46 ideas
17774 | Definitions make our intuitions mathematically useful [Mayberry] |
Full Idea: Definition provides us with the means for converting our intuitions into mathematically usable concepts. | |
From: John Mayberry (What Required for Foundation for Maths? [1994], p.405-1) |
17773 | Proof shows that it is true, but also why it must be true [Mayberry] |
Full Idea: When you have proved something you know not only that it is true, but why it must be true. | |
From: John Mayberry (What Required for Foundation for Maths? [1994], p.405-2) | |
A reaction: Note the word 'must'. Presumably both the grounding and the necessitation of the truth are revealed. |
17795 | Set theory can't be axiomatic, because it is needed to express the very notion of axiomatisation [Mayberry] |
Full Idea: Set theory cannot be an axiomatic theory, because the very notion of an axiomatic theory makes no sense without it. | |
From: John Mayberry (What Required for Foundation for Maths? [1994], p.413-2) | |
A reaction: This will come as a surprise to Penelope Maddy, who battles with ways to accept the set theory axioms as the foundation of mathematics. Mayberry says that the basic set theory required is much more simple and intuitive. |
17796 | There is a semi-categorical axiomatisation of set-theory [Mayberry] |
Full Idea: We can give a semi-categorical axiomatisation of set-theory (all that remains undetermined is the size of the set of urelements and the length of the sequence of ordinals). The system is second-order in formalisation. | |
From: John Mayberry (What Required for Foundation for Maths? [1994], p.413-2) | |
A reaction: I gather this means the models may not be isomorphic to one another (because they differ in size), but can be shown to isomorphic to some third ingredient. I think. Mayberry says this shows there is no such thing as non-Cantorian set theory. |
17800 | The misnamed Axiom of Infinity says the natural numbers are finite in size [Mayberry] |
Full Idea: The (misnamed!) Axiom of Infinity expresses Cantor's fundamental assumption that the species of natural numbers is finite in size. | |
From: John Mayberry (What Required for Foundation for Maths? [1994], p.414-2) |
17801 | The set hierarchy doesn't rely on the dubious notion of 'generating' them [Mayberry] |
Full Idea: The idea of 'generating' sets is only a metaphor - the existence of the hierarchy is established without appealing to such dubious notions. | |
From: John Mayberry (What Required for Foundation for Maths? [1994], p.414-2) | |
A reaction: Presumably there can be a 'dependence' or 'determination' relation which does not involve actual generation. |
17803 | Limitation of size is part of the very conception of a set [Mayberry] |
Full Idea: Our very notion of a set is that of an extensional plurality limited in size. | |
From: John Mayberry (What Required for Foundation for Maths? [1994], p.415-2) |
17786 | The mainstream of modern logic sees it as a branch of mathematics [Mayberry] |
Full Idea: In the mainstream tradition of modern logic, beginning with Boole, Peirce and Schröder, descending through Löwenheim and Skolem to reach maturity with Tarski and his school ...saw logic as a branch of mathematics. | |
From: John Mayberry (What Required for Foundation for Maths? [1994], p.410-1) | |
A reaction: [The lesser tradition, of Frege and Russell, says mathematics is a branch of logic]. Mayberry says the Fregean tradition 'has almost died out'. |
17788 | First-order logic only has its main theorems because it is so weak [Mayberry] |
Full Idea: First-order logic is very weak, but therein lies its strength. Its principle tools (Compactness, Completeness, Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems) can be established only because it is too weak to axiomatize either arithmetic or analysis. | |
From: John Mayberry (What Required for Foundation for Maths? [1994], p.411-2) | |
A reaction: He adds the proviso that this is 'unless we are dealing with structures on whose size we have placed an explicit, finite bound' (p.412-1). |
17791 | Only second-order logic can capture mathematical structure up to isomorphism [Mayberry] |
Full Idea: Second-order logic is a powerful tool of definition: by means of it alone we can capture mathematical structure up to isomorphism using simple axiom systems. | |
From: John Mayberry (What Required for Foundation for Maths? [1994], p.412-1) |
17787 | Big logic has one fixed domain, but standard logic has a domain for each interpretation [Mayberry] |
