65 ideas
9123 | Someone standing in a doorway seems to be both in and not-in the room [Priest,G, by Sorensen] |
Full Idea: Priest says there is room for contradictions. He gives the example of someone in a doorway; is he in or out of the room. Given that in and out are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, and neither is the default, he seems to be both in and not in. | |
From: report of Graham Priest (What is so bad about Contradictions? [1998]) by Roy Sorensen - Vagueness and Contradiction 4.3 | |
A reaction: Priest is a clever lad, but I don't think I can go with this. It just seems to be an equivocation on the word 'in' when applied to rooms. First tell me the criteria for being 'in' a room. What is the proposition expressed in 'he is in the room'? |
8720 | A logic is 'relevant' if premise and conclusion are connected, and 'paraconsistent' allows contradictions [Priest,G, by Friend] |
Full Idea: Priest and Routley have developed paraconsistent relevant logic. 'Relevant' logics insist on there being some sort of connection between the premises and the conclusion of an argument. 'Paraconsistent' logics allow contradictions. | |
From: report of Graham Priest (works [1998]) by Michčle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 6.8 | |
A reaction: Relevance blocks the move of saying that a falsehood implies everything, which sounds good. The offer of paraconsistency is very wicked indeed, and they are very naughty boys for even suggesting it. |
9672 | Free logic is one of the few first-order non-classical logics [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: Free logic is an unusual example of a non-classical logic which is first-order. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], Pref) |
9697 | X1 x X2 x X3... x Xn indicates the 'cartesian product' of those sets [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: X1 x X2 x X3... x Xn indicates the 'cartesian product' of those sets, the set of all the n-tuples with its first member in X1, its second in X2, and so on. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.0) |
9685 | <a,b&62; is a set whose members occur in the order shown [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: <a,b> is a set whose members occur in the order shown; <x1,x2,x3, ..xn> is an 'n-tuple' ordered set. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.10) |
9675 | a ∈ X says a is an object in set X; a ∉ X says a is not in X [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: a ∈ X means that a is a member of the set X, that is, a is one of the objects in X. a ∉ X indicates that a is not in X. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.2) |
9674 | {x; A(x)} is a set of objects satisfying the condition A(x) [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: {x; A(x)} indicates a set of objects which satisfy the condition A(x). | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.2) |
9673 | {a1, a2, ...an} indicates that a set comprising just those objects [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: {a1, a2, ...an} indicates that the set comprises of just those objects. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.2) |
9677 | Φ indicates the empty set, which has no members [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: Φ indicates the empty set, which has no members | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.4) |
9676 | {a} is the 'singleton' set of a (not the object a itself) [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: {a} is the 'singleton' set of a, not to be confused with the object a itself. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.4) |
9679 | X⊂Y means set X is a 'proper subset' of set Y [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: X⊂Y means set X is a 'proper subset' of set Y (if and only if all of its members are members of Y, but some things in Y are not in X) | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.6) |
9678 | X⊆Y means set X is a 'subset' of set Y [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: X⊆Y means set X is a 'subset' of set Y (if and only if all of its members are members of Y). | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.6) |
9681 | X = Y means the set X equals the set Y [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: X = Y means the set X equals the set Y, which means they have the same members (i.e. X⊆Y and Y⊆X). | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.6) |
9683 | X ∩ Y indicates the 'intersection' of sets X and Y, the objects which are in both sets [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: X ∩ Y indicates the 'intersection' of sets X and Y, which is a set containing just those things that are in both X and Y. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.8) |
9682 | X∪Y indicates the 'union' of all the things in sets X and Y [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: X ∪ Y indicates the 'union' of sets X and Y, which is a set containing just those things that are in X or Y (or both). | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.8) |
9684 | Y - X is the 'relative complement' of X with respect to Y; the things in Y that are not in X [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: Y - X indicates the 'relative complement' of X with respect to Y, that is, all the things in Y that are not in X. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.8) |
9688 | A 'singleton' is a set with only one member [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: A 'singleton' is a set with only one member. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.4) |
9689 | The 'empty set' or 'null set' has no members [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: The 'empty set' or 'null set' is a set with no members. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.4) |
