Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Keith T. Maslin and David O. Brink

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20 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
     Full Idea: It seems unavoidable that the facts about logically necessary relations between levels of facts are themselves logically distinct further facts, irreducible to the microphysical facts.
     From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C)
     A reaction: I'm beginning to think that rejecting every theory of reality that is proposed by carefully exposing some infinite regress hidden in it is a rather lazy way to do philosophy. Almost as bad as rejecting anything if it can't be defined.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Shadows are supervenient on their objects, but not reducible [Maslin]
     Full Idea: Shadows are distinct from the physical objects casting the shadows and irreducible to them; any attempt at reduction would be incoherent, as it would entail identifying a shadow with the object of which it is a shadow.
     From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 6.3)
     A reaction: Another failure to find a decent analogy for what is claimed in property dualism. A 'shadow' is a reification of the abstract concept of an absence of light. Objects lose their shadows at dusk, but the object itself doesn't change.
If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
     Full Idea: Logical supervenience, restricted to individuals, seems to imply strong reduction. It is said that where the B-facts logically supervene on the A-facts, the B-facts simply re-describe what the A-facts describe, and the B-facts come along 'for free'.
     From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C)
     A reaction: This seems to be taking 'logically' to mean 'analytically'. Presumably an entailment is logically supervenient on its premisses, and may therefore be very revealing, even if some people think such things are analytic.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
'Ontology' means 'study of things which exist' [Maslin]
     Full Idea: The word 'ontology' is derived from the Greek word 'ontia', which means 'things which exist'.
     From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 1.1)
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
     Full Idea: The root intuition behind nonreductive materialism is that reality is composed of ontologically distinct layers or levels. …The upper levels depend on the physical without reducing to it.
     From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], B)
     A reaction: A nice clear statement of a view which I take to be false. This relationship is the sort of thing that drives people fishing for an account of it to use the word 'supervenience', which just says two things seem to hang out together. Fluffy materialism.
The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
     Full Idea: Jessica Wilson (1999) says what makes physicalist accounts different from emergentism etc. is that each individual causal power associated with a supervenient property is numerically identical with a causal power associated with its base property.
     From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], n 11)
     A reaction: Hence the key thought in so-called (serious, rather than self-evident) 'emergentism' is so-called 'downward causation', which I take to be an idle daydream.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
Analogy to other minds is uncheckable, over-confident and chauvinistic [Maslin]
     Full Idea: The argument from analogy makes it impossible to check my inductive inferences because of the privacy of other minds; it also seems irresponsible to generalise from a single case; and it seems like a case of human chauvinism.
     From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 8.2)
     A reaction: Privacy of other minds need not imply scepticism about them. I'm a believer, so I have no trouble checking my theories. Solipsists can't 'check' anything. It isn't 'irresponsible' to generalise from one case if that is all you have.
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / b. Self as brain
If we are brains then we never meet each other [Maslin]
     Full Idea: If I am my brain this leads to the odd result that you have never met me because you have never seen my brain.
     From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 10.7)
     A reaction: 'Star Trek' is full of aliens who appear beautiful, and turn out to be ugly grey lumps. 'I am my face' would be just as odd, particularly if I were in a coma, or dead.
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
I'm not the final authority on my understanding of maths [Maslin]
     Full Idea: I may be the final authority on whether my shoe pinches, but I am manifestly not the final authority on whether I understand some mathematical theorem.
     From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 1.7)
     A reaction: However, it doesn't follow that his teachers are the final authority either, because he may get correct answers by an algorithm, and bluff his way when demonstrating his understanding. Who knows whether anyone really understands anything?
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
Denial of purely mental causation will lead to epiphenomenalism [Maslin]
     Full Idea: If mental events are causally efficacious only by virtue of their physical features and not their mental ones, …then anomalous monism leads straight to ephiphenomenalism.
     From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 7.6)
     A reaction: As epiphenomenalism strikes me as being incoherent (see Idea 7379), what this amounts to is that either mental effects are causally efficacious, or they are not worth mentioning. I take them to be causally efficacious because they are brain events.
