Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, PG and Wesley Salmon

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244 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 3. Greek-English Lexicon
Agathon: good [PG]
     Full Idea: Agathon: good, the highest good
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 01)
Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness [PG]
     Full Idea: Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 02)
Aitia / aition: cause, explanation [PG]
     Full Idea: Aitia / aition: cause, explanation
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 03)
     A reaction: The consensus is that 'explanation' is the better translation, and hence that the famous Four Causes (in 'Physics') must really be understood as the Four Modes of Explanation. They then make far more sense.
Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will [PG]
     Full Idea: Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 04)
     A reaction: The whole Greek debate (and modern debate, I would say) makes much more sense if we stick to 'lack of control' as the translation, and forget about weakness of will - and certainly give up 'incontinence' as a translation.
Aletheia: truth [PG]
     Full Idea: Aletheia: truth
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 05)
Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance [PG]
     Full Idea: Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 06)
     A reaction: This is used for Plato's doctrine that we recollect past lives.
Ananke: necessity [PG]
     Full Idea: Ananke: necessity
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 07)
Antikeimenon: object [PG]
     Full Idea: Antikeimenon: object
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 08)
Apatheia: unemotional [PG]
     Full Idea: Apatheia: lack of involvement, unemotional
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 09)
Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite [PG]
     Full Idea: Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 10)
     A reaction: Key term in the philosophy of Anaximander, the one unknowable underlying element.
Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction [PG]
     Full Idea: Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 11)
Apodeixis: demonstration [PG]
     Full Idea: Apodeixis: demonstration, proof
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 12)
Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly [PG]
     Full Idea: Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 13)
Arche: first principle, the basic [PG]
     Full Idea: Arché: first principle, the basic
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 14)
     A reaction: Interchangeable with 'aitia' by Aristotle. The first principle and the cause are almost identical.
Arete: virtue, excellence [PG]
     Full Idea: Areté: virtue, excellence
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 15)
     A reaction: The word hovers between moral excellence and being good at what you do. Annas defends the older translation as 'virtue', rather than the modern 'excellence'.
Chronismos: separation [PG]
     Full Idea: Chronismos: separation
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 16)
Diairesis: division [PG]
     Full Idea: Diairesis: division, distinction
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 17)
Dialectic: dialectic, discussion [PG]
     Full Idea: Dialectic: dialectic, discussion
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 18)
Dianoia: intellection [cf. Noesis] [PG]
     Full Idea: Dianoia: intellection, understanding [cf. Noesis]
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 21)
Diaphora: difference [PG]
     Full Idea: Diaphora: difference
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 22)
Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice [PG]
     Full Idea: Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 23)
     A reaction: Usually translated as 'justice' in 'Republic', but it is a general term of moral approbation, not like the modern political and legal notion of 'justice'. 'Justice' actually seems to be bad translation.
Doxa: opinion, belief [PG]
     Full Idea: Doxa: opinion, belief, judgement
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 24)
Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity [PG]
     Full Idea: Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 25)
Eidos: form, idea [PG]
     Full Idea: Eidos: form, idea
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 26)
     A reaction: In Plato it is the word best translated as 'Form' (Theory of...); in Aritotle's 'Categories' it designates the species, and in 'Metaphysics' it ends up naming the structural form of the species (and hence the essence) [Wedin p.120]
Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation [PG]
     Full Idea: Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 27)
Empeiron: experience [PG]
     Full Idea: Empeiron: experience
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 28)
Energeia: employment, actuality, power? [PG]
     Full Idea: Energeia: employment, actuality, power?
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 31)
Enkrateia: control [PG]
     Full Idea: Enkrateia: control
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 32)
     A reaction: See 'akrasia', of which this is the opposite. The enkratic person is controlled.
Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end [PG]
     Full Idea: Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 33)
Epagoge: induction, explanation [PG]
     Full Idea: Epagoge: induction, explanation, leading on
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 34)
Episteme: knowledge, understanding [PG]
     Full Idea: Episteme: knowledge, understanding
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 35)
     A reaction: Note that 'episteme' can form a plural in Greek, but we can't say 'knowledges', so we have to say 'branches of knowledge', or 'sciences'.
Epithumia: appetite [PG]
     Full Idea: Epithumia: appetite
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 36)
Ergon: function [PG]
     Full Idea: Ergon: function, work
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 37)
Eristic: polemic, disputation [PG]
     Full Idea: Eristic: polemic, disputation
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 38)
     A reaction: This is confrontational argument, rather than the subtle co-operative dialogue of dialectic. British law courts and the House of Commons are founded on eristic, rather than on dialectic. Could there be a dialectical elected assembly?
Eros: love [PG]
     Full Idea: Eros: love, desire
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 41)
Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment [PG]
     Full Idea: Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 42)
     A reaction: Some people defend 'happiness' as the translation, but that seems to me wildly misleading, since eudaimonia is something like life going well, and certainly isn't a psychological state - and definitely not pleasure.
Genos: type, genus [PG]
     Full Idea: Genos: type, genus, kind
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 43)
Hexis: state, habit [PG]
     Full Idea: Hexis: state, habit
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 44)
Horismos: definition [PG]
     Full Idea: Horismos: definition
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 45)
Hule: matter [PG]
     Full Idea: Hule: matter
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 46)
     A reaction: The first half of the 'hylomorphism' of Aristotle. See 'morphe'!
Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing [cf. Tode ti] [PG]
     Full Idea: Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing, substratum [cf. Tode ti]
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 47)
     A reaction: Literally 'that which lies under'. Latin version is 'substratum'. In Aristotle it is the problem, of explaining what lies under. It is not the theory that there is some entity called a 'substratum'.
Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility [PG]
     Full Idea: Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 48)
     A reaction: A revealing Greek word, which is not only our rather pure notion of 'beauty', but also seems to mean something like wow!, and (very suggestive, this) applies as much to actions as to objects.
Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially [PG]
     Full Idea: Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 51)
Kinesis: movement, process [PG]
     Full Idea: Kinesis: movement, process, change
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 52)
Kosmos: order, universe [PG]
     Full Idea: Kosmos: order, universe
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 53)
Logos: reason, account, word [PG]
     Full Idea: Logos: reason, account, word
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 54)
Meson: the mean [PG]
     Full Idea: Meson: the mean
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 55)
     A reaction: This is not the 'average', and hence not some theoretical mid-point. I would call it the 'appropriate compromise', remembering that an extreme may be appropriate in certain circumstances.
Metechein: partaking, sharing [PG]
     Full Idea: Metechein: partaking, sharing
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 56)
     A reaction: The key word in Plato for the difficult question of the relationships between the Forms and the particulars. The latter 'partake' of the former. Hm. Compare modern 'instantiation', which strikes me as being equally problematic.
Mimesis: imitation, fine art [PG]
     Full Idea: Mimesis: imitation, fine art
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 57)
Morphe: form [PG]
     Full Idea: Morphe: form
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 58)
Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] [PG]
     Full Idea: Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia]
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 59)
Nomos: convention, law, custom [PG]
     Full Idea: Nomos: convention, law, custom
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 61)
Nous: intuition, intellect, understanding [PG]
     Full Idea: Nous: intuition, intellect
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 62)
     A reaction: There is a condensed discussion of 'nous' in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics B.19
Orexis: desire [PG]
     Full Idea: Orexis: desire
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 63)
Ousia: substance, (primary) being, [see 'Prote ousia'] [PG]
     Full Idea: Ousia: substance, (primary) being [see 'Prote ousia']
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 64)
     A reaction: It is based on the verb 'to be'. Latin therefore translated it as 'essentia' (esse: to be), and we have ended up translating it as 'essence', but this is wrong! 'Being' is the best translation, and 'substance' is OK. It is the problem, not the answer.
Pathos: emotion, affection, property [PG]
     Full Idea: Pathos: emotion, affection, property
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 65)
Phantasia: imagination [PG]
     Full Idea: Phantasia: imagination
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 66)
Philia: friendship [PG]
     Full Idea: Philia: friendship
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 67)
Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom [PG]
     Full Idea: Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 68)
     A reaction: The point of the word is its claim only to love wisdom, and not actually to be wise.
Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense [PG]
     Full Idea: Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 71)
     A reaction: None of the experts use my own translation, which is 'common sense', but that seems to me to perfectly fit all of Aristotle's discussions of the word in 'Ethics'. 'Prudence' seems a daft translation in modern English.
Physis: nature [PG]
     Full Idea: Physis: nature
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 72)
Praxis: action, activity [PG]
     Full Idea: Praxis: action, activity
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 73)
Prote ousia: primary being [PG]
     Full Idea: Prote ousia: primary being
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 74)
     A reaction: The main topic of investigation in Aristotle's 'Metaphysics'. 'Ousia' is the central problem of the text, NOT the answer to the problem.
Psuche: mind, soul, life [PG]
     Full Idea: Psuche: mind, soul, life
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 75)
     A reaction: The interesting thing about this is that we have tended to translate it as 'soul', but Aristotle says plants have it, and not merely conscious beings. It is something like the 'form' of a living thing, but then 'form' is a misleading translation too.
Sophia: wisdom [PG]
     Full Idea: Sophia: wisdom
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 76)
Sophrosune: moderation, self-control [PG]
     Full Idea: Sophrosune: moderation, self-control
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 77)
Stoicheia: elements [PG]
     Full Idea: Stoicheia: elements
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 78)
Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism [PG]
     Full Idea: Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 81)
Techne: skill, practical knowledge [PG]
     Full Idea: Techne: skill, practical knowledge
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 82)
Telos: purpose, end [PG]
     Full Idea: Telos: purpose, end
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 83)
Theoria: contemplation [PG]
     Full Idea: Theoria: contemplation
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 84)
Theos: god [PG]
     Full Idea: Theos: god
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 85)
Ti esti: what-something-is, essence [PG]
     Full Idea: Ti esti: the what-something-is, essence, whatness
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 86)
Timoria: vengeance, punishment [PG]
     Full Idea: Timoria: vengeance, punishment
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 87)
To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be [PG]
     Full Idea: To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 88)
     A reaction: This is Aristotle's main term for what we would now call the 'essence'. It is still not a theory of essence, merely an identification of the target. 'Form' is the nearest we get to his actual theory.
To ti estin: essence [PG]
     Full Idea: To ti estin: essence
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 91)
Tode ti: this-such, subject of predication [cf. hupokeimenon] [PG]
     Full Idea: Tode ti: this-something, subject of predication, thisness [cf. hupokeimenon]
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 92)
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / a. Ancient chronology
323 (roughly): Euclid wrote 'Elements', summarising all of geometry [PG]
     Full Idea: Euclid: In around 323 BCE Euclid wrote his 'Elements', summarising all of known geometry.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030])
1000 (roughly): Upanishads written (in Sanskrit); religious and philosophical texts [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 1000 BCE the Upanishads were written, the most philosophical of ancient Hindu texts
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0001)
750 (roughly): the Book of Genesis written by Hebrew writers [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 750 BCE the Book of Genesis was written by an anonymous jewish writer
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0250)
586: eclipse of the sun on the coast of modern Turkey was predicted by Thales of Miletus [PG]
     Full Idea: In 585 BCE there was an eclipse of the sun, which Thales of Miletus is said to have predicted
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0415)
570: Anaximander flourished in Miletus [PG]
     Full Idea: Anaximander: In around 570 BCE the philosopher and astronomer Anaximander flourished in Miletus
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0430)
563: the Buddha born in northern India [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 563 BCE Siddhartha Gautama, the Buddha, was born in northern India
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0437)
540: Lao Tzu wrote 'Tao Te Ching', the basis of Taoism [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 540 BCE Lao Tzu wrote the 'Tao Te Ching', the basis of Taoism
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0460)
529: Pythagoras created his secretive community at Croton in Sicily [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 529 BCE Pythagoras set up a community in Croton, with strict and secret rules and teachings
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0471)
500: Heraclitus flourishes at Ephesus, in modern Turkey [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 500 BCE Heraclitus flourished in the city of Ephesus in Ionia
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0500)
496: Confucius travels widely, persuading rulers to be more moral [PG]
     Full Idea: In 496 BCE Confucius began a period of wandering, to persuade rulers to be more moral
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0504)
472: Empedocles persuades his city (Acragas in Sicily) to become a democracy [PG]