9690 | A set is a 'subset' of another set if all of its members are in that set [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: A set is a 'subset' of another set if all of its members are in that set. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.6) |
9691 | A 'proper subset' is smaller than the containing set [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: A set is a 'proper subset' of another set if some things in the large set are not in the smaller set | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.6) |
9694 | The 'relative complement' is things in the second set not in the first [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: The 'relative complement' of one set with respect to another is the things in the second set that aren't in the first. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.8) |
9693 | The 'intersection' of two sets is a set of the things that are in both sets [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: The 'intersection' of two sets is a set containing the things that are in both sets. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.8) |
9692 | The 'union' of two sets is a set containing all the things in either of the sets [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: The 'union' of two sets is a set containing all the things in either of the sets | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.8) |
9698 | The 'induction clause' says complex formulas retain the properties of their basic formulas [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: The 'induction clause' says that whenever one constructs more complex formulas out of formulas that have the property P, the resulting formulas will also have that property. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.2) |
9695 | An 'ordered pair' (or ordered n-tuple) is a set with its members in a particular order [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: An 'ordered pair' (or ordered n-tuple) is a set with its members in a particular order. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.10) |
9696 | A 'cartesian product' of sets is the set of all the n-tuples with one member in each of the sets [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: A 'cartesian product' of sets is the set of all the n-tuples with one member in each of the sets. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.10) |
9686 | A 'set' is a collection of objects [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: A 'set' is a collection of objects. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.2) |
9687 | A 'member' of a set is one of the objects in the set [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: A 'member' of a set is one of the objects in the set. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.2) |
9680 | The empty set Φ is a subset of every set (including itself) [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: The empty set Φ is a subset of every set (including itself). | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.6) |
13373 | Typically, paradoxes are dealt with by dividing them into two groups, but the division is wrong [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: A natural principle is the same kind of paradox will have the same kind of solution. Standardly Ramsey's first group are solved by denying the existence of some totality, and the second group are less clear. But denial of the groups sink both. | |
From: Graham Priest (The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference [1994], §5) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This sums up the argument of Priest's paper, which is that it is Ramsey's division into two kinds (see Idea 13334) which is preventing us from getting to grips with the paradoxes. Priest, notoriously, just lives with them. |
13368 | The 'least indefinable ordinal' is defined by that very phrase [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: König: there are indefinable ordinals, and the least indefinable ordinal has just been defined in that very phrase. (Recall that something is definable iff there is a (non-indexical) noun-phrase that refers to it). | |
From: Graham Priest (The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference [1994], §3) | |
A reaction: Priest makes great subsequent use of this one, but it feels like a card trick. 'Everything indefinable has now been defined' (by the subject of this sentence)? König, of course, does manage to pick out one particular object. |
13370 | 'x is a natural number definable in less than 19 words' leads to contradiction [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: Berry: if we take 'x is a natural number definable in less than 19 words', we can generate a number which is and is not one of these numbers. | |
From: Graham Priest (The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference [1994], §3) | |
A reaction: [not enough space to spell this one out in full] |
13369 | By diagonalization we can define a real number that isn't in the definable set of reals [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: Richard: φ(x) is 'x is a definable real number between 0 and 1' and ψ(x) is 'x is definable'. We can define a real by diagonalization so that it is not in x. It is and isn't in the set of reals. | |
From: Graham Priest (The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference [1994], §3) | |
A reaction: [this isn't fully clear here because it is compressed] |
13366 | The least ordinal greater than the set of all ordinals is both one of them and not one of them [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: Burali-Forti: φ(x) is 'x is an ordinal', and so w is the set of all ordinals, On; δ(x) is the least ordinal greater than every member of x (abbreviation: log(x)). The contradiction is that log(On)∈On and log(On)∉On. | |