Full Idea: The 'logica magna' [of the Fregean tradition] has quantifiers ranging over a fixed domain, namely everything there is. In the Boolean tradition the domains differ from interpretation to interpretation. | |
From: John Mayberry (What Required for Foundation for Maths? [1994], p.410-2) | |
A reaction: Modal logic displays both approaches, with different systems for global and local domains. |
17790 | No Löwenheim-Skolem logic can axiomatise real analysis [Mayberry] |
Full Idea: No logic which can axiomatize real analysis can have the Löwenheim-Skolem property. | |
From: John Mayberry (What Required for Foundation for Maths? [1994], p.412-1) |
17778 | Axiomatiation relies on isomorphic structures being essentially the same [Mayberry] |
Full Idea: The central dogma of the axiomatic method is this: isomorphic structures are mathematically indistinguishable in their essential properties. | |
From: John Mayberry (What Required for Foundation for Maths? [1994], p.406-2) | |
A reaction: Hence it is not that we have to settle for the success of a system 'up to isomorphism', since that was the original aim. The structures must differ in their non-essential properties, or they would be the same system. |
17779 | 'Classificatory' axioms aim at revealing similarity in morphology of structures [Mayberry] |
Full Idea: The purpose of a 'classificatory' axiomatic theory is to single out an otherwise disparate species of structures by fixing certain features of morphology. ...The aim is to single out common features. | |
From: John Mayberry (What Required for Foundation for Maths? [1994], p.406-2) |
17780 | 'Eliminatory' axioms get rid of traditional ideal and abstract objects [Mayberry] |
Full Idea: The purpose of what I am calling 'eliminatory' axiomatic theories is precisely to eliminate from mathematics those peculiar ideal and abstract objects that, on the traditional view, constitute its subject matter. | |
From: John Mayberry (What Required for Foundation for Maths? [1994], p.407-1) | |
A reaction: A very interesting idea. I have a natural antipathy to 'abstract objects', because they really mess up what could otherwise be a very tidy ontology. What he describes might be better called 'ignoring' axioms. The objects may 'exist', but who cares? |
17789 | No logic which can axiomatise arithmetic can be compact or complete [Mayberry] |
Full Idea: No logic which can axiomatise arithmetic can be compact or complete. | |
From: John Mayberry (What Required for Foundation for Maths? [1994], p.412-1) | |
A reaction: I take this to be because there are new truths in the transfinite level (as well as the problem of incompleteness). |
17784 | Real numbers can be eliminated, by axiom systems for complete ordered fields [Mayberry] |
Full Idea: We eliminate the real numbers by giving an axiomatic definition of the species of complete ordered fields. These axioms are categorical (mutually isomorphic), and thus are mathematically indistinguishable. | |
From: John Mayberry (What Required for Foundation for Maths? [1994], p.408-2) | |
A reaction: Hence my clever mathematical friend says that it is a terrible misunderstanding to think that mathematics is about numbers. Mayberry says the reals are one ordered field, but mathematics now studies all ordered fields together. |
17781 | Real numbers were invented, as objects, to simplify and generalise 'quantity' [Mayberry] |
Full Idea: The abstract objects of modern mathematics, the real numbers, were invented by the mathematicians of the seventeenth century in order to simplify and to generalize the Greek science of quantity. | |
From: John Mayberry (What Required for Foundation for Maths? [1994], p.407-2) |
17782 | Greek quantities were concrete, and ratio and proportion were their science [Mayberry] |
Full Idea: Quantities for Greeks were concrete things - lines, surfaces, solids, times, weights. At the centre of their science of quantity was the beautiful theory of ratio and proportion (...in which the notion of number does not appear!). | |
From: John Mayberry (What Required for Foundation for Maths? [1994], p.407-2) | |
A reaction: [He credits Eudoxus, and cites Book V of Euclid] |
17799 | Cantor's infinite is an absolute, of all the sets or all the ordinal numbers [Mayberry] |
Full Idea: In Cantor's new vision, the infinite, the genuine infinite, does not disappear, but presents itself in the guise of the absolute, as manifested in the species of all sets or the species of all ordinal numbers. | |
From: John Mayberry (What Required for Foundation for Maths? [1994], p.414-2) |
17797 | Cantor extended the finite (rather than 'taming the infinite') [Mayberry] |