     Full Idea: In 472 BCE Empedocles helped his city of Acragas change to democracy
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0528)
450 (roughly): Parmenides and Zeno visit Athens from Italy [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 450 BCE Parmenides and Zeno visited the festival in Athens
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0550)
445: Protagoras helps write laws for the new colony of Thurii [PG]
     Full Idea: In 443 BCE Protagoras helped write the laws for the new colony of Thurii
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0557)
436 (roughly): Anaxagoras is tried for impiety, and expelled from Athens [PG]
     Full Idea: In about 436 BCE Anaxagoras was tried on a charge of impiety and expelled from Athens
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0564)
427: Gorgias visited Athens as ambassador for Leontini [PG]
     Full Idea: In 427 BCE Gorgias of Leontini visited Athens as an ambassador for his city
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0573)
399: Socrates executed (with Plato absent through ill health) [PG]
     Full Idea: In 399 BCE Plato was unwell, and was not present at the death of Socrates
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0601)
387 (roughly): Plato returned to Athens, and founded the Academy [PG]
     Full Idea: In about 387 BCE Plato returned to Athens and founded his new school at the Academy
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0613)
387 (roughly): Aristippus the Elder founder a hedonist school at Cyrene [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 387 BCE a new school was founded at Cyrene by Aristippus the elder
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0613)
367: the teenaged Aristotle came to study at the Academy [PG]
     Full Idea: In 367 BCE the seventeen-year-old Aristotle came south to study at the Academy
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0633)
360 (roughly): Diogenes of Sinope lives in a barrel in central Athens [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 360 BCE Diogenes of Sinope was living in a barrel in the Agora in Athens
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0640)
347: death of Plato [PG]
     Full Idea: In 347 BCE Plato died
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0653)
343: Aristotle becomes tutor to 13 year old Alexander (the Great) [PG]
     Full Idea: In 343 BCE at Stagira Aristotle became personal tutor to the thirteen-year-old Alexander (the Great)
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0657)
335: Arisotle founded his school at the Lyceum in Athens [PG]
     Full Idea: In 335 BCE Aristotle founded the Lyceum in Athens
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0665)
330 (roughly): Chuang Tzu wrote his Taoist book [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 330 BCE Chuang Tzu wrote a key work in the Taoist tradition
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0670)
322: Aristotle retired to Chalcis, and died there [PG]
     Full Idea: In 322 BCE Aristotle retired to Chalcis in Euboea, where he died
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0678)
307 (roughly): Epicurus founded his school at the Garden in Athens [PG]
     Full Idea: In about 307 BCE Epicurus founded his school at the Garden in Athens
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0693)
301 (roughly): Zeno of Citium founded Stoicism at the Stoa Poikile in Athens [PG]
     Full Idea: In about 301 BCE the Stoic school was founded by Zeno of Citium in the Stoa Poikile in Athens
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0699)
261: Cleanthes replaced Zeno as head of the Stoa [PG]
     Full Idea: In 261 BCE Cleanthes took over from Zeno as head of the Stoa.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0739)
229 (roughly): Chrysippus replaced Cleanthes has head of the Stoa [PG]
     Full Idea: In about 229 BCE Chrysippus took over from Cleanthes as the head of the Stoic school
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0771)
157 (roughly): Carneades became head of the Academy [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 157 BCE Carneades took over as head of the Academy from Hegesinus
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0843)
85: most philosophical activity moves to Alexandria [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 85 BCE Athens went into philosophical decline, and leadership moved to Alexandria
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0915)
78: Cicero visited the stoic school on Rhodes [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 78 BCE Cicero visited the school of Posidonius in Rhodes.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0922)
60 (roughly): Lucretius wrote his Latin poem on epicureanism [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 60 BCE Lucretius wrote his Latin poem on Epicureanism
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0940)
65: Seneca forced to commit suicide by Nero [PG]
     Full Idea: In 65 CE Seneca was forced to commit suicide by the Emperor Nero.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1065)
80: the discourses of the stoic Epictetus are written down [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 80 CE the 'Discourses' of the freed slave Epictetus were written down in Rome.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1080)
170 (roughly): Marcus Aurelius wrote his private stoic meditations [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 170 CE the Emperor Marcus Aurelius wrote his 'Meditations' for private reading.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1170)
-200 (roughly): Sextus Empiricus wrote a series of books on scepticism [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 200 CE Sextus Empiricus wrote a series of books (which survive) defending scepticism
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1200)
263: Porphyry began to study with Plotinus in Rome [PG]
     Full Idea: In 263 CE Porphyry joined Plotinus' classes in Rome
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1263)
310: Christianity became the official religion of the Roman empire [PG]
     Full Idea: In 310 CE Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1310)
387: Ambrose converts Augustine to Christianity [PG]
     Full Idea: In 387 CE Augustine converted to Christianity in Milan, guided by St Ambrose
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1387)
523: Boethius imprisoned at Pavia, and begins to write [PG]
     Full Idea: In 523 CE Boethius was imprisoned in exile at Pavia, and wrote 'Consolations of Philosophy'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1523)
529: the emperor Justinian closes all the philosophy schools in Athens [PG]
     Full Idea: In 529 CE the Emperor Justinian closed all the philosophy schools in Athens
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1529)
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 3. Earlier European Philosophy / a. Earlier European chronology
622 (roughly): Mohammed writes the Koran [PG]
     Full Idea: Mohammed: In about 622 CE Muhammed wrote the basic text of Islam, the Koran.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1622)
642: Arabs close the philosophy schools in Alexandria [PG]
     Full Idea: In 642 CE Alexandria was captured by the Arabs, and the philosophy schools were closed
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1642)
910 (roughly): Al-Farabi wrote Arabic commentaries on Aristotle [PG]
     Full Idea: Alfarabi: In around 910 CE Al-Farabi explained and expanded Aristotle for the Islamic world.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1910)
1015 (roughly): Ibn Sina (Avicenna) writes a book on Aristotle [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 1015 Avicenna produced his Platonised version of Aristotle in 'The Healing'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2015)
1090: Anselm publishes his proof of the existence of God [PG]
     Full Idea: Anselm: In about 1090 St Anselm of Canterbury publishes his Ontological Proof of God's existence
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2090)
1115: Abelard is the chief logic teacher in Paris [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 1115 Abelard became established as the chief logic teacher in Paris
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2115)
1166: Ibn Rushd (Averroes) wrote extensive commentaries on Aristotle [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 1166 Averroes (Ibn Rushd), in Seville, wrote extensive commentaries on Aristotle
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2166)
1266: Aquinas began writing 'Summa Theologica' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1266 Aquinas began writing his great theological work, the 'Summa Theologica'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2266)
1280: after his death, the teaching of Aquinas becomes official Dominican doctrine [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 1280 Aquinas's teaching became the official theology of the Dominican order