From: Graham Priest (The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference [1994], §2) |
13367 | The next set up in the hierarchy of sets seems to be both a member and not a member of it [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: Mirimanoff: φ(x) is 'x is well founded', so that w is the cumulative hierarchy of sets, V; &delta(x) is just the power set of x, P(x). If x⊆V, then V∈V and V∉V, since δ(V) is just V itself. | |
From: Graham Priest (The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference [1994], §2) |
13371 | If you know that a sentence is not one of the known sentences, you know its truth [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: In the family of the Liar is the Knower Paradox, where φ(x) is 'x is known to be true', and there is a set of known things, Kn. By knowing a sentence is not in the known sentences, you know its truth. | |
From: Graham Priest (The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference [1994], §4) | |
A reaction: [mostly my wording] |
13372 | There are Liar Pairs, and Liar Chains, which fit the same pattern as the basic Liar [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: There are liar chains which fit the pattern of Transcendence and Closure, as can be seen with the simplest case of the Liar Pair. | |
From: Graham Priest (The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference [1994], §4) | |
A reaction: [Priest gives full details] Priest's idea is that Closure is when a set is announced as complete, and Transcendence is when the set is forced to expand. He claims that the two keep coming into conflict. |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
Full Idea: It seems unavoidable that the facts about logically necessary relations between levels of facts are themselves logically distinct further facts, irreducible to the microphysical facts. | |
From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C) | |
A reaction: I'm beginning to think that rejecting every theory of reality that is proposed by carefully exposing some infinite regress hidden in it is a rather lazy way to do philosophy. Almost as bad as rejecting anything if it can't be defined. |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
Full Idea: Logical supervenience, restricted to individuals, seems to imply strong reduction. It is said that where the B-facts logically supervene on the A-facts, the B-facts simply re-describe what the A-facts describe, and the B-facts come along 'for free'. | |
From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C) | |
A reaction: This seems to be taking 'logically' to mean 'analytically'. Presumably an entailment is logically supervenient on its premisses, and may therefore be very revealing, even if some people think such things are analytic. |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
Full Idea: The root intuition behind nonreductive materialism is that reality is composed of ontologically distinct layers or levels. …The upper levels depend on the physical without reducing to it. | |
From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], B) | |
A reaction: A nice clear statement of a view which I take to be false. This relationship is the sort of thing that drives people fishing for an account of it to use the word 'supervenience', which just says two things seem to hang out together. Fluffy materialism. |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
Full Idea: Jessica Wilson (1999) says what makes physicalist accounts different from emergentism etc. is that each individual causal power associated with a supervenient property is numerically identical with a causal power associated with its base property. | |
From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], n 11) | |
A reaction: Hence the key thought in so-called (serious, rather than self-evident) 'emergentism' is so-called 'downward causation', which I take to be an idle daydream. |
16661 | There are two sorts of category - referring to things, and to circumstances of things [Boethius] |
Full Idea: Is it not now clear what the difference is between items in the categories? Some serve to refer to a thing, whereas others serve to refer to the circumstances of a thing. | |
From: Boethius (Concerning the Trinity [c.518], Ch. 4), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.5 |
15035 | If universals are not separate, we can isolate them by abstraction [Boethius, by Panaccio] |
Full Idea: Boethius argued that universals can be successfully isolated by abstraction, even if they do not exist as separate entities in the world. | |
From: report of Boethius (Second Commentary on 'Isagoge' [c.517]) by Claude Panaccio - Medieval Problem of Universals 'Sources' | |
A reaction: Personally I rather like this unfashionable view. I can't think of any other plausible explanation, unless it is a less conscious psychological process of labelling. Boethius's idea led to medieval 'immanent realism'. |
14665 | We can call the quality of Plato 'Platonity', and say it is a quality which only he possesses [Boethius] |
Full Idea: Let the incommunicable property of Plato be called 'Platonity'. For we can call this quality 'Platonity' by a fabricated word, in the way in which we call the quality of man 'humanity'. Therefore this Platonity is one man's alone - Plato's. | |
From: Boethius (Librium de interpretatione editio secunda [c.516], PL64 462d), quoted by Alvin Plantinga - Actualism and Possible Worlds 5 | |
A reaction: Plantinga uses this idea to reinstate the old notion of a haecceity, to bestow unshakable identity on things. My interest in the quotation is that the most shocking confusions about properties arose long before the invention of set theory. |