Full Idea: We may describe Cantor's achievement by saying, not that he tamed the infinite, but that he extended the finite. | |
From: John Mayberry (What Required for Foundation for Maths? [1994], p.414-2) |
17775 | If proof and definition are central, then mathematics needs and possesses foundations [Mayberry] |
Full Idea: If we grant, as surely we must, the central importance of proof and definition, then we must also grant that mathematics not only needs, but in fact has, foundations. | |
From: John Mayberry (What Required for Foundation for Maths? [1994], p.405-1) |
17776 | The ultimate principles and concepts of mathematics are presumed, or grasped directly [Mayberry] |
Full Idea: The ultimate principles upon which mathematics rests are those to which mathematicians appeal without proof; and the primitive concepts of mathematics ...themselves are grasped directly, if grasped at all, without the mediation of definition. | |
From: John Mayberry (What Required for Foundation for Maths? [1994], p.405-1) | |
A reaction: This begs the question of whether the 'grasping' is purely a priori, or whether it derives from experience. I defend the latter, and Jenkins puts the case well. |
17777 | Foundations need concepts, definition rules, premises, and proof rules [Mayberry] |
Full Idea: An account of the foundations of mathematics must specify four things: the primitive concepts for use in definitions, the rules governing definitions, the ultimate premises of proofs, and rules allowing advance from premises to conclusions. | |
From: John Mayberry (What Required for Foundation for Maths? [1994], p.405-2) |
17804 | Axiom theories can't give foundations for mathematics - that's using axioms to explain axioms [Mayberry] |
Full Idea: No axiomatic theory, formal or informal, of first or of higher order can logically play a foundational role in mathematics. ...It is obvious that you cannot use the axiomatic method to explain what the axiomatic method is. | |
From: John Mayberry (What Required for Foundation for Maths? [1994], p.415-2) |
17792 | 1st-order PA is only interesting because of results which use 2nd-order PA [Mayberry] |
Full Idea: The sole theoretical interest of first-order Peano arithmetic derives from the fact that it is a first-order reduct of a categorical second-order theory. Its axioms can be proved incomplete only because the second-order theory is categorical. | |
From: John Mayberry (What Required for Foundation for Maths? [1994], p.412-1) |
17793 | It is only 2nd-order isomorphism which suggested first-order PA completeness [Mayberry] |
Full Idea: If we did not know that the second-order axioms characterise the natural numbers up to isomorphism, we should have no reason to suppose, a priori, that first-order Peano Arithmetic should be complete. | |
From: John Mayberry (What Required for Foundation for Maths? [1994], p.412-1) |
17794 | Set theory is not just first-order ZF, because that is inadequate for mathematics [Mayberry] |
Full Idea: The idea that set theory must simply be identified with first-order Zermelo-Fraenkel is surprisingly widespread. ...The first-order axiomatic theory of sets is clearly inadequate as a foundation of mathematics. | |
From: John Mayberry (What Required for Foundation for Maths? [1994], p.412-2) | |
A reaction: [He is agreeing with a quotation from Skolem]. |
17802 | We don't translate mathematics into set theory, because it comes embodied in that way [Mayberry] |
Full Idea: One does not have to translate 'ordinary' mathematics into the Zermelo-Fraenkel system: ordinary mathematics comes embodied in that system. | |
From: John Mayberry (What Required for Foundation for Maths? [1994], p.415-1) | |
A reaction: Mayberry seems to be a particular fan of set theory as spelling out the underlying facts of mathematics, though it has to be second-order. |
17805 | Set theory is not just another axiomatised part of mathematics [Mayberry] |
Full Idea: The fons et origo of all confusion is the view that set theory is just another axiomatic theory and the universe of sets just another mathematical structure. ...The universe of sets ...is the world that all mathematical structures inhabit. | |
From: John Mayberry (What Required for Foundation for Maths? [1994], p.416-1) |
22076 | Being is only perceptible to itself as becoming [Schelling] |
Full Idea: Being is only perceptible to itself in the state of becoming. | |
From: Friedrich Schelling (Of Human Freedom [1809], p.403), quoted by Jean-François Courtine - Schelling p.90 | |
