191 ideas
19199 | Some say metaphysics is a highly generalised empirical study of objects [Tarski] |
Full Idea: For some people metaphysics is a general theory of objects (ontology) - a discipline which is to be developed in a purely empirical way, and which differs from other empirical disciplines in its generality. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 19) | |
A reaction: Tarski says some people despise it, but for him such metaphysics is 'not objectionable'. I subscribe to this view, but the empirical aspect is very remote, because it's too general for detail observation or experiment. Generality is the key to philosophy. |
19193 | Disputes that fail to use precise scientific terminology are all meaningless [Tarski] |
Full Idea: Disputes like the vague one about 'the right conception of truth' occur in all domains where, instead of exact, scientific terminology, common language with its vagueness and ambiguity is used; and they are always meaningless, and therefore in vain. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 14) | |
A reaction: Taski taught a large number of famous philosophers in California in the 1950s, and this approach has had a huge influence. Recently there has been a bit of a rebellion. E.g. Kit Fine doesn't think it can all be done in formal languages. |
19179 | For a definition we need the words or concepts used, the rules, and the structure of the language [Tarski] |
Full Idea: We must specify the words or concepts which we wish to use in defining the notion of truth; and we must also give the formal rules to which the definition should conform. More generally, we must describe the formal structure of the language. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 01) | |
A reaction: This, of course, is a highly formal view of how definition should be achieved, offered in anticipation of one of the most famous definitions in logic (of truth, by Tarski). Normally we assume English and classical logic. |
16295 | Tarski proved that truth cannot be defined from within a given theory [Tarski, by Halbach] |
Full Idea: Tarski's Theorem states that under fairly generally applicable conditions, the assumption that there is a definition of truth within a given theory for the language of that same theory leads to a contradiction. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Volker Halbach - Axiomatic Theories of Truth 1 | |
A reaction: That might leave room for a definition outside the given theory. I take the main motivation for the axiomatic approach to be a desire to get a theory of truth within the given theory, where Tarski's Theorem says traditional approaches are just wrong. |
10153 | In everyday language, truth seems indefinable, inconsistent, and illogical [Tarski] |
Full Idea: In everyday language it seems impossible to define the notion of truth or even to use this notion in a consistent manner and in agreement with the laws of logic. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (works [1936]), quoted by Feferman / Feferman - Alfred Tarski: life and logic Int III | |
A reaction: [1935] See Logic|Theory of Logic|Semantics of Logic for Tarski's approach to truth. |
15342 | Tarski proved that any reasonably expressive language suffers from the liar paradox [Tarski, by Horsten] |
Full Idea: Tarski's Theorem on the undefinability of truth says in a language sufficiently rich to talk about itself (which Gödel proved possible, via coding) the liar paradox can be carried out. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Leon Horsten - The Tarskian Turn 02.2 | |
A reaction: The point is that truth is formally indefinable if it leads inescapably to contradiction, which the liar paradox does. This theorem is the motivation for all modern attempts to give a rigorous account of truth. |
19069 | 'True sentence' has no use consistent with logic and ordinary language, so definition seems hopeless [Tarski] |
Full Idea: The possibility of a consistent use of 'true sentence' which is in harmony with the laws of logic and the spirit of everyday language seems to be very questionable, so the same doubt attaches to the possibility of constructing a correct definition. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933], §1) | |
A reaction: This is often cited as Tarski having conclusively proved that 'true' cannot be defined from within a language, but his language here is much more circumspect. Modern critics say the claim depends entirely on classical logic. |
19178 | Definitions of truth should not introduce a new version of the concept, but capture the old one [Tarski] |
Full Idea: The desired definition of truth does not aim to specify the meaning of a familiar word used to denote a novel notion; on the contrary, it aims to catch hold of the actual meaning of an old notion. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 01) | |
A reaction: Tarski refers back to Aristotle for an account of the 'old notion'. To many the definition of Tarski looks very weird, so it is important to see that he is trying to capture the original concept. |
19177 | A definition of truth should be materially adequate and formally correct [Tarski] |
Full Idea: The main problem of the notion of truth is to give a satisfactory definition which is materially adequate and formally correct. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 01) | |
A reaction: That is, I take it, that it covers all cases of being true and failing to be true, and it fits in with the logic. The logic is explicitly classical logic, and he is not aiming to give the 'nature' or natural language understanding of the concept. |
19186 | A rigorous definition of truth is only possible in an exactly specified language [Tarski] |
Full Idea: The problem of the definition of truth obtains a precise meaning and can be solved in a rigorous way only for those languages whose structure has been exactly specified. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 06) | |
A reaction: Taski has just stated how to exactly specify the structure of a language. He says definition can only be vague and approximate for natural languages. (The usual criticism of the correspondence theory is its vagueness). |
19194 | We may eventually need to split the word 'true' into several less ambiguous terms [Tarski] |
Full Idea: A time may come when we find ourselves confronted with several incompatible, but equally clear and precise, conceptions of truth. It will then become necessary to abandon the ambiguous usage of the word 'true', and introduce several terms instead. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 14) | |
A reaction: There may be a whiff of the pragmatic attitude to truth here, though that view is not necessarily pluralist. Analytic philosophy needs much more splitting of difficult terms into several more focused terms. |
16296 | Tarski's Theorem renders any precise version of correspondence impossible [Tarski, by Halbach] |
Full Idea: Tarski's Theorem applies to any sufficient precise version of the correspondence theory of truth, and all the other traditional theories of truth. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Volker Halbach - Axiomatic Theories of Truth 1 | |
A reaction: This is the key reason why modern thinkers have largely dropped talk of the correspondence theory. See Idea 16295. |
19196 | Scheme (T) is not a definition of truth [Tarski] |
Full Idea: It is a mistake to regard scheme (T) as a definition of truth. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 15) | |
A reaction: The point is, I take it, that the definition is the multitude of sentences which are generated by the schema, not the schema itself. |
15339 | Tarski gave up on the essence of truth, and asked how truth is used, or how it functions [Tarski, by Horsten] |
Full Idea: Tarski emancipated truth theory from traditional philosophy, by no longer posing Pilate's question (what is truth? or what is the essence of truth?) but instead 'how is truth used?', 'how does truth function?' and 'how can its functioning be described?'. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Leon Horsten - The Tarskian Turn 02.2 | |
A reaction: Horsten, later in the book, does not give up on the essence of truth, and modern theorists are trying to get back to that question by following Tarski's formal route. Modern analytic philosophy at its best, it seems to me. |
16302 | Tarski did not just aim at a definition; he also offered an adequacy criterion for any truth definition [Tarski, by Halbach] |
Full Idea: Tarski did not settle for a definition of truth, taking its adequacy for granted. Rather he proposed an adequacy criterion for evaluating the adequacy of definitions of truth. The criterion is his famous Convention T. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Volker Halbach - Axiomatic Theories of Truth 3 | |
A reaction: Convention T famously says the sentence is true if and only if a description of the sentence is equivalent to affirming the sentence. 'Snow is white' iff snow is white. |
19135 | Tarski enumerates cases of truth, so it can't be applied to new words or languages [Davidson on Tarski] |
Full Idea: Tarski does not tell us how to apply his concept of truth to a new case, whether the new case is a new language or a word newly added to a language. This is because enumerating cases gives no clue for the next or general case. | |
From: comment on Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 1 | |
A reaction: His account has been compared to a telephone directory. We aim to understand the essence of anything, so that we can fully know it, and explain and predict how it will behave. Either truth is primitive, or I demand to know its essence. |
19138 | Tarski define truths by giving the extension of the predicate, rather than the meaning [Davidson on Tarski] |
Full Idea: Tarski defined the class of true sentences by giving the extension of the truth predicate, but he did not give the meaning. | |
From: comment on Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 1 | |
A reaction: This is analogous to giving an account of the predicate 'red' as the set of red objects. Since I regard that as a hopeless definition of 'red', I am inclined to think the same of Tarski's account of truth. It works in the logic, but so what? |
4699 | Tarski made truth relative, by only defining truth within some given artificial language [Tarski, by O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Tarski's account doesn't hold for natural languages. The general notion of truth is replaced by "true-in-L", where L is a formal language. Hence truth is relativized to each artificial language. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Paul O'Grady - Relativism Ch.2 | |
A reaction: This is a pretty good indication that Tarski's theory is NOT a correspondence theory, even if its structure may sometimes give that impression. |
19324 | Tarski has to avoid stating how truths relate to states of affairs [Kirkham on Tarski] |
Full Idea: Tarski has to define truths so as not to make explicit the relation between a true sentence and an obtaining state of affairs. ...He has to list each sentence separately, and simply assign it a state of affairs. | |
From: comment on Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Richard L. Kirkham - Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction 5.8 | |
A reaction: He has to avoid semantic concepts like 'reference', because he wants a physicalist theory, according to Kirkham. Thus the hot interest in theories of reference in the 1970s/80s. And also attempts to give a physicalist account of meaning. |
10672 | Tarskian semantics says that a sentence is true iff it is satisfied by every sequence [Tarski, by Hossack] |
Full Idea: Tarskian semantics says that a sentence is true iff it is satisfied by every sequence, where a sequence is a set-theoretic individual, a set of ordered pairs each with a natural number as its first element and an object from the domain for its second. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Keith Hossack - Plurals and Complexes 3 |
13338 | '"It is snowing" is true if and only if it is snowing' is a partial definition of the concept of truth [Tarski] |
Full Idea: Statements of the form '"it is snowing" is true if and only if it is snowing' and '"the world war will begin in 1963" is true if and only if the world war will being in 1963' can be regarded as partial definitions of the concept of truth. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Establishment of Scientific Semantics [1936], p.404) | |
A reaction: The key word here is 'partial'. Truth is defined, presumably, when every such translation from the object language has been articulated, which is presumably impossible, given the infinity of concatenated phrases possible in a sentence. |
19180 | It is convenient to attach 'true' to sentences, and hence the language must be specified [Tarski] |
Full Idea: For several reasons it appears most convenient to apply the term 'true' to sentences, and we shall follow this course. Consequently, we must always relate the notion of truth, like that of a sentence, to a specific language. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 02) | |
A reaction: Personally I take truth to attach to propositions, since sentences are ambiguous. In Idea 17308 the one sentence expresses three different truths (in my opinion), even though a single sentence (given in the object language) specifies it. |
19181 | In the classical concept of truth, 'snow is white' is true if snow is white [Tarski] |
Full Idea: If we base ourselves on the classical conception of truth, we shall say that the sentence 'snow is white' is true if snow is white, and it is false if snow is not white. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 04) | |