23308 | Reasoning relates to understanding as time does to eternity [Boethius, by Sorabji] |
Full Idea: Boethius says that reasoning [ratiocinatio] is related to intellectual understanding [intellectus] as time to eternity, involving as it does movement from one stage to another. | |
From: report of Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], 4, prose 6) by Richard Sorabji - Rationality 'Shifting' | |
A reaction: This gives true understanding a quasi-religious aura, as befits a subject which is truly consoling. |
5771 | Knowledge of present events doesn't make them necessary, so future events are no different [Boethius] |
Full Idea: Just as the knowledge of present things imposes no necessity on what is happening, so foreknowledge imposes no necessity on what is going to happen. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], V.IV) | |
A reaction: This, I think, is the key idea if you are looking for a theological answer to the theological problem of free will. Don't think of God as seeing the future 'now'. God is outside time, and so only observes all of history just as we observe the present. |
5767 | Rational natures require free will, in order to have power of judgement [Boethius] |
Full Idea: There is freedom of the will, for it would be impossible for any rational nature to exist without it. Whatever by nature has the use of reason has the power of judgement to decide each matter. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], V.II) | |
A reaction: A view taken up by Aquinas (Idea 1849) and Kant (Idea 3740). The 'power of judgement' pinpoints the core of rationality, and it is not clear how a robot could fulfil such a power, if it lacked consciousness. Does a machine 'judge' barcodes? |
5768 | God's universal foreknowledge seems opposed to free will [Boethius] |
Full Idea: God's universal foreknowledge and freedom of the will seem clean contrary and opposite. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], V.III) | |
A reaction: The original source of the great theological and philosophical anguish over free will. The problem is anything which fixes future facts, be it oracular knowledge or scientific prediction. Personally I think free will was an invention by religions. |
5769 | Does foreknowledge cause necessity, or necessity cause foreknowledge? [Boethius] |
Full Idea: Does foreknowledge of the future cause the necessity of events, or necessity cause the foreknowledge? | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], V.III) | |
A reaction: An intriguing question, though not one that bothers me. I don't understand how foreknowledge causes necessity, unless God's vision of the future is a kind of 'freezing ray'. Even the gods must bow to necessity (Idea 3016). |
5762 | The wicked want goodness, so they would not be wicked if they obtained it [Boethius] |
Full Idea: If the wicked obtained what they want - that is goodness - they could not be wicked. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], IV.II) | |
A reaction: This is a nice paradox which arises from Boethius being, like Socrates, an intellectualist. The question is whether the wicked want the good de re or de dicto. If they wanted to good de re (as its true self) they would obviously not be wicked. |
5770 | Rewards and punishments are not deserved if they don't arise from free movement of the mind [Boethius] |
Full Idea: If there is no free will, then in vain is reward offered to the good and punishment to the bad, because they have not been deserved by any free and willed movement of the mind. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], V.III) | |
A reaction: I just don't see why decisions have to come out of nowhere in order to have any merit. People are different from natural forces, because the former can be persuaded by reasons. A moral agent is a mechanism which decides according to reasons. |
5764 | When people fall into wickedness they lose their human nature [Boethius] |
Full Idea: When people fall into wickedness they lose their human nature. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], IV.III) | |
A reaction: This is a view I find quite sympathetic, but which is a million miles from the modern view. Today's paper showed a picture of a famous criminal holding a machine gun and a baby. We seem to delight in the idea that human nature is partly wicked. |
5756 | Happiness is a good which once obtained leaves nothing more to be desired [Boethius] |
Full Idea: Happiness is a good which once obtained leaves nothing more to be desired. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], III.I) | |
A reaction: This sounds like the ancient 'eudaimonism' of Socrates and Aristotle, which might not be entirely compatible with orthodox Christianity. It is not true, though, that happy people lack ambition. To be happy, an unfilfilled aim may be needed. |
5763 | The bad seek the good through desire, but the good through virtue, which is more natural [Boethius] |
Full Idea: The supreme good is the goal of good men and bad men alike, and the good seek it by means of a natural activity - the exercise of virtue - while the bad strive to acquire it by means of their desires, which is not a natural way of obtaining the good. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], IV.II) | |
A reaction: Interesting here is the slightly surprising claim that the pursuit of virtue is 'natural', implying that the mere pursuit of desire is not. Doesn't nature have to be restrained to achieve the good? Boethius is in the tradition of Aristotle and stoicism. |
5759 | Varied aims cannot be good because they differ, but only become good when they unify [Boethius] |