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2280)
1328: William of Ockham decides the Pope is a heretic, and moves to Munich [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1328 William of Ockham decided the Pope was a heretic, and moved to Munich
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2328)
1347: the Church persecutes philosophical heresies [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1347 the Church began extensive persecution of unorthodox philosophical thought
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2347)
1470: Marsilio Ficino founds a Platonic Academy in Florence [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 1470 Marsilio Ficino founded a Platonic Academy in Florence
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2470)
1513: Machiavelli wrote 'The Prince' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1513 Machiavelli wrote 'The Prince', a tough view of political theory.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2513)
1543: Copernicus publishes his heliocentric view of the solar system [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1543 Nicholas Copernicus, a Polish monk, publishes his new theory of the solar system.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2543)
1580: Montaigne publishes his essays [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1580 Montaigne published a volume of his 'Essays'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2580)
1600: Giordano Bruno was burned at the stake in Rome [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1600 Giordano Bruno was burnt at the stake in Rome, largely for endorsing Copernicus
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2600)
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / a. Later European chronology
1619: Descartes's famous day of meditation inside a stove [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1619 Descartes had a famous day of meditation in a heated stove at Ulm
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2619)
1620: Bacon publishes 'Novum Organum' [PG]
     Full Idea: Francis Bacon: In 1620 Bacon published his 'Novum Organon', urging the rise of experimental science
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2620)
1633: Galileo convicted of heresy by the Inquisition [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1633 Galileo was condemned to life emprisonment for contradicting church teachings.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2633)
1641: Descartes publishes his 'Meditations' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1641 Descartes published his well-known 'Meditations', complete with Objections and Replies
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2641)
1650: death of Descartes, in Stockholm [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1650 Descartes died in Stockholm, after stressful work for Queen Christina
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2650)
1651: Hobbes publishes 'Leviathan' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1651 Hobbes published his great work on politics and contract morality, 'Leviathan'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2651)
1662: the Port Royal Logic is published [PG]
     Full Idea: Antoine Arnauld: In 1662 Arnauld and Nicole published their famous text, the 'Port-Royal Logic'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2662)
1665: Spinoza writes his 'Ethics' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1665 the first draft of Spinoza's 'Ethics', his major work, was finished, and published posthumously
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2665)
1676: Leibniz settled as librarian to the Duke of Brunswick [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1676 Leibniz became librarian to the Duke of Brunswick, staying for the rest of his life
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2676)
1687: Newton publishes his 'Principia Mathematica' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1687 Newton published his 'Principia', containing his theory of gravity.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2687)
1690: Locke publishes his 'Essay' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1690 Locke published his 'Essay', his major work on empiricism
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2690)
1697: Bayle publishes his 'Dictionary' [PG]
     Full Idea: Pierre Bayle: In about 1697 Pierre Bayle published his 'Historical and Critical Dictionary'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2697)
1713: Berkeley publishes his 'Three Dialogues' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1713 Berkeley published a popular account of his empiricist idealism in 'Three Dialogues'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2713)
1734: Voltaire publishes his 'Philosophical Letters' [PG]
     Full Idea: Francois-Marie Voltaire: In 1734 Voltaire's 'Lettres Philosophiques' praised liberalism and empiricism
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2734)
1739: Hume publishes his 'Treatise' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1739 Hume returned to Edinburgh and published his 'Treatise', but it sold very few copies
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2739)
1762: Rousseau publishes his 'Social Contract' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1762 Rousseau published his 'Social Contract', basing politics on the popular will
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2762)
1781: Kant publishes his 'Critique of Pure Reason' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1781 Kant published his first great work, the 'Critique of Pure Reason'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2781)
1785: Reid publishes his essays defending common sense [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1785 Thomas Reid, based in Glasgow, published essays defending common sense.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2785)
1798: the French Revolution [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1789 the French Revolution gave strong impetus to the anti-rational 'Romantic' movement
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2789)
1807: Hegel publishes his 'Phenomenology of Spirit' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1807 Hegel published his first major work, the 'Phenomenology of Spirit'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2807)
1818: Schopenhauer publishes his 'World as Will and Idea' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1818 Schopenhauer published 'The World as Will and Idea', his major work
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2818)
1840: Kierkegaard is writing extensively in Copenhagen [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 1840 Kierkegaard lived a quiet life as a writer in Copenhagen
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2840)
1843: Mill publishes his 'System of Logic' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1843 Mill published his 'System of Logic'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2843)
1848: Marx and Engels publis the Communist Manifesto [PG]
     Full Idea: Karl Marx: In 1848 Marx and Engels published their 'Communist Manifesto'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2848)
1859: Darwin publishes his 'Origin of the Species' [PG]
     Full Idea: Charles Darwin: In 1859 Charles Darwin published his theory of natural selection in 'Origin of the Species'.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2859)
1861: Mill publishes 'Utilitarianism' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1861 Mill published his book 'Utilitarianism'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2861)
1867: Marx begins publishing 'Das Kapital' [PG]
     Full Idea: Karl Marx: In 1867 Karl Marx began publishing his political work 'Das Kapital'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2867)
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / a. Modern philosophy chronology
1879: Peirce taught for five years at Johns Hopkins University [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1879 Peirce began five years of teaching at Johns Hopkins University
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2879)
1879: Frege invents predicate logic [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1879 Frege published his 'Concept Script', which created predicate logic
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2879)
1892: Frege's essay 'Sense and Reference' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1892 Frege published his famous essay 'Sense and Reference' (Sinn und Bedeutung)
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2882)
1884: Frege publishes his 'Foundations of Arithmetic' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1884 Frege published his 'Foundations of Arithmetic', the beginning of logicism
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2884)
1885: Nietzsche completed 'Thus Spake Zarathustra' [PG]