A reaction: I had not realised, prior to his, how closely Tarski is sticking to Aristotle's famous formulation of truth. The point is that you can only specify 'what is' using a language. Putting 'true' in the metalanguage gives specific content to Aristotle. |
19183 | Each interpreted T-sentence is a partial definition of truth; the whole definition is their conjunction [Tarski] |
Full Idea: In 'X is true iff p' if we replace X by the name of a sentence and p by a particular sentence this can be considered a partial definition of truth. The whole definition has to be ...a logical conjunction of all these partial definitions. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 04) | |
A reaction: This seems an unprecedented and odd way to define something. Define 'red' by '"This tomato is red" iff this tomato is red', etc? Define 'stone' by collecting together all the stones? The complex T-sentences are infinite in number. |
19182 | Use 'true' so that all T-sentences can be asserted, and the definition will then be 'adequate' [Tarski] |
Full Idea: We wish to use the term 'true' in such a way that all the equivalences of the form (T) [i.e. X is true iff p] can be asserted, and we shall call a definition of truth 'adequate' if all these equivalences follow from it. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 04) | |
A reaction: The interpretation of Tarski's theory is difficult. From this I'm thinking that 'true' is simply being defined as 'assertible'. This is the status of each line in a logical proof, if there is a semantic dimension to the proof (and not mere syntax). |
19198 | We don't give conditions for asserting 'snow is white'; just that assertion implies 'snow is white' is true [Tarski] |
Full Idea: Semantic truth implies nothing regarding the conditions under which 'snow is white' can be asserted. It implies only that, whenever we assert or reject this sentence, we must be ready to assert or reject the correlated sentence '"snow is white" is true'. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 18) | |
A reaction: This appears to identify truth with assertibility, which is pretty much what modern pragmatists say. How do you distinguish 'genuine' assertion from rhetorical, teasing or lying assertions? Genuine assertion implies truth? Hm. |
15410 | Truth only applies to closed formulas, but we need satisfaction of open formulas to define it [Burgess on Tarski] |
Full Idea: In Tarski's theory of truth, although the notion of truth is applicable only to closed formulas, to define it we must define a more general notion of satisfaction applicable to open formulas. | |
From: comment on Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by John P. Burgess - Philosophical Logic 1.8 | |
A reaction: This is a helpful pointer to what is going on in the Tarski definition. It culminates in the 'satisfaction of all sequences', which presumable delivers the required closed formula. |
18811 | Tarski uses sentential functions; truly assigning the objects to variables is what satisfies them [Tarski, by Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: Tarski invoked the notion of a sentential function, where components are replaced by appropriate variables. A function is then satisfied by assigning objects to variables. An assignment satisfies if the function is true of the things assigned. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Ian Rumfitt - The Boundary Stones of Thought 3.2 | |
A reaction: [very compressed] This use of sentential functions, rather than sentences, looks like the key to Tarski's definition of truth. |
15365 | We can define the truth predicate using 'true of' (satisfaction) for variables and some objects [Tarski, by Horsten] |
Full Idea: The truth predicate, says Tarski, should be defined in terms of the more primitive satisfaction relation: the relation of being 'true of'. The fundamental notion is a formula (containing the free variables) being true of a sequence of objects as values. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Leon Horsten - The Tarskian Turn 06.3 |
19314 | For physicalism, reduce truth to satisfaction, then define satisfaction as physical-plus-logic [Tarski, by Kirkham] |
Full Idea: Tarski, a physicalist, reduced semantics to physical and/or logicomathematical concepts. He defined all semantic concepts, save satisfaction, in terms of truth. Then truth is defined in terms of satisfaction, and satisfaction is given non-semantically. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Richard L. Kirkham - Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction 5.1 | |
A reaction: The term 'logicomathematical' is intended to cover set theory. Kirkham says you can remove these restrictions from Tarski's theory, and the result is a version of the correspondence theory. |
19316 | Insight: don't use truth, use a property which can be compositional in complex quantified sentence [Tarski, by Kirkham] |
Full Idea: Tarski's great insight is find another property, since open sentences are not truth. It must be had by open and genuine sentences. Clauses having it must generate it for the whole sentence. Truth can be defined for sentences by using it. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Richard L. Kirkham - Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction 5.4 | |
A reaction: The proposed property is 'satisfaction', which can (unlike truth) be a feature open sentences (such as 'x is green', which is satisfied by x='grass'), |
19175 | Tarski gave axioms for satisfaction, then derived its explicit definition, which led to defining truth [Tarski, by Davidson] |
Full Idea: Tarski turned his axiomatic characterisation of satisfaction into an explicit definition of the satisfaction-predicate using some fancy set theoretical apparatus, and this in turn leads to the explicit definition of the truth predicate. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 7 |
19184 | The best truth definition involves other semantic notions, like satisfaction (relating terms and objects) [Tarski] |
Full Idea: It turns out that the simplest and most natural way of obtaining an exact definition of truth is one which involves the use of other semantic notions, e.g. the notion of satisfaction (...which expresses relations between expressions and objects). | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 05) | |
A reaction: While the T-sentences appear to be 'minimal' and 'deflationary', it seems important to remember that 'satisfaction', which is basic to his theory, is a very robust notion. He actually mentions 'objects'. But see Idea 19185. |
19191 | Specify satisfaction for simple sentences, then compounds; true sentences are satisfied by all objects [Tarski] |
Full Idea: To define satisfaction we indicate which objects satisfy the simplest sentential functions, then state the conditions for compound functions. This applies automatically to sentences (with no free variables) so a true sentence is satisfied by all objects. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 11) | |
A reaction: I presume nothing in the domain of objects can conflict with a sentence that has been satisfied by some of them, so 'all' the objects satisfy the sentence. Tarski doesn't use the word 'domain'. Basic satisfaction seems to be stipulated. |
19188 | We can't use a semantically closed language, or ditch our logic, so a meta-language is needed [Tarski] |
Full Idea: In a 'semantically closed' language all sentences which determine the adequate usage of 'true' can be asserted in the language. ...We can't change our logic, so we reject such languages. ...So must use two different languages to discuss truth. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 08-09) | |
A reaction: This section explains why a meta-language is required. It rests entirely on the existence of the Liar paradox is a semantically closed language. |
19189 | The metalanguage must contain the object language, logic, and defined semantics [Tarski] |
Full Idea: Every sentence which occurs in the object language must also occur in the metalanguage, or can be translated into the metalanguage. There must also be logical terms, ...and semantic terms can only be introduced in the metalanguage by definition. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 09) | |
A reaction: He suggest that if the languages are 'typed', the meta-languag, to be 'richer', must contain variables of a higher logica type. Does this mean second-order logic? |
10969 | Tarski had a theory of truth, and a theory of theories of truth [Tarski, by Read] |
Full Idea: Besides a theory of truth of his own, Tarski developed a theory of theories of truth. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.1 | |
A reaction: The famous snow biconditional is the latter, and the recursive account based on satisfaction is the former. |
17746 | Tarski's 'truth' is a precise relation between the language and its semantics [Tarski, by Walicki] |
Full Idea: Tarski's analysis of the concept of 'truth' ...is given a precise treatment as a particular relation between syntax (language) and semantics (the world). | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Michal Walicki - Introduction to Mathematical Logic History E.1 | |
A reaction: My problem is that the concept of truth seems to apply to animal minds, which are capable of making right or wrong judgements, and of realising their errors. Tarski didn't make universal claims for his account. |
10904 | Tarskian truth neglects the atomic sentences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith on Tarski] |
Full Idea: The Tarskian account of truth neglects the atomic sentences. | |
From: comment on Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Mulligan/Simons/Smith - Truth-makers §1 | |
A reaction: Yes! The whole Tarskian edifice is built on a foundation which it is taboo even to mention. If truth is just the assignment of 'T' and 'F', that isn't even the beginnings of a theory of 'truth'. |
2571 | Tarski says that his semantic theory of truth is completely neutral about all metaphysics [Tarski, by Haack] |
Full Idea: Tarski says "we may remain naďve realists or idealists, empiricists or metaphysicians… The semantic conception is completely neutral toward all these issues." | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Susan Haack - Philosophy of Logics 7.5 |
10821 | Physicalists should explain reference nonsemantically, rather than getting rid of it [Tarski, by Field,H] |
Full Idea: Tarski work was to persuade physicalist that eliminating semantics was on the wrong track, and that we should explicate notions in the theory of reference nonsemantically rather than simply get rid of them. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Hartry Field - Tarski's Theory of Truth §3 |
10822 | A physicalist account must add primitive reference to Tarski's theory [Field,H on Tarski] |
Full Idea: We need to add theories of primitive reference to Tarski's account if we are to establish the notion of truth as a physicalistically acceptable notion. | |
From: comment on Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Hartry Field - Tarski's Theory of Truth §4 | |
A reaction: This is the main point of Field's paper, and sounds very plausible to me. There is something major missing from Tarski, and at some point there needs to be a 'primitive' notion of thought and language making contact with the world, as it can't be proved. |
10824 | If listing equivalences is a reduction of truth, witchcraft is just a list of witch-victim pairs [Field,H on Tarski] |
Full Idea: By similar standards of reduction to Tarski's, one might prove witchcraft compatible with physicalism, as long as witches cast only a finite number of spells. We merely list witch-and-victim pairs, with no mention of the terms of witchcraft theory. | |
From: comment on Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 04) by Hartry Field - Tarski's Theory of Truth §4 |
19134 | Tarski defined truth for particular languages, but didn't define it across languages [Davidson on Tarski] |
Full Idea: Tarski defined various predicates of the form 's is true in L', each applicable to a single language, but he failed to define a predicate of the form 's is true in L' for variable 'L'. | |
From: comment on Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 1 | |
A reaction: You might say that no one defines 'tree' to be just 'in English', but we might define 'multiplies' to be in Peano Arithmetic. This indicates the limited and formal nature of what Tarski was trying to achieve. |
16303 | Tarski made truth respectable, by proving that it could be defined [Tarski, by Halbach] |
Full Idea: Tarski's proof of the definability of truth allowed him to establish truth as a respectable notion by his standards. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Volker Halbach - Axiomatic Theories of Truth 3 |
16304 | Tarski didn't capture the notion of an adequate truth definition, as Convention T won't prove non-contradiction [Halbach on Tarski] |
Full Idea: Every really adequate theory of truth should also prove the law of non-contradiction. Therefore Tarski's notion of adequacy in Convention T fails to capture the intuitive notion of adequacy he is after. | |
From: comment on Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Volker Halbach - Axiomatic Theories of Truth 3 | |
A reaction: Tarski points out this weakness, in a passage quoted by Halbach. This obviously raises the question of what truth theories should prove, and this is explored by Halbach. If they start to prove arithmetic, we get nervous. Non-contradiction and x-middle? |
19141 | Tarski thought axiomatic truth was too contingent, and in danger of inconsistencies [Tarski, by Davidson] |
