28 ideas
8797 | The negation of all my beliefs about my current headache would be fully coherent [Sosa] |
Full Idea: If I have a headache, I could have a set of beliefs that I do not have a headache, that I am not in pain, that no one is in pain, and so on. The resulting system of beliefs would cohere as fully as does my actual system of beliefs. | |
From: Ernest Sosa (The Raft and the Pyramid [1980], §9) | |
A reaction: I think this is a misunderstanding of coherentism. Beliefs are not to be formulated through a process of coherence, but are evaluated that way. A belief that I have headache just arrives; I then see that its denial is incoherent, so I accept it. |
8877 | We can't attain a coherent system by lopping off any beliefs that won't fit [Sosa] |
Full Idea: Coherence involves the logical, explanatory and probabilistic relations among one's beliefs, but it could not do to attain a tightly iterrelated system by lopping off whatever beliefs refuse to fit. | |
From: Ernest Sosa (Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues [2003], 6.4) | |
A reaction: This is clearly right, so the coherentist has to distinguish between lopping off a belief because it is inconvenient (fundamentalists rejecting textual contradictions), and lopping it off because it is wrong (chemists rejecting phlogiston). |
8884 | The phenomenal concept of an eleven-dot pattern does not include the concept of eleven [Sosa] |
Full Idea: You could detect the absence of an eleven-dot pattern without having counted the dots, so your phenomenal concept of that array is not an arithmetical concept, and its content will not yield that its dots do indeed number eleven. | |
From: Ernest Sosa (Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues [2003], 7.3) | |
A reaction: Sosa is discussing foundational epistemology, but this draws attention to the gulf that has to be leaped by structuralists. If eleven is not derived from the pattern, where does it come from? Presumably two eleven-dotters are needed, to map them. |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
Full Idea: It seems unavoidable that the facts about logically necessary relations between levels of facts are themselves logically distinct further facts, irreducible to the microphysical facts. | |
From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C) | |
A reaction: I'm beginning to think that rejecting every theory of reality that is proposed by carefully exposing some infinite regress hidden in it is a rather lazy way to do philosophy. Almost as bad as rejecting anything if it can't be defined. |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
Full Idea: Logical supervenience, restricted to individuals, seems to imply strong reduction. It is said that where the B-facts logically supervene on the A-facts, the B-facts simply re-describe what the A-facts describe, and the B-facts come along 'for free'. | |
From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C) | |
A reaction: This seems to be taking 'logically' to mean 'analytically'. Presumably an entailment is logically supervenient on its premisses, and may therefore be very revealing, even if some people think such things are analytic. |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
Full Idea: The root intuition behind nonreductive materialism is that reality is composed of ontologically distinct layers or levels. …The upper levels depend on the physical without reducing to it. | |
From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], B) | |
A reaction: A nice clear statement of a view which I take to be false. This relationship is the sort of thing that drives people fishing for an account of it to use the word 'supervenience', which just says two things seem to hang out together. Fluffy materialism. |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
Full Idea: Jessica Wilson (1999) says what makes physicalist accounts different from emergentism etc. is that each individual causal power associated with a supervenient property is numerically identical with a causal power associated with its base property. | |
From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], n 11) | |
A reaction: Hence the key thought in so-called (serious, rather than self-evident) 'emergentism' is so-called 'downward causation', which I take to be an idle daydream. |
8443 | Mereological essentialism says an entity must have exactly those parts [Sosa] |
Full Idea: Mereological essentialism says that nothing else could have been the unique entity composed of certain parts except the very thing that is composed of those parts. | |
From: Ernest Sosa (Varieties of Causation [1980], 2) | |
A reaction: This sounds initially implausible. It means the ship of Theseus ceases to be that ship if you change a single nail of it. Whether we say that seems optional, but if we do, it leads to the collaps of all our normal understanding of identity. |
8878 | It is acceptable to say a supermarket door 'knows' someone is approaching [Sosa] |
Full Idea: I am quite flexible on epistemic terminology, and am even willing to grant that a supermarket door can 'know' that someone is approaching. | |
From: Ernest Sosa (Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues [2003], 6.6) | |
A reaction: I take this amazing admission to be a hallmark of externalism. Sosa must extend this to thermostats. So flowers know the sun has come out. This is knowledge without belief. Could the door ever be 'wrong'? |