A reaction: Is the Enlightenment the era of Being, and the Romantic era that of Becoming? They like process, fluidity, even chaos. |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
Full Idea: It seems unavoidable that the facts about logically necessary relations between levels of facts are themselves logically distinct further facts, irreducible to the microphysical facts. | |
From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C) | |
A reaction: I'm beginning to think that rejecting every theory of reality that is proposed by carefully exposing some infinite regress hidden in it is a rather lazy way to do philosophy. Almost as bad as rejecting anything if it can't be defined. |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
Full Idea: Logical supervenience, restricted to individuals, seems to imply strong reduction. It is said that where the B-facts logically supervene on the A-facts, the B-facts simply re-describe what the A-facts describe, and the B-facts come along 'for free'. | |
From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C) | |
A reaction: This seems to be taking 'logically' to mean 'analytically'. Presumably an entailment is logically supervenient on its premisses, and may therefore be very revealing, even if some people think such things are analytic. |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
Full Idea: The root intuition behind nonreductive materialism is that reality is composed of ontologically distinct layers or levels. …The upper levels depend on the physical without reducing to it. | |
From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], B) | |
A reaction: A nice clear statement of a view which I take to be false. This relationship is the sort of thing that drives people fishing for an account of it to use the word 'supervenience', which just says two things seem to hang out together. Fluffy materialism. |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
Full Idea: Jessica Wilson (1999) says what makes physicalist accounts different from emergentism etc. is that each individual causal power associated with a supervenient property is numerically identical with a causal power associated with its base property. | |
From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], n 11) | |
A reaction: Hence the key thought in so-called (serious, rather than self-evident) 'emergentism' is so-called 'downward causation', which I take to be an idle daydream. |
17785 | Real numbers as abstracted objects are now treated as complete ordered fields [Mayberry] |
Full Idea: The abstractness of the old fashioned real numbers has been replaced by generality in the modern theory of complete ordered fields. | |
From: John Mayberry (What Required for Foundation for Maths? [1994], p.408-2) | |
A reaction: In philosophy, I'm increasingly thinking that we should talk much more of 'generality', and a great deal less about 'universals'. (By which I don't mean that redness is just the set of red things). |
21925 | For Schelling the Absolute spirit manifests as nature in which self-consciousness evolves [Schelling, by Lewis,PB] |
Full Idea: (Like Schopenhauer) Schelling understood the Absolute - spirit rather than will - to manifest itself as nature in which man evolves with self-consciousness. | |
From: report of Friedrich Schelling (Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature [1799]) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 4 | |
A reaction: The influence of Spinoza seems strong here. Is his Absolute just Spinoza's 'God'? |
22045 | Metaphysics aims at the Absolute, which goes beyond subjective and objective viewpoints [Schelling, by Pinkard] |
Full Idea: Schelling never lost his youthful conviction that any metaphysics had to be an explication of the 'absolute' as something that went beyond both subjective and objective points of view. | |
From: report of Friedrich Schelling (Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature [1799]) by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 12 | |
A reaction: Even for a scientific and analytic modern philosopher there must be a target of an ideal account that includes human subjectivity within an objective view of the world. Even Mysterians like McGinn would like that. |
22074 | We must show that the whole of nature, because it is effective, is grounded in freedom [Schelling] |
Full Idea: What is required is to show that everything that is effective (nature, the world of things) is grounded in activity, life, freedom. | |
From: Friedrich Schelling (Of Human Freedom [1809], p.351), quoted by Jean-François Courtine - Schelling | |
