14 ideas
16014 | It is controversial whether only 'numerical identity' allows two things to be counted as one [Noonan] |
Full Idea: 'Numerical identity' implies the controversial view that it is the only identity relation in accordance with which we can properly count (or number) things: x and y are to be properly counted as one just in case they are numerically identical. | |
From: Harold Noonan (Identity [2009], §1) | |
A reaction: Noonan cites Geach, presumably to remind us of relative identity, where two things may be one or two, depending on what they are relative to. The one 'guard on the gate' may actually be two men. |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
Full Idea: It seems unavoidable that the facts about logically necessary relations between levels of facts are themselves logically distinct further facts, irreducible to the microphysical facts. | |
From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C) | |
A reaction: I'm beginning to think that rejecting every theory of reality that is proposed by carefully exposing some infinite regress hidden in it is a rather lazy way to do philosophy. Almost as bad as rejecting anything if it can't be defined. |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
Full Idea: Logical supervenience, restricted to individuals, seems to imply strong reduction. It is said that where the B-facts logically supervene on the A-facts, the B-facts simply re-describe what the A-facts describe, and the B-facts come along 'for free'. | |
From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C) | |
A reaction: This seems to be taking 'logically' to mean 'analytically'. Presumably an entailment is logically supervenient on its premisses, and may therefore be very revealing, even if some people think such things are analytic. |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
Full Idea: The root intuition behind nonreductive materialism is that reality is composed of ontologically distinct layers or levels. …The upper levels depend on the physical without reducing to it. | |
From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], B) | |
A reaction: A nice clear statement of a view which I take to be false. This relationship is the sort of thing that drives people fishing for an account of it to use the word 'supervenience', which just says two things seem to hang out together. Fluffy materialism. |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
Full Idea: Jessica Wilson (1999) says what makes physicalist accounts different from emergentism etc. is that each individual causal power associated with a supervenient property is numerically identical with a causal power associated with its base property. | |
From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], n 11) | |
A reaction: Hence the key thought in so-called (serious, rather than self-evident) 'emergentism' is so-called 'downward causation', which I take to be an idle daydream. |
16024 | I could have died at five, but the summation of my adult stages could not [Noonan] |
Full Idea: Persons have different modal properties from the summations of person-stages. …I might have died when I was five. But the maximal summation of person-stages which perdurantists say is me could not have had a temporal extent of a mere five years. | |
From: Harold Noonan (Identity [2009], §5) | |
A reaction: Thus the summation of stages seems to fail Leibniz's Law, since truths about a part are not true of the whole. But my foot might be amputated without me being amputated. The objection is the fallacy of composition? |
16023 | Stage theorists accept four-dimensionalism, but call each stage a whole object [Noonan] |
Full Idea: Stage theorists, accepting the ontology of perdurance, modify the semantics to secure the result that fatness is a property of a cat. Every temporal part of a cat (such as Tabby-on-Monday) is a cat. …(but they pay a price over the counting of cats). | |
From: Harold Noonan (Identity [2009], §5) | |
A reaction: [Noonan cites Hawley and Sider for this view. The final parenthesis compresses Noonan] I would take the difficulty over counting cats to be fatal to the view. It produces too many cats, or too few, or denies counting altogether. |
16015 | Problems about identity can't even be formulated without the concept of identity [Noonan] |
Full Idea: If identity is problematic, it is difficult to see how the problem could be resolved, since it is difficult to see how a thinker could have the conceptual resources with which to explain the concept of identity whilst lacking that concept itself. | |
From: Harold Noonan (Identity [2009], §1) | |
A reaction: I don't think I accept this. We can comprehend the idea of a mind that didn't think in terms of identities (at least for objects). I suppose any relation of a mind to the world has to distinguish things in some way. Does the Parmenidean One have identity? |
16017 | Identity is usually defined as the equivalence relation satisfying Leibniz's Law [Noonan] |
Full Idea: Numerical identity is usually defined as the equivalence relation (or: the reflexive relation) satisfying Leibniz's Law, the indiscernibility of identicals, where everything true of x is true of y. | |
From: Harold Noonan (Identity [2009], §2) | |
A reaction: Noonan says this must include 'is identical to x' among the truths, and so is circular |
16016 | Identity definitions (such as self-identity, or the smallest equivalence relation) are usually circular [Noonan] |
Full Idea: Identity can be circularly defined, as 'the relation everything has to itself and to nothing else', …or as 'the smallest equivalence relation'. | |
From: Harold Noonan (Identity [2009], §2) | |
A reaction: The first one is circular because 'nothing else' implies identity. The second is circular because it has to quantify over all equivalence relations. (So says Noonan). |
16020 | Identity can only be characterised in a second-order language [Noonan] |
Full Idea: There is no condition in a first-order language for a predicate to express identity, rather than indiscernibility within the resources of the language. Leibniz's Law is statable in a second-order language, so identity can be uniquely characterised. | |
From: Harold Noonan (Identity [2009], §2) | |
A reaction: The point is that first-order languages only refer to all objects, but you need to refer to all properties to include Leibniz's Law. Quine's 'Identity, Ostension and Hypostasis' is the source of this idea. |
16018 | Indiscernibility is basic to our understanding of identity and distinctness [Noonan] |
Full Idea: Leibniz's Law (the indiscernibility of identicals) appears to be crucial to our understanding of identity, and, more particularly, to our understanding of distinctness. | |
From: Harold Noonan (Identity [2009], §2) | |
A reaction: True, but indiscernibility concerns the epistemology, and identity concerns the ontology. |
16019 | Leibniz's Law must be kept separate from the substitutivity principle [Noonan] |
Full Idea: Leibniz's Law must be clearly distinguished from the substitutivity principle, that if 'a' and 'b' are codesignators they are substitutable salva veritate. | |
From: Harold Noonan (Identity [2009], §2) | |
A reaction: He gives a bunch of well-known problem cases for substitutivity. The Morning Star, Giorgione, and the number of planets won't work. Belief contexts, or facts about spelling, may not be substitutable. |
15282 | Facts should be deducible from the theory and initial conditions, and prefer the simpler theory [Osiander, by Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: The two positivist criteria for a scientific theory are that the facts must be deducible from the theory together with initial conditions, and if there is more than one theory the simplest must be chosen. | |
From: report of Andreas Osiander (Preface to 'De Revolutionibus' [1543]) by Harré,R./Madden,E.H. - Causal Powers 7.I | |
A reaction: Harré and Madden cite this as a famous early statement of positivism. It seems to combine Hempel and Lewis very concisely. Wrong, of course. It does not, though, appear to mention 'laws'. |