8880 | In reducing arithmetic to self-evident logic, logicism is in sympathy with rationalism [Sosa] |
Full Idea: In trying to reduce arithmetic to self-evident logical axioms, logicism is in sympathy with rationalism. | |
From: Ernest Sosa (Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues [2003], 6.7) | |
A reaction: I have heard Frege called "the greatest of all rationalist philosophers". However, the apparent reduction of arithmetic to analytic truths played into the hands of logical positivists, who could then marginalise arithmetic. |
8881 | Most of our knowledge has insufficient sensory support [Sosa] |
Full Idea: Almost nothing that one knows of history or geography or science has adequate sensory support, present or even recalled. | |
From: Ernest Sosa (Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues [2003], 6.7) | |
A reaction: This seems a bit glib, and may be false. The main issue to which this refers is, of course, induction, which (almost by definition) is a supposedly empirical process which goes beyond the empirical evidence. |
8794 | There are very few really obvious truths, and not much can be proved from them [Sosa] |
Full Idea: Radical foundationalism suffers from two weaknesses: there are not so many perfectly obvious truths as Descartes thought; and if we restrict ourselves to what it truly obvious, very little supposed common sense knowledge can be proved. | |
From: Ernest Sosa (The Raft and the Pyramid [1980], §3) | |
A reaction: It is striking how few examples can ever be found of self-evident a priori truths. However, if there are self-evident truths about direct experience (pace Descartes), that would give us more than enough. |
8882 | Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts [Sosa] |
Full Idea: There is a difference between having just an indexical concept which one can apply to a perceptual characteristic (just saying 'this is thus'), and having a thicker perceptual concept of that characteristic. | |
From: Ernest Sosa (Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues [2003], 7.2) | |
A reaction: Both of these, of course, would precede any categorial concepts that enabled one to identify the characteristic or the object. This is a ladder foundationalists must climb if they are to reach the cellar of basic beliefs. |
8883 | Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? [Sosa] |
Full Idea: Are foundationally justified beliefs perhaps those that result from attending to our experience and to features of it or in it? | |
From: Ernest Sosa (Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues [2003], 7.3) | |
A reaction: A promising suggestion. I do think our ideas acquire a different epistmological status once we have given them our full attention, though is that merely full consciousness, or full thoughtful evaluation? The latter I take to be what matters. Cf Idea 2414. |
8885 | Some features of a thought are known directly, but others must be inferred [Sosa] |
Full Idea: Some intrinsic features of our thoughts are attributable to them directly, or foundationally, while others are attributable only based on counting or inference. | |
From: Ernest Sosa (Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues [2003], 7.5) | |
A reaction: In practice the brain combines the two at a speed which makes the distinction impossible. I'll show you ten dot-patterns: you pick out the sixer. The foundationalist problem is that only those drained of meaning could be foundational. |
8796 | A single belief can trail two regresses, one terminating and one not [Sosa] |
Full Idea: A single belief can trail at once regresses of both sorts: one terminating and one not. | |
From: Ernest Sosa (The Raft and the Pyramid [1980], §6) | |
A reaction: This makes foundationalism possible, while admitting the existence of regresses. It is a good point, and triumphalist anti-foundationalists can't just point out a regress and then smugly troop off to the pub. |
8876 | Much propositional knowledge cannot be formulated, as in recognising a face [Sosa] |
Full Idea: Much of our propositional knowledge is not easily formulable, as when a witness looking at a police lineup may know what the culprit's face looks like. | |
From: Ernest Sosa (Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues [2003], 6.1) | |
A reaction: This is actually a very helpful defence of foundationalism, because it shows that we will accept perceptual experiences as knowledge when they are not expressed as explicit propositions. Davidson (Idea 8801), for example, must deal with this difficulty. |
8799 | If mental states are not propositional, they are logically dumb, and cannot be foundations [Sosa] |
Full Idea: If a mental state is not propositional, then how can it possibly serve as a foundation for belief? How can one infer or justify anything on the basis of a state that, having no propositional content, must be logically dumb? | |
From: Ernest Sosa (The Raft and the Pyramid [1980], §11) | |
A reaction: This may be the best objection to foundationalism. McDowell tries to argue that conceptual content is inherent in perception, thus giving the beginnings of inbuilt propositional content. But an organism awash with bare experiences knows nothing. |
8795 | Mental states cannot be foundational if they are not immune to error [Sosa] |
Full Idea: If a mental state provides no guarantee against error, then it cannot serve as a foundation for knowledge. | |
From: Ernest Sosa (The Raft and the Pyramid [1980], §4) | |