     Full Idea: In about 1885 Nietzsche completed his book 'Also Sprach Zarathustra'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2885)
1888: Dedekind publishes axioms for arithmetic [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1888 Dedekind created simple axioms for arithmetic (the Peano Axioms)
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2888)
1890: James published 'Principles of Psychology' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1890 James published his 'Principles of Psychology'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2890)
1895 (roughly): Freud developed theories of the unconscious [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 1895 Sigmund Freud developed his theories of the unconscious mind
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2895)
1900: Husserl began developing Phenomenology [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1900 Edmund Husserl began presenting his new philosophy of Phenomenology
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2900)
1903: Moore published 'Principia Ethica' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1903 G.E. Moore published his 'Principia Ethica', attacking naturalistic ethics.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2903)
1904: Dewey became professor at Columbia University [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1904 Dewey moved to Columbia University in New York.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2904)
1908: Zermelo publishes axioms for set theory [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1908 Zermelo published an axiomatisation of the new set theory
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2908)
1910: Russell and Whitehead begin publishing 'Principia Mathematica' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1910 Russell began publication of 'Principia Mathematica', with Whitehead
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2910)
1912: Russell meets Wittgenstein in Cambridge [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1912 Russell met Wittgenstein at Cambridge
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2912)
1921: Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' published [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1921 Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' was published
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2921)
1927: Heidegger's 'Being and Time' published [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1927 Heidegger's major work, 'Being and Time', was published
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2927)
1930: Frank Ramsey dies at 27 [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1930 Frank Ramsey died at the age of 27.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2930)
1931: Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems [PG]
     Full Idea: Kurt Gödel: In 1931 the mathematician Kurt Gödel publishes his Incompleteness Theorems.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2931)
1933: Tarski's theory of truth [PG]
     Full Idea: Alfred Tarski: In 1933 Alfred Tarski wrote a famous paper presenting a semantic theory of truth.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2933)
1942: Camus published 'The Myth of Sisyphus' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1942 Camus published 'The Myth of Sisyphus', exploring suicide and the absurd
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2942)
1943: Sartre's 'Being and Nothingness' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1943 Jean-Paul Sartre published his major work, 'Being and Nothingness'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2943)
1945: Merleau-Ponty's 'Phenomenology of Perception' [PG]
     Full Idea: Maurice Merleau-Ponty: In 1945 Maurice Merleau-Pont published 'The Phenomenology of Perception'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2945)
1947: Carnap published 'Meaning and Necessity' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1947 Carnap published 'Meaning and Necessity'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2947)
1950: Quine's essay 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1950 Willard Quine published 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', attacking analytic truth
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2950)
1953: Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1953 Wittgenstein's posthumous work 'Philosophical Investigations' is published
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2953)
1956: Place proposed mind-brain identity [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1956 U.T. Place proposed that the mind is identical to the brain
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2956)
1962: Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1962 Thomas Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions' questioned the authority of science
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2962)
1967: Putnam proposed functionalism of the mind [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1967 Putname proposed the functionalist view of the mind
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2967)
1971: Rawls's 'A Theory of Justice' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1971 John Rawls published his famous defence of liberalism in 'A Theory of Justice'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2971)
1972: Kripke publishes 'Naming and Necessity' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1972 Saul Kripke's 'Naming and Necessity' revised theories about language and reality
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2972)
1975: Singer publishes 'Animal Rights' [PG]
     Full Idea: Peter Singer: In 1975 Peter Singer's 'Animal Rights' turned the attention of philosophers to applied ethics.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2975)
1975: Putnam published his Twin Earth example [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1975 Putnam published 'The Meaning of 'Meaning'', containing his Twin Earth example
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2975)
1986: David Lewis publishes 'On the Plurality of Worlds' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1986 David Lewis published 'On the Plurality of Worlds', about possible worlds.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2986)
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Note that "is" can assert existence, or predication, or identity, or classification [PG]
     Full Idea: There are four uses of the word "is" in English: as existence ('he is at home'), as predication ('he is tall'), as identity ('he is the man I saw'), and as classification ('he is British').
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
     A reaction: This seems a nice instance of the sort of point made by analytical philosophy, which can lead to horrible confusion in other breeds of philosophy when it is overlooked.
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
Fallacies are errors in reasoning, 'formal' if a clear rule is breached, and 'informal' if more general [PG]
     Full Idea: Fallacies are errors in reasoning, labelled as 'formal' if a clear rule has been breached, and 'informal' if some less precise error has been made.
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
     A reaction: Presumably there can be a grey area between the two.
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 3. Question Begging
Question-begging assumes the proposition which is being challenged [PG]
     Full Idea: To beg the question is to take for granted in your argument that very proposition which is being challenged
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
     A reaction: An undoubted fallacy, and a simple failure to engage in the rational enterprise. I suppose one might give a reason for something, under the mistaken apprehension that it didn't beg the question; analysis of logical form is then needed.
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 6. Fallacy of Division
What is true of a set is also true of its members [PG]
     Full Idea: The fallacy of division is the claim that what is true of a set must therefore be true of its members.
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
     A reaction: Clearly a fallacy, but if you only accept sets which are rational, then there is always a reason why a particular is a member of a set, and you can infer facts about particulars from the nature of the set
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
The Ad Hominem Fallacy criticises the speaker rather than the argument [PG]
     Full Idea: The Ad Hominem Fallacy is to criticise the person proposing an argument rather than the argument itself, as when you say "You would say that", or "Your behaviour contradicts what you just said".
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
     A reaction: Nietzsche is very keen on ad hominem arguments, and cheerfully insults great philosophers, but then he doesn't believe there is such a thing as 'pure argument', and he is a relativist.
