Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Johanna Oksala and Haskell B. Curry

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12 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 6. Deconstruction
Post-structuralism focused on exterior determinants of thought, rather than the thinker [Oksala]
     Full Idea: Post-structuralism was characterised by the denial of the human being as the privileged object of philosophical analysis, focusing instead on the social, linguistic and unconscious determinants of thought.
     From: Johanna Oksala (How to Read Foucault [2007], Intro)
     A reaction: I'm new to this, and so far this sounds the same as structralism, so I'll have to keep going. I presume it is the same as the rejection of the author when interpreting literature (as in Barthes?). Structuralism was 'non-historical'.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
To study formal systems, look at the whole thing, and not just how it is constructed in steps [Curry]
     Full Idea: In the study of formal systems we do not confine ourselves to the derivation of elementary propositions step by step. Rather we take the system, defined by its primitive frame, as datum, and then study it by any means at our command.
     From: Haskell B. Curry (Remarks on the definition and nature of mathematics [1954], 'The formalist')
     A reaction: This is what may potentially lead to an essentialist view of such things. Focusing on bricks gives formalism, focusing on buildings gives essentialism.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
It is untenable that mathematics is general physical truths, because it needs infinity [Curry]
     Full Idea: According to realism, mathematical propositions express the most general properties of our physical environment. This is the primitive view of mathematics, yet on account of the essential role played by infinity in mathematics, it is untenable today.
     From: Haskell B. Curry (Remarks on the definition and nature of mathematics [1954], 'The problem')
     A reaction: I resist this view, because Curry's view seems to imply a mad metaphysics. Hilbert resisted the role of the infinite in essential mathematics. If the physical world includes its possibilities, that might do the job. Hellman on structuralism?
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Saying mathematics is logic is merely replacing one undefined term by another [Curry]
     Full Idea: To say that mathematics is logic is merely to replace one undefined term by another.
     From: Haskell B. Curry (Remarks on the definition and nature of mathematics [1954], 'Mathematics')
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
     Full Idea: It seems unavoidable that the facts about logically necessary relations between levels of facts are themselves logically distinct further facts, irreducible to the microphysical facts.
     From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C)
     A reaction: I'm beginning to think that rejecting every theory of reality that is proposed by carefully exposing some infinite regress hidden in it is a rather lazy way to do philosophy. Almost as bad as rejecting anything if it can't be defined.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
     Full Idea: Logical supervenience, restricted to individuals, seems to imply strong reduction. It is said that where the B-facts logically supervene on the A-facts, the B-facts simply re-describe what the A-facts describe, and the B-facts come along 'for free'.
     From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C)
     A reaction: This seems to be taking 'logically' to mean 'analytically'. Presumably an entailment is logically supervenient on its premisses, and may therefore be very revealing, even if some people think such things are analytic.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
     Full Idea: The root intuition behind nonreductive materialism is that reality is composed of ontologically distinct layers or levels. …The upper levels depend on the physical without reducing to it.
     From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], B)
     A reaction: A nice clear statement of a view which I take to be false. This relationship is the sort of thing that drives people fishing for an account of it to use the word 'supervenience', which just says two things seem to hang out together. Fluffy materialism.
The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
     Full Idea: Jessica Wilson (1999) says what makes physicalist accounts different from emergentism etc. is that each individual causal power associated with a supervenient property is numerically identical with a causal power associated with its base property.
     From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], n 11)
     A reaction: Hence the key thought in so-called (serious, rather than self-evident) 'emergentism' is so-called 'downward causation', which I take to be an idle daydream.
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
World government needs a shared global identity [Oksala]
     Full Idea: Critics have argued that a global 'demos' would require a shared global identity.
     From: Johanna Oksala (Political Philosophy: all that matters [2013], Ch.9 'Epi')
     A reaction: The great divisions are religion and language. The great unifiers are sport, arts and entertainment, plus basic human needs like food, health and housing. The reply is that there cannot be identity without differences, so global democracy is out.
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / b. Veil of ignorance
The principles Rawls arrives at do not just conform to benevolence, but also result from choices [Oksala]
     Full Idea: The advantage of Rawls's method is that the principles the individual chooses are not only fair according to some abstract principle of benevolence, but also the result of rational choice.
     From: Johanna Oksala (Political Philosophy: all that matters [2013], Ch.5)
     A reaction: That is a very nice way of putting the beauty of Rawls's idea. In modern political philosophy you hear far more criticisms of Rawls than praise. If a philosopher is criticised a lot, it is probably because they have stated their views clearly.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 2. Anarchism
Anarchists prefer local and communal government [Oksala]
     Full Idea: Anarchists advocate forms of governance such as communes and associations that are as local and close to the direct control of the people as possible.
     From: Johanna Oksala (Political Philosophy: all that matters [2013], Ch.8)
     A reaction: Which might explain why recent conservative governments have steadily eliminated local government in Britain.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 4. Social Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism neglects responsibility, duties and rights [Oksala]
     Full Idea: A focus solely on utility excludes considerations of personal responsibility and duty, as well as considerations of the basic rights of individuals.
     From: Johanna Oksala (Political Philosophy: all that matters [2013], Ch.7)
     A reaction: [He cites these as the common modern criticisms] The defence is to explain the value of each of these in utilitarian terms. There is a general problem (conceded by Mill) of motivation in utilitarianism. There's not much in it for me!