A reaction: That assumes that knowledge entails certainty, which I am sure it should not. On a fallibilist account, a foundation could be incredibly secure, despite a barely imaginable scenario in which it turned out to be false. |
8879 | Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge [Sosa] |
Full Idea: One's beliefs can be comprehensively coherent without amounting to knowledge. | |
From: Ernest Sosa (Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues [2003], 6.6) | |
A reaction: Beliefs that are fully foundational or reliably sourced may also fail to be knowledge. I take it that any epistemological theory must be fallibilist (Idea 6898). Rational coherentism will clearly be sensitive to error. |
8798 | Vision causes and justifies beliefs; but to some extent the cause is the justification [Sosa] |
Full Idea: Visual experience is recognized as both the cause and the justification of our visual beliefs. But these are not wholly independent. Presumably the justification that something is red derives partly from the fact that it originates in visual experience. | |
From: Ernest Sosa (The Raft and the Pyramid [1980], §10) | |
A reaction: Yes, but the fact that certain visual experiences originate in dreams is taken as grounds for denying their truth, not affirming it. So why do we distinguish them? I am thinking that only in the 'space of reasons' can a cause become a justification. |
20416 | By 1790 aestheticians were mainly trying to explain individual artistic genius [Kemp] |
Full Idea: By 1790 the idea that a central task for the aesthetician was to explain or at least adequately to describe the phenomenon of the individual artistic genius had definitely taken hold. | |
From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], Intro) | |
A reaction: Hence when Kant and Hegel write about art, though are only really thinking of the greatest art (which might be in touch with the sublime or Spirit etc.). Nowadays I think we expect accounts of art to cover modest amateur efforts as well. |
20417 | Expression can be either necessary for art, or sufficient for art (or even both) [Kemp] |
Full Idea: Seeing art as expression has two components: 1) if something is a work of art, then it is expressive, 2) if something is expressive, then it is a work of art. So expression can be necessary or sufficient for art. (or both, for Croce and Collingwood). | |
From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], 1) | |
A reaction: I take the idea that art 'expresses' the feelings of an artist to be false. Artists are more like actors. Nearly all art has some emotional impact, which is of major importance, but I don't think 'expression' is a very good word for that. |
20418 | The horror expressed in some works of art could equallly be expressed by other means [Kemp] |
Full Idea: The horror or terror of Edvard Much's 'The Scream' could in principle be expressed by different paintings, or even by works of music. | |
From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], 1) | |
A reaction: A very good simple point against the idea that the point of art is expression. It leaves out the very specific nature of each work of art! |
20419 | We don't already know what to express, and then seek means of expressing it [Kemp] |
Full Idea: One cannot really know, or be conscious of, what it is that one is going to express, and then set about expressing it; indeed if one is genuinely conscious of it then one has already expressed it. | |
From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], 1) | |
A reaction: That pretty conclusively demolishes the idea that art is expression. I picture Schubert composing at the piano: he doesn't feel an emotion, and then hunt for its expression on the keyboard; he seeks out expressive phrases by playing. |
8442 | What law would explain causation in the case of causing a table to come into existence? [Sosa] |
Full Idea: If I fasten a board onto a tree stump, causing a table to come into existence, ...what law of nature or, even, what quasi-law or law-like principle could possibly play in such a case of generation the role required by nomological accounts? | |
From: Ernest Sosa (Varieties of Causation [1980], 1) | |
A reaction: A very nice question. The nomological account is at its strongest when rocks fall off walls or magnets attract, but all sorts of other caused events seem too messy or complex or original to fit the story. |
8444 | Where is the necessary causation in the three people being tall making everybody tall? [Sosa] |
Full Idea: It is not clear how to analyse the form of necessary causation found in the only three people in the room being tall causing everybody in the room to be tall. | |
From: Ernest Sosa (Varieties of Causation [1980], 5) | |
A reaction: I would want to challenge this as a case of causation. There are no events or processes involved. It seems that a situation described in one way can also be described in another. |
8445 | The necessitated is not always a result or consequence of the necessitator [Sosa] |
Full Idea: The necessitated is not always a result or consequence of the necessitator. If p-and-q is a fact, then this necessitates that p, but the fact that p need not be a result or consequence of the fact that p-and-q. | |
From: Ernest Sosa (Varieties of Causation [1980], p.242) | |
A reaction: This is obviously correct, and needs to be borne in mind when considering necessary causation. It is not enough to produce a piece of logic; something in the link from cause to effect must be demonstrated to be necessary. |