Full Idea: Tarski preferred an explicit definition of truth to axioms. He says axioms have a rather accidental character, only a definition can guarantee the continued consistency of the system, and it keeps truth in harmony with physical science and physicalism. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (works [1936]) by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 2 n2 | |
A reaction: Davidson's summary, gleaned from various sources in Tarski. A big challenge for modern axiom systems is to avoid inconsistency, which is extremely hard to do (given that set theory is not sure of having achieved it). |
19190 | We need an undefined term 'true' in the meta-language, specified by axioms [Tarski] |
Full Idea: We have to include the term 'true', or some other semantic term, in the list of undefined terms of the meta-language, and to express fundamental properties of the notion of truth in a series of axioms. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 10) | |
A reaction: It sounds as if Tarski semantic theory gives truth for the object language, but then an axiomatic theory of truth is also needed for the metalanguage. Halbch and Horsten seem to want an axiomatic theory in the object language. |
16306 | Tarski defined truth, but an axiomatisation can be extracted from his inductive clauses [Tarski, by Halbach] |
Full Idea: Tarski preferred a definition of truth, but from that an axiomatisation can be extracted. His induction clauses can be turned into axioms. Hence he opened the way to axiomatic theories of truth. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Volker Halbach - Axiomatic Theories of Truth 3 |
15322 | Tarski's had the first axiomatic theory of truth that was minimally adequate [Tarski, by Horsten] |
Full Idea: Tarski's work is the earliest axiomatic theory of truth that meets minimal adequacy conditions. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Leon Horsten - The Tarskian Turn 01.1 | |
A reaction: This shows a way in which Tarski gave a new direction to the study of truth. Subsequent theories have been 'stronger'. |
19197 | Truth can't be eliminated from universal claims, or from particular unspecified claims [Tarski] |
Full Idea: Truth can't be eliminated from universal statements saying all sentences of a certain type are true, or from the proof that 'all consequences of true sentences are true'. It is also needed if we can't name the sentence ('Plato's first sentence is true'). | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 16) | |
A reaction: This points to the deflationary view of truth, if its only role is in talking about other sentences in this way. Tarski gives the standard reason for rejecting the Redundancy view. |
19185 | Semantics is a very modest discipline which solves no real problems [Tarski] |
Full Idea: Semantics as it is conceived in this paper is a sober and modest discipline which has no pretensions to being a universal patent-medicine for all the ills and diseases of mankind, whether imaginary or real. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 05) | |
A reaction: Written in 1944. This remark encourages the minimal or deflationary interpretation of his theory of truth, but see the robust use of 'satisfaction' in Idea 19184. |
19195 | Truth tables give prior conditions for logic, but are outside the system, and not definitions [Tarski] |
Full Idea: Logical sentences are often assigned preliminary conditions under which they are true or false (often given as truth tables). However, these are outside the system of logic, and should not be regarded as definitions of the terms involved. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 15) | |
A reaction: Hence, presumably, the connectives are primitives (with no nature or meaning), and the truth tables are axioms for their use? This opinion of Tarski's may have helped shift the preference towards natural deduction introduction and elimination rules. |
8625 | What physical facts could underlie 0 or 1, or very large numbers? [Frege on Mill] |
Full Idea: What in the world can be the observed fact, or the physical fact, which is asserted in the definition of the number 777864? ...What a pity that Mill did not also illustrate the physical facts underlying the numbers 0 and 1! | |
From: comment on John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843]) by Gottlob Frege - Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) §7 | |
A reaction: I still think patterns could be an empirical foundation for arithmetic, though you still have to grasp the abstract concept of the pattern. An innate capacity to spot resemblance gets you a long way. |
10152 | Set theory and logic are fairy tales, but still worth studying [Tarski] |
Full Idea: People have asked me, 'How can you, a nominalist, do work in set theory and in logic, which are theories about things you do not believe in?' ...I believe that there is a value even in fairy tales and the study of fairy tales. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (talk [1965]), quoted by Feferman / Feferman - Alfred Tarski: life and logic | |
A reaction: This is obviously an oversimplification. I don't think for a moment that Tarski literally believed that the study of fairy tales had as much value as the study of logic. Why do we have this particular logic, and not some other? |
10048 | There is no clear boundary between the logical and the non-logical [Tarski] |
Full Idea: No objective grounds are known to me which permit us to draw a sharp boundary between the two groups of terms, the logical and the non-logical. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (works [1936]), quoted by Alan Musgrave - Logicism Revisited §3 | |
A reaction: Musgrave is pointing out that this is bad news if you want to 'reduce' something like arithmetic to logic. 'Logic' is a vague object. |
13337 | A language: primitive terms, then definition rules, then sentences, then axioms, and finally inference rules [Tarski] |
Full Idea: For a language, we must enumerate the primitive terms, and the rules of definition for new terms. Then we must distinguish the sentences, and separate out the axioms from amng them, and finally add rules of inference. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Establishment of Scientific Semantics [1936], p.402) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This lays down the standard modern procedure for defining a logical language. Once all of this is in place, we then add a semantics and we are in business. Natural deduction tries to do without the axioms. |
18812 | Split out the logical vocabulary, make an assignment to the rest. It's logical if premises and conclusion match [Tarski, by Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: Tarski made a division of logical and non-logical vocabulary. He then defined a model as a non-logical assignment satisfying the corresponding sentential function. Then a conclusion follows logically if every model of the premises models the conclusion. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Logical Consequence [1936]) by Ian Rumfitt - The Boundary Stones of Thought 3.2 | |
A reaction: [compressed] This is Tarski's account of logical consequence, which follows on from his account of truth. 'Logical validity' is then 'true in every model'. Rumfitt doubts whether Tarski has given the meaning of 'logical consequence'. |
10694 | Logical consequence is when in any model in which the premises are true, the conclusion is true [Tarski, by Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: Tarski's 1936 definition of logical consequence is that in any model in which the premises are true, the conclusion is true too (so that no model can make the conclusion false). | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (works [1936]) by JC Beall / G Restall - Logical Consequence 3 | |
A reaction: So the general idea is that a logical consequence is distinguished by being unstoppable. Sounds good. But then we have monotonic and non-monotonic logics, which (I'm guessing) embody different notions of consequence. |
10479 | Logical consequence: true premises give true conclusions under all interpretations [Tarski, by Hodges,W] |
Full Idea: Tarski's definition of logical consequence (1936) is that in a fully interpreted formal language an argument is valid iff under any allowed interpretation of its nonlogical symbols, if the premises are true then so is the conclusion. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (works [1936]) by Wilfrid Hodges - Model Theory 3 | |
A reaction: The idea that you can only make these claims 'under an interpretation' seems to have had a huge influence on later philosophical thinking. |
13344 | X follows from sentences K iff every model of K also models X [Tarski] |
Full Idea: The sentence X follows logically from the sentences of the class K if and only if every model of the class K is also a model of the sentence X. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Logical Consequence [1936], p.417) | |
A reaction: [see Idea 13343 for his account of a 'model'] He is offering to define logical consequence in general, but this definition fits what we now call 'semantic consequence', written |=. This it is standard practice to read |= as 'models'. |
19192 | The truth definition proves semantic contradiction and excluded middle laws (not the logic laws) [Tarski] |
Full Idea: With our definition of truth we can prove the laws of contradiction and excluded middle. These semantic laws should not be identified with the related logical laws, which belong to the sentential calculus, and do not involve 'true' at all. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 12) | |
A reaction: Very illuminating. I wish modern thinkers could be so clear about this matter. The logic contains 'P or not-P'. The semantics contains 'P is either true or false'. Critics say Tarski has presupposed 'classical' logic. |
18759 | Identity is invariant under arbitrary permutations, so it seems to be a logical term [Tarski, by McGee] |
Full Idea: Tarski showed that the only binary relations invariant under arbitrary permutations are the universal relation, the empty relation, identity and non-identity, thus giving us a reason to include '=' among the logical terms. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Vann McGee - Logical Consequence 6 | |
A reaction: Tarski was looking for a criterion to distinguish logical from non-logical terms, since his account of logical validity depended on it. This idea lies behind whether a logic is or is not specified to be 'with identity' (i.e. using '='). |
17895 | Combining two distinct assertions does not necessarily lead to a single 'complex proposition' [Mill] |
Full Idea: In 'Caesar is dead, and Brutus is alive' ...there are here two distinct assertions; and we might as well call a street a complex house, as these two propositions a complex proposition. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], 1.04.3) | |
A reaction: Arthur Prior, in his article on 'tonk', cites this to claim that the mere account of the and-introduction rule does not guarantee the existence of any conjunctive proposition that can result from it. Mill says you are adding a third proposition. |
10427 | All names are names of something, real or imaginary [Mill] |
Full Idea: All names are names of something, real or imaginary. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], p.32), quoted by Mark Sainsbury - The Essence of Reference 18.2 | |
A reaction: Mill's example of of being like a chalk mark on a door, but Sainsbury points out that names can be detached from bearers in a way that chalk marks can't. |
4944 | Mill says names have denotation but not connotation [Mill, by Kripke] |
Full Idea: It is a well known doctrine of Mill that names have denotation but not connotation. | |
From: report of John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843]) by Saul A. Kripke - Naming and Necessity lectures Lecture 1 | |
A reaction: A nice starting point for any discussion of the topic. The obvious response is that a name like 'Attila the Hun' seems to have a very vague denotation for most of us, but a rather powerful connotation. |
7762 | Proper names are just labels for persons or objects, and the meaning is the object [Mill, by Lycan] |
Full Idea: Mill seemed to defend the view that proper names are merely labels for individual persons or objects, and contribute no more than those individuals themselves to the meanings of sentences in which they occur. | |
From: report of John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language | |
A reaction: Identity statements can become trivial on this view ('Twain is Clemens'). Modern views have become more sympathetic to Mill, since externalism places meanings outside the head of the speaker. |
10823 | A name denotes an object if the object satisfies a particular sentential function [Tarski] |
Full Idea: To say that the name x denotes a given object a is the same as to stipulate that the object a ... satisfies a sentential function of a particular type. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933], p.194) |
18756 | Tarski built a compositional semantics for predicate logic, from dependent satisfactions [Tarski, by McGee] |
Full Idea: Tarski discovered how to give a compositional semantics for predicate calculus, defining truth in terms of satisfaction, and showing how satisfaction for a complicated formula depends on satisfaction of the simple subformulas. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Vann McGee - Logical Consequence 4 | |
A reaction: The problem was that the subformulas may contain free variables, and thus not be sentences with truth values. 'Satisfaction' can handle this, where 'truth' cannot (I think). |
