in the head, even if it is social or causal or whatever, so these are not problems that worry me. |
16348 | Descriptivism says we mentally relate to objects through their properties [Recanati] |
Full Idea: Descriptivism is the view that our mental relation to individual objects goes through properties of those objects. …This is so because our knowledge of objects is mediated by our knowledge of their properties. | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 1.1) | |
A reaction: The implication is that if you view an object as just a bundle of properties, then you are obliged to hold a descriptive theory of reference. Hence a 'singularist' theory of reference seems to need a primitive notion of an object's identity. |
16384 | Definite descriptions reveal either a predicate (attributive use) or the file it belongs in (referential) [Recanati] |
Full Idea: A definite description may contribute either the singular predicate it encodes (attributive use) or the mental file to what that predicate belongs (referential use). | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 17.1) | |
A reaction: This nicely explains Donnellan's distinction in terms of mental files. 'Green' may refer in a shop, but isn't much use in a wood. What to make of 'He's a bit of a Bismark'? |
16352 | A rigid definite description can be attributive, not referential: 'the actual F, whoever he is….' [Recanati] |
Full Idea: A rigid use of a definite description need not be referential: it may be attributive. Thus I may say: 'The actual F, whoever he is, is G'. | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 2.2) | |
A reaction: Recanati offers this as a criticism of the attempted 2-D solution to descriptivist accounts of singularity. The singularity is not strong enough, he says. |
22245 | A linguistic expression refers to what its associated mental file refers to [Recanati] |
Full Idea: Mental files determine the reference of linguistic expressions: an expression refers to what the mental file associated with it refers to (at the time of tokening). | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files in Flux [2016], 5) | |
A reaction: Invites the question of how mental files manage to refer, prior to the arrival of a linguistic expression. A mental file is usually fully of descriptions, but it might be no more than a label. |
16353 | Singularity cannot be described, and it needs actual world relations [Recanati] |
Full Idea: As Peirce insisted, singularity as such cannot be described, it can only be given through actual world relations. | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 2.2) | |
A reaction: [Peirce - Exact Logic, Papers 3, 1967, §419] This is the key idea for Recanati's case for basing our grasp of singular things on their relation to a mental file. |
16382 | Fregean modes of presentation can be understood as mental files [Recanati] |
Full Idea: A mental file plays the role which Fregean theory assigns to modes of presentation. | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 17.1) | |
A reaction: I'm a fan of mental files, and this is a nice pointer to how the useful Fregean insights can be written in a way better grounded in brain operations. Rewriting Frege in neuroscience terms is a nice project for someone. |
16389 | If two people think 'I am tired', they think the same thing, and they think different things [Recanati] |
Full Idea: If you and I think 'I am tired', there is a sense in which we think the same thing, and another sense in which we think different things. | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 18.1) | |
A reaction: This is a very nice simple account of the semantic distinctiveness of indexicals, which obviously requires a 'two-tiered framework'. He cites Kaplan and Perry as background. |
16363 | Indexicals (like mental files) determine their reference relationally, not by satisfaction [Recanati] |
Full Idea: The class of indexicals have the same property as mental files, that their reference is determined relationally rather than satisfactionally. | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 5.1) | |
A reaction: Recanati is building an account of reference through mental files. This idea may be the clearest point I have yet encountered about indexicals, showing why they are of particular interest to philosophers. |
16364 | Indexical don't refer; only their tokens do [Recanati] |
Full Idea: Indexicals do not refer; only tokens of an indexical refer | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 5.1) | |
A reaction: Thus 'Thurs 23rd March 2013' refers, but 'now' doesn't, unless someone produces an utterance of it. This is why indexicals are sometimes called 'token-reflexives'. |
16351 | In 2-D semantics, reference is determined, then singularity by the truth of a predication [Recanati] |
Full Idea: In the two-dimensional framework, what characterises the singular case is the fact that truth-evaluation (of possessing of the reference-fixing property) takes place at a later stage than reference determination. | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 2.1) | |
A reaction: This sounds psychologically plausible, which is a big (and unfashionable) plus for me. 1) what are we talking about? 2) what are we saying about it, 3) is it true? |
16350 | Two-D semantics is said to help descriptivism of reference deal with singular objects [Recanati] |
Full Idea: Descriptivism has trouble catching the singularity of objects, construing them as only directly about properties. …To get the truth-conditions right, it is claimed, the descriptivist only as to go two-dimensional. | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 2.1) | |
A reaction: I suspect that the descriptivist only has a problem here because context is being ignored. 'That man on the beach' can quickly be made uniquely singular after a brief chat. |
16380 | Russellian propositions are better than Fregean thoughts, by being constant through communication [Recanati] |
Full Idea: The Russellian notion of a proposition is arguably a better candidate for the status of semantic content than the Fregean notion of a thought. For the proposition remains constant from one person to the next. | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 16.2) | |
A reaction: A good point, though I rebel against Russellian propositions because they are too much out in the world, and propositions strike me as features of minds. We need to keep propositions separate from facts. |
22250 | There are speakers' thoughts and hearers' thoughts, but no further thought attached to the utterance [Recanati] |
Full Idea: There is the speaker's thought and the thought formed by the hearer. That is all there is. We don't need an additional entity, the thought expressed by the utterance. | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files in Flux [2016], 7.2) | |
A reaction: This fits my view of propositions nicely. They are the two 'thoughts'. The notion of some further abstract 'proposition' with its own mode of independent existence strikes me as ontologically absurd. |
22249 | The Naive view of communication is that hearers acquire exactly the thoughts of the speaker [Recanati] |
Full Idea: The Naive Conception of Communication rests on the idea that communication is the replication of thoughts: the thought the hearer entertains when he understands what the speaker is saying is the very thought which the speaker expressed. | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files in Flux [2016], 7.1) | |
A reaction: It is hard to believe that any modern thinker would believe such a view, given holistic views of language etc. |