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
Token-identity removes the explanatory role of the physical [Maslin]
     Full Idea: In token-identity mental and physical features seem as unrelated as colour and shape, which is very weak physicalism because it does not allow physical states an explanatory role in accounting for mental states.
     From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 3.8.6)
     A reaction: Colour and shape are not totally unrelated, as they can both be totally explained by a full knowledge of the physical substance involved. ...But maybe if we fully understood Spinoza's single substance...? See Idea 4834.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Two people might agree in their emotional moral attitude while disagreeing in their judgement [Brink]
     Full Idea: Critics of emotivism claim that moral agreement need not track agreement in attitude; moralists with the same attitude can disagree in their views, and they can hold the same view while disagreeing in attitude.
     From: David O. Brink (Emotivism [1995], p.224)
     A reaction: Thus two racists can disagree about how racists should behave. Sounds like a good criticism.
Emotivists find it hard to analyse assertions of moral principles, rather than actual judgements [Brink]
     Full Idea: It is hard for the emotivist to give an analysis of the occurrence of moral ideas in unasserted contexts, such as "IF he did wrong, then he should be punished".
     From: David O. Brink (Emotivism [1995], p.224)
     A reaction: This is the 'Frege-Geach Problem'.
Emotivists claim to explain moral motivation by basing morality on non-cognitive attitudes [Brink]
     Full Idea: By stressing the intimate connection between moral judgements and the agent's non-cognitive attitudes, emotivists claim to capture the motivational properties of moral judgement.
     From: David O. Brink (Emotivism [1995], p.223)
     A reaction: The same claim is made by contractarians, who start from our universal self-interest. Emotivists also nicely capture the motivation properties of immoral judgements.
Emotivists tend to favour a redundancy theory of truth, making moral judgement meaningless [Brink]
     Full Idea: If you want to recognise the truth of some moral judgements, perhaps to make room for the possibility of moral mistakes, then one may not be satisfied with the emotivists' tendency to appeal to the redundancy theory of truth.
     From: David O. Brink (Emotivism [1995], p.224)
     A reaction: Probably thinking of Simon Blackburn. People who adopt a redundancy view of truth for semantics are left floundering when discussing what is true in the rest of philosophy.
Emotivism implies relativism about moral meanings, but critics say disagreements are about moral reference [Brink]
     Full Idea: Emotivism suggests that different feelings lead to different individual meanings for moral terms, but critics say that meanings are the same, and disagreement is about the extension (range of reference) of the terms.
     From: David O. Brink (Emotivism [1995], p.224)
     A reaction: It's hard to see how 'ought to p' could have quite different meanings for an emotivist and (say) a theistic moralist. 'Ought' is an obvious and simple word. Good criticism.
How can emotivists explain someone who recognises morality but is indifferent to it? [Brink]
     Full Idea: It is not clear how the emotivist can accommodate the amoralist - one who recognises moral requirements but is indifferent to them.
     From: David O. Brink (Emotivism [1995], p.224)
     A reaction: Nietzsche recognised current morals, but was indifferent to them. It is hard to imagine, though, an amoralist who lacked all the feelings which imply morality.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Causality may require that a law is being followed [Maslin]
     Full Idea: The principle of nomological causality says that if two events are intrinsically causally related, there must be a strict physical law under which they can be subsumed.
     From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 7.5)
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
Strict laws make causation logically necessary [Maslin]
     Full Idea: 'Deductive-nomological' explanation consists of two premises - a strict law with no exceptions and supporting deterministic counterfactuals, and a statement of an event which falls under the law - which together logically require the effect.
     From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 7.4)
Strict laws allow no exceptions and are part of a closed system [Maslin]
     Full Idea: 'Strict' laws of nature contain no ceteris paribus clauses ('all things being equal'), and are part of a closed system (so that whatever affects the system must be included within the system).
     From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 7.5)