19313 | Tarksi invented the first semantics for predicate logic, using this conception of truth [Tarski, by Kirkham] |
Full Idea: Tarski invented a formal semantics for quantified predicate logic, the logic of reasoning about mathematics. The heart of this great accomplishment is his theory of truth. It has been called semantic 'theory' of truth, but Tarski preferred 'conception'. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Richard L. Kirkham - Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction 5.1 |
13335 | Semantics is the concepts of connections of language to reality, such as denotation, definition and truth [Tarski] |
Full Idea: Semantics is the totality of considerations concerning concepts which express connections between expressions of a language and objects and states of affairs referred to by these expressions. Examples are denotation, satisfaction, definition and truth. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Establishment of Scientific Semantics [1936], p.401) | |
A reaction: Interestingly, he notes that it 'is not commonly recognised' that truth is part of semantics. Nowadays truth seems to be the central concept in most semantics. |
13336 | A language containing its own semantics is inconsistent - but we can use a second language [Tarski] |
Full Idea: People have not been aware that the language about which we speak need by no means coincide with the language in which we speak. ..But the language which contains its own semantics must inevitably be inconsistent. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Establishment of Scientific Semantics [1936], p.402) | |
A reaction: It seems that Tarski was driven to propose the metalanguage approach mainly by the Liar Paradox. |
13339 | A sentence is satisfied when we can assert the sentence when the variables are assigned [Tarski] |
Full Idea: Here is a partial definition of the concept of satisfaction: John and Peter satisfy the sentential function 'X and Y are brothers' if and only if John and Peter are brothers. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Establishment of Scientific Semantics [1936], p.405) | |
A reaction: Satisfaction applies to open sentences and truth to closed sentences (with named objects). He uses the notion of total satisfaction to define truth. The example is a partial definition, not just an illustration. |
13340 | Satisfaction is the easiest semantical concept to define, and the others will reduce to it [Tarski] |
Full Idea: It has been found useful in defining semantical concepts to deal first with the concept of satisfaction; both because the definition of this concept presents relatively few difficulties, and because the other semantical concepts are easily reduced to it. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Establishment of Scientific Semantics [1936], p.406) | |
A reaction: See Idea 13339 for his explanation of satisfaction. We just say that a open sentence is 'acceptable' or 'assertible' (or even 'true') when particular values are assigned to the variables. Then sentence is then 'satisfied'. |
13343 | A 'model' is a sequence of objects which satisfies a complete set of sentential functions [Tarski] |
Full Idea: An arbitrary sequence of objects which satisfies every sentential function of the sentences L' will be called a 'model' or realization of the class L of sentences. There can also be a model of a single sentence is this way. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Logical Consequence [1936], p.417) | |
A reaction: [L' is L with the constants replaced by variables] Tarski is the originator of model theory, which is central to modern logic. The word 'realization' is a helpful indicator of what he has in mind. A model begins to look like a possible world. |
16323 | The object language/ metalanguage distinction is the basis of model theory [Tarski, by Halbach] |
Full Idea: Tarski's distinction between object and metalanguage forms the basis of model theory. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Volker Halbach - Axiomatic Theories of Truth 11 |
13341 | Using the definition of truth, we can prove theories consistent within sound logics [Tarski] |
Full Idea: Using the definition of truth we are in a position to carry out the proof of consistency for deductive theories in which only (materially) true sentences are (formally) provable. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Establishment of Scientific Semantics [1936], p.407) | |
A reaction: This is evidently what Tarski saw as the most important first fruit of his new semantic theory of truth. |
8940 | Tarski avoids the Liar Paradox, because truth cannot be asserted within the object language [Tarski, by Fisher] |
Full Idea: In Tarski's account of truth, self-reference (as found in the Liar Paradox) is prevented because the truth predicate for any given object language is never a part of that object language, and so a sentence can never predicate truth of itself. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Jennifer Fisher - On the Philosophy of Logic 03.I | |
A reaction: Thus we solve the Liar Paradox by ruling that 'you are not allowed to say that'. Hm. The slightly odd result is that in any conversation about whether p is true, we end up using (logically speaking) two different languages simultaneously. Hm. |
19187 | The Liar makes us assert a false sentence, so it must be taken seriously [Tarski] |
Full Idea: In my judgement, it would be quite wrong and dangerous from the point of view of scientific progress to depreciate the importance of nhtinomies like the Liar Paradox, and treat them as jokes. The fact is we have been compelled to assert a false sentence. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 07) | |
A reaction: This is the heartfelt cry of the perfectionist, who wants everything under control. It was the dream of the age of Frege to Hilbert, which gradually eroded after Gödel's Incompleteness proof. Short ordinary folk panic about the Liar? |
9801 | Numbers must be assumed to have identical units, as horses are equalised in 'horse-power' [Mill] |
Full Idea: There is one hypothetical element in the basis of arithmetic, without which none of it would be true: all the numbers are numbers of the same or of equal units. When we talk of forty horse-power, we assume all horses are of equal strength. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], 2.6.3) | |
A reaction: Of course, horses are not all of equal strength, so there is a problem here for your hard-line empiricist. Mill needs processes of idealisation and abstraction before his empirical arithmetic can get off the ground. |
10157 | Tarski improved Hilbert's geometry axioms, and without set-theory [Tarski, by Feferman/Feferman] |
Full Idea: Tarski found an elegant new axiom system for Euclidean geometry that improved Hilbert's earlier version - and he formulated it without the use of set-theoretical notions. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (works [1936]) by Feferman / Feferman - Alfred Tarski: life and logic Ch.9 |
8742 | The only axioms needed are for equality, addition, and successive numbers [Mill, by Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Mill says arithmetic has two axioms, that 'things which are equal to the same thing are equal to each other', and 'equals added to equals make equal sums', plus a definition for each numeral as 'formed by the addition of a unit to the previous number'. | |
From: report of John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], p.610?) by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 4.3 | |
A reaction: The difficulty here seems to be the definition of 1, and (even worse for an empiricist), of 0. Then he may have a little trouble when he reaches infinity. |
9800 | Arithmetic is based on definitions, and Sums of equals are equal, and Differences of equals are equal [Mill] |
Full Idea: The inductions of arithmetic are based on so-called definitions (such as '2 and 1 are three'), and on two axioms: The sums of equals are equal, The differences of equals are equal. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], 2.6.3) | |
A reaction: These are axioms for arithmetical operations, rather than for numbers themselves (which, for Mill, do not require axioms as they are empirically derived). |
5201 | Mill says logic and maths is induction based on a very large number of instances [Mill, by Ayer] |
Full Idea: Mill maintained that the truths of logic and mathematics are not necessary or certain, by saying these propositions are inductive generalisations based on an extremely large number of instances. | |
From: report of John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843]) by A.J. Ayer - Language,Truth and Logic Ch.4 | |
A reaction: Ayer asserts that they are necessary (but only because they are tautological). I like the idea that maths is the 'science of patterns', but that might lead from an empirical start to a rationalist belief in a priori synthetic truths. |
9360 | If two black and two white objects in practice produced five, what colour is the fifth one? [Lewis,CI on Mill] |
Full Idea: If Mill has a demon who, every time two things are brought together with two other things, always introduces a fifth, then if two black marbles and two white ones are put in an urn, the demon could choose his color, but there would be more of one colour. | |
From: comment on John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843]) by C.I. Lewis - A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori p.367 | |
A reaction: Nice to see philosophers fighting back against demons. This is a lovely argument against the absurdity of thinking that experience could ever controvert a priori knowledge (though Lewis is no great fan of the latter). |
9888 | Mill mistakes particular applications as integral to arithmetic, instead of general patterns [Dummett on Mill] |
Full Idea: Mill's mistake is taking particular applications as integral to the sense of arithmetical propositions. But what is integral to arithmetic is the general principle that explains its applicability, and determines the pattern of particular applications. | |
From: comment on John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], 2.6) by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics Ch.20 | |
A reaction: [Dummett is summarising Frege's view] Sounds like a tidy objection, but you still have to connect the general principles and patterns to the physical world. 'Structure' could be the magic word to achieve this. |
9794 | There are no such things as numbers in the abstract [Mill] |
Full Idea: There are no such things as numbers in the abstract. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], 2.6.2) | |
A reaction: Depends. Would we want to say that 'horses don't exist' (although each individual horse does exist)? It sounds odd to say of an idea that it doesn't exist, when you are currently thinking about it. I am, however, sympathetic to Mill. |
9796 | Things possess the properties of numbers, as quantity, and as countable parts [Mill] |
Full Idea: All things possess quantity; consist of parts which can be numbered; and in that character possess all the properties which are called properties of numbers. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], 2.6.2) | |
A reaction: Here Mill is skating on the very thinnest of ice, and I find myself reluctantly siding with Frege. It is a very optimistic empiricist who hopes to find the numbers actually occurring as properties of experienced objects. A pack of cards, for example. |
9795 | Numbers have generalised application to entities (such as bodies or sounds) [Mill] |
Full Idea: 'Ten' must mean ten bodies, or ten sounds, or ten beatings of the pulse. But though numbers must be numbers of something, they may be numbers of anything. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], 2.6.2) | |
A reaction: Mill always prefers things in close proximity, in space or time. 'I've had ten headaches in the last year'. 'There are ten reasons for doubting p'. His second point puts him very close to Aristotle in his view. |
9798 | Different parcels made from three pebbles produce different actual sensations [Mill] |
Full Idea: Three pebbles make different sense impressions in one parcel or in two. That the same pebbles by an alteration of place and arrangement may be made to produce either sensation is not the identical proposition. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], 2.6.2) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Not quite clear, but Mill seems to be adamant that we really must experience the separation, and not just think what 'may' happen, so Frege is right that Mill is lucky that everything is not 'nailed down'. |
9797 | '2 pebbles and 1 pebble' and '3 pebbles' name the same aggregation, but different facts [Mill] |
Full Idea: The expressions '2 pebbles and 1 pebble' and '3 pebbles' stand for the same aggregation of objects, but do not stand for the same physical fact. They name the same objects in different states, 'denoting' the same things, with different 'connotations'. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], 2.6.2) | |
A reaction: Nothing in this would convert me from the analytic view to the empirical view of simple arithmetic, if I were that way inclined. Personally I think of three pebbles as 4 minus 1, because I am haunted by the thought of a missing stone. |
9799 | 3=2+1 presupposes collections of objects ('Threes'), which may be divided thus [Mill] |
Full Idea: 'Three is two and one' presupposes that collections of objects exist, which while they impress the senses thus, ¶¶¶, may be separated into two parts, thus, ¶¶ ¶. This being granted, we term all such parcels Threes. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], 2.6.2) | |
