18 ideas
| 12036 | Xenophanes began the concern with knowledge [Annas] |
| Full Idea: Xenophanes begins a long concern with knowledge and its grounds. | |
| From: Julia Annas (Ancient Philosophy: very short introduction [2000], Intro) | |
| A reaction: Having that on his cv ought to make Xenophanes more famous than he is. |
| 12046 | Plato was the first philosopher who was concerned to systematize his ideas [Annas] |
| Full Idea: In the ancient world Plato was seen as a pivotal figure, the first philosopher who was concerned to systematize his ideas. | |
| From: Julia Annas (Ancient Philosophy: very short introduction [2000], Ch.6) |
| 21943 | Since Kant, self-criticism has been part of philosophy [Gutting] |
| Full Idea: Philosophy after Kant has involved a continuing critique of its own project. | |
| From: Gary Gutting (Foucault: a very short introduction [2005], 6) | |
| A reaction: I'm struck by many modern philosophers in the analytic tradition who write as if Kant had never existed. I don't know if that is a conscious decision, but it may be a good one. |
| 21944 | Structuralism describes human phenomena in terms of unconscious structures [Gutting] |
| Full Idea: Structuralism in the 1960s was a set of theories which explained human phenomena in terms of underlying unconscious structures, rather than the lived experience described by Phenomenology. | |
| From: Gary Gutting (Foucault: a very short introduction [2005], 6) | |
| A reaction: Hence the interest in Freud and Marx, and Foucault's interest in history, each offering to unmask what is hidden in consciousness. The unmasking is a basically Kantian project. Cf. Frege's hatred of 'psychologism'. |
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| Full Idea: It seems unavoidable that the facts about logically necessary relations between levels of facts are themselves logically distinct further facts, irreducible to the microphysical facts. | |
| From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C) | |
| A reaction: I'm beginning to think that rejecting every theory of reality that is proposed by carefully exposing some infinite regress hidden in it is a rather lazy way to do philosophy. Almost as bad as rejecting anything if it can't be defined. |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| Full Idea: Logical supervenience, restricted to individuals, seems to imply strong reduction. It is said that where the B-facts logically supervene on the A-facts, the B-facts simply re-describe what the A-facts describe, and the B-facts come along 'for free'. | |
| From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be taking 'logically' to mean 'analytically'. Presumably an entailment is logically supervenient on its premisses, and may therefore be very revealing, even if some people think such things are analytic. |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| Full Idea: The root intuition behind nonreductive materialism is that reality is composed of ontologically distinct layers or levels. …The upper levels depend on the physical without reducing to it. | |
| From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], B) | |
| A reaction: A nice clear statement of a view which I take to be false. This relationship is the sort of thing that drives people fishing for an account of it to use the word 'supervenience', which just says two things seem to hang out together. Fluffy materialism. |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| Full Idea: Jessica Wilson (1999) says what makes physicalist accounts different from emergentism etc. is that each individual causal power associated with a supervenient property is numerically identical with a causal power associated with its base property. | |
| From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], n 11) | |
| A reaction: Hence the key thought in so-called (serious, rather than self-evident) 'emergentism' is so-called 'downward causation', which I take to be an idle daydream. |
| 3546 | 'Phronesis' should translate as 'practical intelligence', not as prudence [Annas] |
| Full Idea: The best translation of 'phronesis' is probably not 'prudence' (which implies a non-moral motive), or 'practical wisdom' (which makes it sound contemplative), but 'practical intelligence', or just 'intelligence'. | |
| From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 2.3) |
| 12037 | Euripides's Medea is a key case of reason versus the passions [Annas] |
| Full Idea: Euripides's Medea has remained a key case for discussion of reason and the passions. | |
| From: Julia Annas (Ancient Philosophy: very short introduction [2000], Ch.1) |
| 3547 | Epicureans achieve pleasure through character development [Annas] |
| Full Idea: Since having a virtue does not reduce to performing certain kinds of acts, the Epicurean will achieve pleasure only by aiming at being a certain kind of person. | |
| From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 2.4) | |
| A reaction: No Epicurean would want to merely possess virtues, without enacting them. I assume that virtues are sought as guides to finding the finest pleasures (such as friendship). |
| 3543 | Cyrenaics pursue pleasure, but don't equate it with happiness [Annas] |
| Full Idea: Cyrenaics claimed our final good was pleasure, best achieved by seeking maximum intensity of pleasurable experiences, but they explicitly admitted that this was not happiness. | |
| From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 1) |
| 12040 | Virtue is a kind of understanding of moral value [Annas] |
| Full Idea: There is a widespread view in ancient ethics that virtue is a kind of understanding of moral value. | |
| From: Julia Annas (Ancient Philosophy: very short introduction [2000], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: In Aristotle's case, this coincides with his apparent view that 'understanding' is the aim of all areas of human thought. See Idea 12038. |
| 3541 | Ancient ethics uses attractive notions, not imperatives [Annas] |
| Full Idea: Instead of modern 'imperative' notions of ethics (involving obligation, duty and rule-following), ancient ethics uses 'attractive' notions like those of goodness and worth | |
| From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], Intro) |
| 3550 | Principles cover life as a whole, where rules just cover actions [Annas] |
| Full Idea: Principles concern not just types of actions, but one's life as a whole, grasping truths about the nature of justice, and the like; they explain rules, giving the 'why' and not just the 'what'. | |
| From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 2.4) |
| 3551 | Virtue theory tries to explain our duties in terms of our character [Annas] |
| Full Idea: An ethics of virtue moves from an initial interest in what we ought to do to an interest in the kinds of people we are and hope to be, because the latter is taken to be the best way of understanding the former. | |
| From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 2.5) |
| 3552 | If excessively good actions are admirable but not required, then duty isn't basic [Annas] |
| Full Idea: Supererogatory actions are admirable and valuable, and we praise people for doing them, but they do not generate obligations to perform them, which casts doubt on obligation as the basic notion in ethics. | |
| From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 2.6) |
| 3542 | We should do good when necessary, not maximise it [Annas] |
| Full Idea: Why should I want to maximise my acting courageously? I act courageously when it is required. | |
| From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 1) |