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
Minimal theories of truth avoid ontological commitment to such things as 'facts' or 'reality' [PG]
     Full Idea: Minimalist theories of truth are those which involve minimum ontological commitment, avoiding references to 'reality' or 'facts' or 'what works', preferring to refer to formal relationships within language.
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
     A reaction: Personally I am suspicious of minimal theories, which seem to be designed by and for anti-realists. They seem too focused on language, when animals can obviously formulate correct propositions. I'm quite happy with the 'facts', even if that is vague.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
Monty Hall Dilemma: do you abandon your preference after Monty eliminates one of the rivals? [PG]
     Full Idea: The Monty Hall Dilemma: Three boxes, one with a big prize; pick one to open. Monty Hall then opens one of the other two, which is empty. You may, if you wish, switch from your box to the other unopened box. Should you?
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
     A reaction: The other two boxes, as a pair, are more likely contain the prize than your box. Monty Hall has eliminated one of them for you, so you should choose the other one. Your intuition that the two remaining boxes are equal is incorrect!
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
     Full Idea: It seems unavoidable that the facts about logically necessary relations between levels of facts are themselves logically distinct further facts, irreducible to the microphysical facts.
     From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C)
     A reaction: I'm beginning to think that rejecting every theory of reality that is proposed by carefully exposing some infinite regress hidden in it is a rather lazy way to do philosophy. Almost as bad as rejecting anything if it can't be defined.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
     Full Idea: Logical supervenience, restricted to individuals, seems to imply strong reduction. It is said that where the B-facts logically supervene on the A-facts, the B-facts simply re-describe what the A-facts describe, and the B-facts come along 'for free'.
     From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C)
     A reaction: This seems to be taking 'logically' to mean 'analytically'. Presumably an entailment is logically supervenient on its premisses, and may therefore be very revealing, even if some people think such things are analytic.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
     Full Idea: The root intuition behind nonreductive materialism is that reality is composed of ontologically distinct layers or levels. …The upper levels depend on the physical without reducing to it.
     From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], B)
     A reaction: A nice clear statement of a view which I take to be false. This relationship is the sort of thing that drives people fishing for an account of it to use the word 'supervenience', which just says two things seem to hang out together. Fluffy materialism.
The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
     Full Idea: Jessica Wilson (1999) says what makes physicalist accounts different from emergentism etc. is that each individual causal power associated with a supervenient property is numerically identical with a causal power associated with its base property.
     From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], n 11)
     A reaction: Hence the key thought in so-called (serious, rather than self-evident) 'emergentism' is so-called 'downward causation', which I take to be an idle daydream.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
Everything has a probability, something will happen, and probabilities add up [PG]
     Full Idea: The three Kolgorov axioms of probability: the probability of an event is a non-negative real number; it is certain that one of the 'elementary events' will occur; and the unity of probabilities is the sum of probability of parts ('additivity').
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
     A reaction: [My attempt to verbalise them; they are normally expressed in terms of set theory]. Got this from a talk handout, and Wikipedia.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
It is knowing 'why' that gives scientific understanding, not knowing 'that' [Salmon]
     Full Idea: Knowledge 'that' is descriptive, and knowledge 'why' is explanatory, and it is the latter that provides scientific understanding of our world.
     From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], Intro)
     A reaction: I agree, but of course, knowing 'why' may require a lot of knowing 'that'. People with extensive knowledge 'that' things are so tend to understand why something happens more readily than the rest of us ignoramuses.
Understanding is an extremely vague concept [Salmon]
     Full Idea: Understanding is an extremely vague concept.
     From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 4.3)
     A reaction: True, I suppose, but we usually recognise understanding when we encounter it, and everybody has a pretty clear notion of an 'increase' in understanding. I suspect that the concept is perfectly clear, but we lack any scale for measuring it.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / a. Naïve realism
If reality is just what we perceive, we would have no need for a sixth sense [PG]
     Full Idea: Reality must be more than merely what we perceive, because a sixth sense would enhance our current knowledge, and a seventh, and so on.
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
If my team is losing 3-1, I have synthetic a priori knowledge that they need two goals for a draw [PG]
     Full Idea: If my football team is losing 3-1, I seem to have synthetic a priori knowledge that they need two goals to achieve a draw
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
Correlations can provide predictions, but only causes can give explanations [Salmon]
     Full Idea: Various kinds of correlations exist that provide excellent bases for prediction, but because no suitable causal relations exist (or are known), these correlations do not furnish explanation.
     From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 2.3)
     A reaction: There may be problem cases for the claim that all explanations are causal, but I certainly think that this idea is essentially right. Prediction can come from induction, but inductions may be true and yet baffling.
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
For the instrumentalists there are no scientific explanations [Salmon]
     Full Idea: There is a centuries-old philosophical tradition, sometimes referred to by the name of 'instrumentalism', that has denied the claim that science has explanatory power. For the instrumentalists there are no scientific explanations.
     From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 4.3)
     A reaction: [He quotes Coffa] Presumably it is just a matter of matching the world to the readings on the instruments, aiming at van Fraassen's 'empirical adequacy'. If there are no scientific explanations, does that mean that there are no explanations at all? Daft!
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
Good induction needs 'total evidence' - the absence at the time of any undermining evidence [Salmon]
     Full Idea: Inductive logicians have a 'requirement of total evidence': induction is strong if 1) it has true premises, 2) it has correct inductive form, and 3) no additional evidence that would change the degree of support is available at the time.
     From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 2.4.2)
     A reaction: The evidence might be very close at hand, but not quite 'available' to the person doing the induction.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
Scientific explanation is not reducing the unfamiliar to the familiar [Salmon]
     Full Idea: I reject the view that scientific explanation involves reduction of the unfamiliar to the familiar.
     From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], Pref)
     A reaction: Aristotle sometimes seems to imply this account of explanation, and I would have to agree with Salmon's view of it. Aristotle is also, though, aware of real explanations, definitions and essences. People are 'familiar' with some peculiar things.
Why-questions can seek evidence as well as explanation [Salmon]
     Full Idea: There are evidence-seeking why-questions, as well as explanation-seeking why-questions.
