26 ideas
23449 | Interpreting a text is representing it as making sense [Morris,M] |
Full Idea: Interpreting a text is a matter of making sense of it. And to make sense of a text is to represent it as making sense. | |
From: Michael Morris (Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus [2008], Intro.2) | |
A reaction: 'Making sense' is obviously not a very precise or determinate concept. It is probably better to say that the process is 'trying' to make sense of the text, because most texts don't totally make sense. |
23484 | Bipolarity adds to Bivalence the capacity for both truth values [Morris,M] |
Full Idea: According to the Principle of Bipolarity, every meaningful sentence must be capable both of being true and of being false. It is not enough merely that every sentence must be either true or false (which is Bivalence). | |
From: Michael Morris (Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus [2008], 3D) | |
A reaction: It is said that early Wittgenstein endorses this. That is, in addition to being true, the sentence must be capable of falsehood (and vice versa). This seems to be flirting with the verification principle. I presume it is 'affirmative' sentences. |
23494 | Conjunctive and disjunctive quantifiers are too specific, and are confined to the finite [Morris,M] |
Full Idea: There are two problems with defining the quantifiers in terms of conjunction and disjunction. The general statements are unspecific, and do not say which things have the properties, and also they can't range over infinite objects. | |
From: Michael Morris (Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus [2008], 5C) | |
A reaction: That is, the universal quantifier is lots of ands, and the existential is lots of ors. If there only existed finite objects, then naming them all would be universal, and the infinite wouldn't be needed. |
23452 | Discriminating things for counting implies concepts of identity and distinctness [Morris,M] |
Full Idea: The discrimination of things for counting needs to bring with it the notion of identity (and, correlatively, distinctness). | |
From: Michael Morris (Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus [2008], Intro.5) | |
A reaction: Morris is exploring how practices like counting might reveal necessary truths about the world. |
23460 | To count, we must distinguish things, and have a series with successors in it [Morris,M] |
Full Idea: Distinguishing between things is not enough for counting. …We need the crucial extra notion of a successor in a series of a certain kind. | |
From: Michael Morris (Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus [2008], Intro) | |
A reaction: This is the thinking that led to the Dedekind-Peano axioms for arithmetic. E.g. each series member can only have one successor. There is an unformalisable assumption that the series can then be applied to the things. |
23451 | Counting needs to distinguish things, and also needs the concept of a successor in a series [Morris,M] |
Full Idea: Just distinguishing things is not enough for counting (and hence arithmetic). We need the crucial extra notion of the successor in a series of some kind. | |
From: Michael Morris (Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus [2008], Intro.5) | |
A reaction: This is a step towards the Peano Axioms of arithmetic. The successors could be fingers and toes, taken in a conventional order, and matched one-to-one to the objects. 'My right big toe of cows' means 16 cows (but non-verbally). |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
Full Idea: It seems unavoidable that the facts about logically necessary relations between levels of facts are themselves logically distinct further facts, irreducible to the microphysical facts. | |
From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C) | |
A reaction: I'm beginning to think that rejecting every theory of reality that is proposed by carefully exposing some infinite regress hidden in it is a rather lazy way to do philosophy. Almost as bad as rejecting anything if it can't be defined. |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
Full Idea: Logical supervenience, restricted to individuals, seems to imply strong reduction. It is said that where the B-facts logically supervene on the A-facts, the B-facts simply re-describe what the A-facts describe, and the B-facts come along 'for free'. | |
From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C) | |
A reaction: This seems to be taking 'logically' to mean 'analytically'. Presumably an entailment is logically supervenient on its premisses, and may therefore be very revealing, even if some people think such things are analytic. |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
Full Idea: The root intuition behind nonreductive materialism is that reality is composed of ontologically distinct layers or levels. …The upper levels depend on the physical without reducing to it. | |
From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], B) | |
A reaction: A nice clear statement of a view which I take to be false. This relationship is the sort of thing that drives people fishing for an account of it to use the word 'supervenience', which just says two things seem to hang out together. Fluffy materialism. |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
Full Idea: Jessica Wilson (1999) says what makes physicalist accounts different from emergentism etc. is that each individual causal power associated with a supervenient property is numerically identical with a causal power associated with its base property. | |
From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], n 11) | |
A reaction: Hence the key thought in so-called (serious, rather than self-evident) 'emergentism' is so-called 'downward causation', which I take to be an idle daydream. |
23491 | There must exist a general form of propositions, which are predictabe. It is: such and such is the case [Morris,M] |
Full Idea: The existence of a general propositional form is proved by the fact that there cannot be a proposition whose form could not have been foreseen (i.e. constructed). The general form of the proposition is: Such and such is the case. | |
From: Michael Morris (Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus [2008], 4.5) | |
A reaction: [last bit in Ogden translation] LW eventually expresses this symbolically. We could just say a proposition is an assertion. This strikes as either a rather empty claim, or an unfounded one. |
22858 | There is collective action, where a trend is manifest, but is not attributable to individuals [Lukes] |
Full Idea: There is a phenomenon of collective action, where the policy or action of a collectivity is manifest, but not attributable to particular individuals' decisions or behaviour. | |
From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], 1.4) | |
A reaction: This observation of Lukes is seen as important in the understanding of social power, but it is also significant for the understanding of the theory of action. Small racial slights by individuals can indicate institutional racism. |
22854 | Power is a capacity, which may never need to be exercised [Lukes] |
Full Idea: Power is a capacity not the exercise of that capacity (it may never be, and never need to be, exercised); and you can be powerful by satisfying and advancing others' interests. | |
From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], Intro) | |