A reaction: Mill is clearly in trouble here because he sticks to simple arithmetic. He must deal with parcels too big for humans to count, and parcels so big that they could not naturally exist, and that is before you even reach infinite parcels. |
9802 | Numbers denote physical properties of physical phenomena [Mill] |
Full Idea: The fact asserted in the definition of a number is a physical fact. Each of the numbers two, three, four denotes physical phenomena, and connotes a physical property of those phenomena. Two denotes all pairs of things, and twelve all dozens. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], 3.24.5) | |
A reaction: The least plausible part of Mill's thesis. Is the fact that a pair of things is fewer than five things also a property? You see two boots, or you see a pair of boots, depending partly on you. Is pure two a visible property? Courage and an onion? |
9803 | We can't easily distinguish 102 horses from 103, but we could arrange them to make it obvious [Mill] |
Full Idea: 102 horses are not as easily distinguished from 103 as two are from three, yet the horses may be so placed that a difference will be perceptible. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], 3.24.5) | |
A reaction: More trouble for Mill. We are now moving from the claim that we actually perceive numbers to the claim that we could if we arranged things right. But we would still only see which group of horses was bigger by one, not how many horses there were. |
9804 | Arithmetical results give a mode of formation of a given number [Mill] |
Full Idea: Every statement of the result of an arithmetical operation is a statement of one of the modes of formation of a given number. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], 3.24.5) | |
A reaction: Although Mill sticks cautiously to very simple arithmetic, inviting empirical accounts of much higher mathematics, I think the phrase 'modes of formation' of numbers is very helpful. It could take us either into structuralism, or into constructivism. |
9805 | 12 is the cube of 1728 means pebbles can be aggregated a certain way [Mill] |
Full Idea: When we say 12 is the cube of 1728, we affirm that if we had sufficient pebbles, we put them into parcels or aggregates called twelves, and put those twelves into similar collections, and make twelve of these largests parcels, we have the aggregate 1728. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], 3.24.5) | |
A reaction: There is always hidden modal thinking in Mill's proposals, despite his longing to stick to actual experience. Imagination actually plays a much bigger role in his theory than sense experience does. |
8741 | Numbers must be of something; they don't exist as abstractions [Mill] |
Full Idea: All numbers must be numbers of something: there are no such things as numbers in the abstract. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], p.245?), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 4.3 | |
A reaction: This shows why the concept of 'abstraction' is such a deep problem. Numbers can't be properties of objects, because two boots can become one boot without changing the surviving boot. But why should abstractions have to 'exist'? |
12411 | Mill is too imprecise, and is restricted to simple arithmetic [Kitcher on Mill] |
Full Idea: The problem with Mill is that many of his formulations are imprecise, and he only considers the most rudimentary parts of arithmetic. | |
From: comment on John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843]) by Philip Kitcher - The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge Intro | |
A reaction: This is from a fan of Mill, trying to restore his approach in the face of the authoritative and crushing criticisms offered by Frege. I too am a fan of Mill's approach. Patterns can be discerned in arrangements of pebbles. Infinities are a problem. |
5656 | Empirical theories of arithmetic ignore zero, limit our maths, and need probability to get started [Frege on Mill] |
Full Idea: Mill does not give us a clue as to how to understand the number zero, he limits our mathematical knowledge to the limits of our experience, ..and induction can only give you probability, but that presupposes arithmetical laws. | |
From: comment on John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843]) by Gottlob Frege - Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) | |
A reaction: This summarises Frege's criticisms of Mill's empirical account of maths. I like 'maths is the science of patterns', in which case zero is just a late-introduced trick (it is hardly a Platonic Form!), and induction is the wrong account to give. |
9624 | Numbers are a very general property of objects [Mill, by Brown,JR] |
Full Idea: Mill held that numbers are a kind of very general property that objects possess. | |
From: report of John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], Ch.4) by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics | |
A reaction: Intuitively this sounds hopeless, because if you place one apple next to another you introduce 'two', but which apple has changed its property? Both? It seems to be a Cambridge change. It isn't a change that would bother the apples. Kitcher pursues this. |
10154 | Tarski's theory of truth shifted the approach away from syntax, to set theory and semantics [Feferman/Feferman on Tarski] |
Full Idea: Tarski's theory of truth has been most influential in eventually creating a shift from the entirely syntactic way of doing things in metamathematics (promoted by Hilbert in the 1920s, in his theory of proofs), towards a set-theoretical, semantic approach. | |
From: comment on Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Feferman / Feferman - Alfred Tarski: life and logic Int III |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
Full Idea: It seems unavoidable that the facts about logically necessary relations between levels of facts are themselves logically distinct further facts, irreducible to the microphysical facts. | |
From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C) | |
A reaction: I'm beginning to think that rejecting every theory of reality that is proposed by carefully exposing some infinite regress hidden in it is a rather lazy way to do philosophy. Almost as bad as rejecting anything if it can't be defined. |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
Full Idea: Logical supervenience, restricted to individuals, seems to imply strong reduction. It is said that where the B-facts logically supervene on the A-facts, the B-facts simply re-describe what the A-facts describe, and the B-facts come along 'for free'. | |
From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C) | |
A reaction: This seems to be taking 'logically' to mean 'analytically'. Presumably an entailment is logically supervenient on its premisses, and may therefore be very revealing, even if some people think such things are analytic. |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
Full Idea: The root intuition behind nonreductive materialism is that reality is composed of ontologically distinct layers or levels. …The upper levels depend on the physical without reducing to it. | |
From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], B) | |
A reaction: A nice clear statement of a view which I take to be false. This relationship is the sort of thing that drives people fishing for an account of it to use the word 'supervenience', which just says two things seem to hang out together. Fluffy materialism. |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
Full Idea: Jessica Wilson (1999) says what makes physicalist accounts different from emergentism etc. is that each individual causal power associated with a supervenient property is numerically identical with a causal power associated with its base property. | |
From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], n 11) | |
A reaction: Hence the key thought in so-called (serious, rather than self-evident) 'emergentism' is so-called 'downward causation', which I take to be an idle daydream. |
10151 | I am a deeply convinced nominalist [Tarski] |
Full Idea: I am a nominalist. This is a very deep conviction of mine. ...I am a tortured nominalist. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (talk [1965]), quoted by Feferman / Feferman - Alfred Tarski: life and logic Int I | |
A reaction: I too am of the nominalist persuasion, but I don't feel justified in such a strong commitment. |
9806 | Whatever is made up of parts is made up of parts of those parts [Mill] |
Full Idea: Whatever is made up of parts is made up of parts of those parts. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], 3.24.5) | |
A reaction: Mill considers this principle to be fundamental to the possibilities of arithmetic. Presumably he thought of it as an inductive inference from our dealings with physical objects. |
11156 | The essence is that without which a thing can neither be, nor be conceived to be [Mill] |
Full Idea: The essence of a thing was said to be that without which the thing could neither be, nor be conceived to be. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], 1.6.2) | |
A reaction: Fine cites this as the 'modal' account of essence, as opposed to the 'definitional' account. |
12190 | Necessity is what will be, despite any alternative suppositions whatever [Mill] |
Full Idea: That which is necessary, that which must be, means that which will be, whatever suppositions we may make in regard to all other things. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], 3.06.6) | |
A reaction: [Mill discusses causal necessity] This is quoted by McFetridge. This slightly firms up the definition as 'what has to be true', though it makes it dependent on our 'suppositions'. Presumably nothing beyond our powers of supposition could matter either. |
22623 | Necessity can only mean what must be, without conditions of any kind [Mill] |
Full Idea: If there be any meaning which confessedly belongs to the term necessity, it is unconditionalness. That which is necessary, that which must be, means that which will be whatever supposition we make with regard to other things. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], p.339 [1974 ed]), quoted by R.D. Ingthorsson - A Powerful Particulars View of Causation 5.3 | |
A reaction: 'It is necessary to leave now, if you want to catch the train' is a genuine type of necessity. Mill's type is probably Absolute necessity, to which nothing could make any difference. Or Metaphysical necessity, determined by all things. |
3583 | External objects are permanent possibilities of sensation [Mill] |
Full Idea: External objects are permanent possibilities of sensation. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Examination of Sir Wm Hamilton's Philosophy [1865]), quoted by Michael Williams - Problems of Knowledge Ch.9 |
16859 | Most perception is one-tenth observation and nine-tenths inference [Mill] |
Full Idea: In almost every act of our perceiving faculties, observation and inference are intimately blended. What we are said to observe is usually a compound result, of which one-tenth may be observation, and the remaining nine-tenths inference. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], 4.1.2), quoted by Peter Lipton - Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) 11 'The scientific' | |
A reaction: We seem to think that his kind of observation is a great realisation of twentieth century thought, but thoughtful empiricists spotted it much earlier. |
9082 | Clear concepts result from good observation, extensive experience, and accurate memory [Mill] |
Full Idea: The principle requisites of clear conceptions, are habits of attentive observation, an extensive experience, and a memory which receives and retains an exact image of what is observed. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], 4.2.5) | |
A reaction: Empiricists are always crying out for people to 'attend to the evidence', and this is the deeper reason why. Not only will one know the world better in a direct way, but one will actually think more clearly. Darwin is the perfect model for this. |
16860 | Inductive generalisation is more reliable than one of its instances; they can't all be wrong [Mill] |
Full Idea: A general proposition collected from particulars is often more certainly true than any one of the particular propositions from which, by an act of induction, it was inferred. It might be erroneous in any instance, but cannot be erroneous in all of them. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], 4.1.2), quoted by Peter Lipton - Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) 11 'The scientific' | |
A reaction: One anomaly can be ignored, but several can't, especially if the anomalies agree. |
16843 | Mill's methods (Difference,Agreement,Residues,Concomitance,Hypothesis) don't nail induction [Mill, by Lipton] |
Full Idea: The Method of Difference, and even the full four 'experimental methods' (Difference, Agreement, Residues and Concomitant Variations) are agreed on all sides to be incomplete accounts of inductive inference. Mill himself added the Method of Hypothesis. | |
From: report of John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], 3.14.4-5) by Peter Lipton - Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) 08 'Improved' | |
A reaction: If induction is just 'learning from experience' (my preferred definition) then there is unlikely to be a precise account of its methods. Mill seems to have done a lovely job. |
16845 | The whole theory of induction rests on causes [Mill] |