     From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 3.2)
     A reaction: Surely we would all prefer an explanation to mere evidence? It seems to me that they are all explanation-seeking, but that we are grateful for some evidence when no full explanation is available. Explanation renders evidence otiose.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
An explanation is a table of statistical information [Salmon, by Strevens]
     Full Idea: On Salmon's statistical relevance view, an explanation is a table of statistical information.
     From: report of Wesley Salmon (Statistical Explanation [1970]) by Michael Strevens - No Understanding without Explanation 1
     A reaction: [He cites W.Salmon 1970] When put like that the view sounds incredibly implausible, but maybe a reading of Salmon would improve the case for it.
The three basic conceptions of scientific explanation are modal, epistemic, and ontic [Salmon]
     Full Idea: There are three basic conceptions of scientific explanation - modal, epistemic, and ontic - which can be discerned in Aristotle, and that have persisted down the ages.
     From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 4.1)
The 'inferential' conception is that all scientific explanations are arguments [Salmon]
     Full Idea: The 'inferential' conception of scientific explanation is the thesis that all legitimate scientific explanations are arguments of one sort or another.
     From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 1.1)
     A reaction: This seems to imply that someone has to be persuaded of something, and hence seems a rather too pragmatic view. I presume an explanation might be no more than dumbly pointing at conclusive evidence of a cause. Man with smoking gun.
Ontic explanations can be facts, or reports of facts [Salmon]
     Full Idea: Proponents of the ontic conception of explanation can say that explanations exist in the world as facts, or that they are reports of such facts (as opposed to the view of explanations as arguments, or as speech acts).
     From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 3.2)
     A reaction: [compressed] I am strongly drawn to the ontic approach, but not sure whether we want facts, or reports of them. The facts are the causal nexus, but which parts of the nexus provide the main aspect of explanation? I'll vote for reports, for now.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
We must distinguish true laws because they (unlike accidental generalizations) explain things [Salmon]
     Full Idea: The problem is to distinguish between laws and accidental generalizations, for laws have explanatory force while accidental generalizations, even if they are true, do not.
     From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 1.1)
     A reaction: [He is discussing Hempel and Oppenheim 1948] This seems obviously right, but I can only make sense of the explanatory power if we have identified the mechanism which requires the generalisation to continue in future cases.
Deductive-nomological explanations will predict, and their predictions will explain [Salmon]
     Full Idea: The deductive-nomological view has an explanation/prediction symmetry thesis - that a correct explanation could be a scientific prediction, and that any deductive prediction could serve as a deductive-nomological explanation.
     From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 1.1)
     A reaction: Of course, not all predictions will explain, or vice versa. Weird regularities become predictable but remain baffling. Good explanations may be of unrepeatable events. It is the 'law' in the account that ties the two ends together.
A law is not enough for explanation - we need information about what makes a difference [Salmon]
     Full Idea: To provide an adequate explanation of any given fact, we need to provide information that is relevant to the occurrence of that fact - information that makes a difference to its occurrence. It is not enough to subsume it under a general law.
     From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 2.2)
     A reaction: [He cites Bromberger for this idea] Salmon is identifying this idea as the beginnings of trouble for the covering-law account of explanation, and it sounds exactly right.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Flagpoles explain shadows, and not vice versa, because of temporal ordering [Salmon]
     Full Idea: The height of the flagpole explains the length of the shadow because the interaction between the sunlight and the flagpole occurs before the interaction between the sunlight and the ground.
     From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 3.6)
     A reaction: [Bromberger produced the flagpole example] This seems to be correct, and would apply to all physical cases, but there may still be cases of explanation which are not causal (in mathematics, for example).
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
Causation produces productive mechanisms; to understand the world, understand these mechanisms [Salmon]
     Full Idea: Causal processes, causal interactions, and causal laws provide the mechanisms by which the world works; to understand why certain things happen, we need to see how they are produced by these mechanisms.
     From: Wesley Salmon (Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World [1984]), quoted by David-Hillel Ruben - Explaining Explanation Ch 7
     A reaction: I don't think I've ever found a better quotation on explanation. That strikes me as correct, and (basically) there is nothing more to be said. I'm not sure about the 'laws'. This is later Wesley Salmon.
Salmon's interaction mechanisms needn't be regular, or involving any systems [Glennan on Salmon]
     Full Idea: While Salmon's mechanisms are processes involving interactions, the interactions are not necessarily regular, and they do not involve the operation of systems.
     From: comment on Wesley Salmon (Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World [1984]) by Stuart Glennan - Mechanisms 'hierarchical'
     A reaction: This is why modern mechanistic philosophy only began in 2000, despite Wesley Salmon's championing of the roughly mechanistic approach.
Explanation at the quantum level will probably be by entirely new mechanisms [Salmon]
     Full Idea: My basic feeling about explanation in the quantum realm is that it will involve mechanisms, but mechanisms that are quite different from those that seem to work in the macrocosm.
     From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], Pref)
     A reaction: Since I take most explanation to be by mechanisms (or some abstraction analogous to mechanisms), then I think this is probably right (rather than being by new 'laws').
Does an item have a function the first time it occurs? [Salmon]
     Full Idea: In functional explanation, there is a disagreement over whether an item has a function the first time it occurs.
     From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 3.8)
     A reaction: This question arises particularly in evolutionary contexts, and would obviously not generally arise in the case of human artefacts.
Explanations reveal the mechanisms which produce the facts [Salmon]
     Full Idea: I favour an ontic conception of explanation, that explanations reveal the mechanisms, causal or other, that produce the facts we are trying to explain.
     From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 4.1)
     A reaction: [He also cites Coffa and Peter Railton] A structure may explain, and only be supported by causal powers, but it doesn't seem to be the causal powers that do the explaining. Is a peg fitting a hole explained causally?
Salmon's mechanisms are processes and interactions, involving marks, or conserved quantities [Salmon, by Machamer/Darden/Craver]
     Full Idea: For Salmon mechanisms are composed of processes and interactions. The interactions are identified in terms of transmitted marks and statistical relations, or (more recently) exchanges of conserved quantities.