A reaction: A school teacher could, in extremis, bring in the army to control a wildly anarchic class of kids. You control kids by making them want to do what you want them to do. |
22859 | Power can be exercised to determine a person's desires [Lukes] |
Full Idea: A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but also by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants. | |
From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], 1.4) | |
A reaction: The classic modern instances of this are advertising and control of the media. This was apparently a new idea from Lukes, but it seems fairly obvious now. This is his third dimension of power. |
22857 | The two-dimensional view of power recognises the importance of controlling the agenda [Lukes] |
Full Idea: The two-dimensional view of power is a major advance over the one-dimensional view. It incorporates the question of the control of the agenda in politics. | |
From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], 1.4) | |
A reaction: So One-D is controlling what happens in conflicts, and Two-D is controlling the nature of the conflicts. If we keep digging we may come to the power which no one knows exists. |
22863 | Power is the capacity of a social class to realise its interests [Lukes] |
Full Idea: Poulantzas (1968) defined his concept of power as the capacity of a social class to realise its specific objective interests. | |
From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], 1.8) | |
A reaction: Lukes offers this as an account of power in terms of structures, rather than of the actions of individuals. Lukes says that power must include the ability of the agent to act differently. Power must involve responsibility. Power is not fate. |
22850 | Hidden powers are the most effective [Lukes] |
Full Idea: Power is at its most effective when it is least observable. | |
From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], Intro) | |
A reaction: Kind of common sense, though his account has been very influential. We must be cautious about asserting the existence of powers which are massive but totally undetectable. |
22852 | The pluralist view says that power is restrained by group rivalry [Lukes] |
Full Idea: In the 1950s 'pluralism' was a common idea about power - that the concentration of power in America is not excessive because one group always balances the power of others. | |
From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], Intro) | |
A reaction: [He cites Alan Wolfe's 2000 intro to C. Wright Mills] There must be something to this idea. In the UK we encourage the existence of an official opposition to the government for that reason. |
22855 | One-dimensionsal power is behaviour in observable conflicts of interests [Lukes] |
Full Idea: The one-dimensional view of power involves a focus on behaviour in the making of decisions on issues over which there is an observable conflict of (subjective) interests, revealed by political participation. | |
From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], 1.2) | |
A reaction: It seems unbalanced to give this the pejorative label 'one-dimensional', as if it wasn't really power at all. Watching police beating demonstrators looks like real power to me. His point that power runs deeper is, of course, a good one. |
22856 | Political organisation brings some conflicts to the fore, and suppresses others [Lukes] |
Full Idea: All forms of political organisation have a bias in favour of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others, because organisation is the mobilisation of bias. Some issues are organised into politics while others are organised out | |
From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], 1.3) | |
A reaction: [He cites Schattschneider 1960] This is what Lukes calls the two-dimensional theory of power. The point is that students of power should observe what does not happen, as well as what does. |
22860 | The evidence for the exertion of power need not involve a grievance of the powerless [Lukes] |
Full Idea: It is inadequate to insist that nondecision-making power only exists where there are grievances which are denied entry into the political process in the form of issues. | |
From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], 1.4) | |
A reaction: A simple example would be where they tricked you into thinking you couldn't vote in an election, or where the women didn't realise the men were paid more. Part of his third dimension of power. |
22861 | Power is affecting a person in a way contrary to their interests [Lukes] |
Full Idea: I have defined the concept of power by saying that A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B's interests | |
From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], 1.6) | |
A reaction: I assume he is not referring to when I accidentally spill your beer. His point is, I think, that neither A nor B may be fully, or even partly, aware of what is going on. Presumably A can also exert power over B which is in B's interests. Dentists. |
21133 | Supreme power is getting people to have thoughts and desires chosen by you [Lukes] |
Full Idea: Is it not the supreme exercise of power to get another or others to have the desires you want them to have - that is, to secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires? | |
From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], p.27), quoted by Andrew Shorten - Contemporary Political Theory 06 | |
A reaction: This seems to be beyond dispute. When the operation is successful, those under your power not only do not need to be intimidated, but they don't even need to be guided. But if two people are in perfect harmony, which one has the power? |
22851 | In the 1950s they said ideology is finished, and expertise takes over [Lukes] |
Full Idea: In the 1950s there was talk of the 'end of ideology' - that grand passions over ideas were exhausted, and in future problems would be solved by technical expertise. | |
From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], Intro) | |
A reaction: An understandable thought, once fascism and communism seemed to have burned themselves out. Political commentators always try to grip the crowds with simplistic labels, but fewer people will now read up an ideology. Tacit ideology. |
22862 | Liberals take people as they are, and take their preferences to be their interests [Lukes] |
Full Idea: Liberals take people as they are, and relates their interests to what they actually want or prefer. | |
From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], 1.6) | |
A reaction: He contrasts this with 'reformists' and 'radicals'. I don't see why liberals should be so uncritical of people's desires. Liberals aren't going to implement harmful policies, simply because people want them. He treats liberals as one-dimensional. |
22853 | Anyone who thinks capitalism can improve their lives is endorsing capitalism [Lukes] |
Full Idea: Wage earners consent to capitalist organisation of society when they act as if they could improve their material conditions within the confines of capitalism. | |
From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], Intro) | |
A reaction: [He is citing Przeworski 1985] Not plausible as it stands. Does a prisoner who tries to improve their life within a hideous prison thereby endorse the prison system? In Auschwitz? Slaves can go along with the system for years, then suddenly rebel. |