Full Idea: The notion of cause is the root of the whole theory of induction. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], 3.05.2), quoted by Peter Lipton - Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) 08 'From cause' | |
A reaction: This sounds much better to me than the Humean view that it rests on the psychology of regularity and habit. However, maybe Hume describes induction, and Mill is adding abduction (inference to the best explanation). |
17086 | Surprisingly, empiricists before Mill ignore explanation, which seems to transcend experience [Mill, by Ruben] |
Full Idea: It is surprising that no empiricist philosopher before Mill turned in an explicit way to the scrutiny of the concept of explanation, which had …every appearance of being experience-transcendent. | |
From: report of John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843]) by David-Hillel Ruben - Explaining Explanation Ch 4 | |
A reaction: Yes indeed! This is why explanation is absolutely basic, to philosophy and to human understanding. The whole of philosophy is a quest for explanations, so to be strictly empirical about it strikes me as crazy. |
17091 | Explanation is fitting of facts into ever more general patterns of regularity [Mill, by Ruben] |
Full Idea: For Mill, explanation was always the fitting of facts into ever more general patterns of regularity. | |
From: report of John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843]) by David-Hillel Ruben - Explaining Explanation Ch 6 | |
A reaction: This seems to nicely capture the standard empirical approach to explanation. If you say that this fitting in doesn't explain much, the answer (I think) is that this is the best we can do. |
16805 | Causal inference is by spotting either Agreements or Differences [Mill, by Lipton] |
Full Idea: The best known account of causal inference is Mill's Method of Agreement (only one antecedent is shared by the effects), and the Method of Difference (there is only one difference prior to the effect occurring or not occurring). | |
From: report of John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], 3.07) by Peter Lipton - Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) 01 'Descr' | |
A reaction: [my summary of Lipton's summary of Mill] |
16835 | The Methods of Difference and of Agreement are forms of inference to the best explanation [Mill, by Lipton] |
Full Idea: Like Mill's Method of Difference, applications of the Method of Agreement are naturally construed as inferences to the best explanation. | |
From: report of John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], 3.07/8) by Peter Lipton - Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) 06 'The Method' | |
A reaction: This sort of thoroughly sensible approach to understanding modes of investigation has been absurdly sidelined by the desire to 'deduce' observations from 'laws'. Scientific investigation is no different from enquiry in daily life. Where are my glasses? |
3537 | I judge others' feeling by analogy with my body and behaviour [Mill] |
Full Idea: I conclude other humans have feelings like me because they have bodies like mine (which I know in my case to be antecedent to feelings), and because they exhibit acts and outwards signs which I know in my own case to be caused by feelings. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Examination of Sir Wm Hamilton's Philosophy [1865], p.243), quoted by Keith T. Maslin - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind 8.2 | |
A reaction: It is hard to see anything further that can be added to the 'other minds' question. Behaviour is highly relevant (imagine meeting a human who talked like a robot), but so are bodies (imagine a tin box that talked like Marilyn Monroe). |
9079 | We can focus our minds on what is common to a whole class, neglecting other aspects [Mill] |
Full Idea: The voluntary power which the mind has, of attending to one part of what is present at any moment, and neglecting another part, enables us to be unaffected by anything in the idea which is not really common to the whole class. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], 4.2.1) | |
A reaction: There is a question for empiricists of whether abstraction is a 'voluntary' power or a mechanical one. Associationism presents it as more mechanical. I would say, with Mill, that it is a least partly voluntary, and even rational. |
9081 | We don't recognise comparisons by something in our minds; the concepts result from the comparisons [Mill] |
Full Idea: It is not a law of our intellect that in comparing things and noting their agreements we recognise as realized in the outward world something we already had in our minds. The conception found its way to us as the result of such a comparison. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], 4.2.2) | |
A reaction: He recognises, of course, that this gradually becomes a two-way process. In the physicalist view of things, it is not really of great importance which concepts are hard-wired, and which constructed culturally or through perception. |
9078 | The study of the nature of Abstract Ideas does not belong to logic, but to a different science [Mill] |
Full Idea: The metaphysical inquiry into the nature and composition of what have been called Abstract Ideas, or in other words, of the notions which answer in the mind to classes and to general names, belongs not to Logic, but to a different science. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], 4.2.1) | |
A reaction: He doesn't name the science, but the point here seems to be precisely what Frege so vigorously disagreed with. I would say that the state of being 'abstract' has logical aspects, and can be partly described by logic, but that Mill is basically right. |
9080 | General conceptions are a necessary preliminary to Induction [Mill] |
Full Idea: Forming general conceptions is a necessary preliminary to Induction. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], 4.2.1) | |
A reaction: A key link in the framework of empirical philosophies, which gets us from experience to science. Induction is the very process of generalisation. We can't bring a concept like 'evolution' to preliminary observations, so it must be formulated inductively. |
13345 | Sentences are 'analytical' if every sequence of objects models them [Tarski] |
Full Idea: A class of sentences can be called 'analytical' if every sequence of objects is a model of it. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Logical Consequence [1936], p.418) | |
A reaction: See Idea 13344 and Idea 13343 for the context of this assertion. |
3772 | The will, in the beginning, is entirely produced by desire [Mill] |
Full Idea: The will, in the beginning, is entirely produced by desire. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Utilitarianism [1861], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: This is the sort of simplistic psychology that modern philosophers tend to avoid. Personally I am more Kantian. I will and desire that the answer to 3+2=? is 5, simply because it is true. Mill must realise we can will ourselves to desire something. |
20407 | Taste is the capacity to judge an object or representation which is thought to be beautiful [Tarski, by Schellekens] |
Full Idea: Taste is the faculty for judging an object or a kind of representation through a satisfaction or a dissatisfaction, ...where the object of such a satisfaction is called beautiful. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Elizabeth Schellekens - Immanuel Kant (aesthetics) 1 | |
A reaction: We usually avoid the word 'faculty' nowadays, because it implies a specific mechanism, but 'capacity' will do. Kant is said to focus specifically on beauty, whereas modern aestheticians have a broader view of the type of subject matter. |
7222 | It is a crime for someone with a violent disposition to get drunk [Mill] |
Full Idea: The making himself drunk, in a person whom drunkenness excites to do harm to others, is a crime against others. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: This principle (based on knowing your own dispositions) is a very good account of the ethics drunkenness. We have a moral duty to know and remember our own dispositions. Violent people should avoid arguments as well as alcohol. |
3769 | With early training, any absurdity or evil may be given the power of conscience [Mill] |
Full Idea: There is hardly anything so absurd or so mischievous that it may not, by means of early sanctions and influence, be made to act on the human mind with all the influence of conscience. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Utilitarianism [1861], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Like this! Think of all the people who have had weird upbringings, and end up feeling guilty about absurd things. Conscience just summarise upbringing and social conventions. |
3767 | Motive shows the worth of the agent, but not of the action [Mill] |
Full Idea: The motive has nothing to do with the morality of the action, though much with the worth of the agent. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Utilitarianism [1861], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: I think it is an error to try to separate these too sharply. Morality can't be purely consequential, because it would make earthquakes immoral. Actions indicate the worth of agents. |
7076 | Mill wondered if he would be happy if all his aims were realised, and answered no [Mill, by Critchley] |
Full Idea: Mill, in his crisis of 1827, asked himself whether he would be happy if all his objects in life were realised, and had to answer that he would not. | |
From: report of John Stuart Mill (Autobiography [1870]) by Simon Critchley - Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro Ch.3 | |
A reaction: The reply is either that happiness is in the striving, or that his aims in life were wrong, or that happiness is impossible. It seems to contradict Kant's definition (Idea 1452). |
3771 | Virtues only have value because they achieve some further end [Mill] |
Full Idea: Utilitarians believe that actions and dispositions are only virtuous because they promote another end than virtue. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Utilitarianism [1861], Ch.4) |
3768 | Orthodox morality is the only one which feels obligatory [Mill] |
Full Idea: The customary morality, that which education and opinion have consecrated, is the only one which presents itself to the mind with the feeling of being in itself obligatory. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Utilitarianism [1861], Ch.3) |
3776 | Utilitarianism only works if everybody has a totally equal right to happiness [Mill] |
Full Idea: The Greatest Happiness Principle is a mere form of empty words unless one person's happiness, supposed equal in degree, is counted for exactly as much as another's (Bentham's "everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one"). | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Utilitarianism [1861], Ch.5) |
7214 | Ethics rests on utility, which is the permanent progressive interests of people [Mill] |
Full Idea: I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of a man as a progressive being. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: Mill, writing in praise of personal liberty, is desperate to introduce a paternalistic element into his politics, and the 'maximisation of happiness' will justify such paternalism, while his basic liberal principle (Idea 7211) won't. Mill's Dilemma. |
7202 | The English believe in the task of annihilating evil for the victory of good [Nietzsche on Mill] |
Full Idea: One continues to believe in good and evil: in such a way that one feels the victory of good and the annihilation of evil to be a task (- this is English; a typical case is that shallow-headed John Stuart Mill). | |
From: comment on John Stuart Mill (Utilitarianism [1861]) by Friedrich Nietzsche - Writings from Late Notebooks 11[148]e | |
A reaction: The poor old English try very hard to be clear, sensible, practical and realistic, and get branded as 'shallow' for their pains. Nietzsche was a deeper thinker than Mill, but I would prefer Mill to Heidegger any day. |
5935 | Mill's qualities of pleasure is an admission that there are other good states of mind than pleasure [Ross on Mill] |
Full Idea: Mill's introduction of quality of pleasures into the hedonistic calculus is an unconscious departure from hedonism and a half-hearted admission that there are other qualities than pleasantness in virtue of which states of mind are good. | |
From: comment on John Stuart Mill (Utilitarianism [1861], Ch.2) by W. David Ross - The Right and the Good §VI | |
A reaction: Mill argues that experienced people prefer some pleasures to others, but ducks the question of why they might prefer them. It can only be because they have some further desirable quality on top of the equal amount of pleasure. |
3764 | Actions are right if they promote pleasure, wrong if they promote pain [Mill] |
Full Idea: The Greatest Happiness Principle holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Utilitarianism [1861], Ch.2) |
3766 | Better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied [Mill] |
Full Idea: Better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Utilitarianism [1861], Ch.2) |
3763 | Ultimate goods such as pleasure can never be proved to be good [Mill] |
Full Idea: What can be proved good must be so by being shown to be a means to something admitted to be good without proof. Music is good because it produces pleasure, but what proof is it possible to give that pleasure is good? | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Utilitarianism [1861], Ch.1) |
3765 | Only pleasure and freedom from pain are desirable as ends [Mill] |
Full Idea: Pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Utilitarianism [1861], Ch.2) |