     From: report of Wesley Salmon (Causality and Explanation [1998], 3.1) by Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C - Thinking About Mechanisms 3.1
     A reaction: They say that Salmon has too little to say about the activities that constitute a mechanism. A 'mark' doesn't sound too promising, but I quite like the exchange of conserved quantities, which gets into the guts of what is going on.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / l. Probabilistic explanations
Can events whose probabilities are low be explained? [Salmon]
     Full Idea: Can events whose probabilities are low be explained?
     From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 3.6)
     A reaction: I take this to be one of the reasons why explanation must ultimately reside at the level of individual objects and events, rather than residing with generalisations and laws.
Statistical explanation needs relevance, not high probability [Salmon]
     Full Idea: Statistical relevance, not high probability, is the key desideratum in statistical explanation.
     From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 2.5)
     A reaction: I suspect that this is because the explanation will not ultimately be probabilistic at all, but mechanical and causal. Hence the link is what counts, which is the relevance. He notes that relevance needs two values instead of one high value.
Think of probabilities in terms of propensities rather than frequencies [Salmon]
     Full Idea: Perhaps we should think of probabilities in terms of propensities rather than frequencies.
     From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 3.2)
     A reaction: [He cites Coffa 1974 for this] I find this suggestion very appealing, as it connects up with dispositions and powers, which I take to be the building blocks of all explanation. It is, of course, easier to render frequencies numerically.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Maybe a mollusc's brain events for pain ARE of the same type (broadly) as a human's [PG]
     Full Idea: To defend type-type identity against the multiple realisability objection, we might say that a molluscs's brain events that register pain ARE of the same type as humans, given that being 'of the same type' is a fairly flexible concept.
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
     A reaction: But this reduces 'of the same type' to such vagueness that it may become vacuous. You would be left with token-token identity, where the mental event is just identical to some brain event, with its 'type' being irrelevant.
Maybe a frog's brain events for fear are functionally like ours, but not phenomenally [PG]
     Full Idea: To defend type-type identity against the multiple realisability objection, we might (also) say that while a frog's brain events for fear are functionally identical to a human's (it runs away), that doesn't mean they are phenomenally identical.
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
     A reaction: I take this to be the key reply to the multiple realisability problem. If a frog flees from a loud noise, it is 'frightened' in a functional sense, but that still leaves the question 'What's it like to be a frightened frog?', which may differ from humans.
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 4. Unfairness
Utilitarianism seems to justify the discreet murder of unhappy people [PG]
     Full Idea: If I discreetly murdered a gloomy and solitary tramp who was upsetting people in my village, if is hard to see how utilitarianism could demonstrate that I had done something wrong.
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
A causal interaction is when two processes intersect, and correlated modifications persist afterwards [Salmon]
     Full Idea: When two processes intersect, and they undergo correlated modifications which persist after the intersection, I shall say that the intersection is a causal interaction. I take this as a fundamental causal concept.
     From: Wesley Salmon (Causality: Production and Propagation [1980], §4)
     A reaction: There may be a problem individuating processes, just as there is for events. I like this approach to causation, which is ontologically sparse, and fits in with the scientific worldview. Change of properties sounds precise, but isn't. Stick to processes.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
Cause must come first in propagations of causal interactions, but interactions are simultaneous [Salmon]
     Full Idea: In a typical cause-effect situation (a 'propagation') cause must precede effect, for propagation over a finite time interval is an essential feature. In an 'interaction', an intersection of processes resulting in change, we have simultaneity.
     From: Wesley Salmon (Causality: Production and Propagation [1980], §8)
     A reaction: This takes the direction of time as axiomatic, and quite right too. Salmon isn't addressing the real difficulty, though, which is that the resultant laws are usually held to be time-reversible, which is a bit of a puzzle.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Instead of localised events, I take enduring and extended processes as basic to causation [Salmon]
     Full Idea: I propose to approach causality by taking processes rather than events as basic entities. Events are relatively localised in space and time, while processes have much greater temporal duration, and, in many cases, much greater spatial extent.
     From: Wesley Salmon (Causality: Production and Propagation [1980], §2)
     A reaction: This strikes me as an incredibly promising proposal, not just in our understanding of causation, but for our general metaphysics and understanding of nature. See Idea 4931, for example. Vague events and processes blend into one another.
Salmon says processes rather than events should be basic in a theory of physical causation [Salmon, by Psillos]
     Full Idea: Salmon argues that processes rather than events should be the basic entities in a theory of physical causation.
     From: report of Wesley Salmon (Causal Connections [1984]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §4.2
     A reaction: It increasingly strikes me that the concept of a 'process' ought to be ontologically basic. Edelman says the mind is a process. An 'event' is too loose, and a 'fact' too vague, and heaven knows what Hume meant by an 'object'.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
Probabilistic causal concepts are widely used in everyday life and in science [Salmon]
     Full Idea: Probabilistic causal concepts are used in innumerable contexts of everyday life and science. ...In causes of cancer, road accidents, or food poisoning, for example.
     From: Wesley Salmon (Probabilistic Causality [1980], p.137)
     A reaction: [Second half compresses his examples] This strikes me as rather a weak point. No one ever thought that a particular road accident was actually caused by the high probability of it at a particular location. Causes are in the mechanisms.
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
Life is Movement, Respiration, Sensation, Nutrition, Excretion, Reproduction, Growth (MRS NERG) [PG]
     Full Idea: The biologists' acronym for the necessary conditions of life is MRS NERG: that is, Movement, Respiration, Sensation, Nutrition, Excretion, Reproduction, Growth.
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
     A reaction: How strictly necessary are each of these is a point for discussion. A notorious problem case is fire, which (at a stretch) may pass all seven tests.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
An omniscient being couldn't know it was omniscient, as that requires information from beyond its scope of knowledge [PG]
     Full Idea: God seems to be in the paradoxical situation that He may be omniscient, but can never know that He is, because that involves knowing that there is nothing outside his scope of knowledge (e.g. another God)
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
How could God know there wasn't an unknown force controlling his 'free' will? [PG]
     Full Idea: How could God be certain that he has free will (if He has), if He couldn't be sure that there wasn't an unknown force controlling his will?
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])