A reaction: I take the ancestor of this view of nature to be the monads of Leibniz, as the active principle in nature. Because this is an idealist view, it starts with the absolute freedom of the Self, and presumably sees nature in its own image. |
22072 | Schelling always affirmed the absolute status of freedom [Schelling, by Courtine] |
Full Idea: Throughout Schelling's work we find the affirmation of absolute freedom or of the absolute as freedom. | |
From: report of Friedrich Schelling (Philosophy of Revelation [1843], Vol.13 p.359) by Jean-François Courtine - Schelling p.83 | |
A reaction: Of all of the German idealists, Schelling may be the closest to modern existentialism. |
22073 | The basis of philosophy is the Self prior to experience, where it is the essence of freedom [Schelling] |
Full Idea: The highest principle of all philosophy is the Self insofar as it is purely and simply Self, not yet conditioned by an object, but where it is formulated by freedom. The alpha and omega of all philosophy is freedom. | |
From: Friedrich Schelling (Letters to Hegel [1795], 1795 02 04), quoted by Jean-François Courtine - Schelling p.83 | |
A reaction: A common later response to this (e.g. in Schopenhauer) is that there is no concept of the Self prior to experience. The idealists seem to adore free will, while offering no reply to Spinoza on the matter, with whom they were very familiar. |
22075 | Only idealism has given us the genuine concept of freedom [Schelling] |
Full Idea: Until the discovery of idealism, the genuine concept of freedom has been missing from every modern system, whether it be that of Leibniz or of Spinoza. | |
From: Friedrich Schelling (Of Human Freedom [1809], p.345), quoted by Jean-François Courtine - Schelling p.87 | |
A reaction: Spinoza denied free will, and Leibniz fudged it. Evidently more medieval theological accounts were not good enough. I presume Fichte is Schelling's hero, and he seems to see freedom as axiomatic about the Self. |
20956 | Ultimately, all being is willing. The nature of primal being is the same as the nature of willing [Schelling] |
Full Idea: In the last and highest instance there is no other being but willing. Willing is primal being, and all the predicates of primal being only fit willing: groundlessness, eternity, being independent of time, self-affirmation. | |
From: Friedrich Schelling (On the Essence of Human Freedom [1809], I.7.350), quoted by Andrew Bowie - Introduction to German Philosophy 5 'Reason' | |
A reaction: Insofar as this says that 'primal being' must be active in character, I love this idea. Not the rest of the idea though! Bowie says this essay clearly influenced Schopenhauer. It looks as if Nietzsche must be read it too. |
20957 | We don't choose our characters, yet we still claim credit for the actions our characters perform [Schelling] |
Full Idea: Nobody has chosen their character; and yet this does not stop anybody attributing the action which follows from his character to themself as a free action. | |
From: Friedrich Schelling (The Ages of the World [1810], I.93) | |
A reaction: This pinpoints a very nice ambivalence about our attitudes to our own characters. We all have some pride and shame about who we are, without having chosed who we are. At least when we are young. But we make the bed we lie in. |
22057 | Schelling sought a union between the productivities of nature and of the mind [Schelling, by Bowie] |
Full Idea: Schelling's philosophy of nature aims to connect nature's 'unconscious productivity' with the mind's 'conscious productivity'. | |
From: report of Friedrich Schelling (Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature [1799]) by Andrew Bowie - German Philosophy: a very short introduction 3 | |
A reaction: If you have a fairly active view of nature (as Leibniz did), then this is a promising line. I like the unpopular view that the modern idea of spontaneous 'powers' in nature is applicable to explanations of mind. |
22031 | Schelling made organisms central to nature, because mere mechanism could never produce them [Schelling, by Pinkard] |
Full Idea: Schelling made the image of the 'organism' central to his conception of nature, arguing that merely mechanical processes could never produce 'life' (as a self-producing, self-sustaining, self-directing process). | |
From: report of Friedrich Schelling (Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature [1799]) by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 08 | |
A reaction: At that date this seems a reasonable claim, but subsequent biochemistry has undermined it. |