Full Idea: The various things that men pursue are not perfect and good, because they differ from one another; ..when they differ they are not good, but when they begin to be one they become good, so it is through the acquisition of unity that these things are good. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], III.XI) | |
A reaction: This is a criticism of Aristotle's pluralism about the good(s) for man. Boethius' thought is appealing, and ties in with the Socratic notion that the virtues might be unified in some way. I think it is right that true virtues merge together, ideally. |
5754 | You can't control someone's free mind, only their body and possessions [Boethius] |
Full Idea: The only way one man can exercise power over another is over his body and what is inferior to it, his possessions. You cannot impose anything on a free mind. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], II.VI) | |
A reaction: Written, of course, in prison. Boethius had not met hypnotism, or mind-controlling drugs, or invasive brain surgery. He hadn't read '1984'. He hadn't seen 'The Ipcress File'. (In fact, he should have got out more…) |
16692 | Divine eternity is the all-at-once and complete possession of unending life [Boethius] |
Full Idea: Divine eternity is the all-at-once [tota simul] and complete possession of unending life. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], V.6), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.1 | |
A reaction: This is a famous definition, and 'tota simul' became the phrase used for 'entia successiva', such as a day, or the Olympic Games. |
5752 | Where does evil come from if there is a god; where does good come from if there isn't? [Boethius] |
Full Idea: A philosopher (possibly Epicurus) asked where evil comes from if there is a god, and where good comes from if there isn't. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], I.IV) | |
A reaction: A nice question. The best known answer to the first question is 'Satan'. Some would say that in the second case good is impossible, but I would have thought that the only possible answer is 'mankind'. |
5757 | God is the supreme good, so no source of goodness could take precedence over God [Boethius] |
Full Idea: That which by its own nature is something distinct from supreme good, cannot be supreme good. ..It is impossible for anything to be by nature better than that from which it is derived, so that which is the origin of all things is supreme good. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], III.X) | |
A reaction: This is the contortion early Christians got into once they decided God had to be 'supreme' in the moral world (and every other world). Boethius allows a possible external source of all morality, but then has to say that this source is morally inferior. |
5758 | God is the good [Boethius] |
Full Idea: God is the good. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], III.XI) | |
A reaction: This summary follows on from the rather dubious discussion in Idea 5757. If God IS the good, it is not clear how God could be usefully described as 'good'. We would know that he was good a priori, without any enquiry into his nature being needed. |
5760 | The power through which creation remains in existence and motion I call 'God' [Boethius] |
Full Idea: For this power, whatever it is, through which creation remains in existence and in motion, I use the word which all people use, namely God. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], III.XII) | |
A reaction: An interesting caution in the phrase 'whatever it is'. Boethius would have been very open-minded in discussion with modern science about the stability of nature. Personally I reject Boethius' theory, but don't have a better one. Cf Idea 1431. |
5753 | The regular events of this life could never be due to chance [Boethius] |
Full Idea: I could never believe that events of such regularity as we find in this life are due to the haphazards of chance. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], I.VI) | |
A reaction: It depends what you mean by 'chance'. Boethius infers a conscious mind, and presumes this to be God, but that is two large and unsupported steps. Modern atheists must acknowledge Boethius' problem. Why is there order? |
5765 | The reward of the good is to become gods [Boethius] |
Full Idea: Goodness is happiness, ..but we agree that those who attain happiness are divine. The reward of the good, then, is to become gods. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], IV.III) | |
A reaction: Kant offered a similar argument (see Idea 1455). Most of us are unlikely to agree with the second premise of Boethius' argument. The idea that we might somehow become gods gripped the imagination for the next thousand years. |
5761 | God can do anything, but he cannot do evil, so evil must be nothing [Boethius] |
Full Idea: 'There is nothing that an omnipotent power could not do?' 'No.' 'Then can God do evil?' 'No.' 'So evil is nothing, since that is what He cannot do who can do anthing.' | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], III.XII) | |
A reaction: A lovely example of the contortions necessary once you insist that God must be 'omnipotent', in some absolute sense of the term. Saying that evil is 'nothing' strikes me as nothing more than a feeble attempt to insult it. |
5766 | If you could see the plan of Providence, you would not think there was evil anywhere [Boethius] |
Full Idea: If you could see the plan of Providence, you would not think there was evil anywhere. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], IV.VI) | |
A reaction: This brings out the verificationist in me. See Idea 1467, by Antony Flew. Presumably Boethius would retain his faith as Europe moved horribly from 1939 to 1945, and even if the whole of humanity sank into squalid viciousness. |