3770 | General happiness is only desirable because individuals desire their own happiness [Mill] |
Full Idea: No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Utilitarianism [1861], Ch.4) |
6697 | Moral rules protecting human welfare are more vital than local maxims [Mill] |
Full Idea: Moral rules which forbid mankind to hurt one another are more vital to human well-being than any maxims about some department of human affairs; ..though in particular cases a social duty is so important, as to overrule any general maxim of justice. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Utilitarianism [1861]), quoted by Gordon Graham - Eight Theories of Ethics Ch.7 | |
A reaction: The qualification is realistic, but raises the question of whether an 'act' calculation will always overrule any 'rule'. Maybe rule utilitirianism is just act utilitarianism, but ensuring that the calculations are long-term and extensive. (1871 edn) |
7212 | Individuals have sovereignty over their own bodies and minds [Mill] |
Full Idea: Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: If I should not even think about evil deeds, then neither should you. I would prevent you if I could. I would prevent you from drinking yourself to death, if I could. It is just that intrusions into private lives leads to greater trouble. |
3774 | Rights are a matter of justice, not of benevolence [Mill] |
Full Idea: Wherever there is a right, the case is one of justice, and not of the virtue of benevolence. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Utilitarianism [1861], Ch.5) |
3773 | No individual has the right to receive our benevolence [Mill] |
Full Idea: No one has a moral right to our generosity or beneficence, because we are not morally bound to practise those virtues towards any given individual. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Utilitarianism [1861], Ch.5) |
7210 | The will of the people is that of the largest or most active part of the people [Mill] |
Full Idea: The will of the people practically means the will of the most numerous or the most active part of the people. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: Hence the nicely coined modern phrase 'the silent majority', on whose behalf certain politicians, usually conservative, offer to speak. It is unlikely that the silent majority are actually deeply opposed to the views of the very active part. |
7227 | It is evil to give a government any more power than is necessary [Mill] |
Full Idea: Government interference should be restricted because of the great evil of adding unnecessarily to its power. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: This would need justification, because it might be replied that individuals should not have unnecessary power either. The main problem is that governments have armies, police and money. |
7228 | Individuals often do things better than governments [Mill] |
Full Idea: Government power should be restricted because things are often done better by individuals. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: This contains some truth, but it is obvious that innumerable things can be done better by governments, and also (and more importantly) that innumerable other good things might be done by governments which individuals can't be bothered to do. |
7230 | Aim for the maximum dissemination of power consistent with efficiency [Mill] |
Full Idea: The safest practical ideal is to aim for the greatest dissemination of power consistent with efficiency. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: This is a very nice principle, which I would think desirable within an institution as well as on the scale of the state. I am becoming a fan of Mill's politics. I still say that freedom is an overrated virtue, so efficiency must be underrated. |
20515 | Maximise happiness by an area of strict privacy, and an area of utilitarian interventions [Mill, by Wolff,J] |
Full Idea: For Mill the greatest happiness will be achieved by giving people a private sphere of interests where no intervention is permitted, while allowing a public sphere where intervention is possible, but only on utilitarian grounds. | |
From: report of John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857]) by Jonathan Wolff - An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) 4 'Liberty' | |
A reaction: This is probably standard liberal practice nowadays. Freely consenting adult sexual activity is agreed to be wholly private. At least some lip-service is paid to increasing happiness when government intervenes. |
7229 | People who transact their own business will also have the initiative to control their government [Mill] |
Full Idea: A people accustomed to transacting their own business is certain to be free; it will never let itself be enslaved by any man or body of men because these are able to seize and pull the reins of the central administration. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: He makes reference to Americans. This is an important idea, because it shows that democratic control is not just a matter of elections (which can be abolished or suborned), but is also a characteristic of a certain way of life. |
20508 | How people vote should be on public record, so they can be held accountable [Mill, by Wolff,J] |
Full Idea: Mill believed in an open vote. People should be held accountable for how they vote, and therefore it should be a matter of public record. | |
From: report of John Stuart Mill (Representative Government [1861]) by Jonathan Wolff - An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) 3 'Representative' | |
A reaction: Nowadays it is a mantra that voting should be secret, because coercion is an obvious problem, but MPs vote publicly, and are held accountable for their voting records. People like the mafia seem to make open public voting impossible. |
20507 | Voting is a strict duty, like jury service, and must only be aimed at the public good [Mill] |
Full Idea: The citizen's vote is not a thing in which he has an option; it has no more to do with his personal wishes than the verdict of a juryman. ...he is bound to give it according to his best and most conscientious opinion of the public good. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Representative Government [1861], p.299), quoted by Jonathan Wolff - An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) 3 'Representative' | |
A reaction: Mill was also concerned that voters might pursue 'class interest' (which they currently do, big time). |
20505 | Direct democracy is inexperience judging experience, and ignorance judging knowledge [Mill] |
Full Idea: At its best [direct democracy] is inexperience sitting in judgement on experience, ignorance on knowledge. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Representative Government [1861], p.232), quoted by Jonathan Wolff - An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) 4 'Representative' | |
A reaction: Recent experiments have suggested that inexperienced people can become very good at making large decisions, if they are allowed to consult experts when they want to. See Van Reybrouck's 'Against Elections'. |
20504 | People can only participate in decisions in small communities, so representatives are needed [Mill] |
Full Idea: Since all cannot, in a community exceeding a single small town, participate personally in any but some very minor portions of the public business, it follows that the ideal type of a perfect government must be representative. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Representative Government [1861], p.217-8), quoted by Jonathan Wolff - An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) 4 'Representative' | |
A reaction: Wolff offers Mill as the principal spokesman for representative democracy. It is not only the difficulty of achieving participation, but also the slowness of decision-making. Modern technology may be changing all of this. |
7211 | Prevention of harm to others is the only justification for exercising power over people [Mill] |
Full Idea: The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others; his own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: This is the key idea in Mill's liberalism, though he goes on to offer some qualifications of this absolute prohibition. I don't disagree with this principle, but there may be a lot more indirect harm than we realise (eg. in allowing liberal sex or drugs). |
7231 | The worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it [Mill] |
Full Idea: The worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: This is a key idea of liberalism, opposed to any idea that we should abandon our own value to that of our state. I agree, but communitarians can subscribe to this too, while disagreeing that maximum freedom is the strategy to follow. |
7217 | The main argument for freedom is that interference with it is usually misguided [Mill] |
Full Idea: The strongest of all the arguments against the interference of the public with purely personal conduct is that, when it does interfere, the odds are that it interferes wrongly, and in the wrong place. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: This is also a well known objection to capital punishment. Generalised, well established, legal interferences are perhaps more likely to get it right than ad hoc decisions about individuals by individual officials. |
7213 | Liberty arises at the point where people can freely and equally discuss things [Mill] |
Full Idea: Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: There is a Victorian (and Enlightenment) optimism here which a glimpse of the freedoms of the early twenty-first century might dampen. I doubt if Mill expected British tabloid newspapers, or porn on cable TV. Education and freedom connect. |
20516 | Mill defends freedom as increasing happiness, but maybe it is an intrinsic good [Wolff,J on Mill] |
Full Idea: Mill has presented liberty as instrumentally valuable, as a way of achieving the greatest possible happiness in society. But perhaps he should have argued that liberty is an intrinsic good, good in itself. | |
From: comment on John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857]) by Jonathan Wolff - An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) 4 'Intrinsic' | |
A reaction: If freedom is intrinsically good, does this leave us (as Wolff warned earlier) unable to defend its value? Freedom isn't an intrinsic good for infants, so why should it be so for adults? Good because it brings happiness, or fulfils our nature? |
20517 | Utilitarianism values liberty, but guides us on which ones we should have or not have [Mill, by Wolff,J] |
Full Idea: Utilitarianism provides an account of what liberties we should and should not have. Mill argues we should be free to compete in trade, but not to use another's property without consent. Thus he sets limits to liberty, while paying it great respect. | |
From: report of John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857]) by Jonathan Wolff - An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) 4 'Intrinsic' |
7215 | True freedom is pursuing our own good, while not impeding others [Mill] |
Full Idea: The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: This principle will probably lead up a Prisoner's Dilemma cul-de-sac. The only freedom which deserves the name is the collective agreed freedom of a whole community to live well, when citizens volunteer to restrict their individual freedoms. |
7220 | Restraint for its own sake is an evil [Mill] |
Full Idea: All restraint, qua restraint, is an evil. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: The ultimate justification for this is (presumably) utilitarian, but that would mean that there was nothing wrong with restraint if the person did not mind, or was not aware of the restraint. What is intrinsically wrong with restraint? |
7218 | Individuals are not accountable for actions which only concern themselves [Mill] |
Full Idea: My first maxim is that the individual is not accountable to society for his actions, in so far as these concern the interests of no person but himself. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: This is a key idea of liberalism, and one which communitarians have doubts about (because it is almost impossible to perform an action which is of no interest, in the short or long term, to others). I share these doubts. |
7221 | Blocking entry to an unsafe bridge does not infringe liberty, since no one wants unsafe bridges [Mill] |
Full Idea: An official could turn a person back from an unsafe bridge without infringeing their liberty; for liberty consists in doing what one desires, and he does not desire to fall into the river. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: Seems fair enough, but it justifies paternalist interference. The tricky one is where the official and the citizen disagree over what the citizen 'truly' desires. Asking people may involve too much time, but it could also involve too much effort. |
7223 | Pimping and running a gambling-house are on the border between toleration and restraint [Mill] |
Full Idea: A person being free to be a pimp, or to keep a gambling-house, lies on the exact boundary line between two principles, of toleration and of restraint. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: Nothing illuminates a philosopher's principles more than for them to specify cases that lie on their borderlines. Both professions seem, unfortunately, to lead people into worse activities, such as violent bullying, or theft. Tricky.. |
3775 | A right is a valid claim to society's protection [Mill] |
Full Idea: When we call anything a person's right, we mean that he has a valid claim on society to protect him in the possession of it. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Utilitarianism [1861], Ch.5) |
7219 | Society can punish actions which it believes to be prejudicial to others [Mill] |
Full Idea: My second maxim is that for actions that are prejudicial to the interests of others, the individual is accountable, and subject to social or legal punishment, if society believes that this is requisite for its protection. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: (wording compressed). The trouble with this would seem to be the possible disagreement between the individual and the society over whether the actions actually are prejudicial to others. It would justify a conservative society in being repressive. |
7226 | Benefits performed by individuals, not by government, help also to educate them [Mill] |
Full Idea: It is often desirable that beneficial things should be done by individuals, rather than by the government, as a means to their own mental education. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: This raises the important danger, which even those on the political left must acknowledge, of the 'nanny state'. It offers a nicely paternalistic, and even patronising reason for giving people freedom, just as a parent might to a child. |
7224 | We need individual opinions and conduct, and State education is a means to prevent that [Mill] |
Full Idea: Individuality of character, and diversity in opinions and modes of conduct, involves diversity of education; a general State education is a mere contrivance for moulding people to be exactly like one another. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as being particularly true with the advent in Britain of the National Curriculum in the early 1990s. However, if there is a pressure towards conformity in state education, private education is dominated by class and money. |
7225 | It is a crime to create a being who lacks the ordinary chances of a desirable existence [Mill] |
Full Idea: To bestow a life on someone which may be either a curse or a blessing, unless the being on whom it is to be bestowed will have at least the ordinary chances of a desirable existence, is a crime against that being. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: This is the standard utilitarian attitude to engendering people. I think I have to agree. It is no argument against this to say that we value people with poor life prospects, once they have arrived. Altruism towards children may disguise selfish parents. |
8345 | A cause is the total of all the conditions which inevitably produce the result [Mill] |
Full Idea: A cause is the sum total of the conditions positive and negative taken together ...which being realized, the consequent invariably follows. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843]), quoted by Donald Davidson - Causal Relations §1 | |
A reaction: This has obvious problems. The absence of Napoleon was a cause of the English Civil War. The Big Bang was a cause of, well, every event. As Davidson notes, some narrowing down is needed. |
10391 | Causes and conditions are not distinct, because we select capriciously from among them [Mill] |
Full Idea: Nothing can better show the absence of any scientific ground for the distinction between the cause of a phenomena and its conditions, than the capricious manner in which we select from among the conditions that which we choose to denominate the cause. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843]), quoted by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 2.2 | |
A reaction: [ref Mill p.196, 1846 edn] Schaffer gives this as the main argument for the 'no-basis' view of the selection of what causes an event. The usual thought is that it is entirely our immediate interests which make us select THE cause. Not convinced. |
14547 | The strict cause is the total positive and negative conditions which ensure the consequent [Mill] |
Full Idea: The cause, philosophically speaking, is the sum total of the conditions, positive and negative taken together; the whole of the contigencies of every description, which being realized, the consequent invariably follows. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], 3.05.3) | |
A reaction: This somewhat notorious remark is not going to be much help in a law court or a laboratory. It is that view which says that the Big Bang must be included in every causal list ever compiled. Well, yes... |
8377 | Causation is just invariability of succession between every natural fact and a preceding fact [Mill] |
Full Idea: The Law of Causation, the recognition of which is the main pillar of inductive science, is but the familiar truth, that invariability of succession is found by observation between every fact in nature and some other fact which has preceded it. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], 3.5.2), quoted by Bertrand Russell - On the Notion of Cause p.178 | |
A reaction: Note that Mill rests causation on 'facts'. In the empiricist Mill endorsing the views of Hume. Russell attacks the bogus claim that science rests on causation. Personally I think Mill's view is incorrect. |
14545 | A cause is an antecedent which invariably and unconditionally leads to a phenomenon [Mill] |
Full Idea: We may define the cause of a phenomenon to be the antecedent, or the concurrence of the antecedents, on which it is invariably and unconditionally consequent. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], 3.05.6) | |
A reaction: This ignores the possibility of the world ending just before the effect occurs, the 'ceteris paribus' clause. If it only counts as a cause if the effect has actually occurred, we begin to suspect tautology. |
4773 | Mill's regularity theory of causation is based on an effect preceded by a conjunction of causes [Mill, by Psillos] |
Full Idea: Millian causation is a version of the Regularity Theory, but with the addition that when claiming that an effect invariably follows from the cause, the cause is not a single factor, but a whole conjunction of necessary and sufficient conditions. | |
From: report of John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], p.217) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §2.2 | |
A reaction: Psillos endorses this as an improvement on Hume. But while we may replicate one event preceding another to get regularity, groups of events are hardly ever identical, so no precise pattern will ever be seen. |
4775 | In Mill's 'Method of Agreement' cause is the common factor in a range of different cases [Mill, by Psillos] |
Full Idea: In Mill's 'Method of Agreement' the cause is the common factor in a number of otherwise different cases in which the effect occurs. | |
From: report of John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], p.255) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §2.3 | |
A reaction: This looks more likely to be good evidence for the cause of an event, rather than a definition of what a cause actually is. Suppose a footballer only scores if and only if I go to watch him? |
4776 | In Mill's 'Method of Difference' the cause is what stops the effect when it is removed [Mill, by Psillos] |
Full Idea: In Mill's 'Method of Difference' the cause is the factor which is different in two cases which are similar, except that in one the effect occurs, and in the other it doesn't. | |
From: report of John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], p.256) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §2.3 | |
A reaction: Like the Method of Agreement, this is a good test, but is unlikely to be a conclusive hallmark of causation. A footballer may never score unless I go to watch him. I become his lucky mascot… |
9417 | What are the fewest propositions from which all natural uniformities could be inferred? [Mill] |
Full Idea: What are the fewest general propositions from which all the uniformities which exist in the universe might be deductively inferred? | |
From: John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], 3.4.1) | |
A reaction: This is the germ of the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis view. |
21332 | We don't get a love of 'order' from nature - which is thoroughly chaotic [Mill] |
Full Idea: Even the love of 'order' which is thought to be a following of the ways of nature is in fact a contradiction of them. All which people are accustomed to deprecate as 'disorder' is precisely a counterpart of nature's ways. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Nature and Utility of Religion [1874], p.116) | |
A reaction: The Greeks elevated the idea that the cosmos was orderly, but almost entirely based on the regular movement of the planets. They turned a blind eye to the messy bits of nature. As you magnify nature, order and chaos seem to alternate. |
7216 | The ethics of the Gospel has been supplemented by barbarous Old Testament values [Mill] |
Full Idea: To extract from the Gospel a body of ethical doctrine, has never been possible withouth eking it out from the Old Testament, that is, from a system elaborate indeed, but in many respects barbarous, and intended only for a barbarous people. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: 'Barbarous' has a quaint Victorian ring to it, but his point is that the surviving teachings of Jesus are very thin and generalised. Christians would do better to expand their implications, than to borrow from the Old Testament. |
21333 | Evil comes from good just as often as good comes from evil [Mill] |
Full Idea: If good frequently comes out of evil, the converse fact, evil coming out of good, is equally common. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Nature and Utility of Religion [1874], p.117) | |
A reaction: Mill surmises that on the whole good comes from good, and evil from evil, but the point is that the evidence doesn't favour the production of increased good. |
21335 | Belief that an afterlife is required for justice is an admission that this life is very unjust [Mill] |
Full Idea: The necessity of redressing the balance [of injustice] is deemed one of the strongest arguments for another life after death, which amounts to an admission that the order of things in this life is often an example of injustice, not justice. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Nature and Utility of Religion [1874]) | |
A reaction: It certainly seems that an omnipotent God could administer swift justice in this life. If the whole point is that we need freedom of will, then why is justice administered at a much later date? The freedom seems to be illusory. |
21334 | No necessity ties an omnipotent Creator, so he evidently wills human misery [Mill] |
Full Idea: If a Creator is assumed to be omnipotent, if he bends to a supposed necessity, he himself makes the necessity which he bends to. If the maker of the world can all that he will, he wills misery, and there is no escape from the conclusion. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Nature and Utility of Religion [1874], p.119) | |
A reaction: If you add that the Creator is supposed to be perfectly benevolent, you arrive at the paradox which Mackie spells out. Is the correct conclusion that God exists, and is malevolent? Mill doesn't take that option seriously. |
21329 | Nature dispenses cruelty with no concern for either mercy or justice [Mill] |
Full Idea: All of this [cruel killing] nature does with the most supercilious disregard both of mercy and of justice, emptying her shafts upon the best and noblest indifferently with the meanest and worst | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Nature and Utility of Religion [1874], p.115) | |
A reaction: The existence of an afterlife at least offers an opportunity to rectify any injustice, but that hardly meets the question of why there was injustice in the first place. It would be odd if it actually is justice, but none of us can see why that is so. |
21328 | Killing is a human crime, but nature kills everyone, and often with great tortures [Mill] |
Full Idea: Killing, the most criminal act recognised by human laws, nature does once to every being that lives, and frequently after protracted tortures such as the greatest know monsters purposely inflicted on their living fellow creatures | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Nature and Utility of Religion [1874], p.115) | |
A reaction: We certainly don't condemn lions for savaging gazelles, but the concept of a supreme mind controlling nature forces the question. Theology needs consistency between human and divine morality, and the supposed derivation of the former from the latter. |
21330 | Nature makes childbirth a miserable experience, often leading to the death of the mother [Mill] |
Full Idea: In the clumsy provision which nature has made for the perpetual renewal of animal life, ...no human being ever comes into the world but another human being is literally stretched on the rack for hours or day, not unfrequently issuing in death. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Nature and Utility of Religion [1874], p.116) | |
A reaction: This is a very powerful example, which is rarely cited in modern discussions. |
21331 | Hurricanes, locusts, floods and blight can starve a million people to death [Mill] |
Full Idea: Nature often takes the means by which we live. A single hurricane, a flight of locusts, or an inundation, or a trifling chemical change in an edible root, starve a million people. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Nature and Utility of Religion [1874], p.116) | |
A reaction: [second sentence compressed] The 'edible root' is an obvious reference to the Irish potato famine. Some desertification had human causes, but these are telling examples. |