Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Richard G. Heck and Anon (Dham)

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23 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
Our life is the creation of our mind [Anon (Dham)]
     Full Idea: What we are today comes from our thoughts of yesterday, and our present thoughts build our life of tomorrow: our life is the creation of our mind.
     From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §1.1)
     A reaction: I may adopt this as a second epigraph for the database. This idea records the subjective view, which now comes up against evolutionary psychology. Maybe philosophy is opposed to science, because it is committed to exploring the subjective view?
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
The meaning of a number isn't just the numerals leading up to it [Heck]
     Full Idea: My knowing what the number '33' denotes cannot consist in my knowing that it denotes the number of decimal numbers between '1' and '33', because I would know that even if it were in hexadecimal (which I don't know well).
     From: Richard G. Heck (Cardinality, Counting and Equinumerosity [2000], 5)
     A reaction: Obviously you wouldn't understand '33' if you didn't understand what '33 things' meant.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / f. Cardinal numbers
A basic grasp of cardinal numbers needs an understanding of equinumerosity [Heck]
     Full Idea: An appreciation of the connection between sameness of number and equinumerosity that it reports is essential to even the most primitive grasp of the concept of cardinal number.
     From: Richard G. Heck (Cardinality, Counting and Equinumerosity [2000], 6)
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
In counting, numerals are used, not mentioned (as objects that have to correlated) [Heck]
     Full Idea: One need not conceive of the numerals as objects in their own right in order to count. The numerals are not mentioned in counting (as objects to be correlated with baseball players), but are used.
     From: Richard G. Heck (Cardinality, Counting and Equinumerosity [2000], 3)
     A reaction: He observes that when you name the team, you aren't correlating a list of names with the players. I could correlate any old tags with some objects, and you could tell me the cardinality denoted by the last tag. I do ordinals, you do cardinals.
Is counting basically mindless, and independent of the cardinality involved? [Heck]
     Full Idea: I am not denying that counting can be done mindlessly, without making judgments of cardinality along the way. ...But the question is whether counting is, as it were, fundamentally a mindless exercise.
     From: Richard G. Heck (Cardinality, Counting and Equinumerosity [2000], 5)
     A reaction: He says no. It seems to me like going on a journey, where you can forget where you are going and where you have got to so far, but those underlying facts are always there. If you just tag things with unknown foreign numbers, you aren't really counting.
Counting is the assignment of successively larger cardinal numbers to collections [Heck]
     Full Idea: Counting is not mere tagging: it is the successive assignment of cardinal numbers to increasingly large collections of objects.
     From: Richard G. Heck (Cardinality, Counting and Equinumerosity [2000], 5)
     A reaction: That the cardinals are 'successive' seems to mean that they are ordinals as well. If you don't know that 'seven' means a cardinality, as well as 'successor of six', you haven't understood it. Days of the week have successors. Does PA capture cardinality?
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / e. Counting by correlation
Understanding 'just as many' needn't involve grasping one-one correspondence [Heck]
     Full Idea: It is far from obvious that knowing what 'just as many' means requires knowing what a one-one correspondence is. The notion of a one-one correspondence is very sophisticated, and it is far from clear that five-year-olds have any grasp of it.
     From: Richard G. Heck (Cardinality, Counting and Equinumerosity [2000], 4)
     A reaction: The point is that children decide 'just as many' by counting each group and arriving at the same numeral, not by matching up. He cites psychological research by Gelman and Galistel.
We can know 'just as many' without the concepts of equinumerosity or numbers [Heck]
     Full Idea: 'Just as many' is independent of the ability to count, and we shouldn't characterise equinumerosity through counting. It is also independent of the concept of number. Enough cookies to go round doesn't need how many cookies.
     From: Richard G. Heck (Cardinality, Counting and Equinumerosity [2000], 4)
     A reaction: [compressed] He talks of children having an 'operational' ability which is independent of these more sophisticated concepts. Interesting. You see how early man could relate 'how many' prior to the development of numbers.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
Frege's Theorem explains why the numbers satisfy the Peano axioms [Heck]
     Full Idea: The interest of Frege's Theorem is that it offers us an explanation of the fact that the numbers satisfy the Dedekind-Peano axioms.
     From: Richard G. Heck (Cardinality, Counting and Equinumerosity [2000], 6)
     A reaction: He says 'explaining' does not make it more fundamental, since all proofs explain why their conclusions hold.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
Children can use numbers, without a concept of them as countable objects [Heck]
     Full Idea: For a long time my daughter had no understanding of the question of how many numerals or numbers there are between 'one' and 'five'. I think she lacked the concept of numerals as objects which can themselves be counted.
     From: Richard G. Heck (Cardinality, Counting and Equinumerosity [2000], 5)
     A reaction: I can't make any sense of numbers actually being objects, though clearly treating all sorts of things as objects helps thinking (as in 'the victory is all that matters').
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
We can understand cardinality without the idea of one-one correspondence [Heck]
     Full Idea: One can have a perfectly serviceable concept of cardinality without so much as having the concept of one-one correspondence.
     From: Richard G. Heck (Cardinality, Counting and Equinumerosity [2000], 3)
     A reaction: This is the culmination of a lengthy discussion. It includes citations about the psychology of children's counting. Cardinality needs one group of things, and 1-1 needs two groups.
Equinumerosity is not the same concept as one-one correspondence [Heck]
     Full Idea: Equinumerosity is not the same concept as being in one-one correspondence with.
     From: Richard G. Heck (Cardinality, Counting and Equinumerosity [2000], 6)
     A reaction: He says this is the case, even if they are coextensive, like renate and cordate. You can see that five loaves are equinumerous with five fishes, without doing a one-one matchup.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
     Full Idea: It seems unavoidable that the facts about logically necessary relations between levels of facts are themselves logically distinct further facts, irreducible to the microphysical facts.
     From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C)
     A reaction: I'm beginning to think that rejecting every theory of reality that is proposed by carefully exposing some infinite regress hidden in it is a rather lazy way to do philosophy. Almost as bad as rejecting anything if it can't be defined.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
     Full Idea: Logical supervenience, restricted to individuals, seems to imply strong reduction. It is said that where the B-facts logically supervene on the A-facts, the B-facts simply re-describe what the A-facts describe, and the B-facts come along 'for free'.
     From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C)
     A reaction: This seems to be taking 'logically' to mean 'analytically'. Presumably an entailment is logically supervenient on its premisses, and may therefore be very revealing, even if some people think such things are analytic.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
     Full Idea: The root intuition behind nonreductive materialism is that reality is composed of ontologically distinct layers or levels. …The upper levels depend on the physical without reducing to it.
     From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], B)
     A reaction: A nice clear statement of a view which I take to be false. This relationship is the sort of thing that drives people fishing for an account of it to use the word 'supervenience', which just says two things seem to hang out together. Fluffy materialism.
The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
     Full Idea: Jessica Wilson (1999) says what makes physicalist accounts different from emergentism etc. is that each individual causal power associated with a supervenient property is numerically identical with a causal power associated with its base property.
     From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], n 11)
     A reaction: Hence the key thought in so-called (serious, rather than self-evident) 'emergentism' is so-called 'downward causation', which I take to be an idle daydream.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
The world is just the illusion of an appearance [Anon (Dham)]
     Full Idea: When a man considers this world as a bubble of froth, and as the illusion of an appearance, then the king of death has no power over him.
     From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §13.170)
     A reaction: Strictly, of course, this says you can 'consider' things this way. Perhaps we could substitute 'pretends', but the world's great religions don't go in for that sort of thing. Berkeley would be shocked to learn he was approaching Buddhism.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Hate is conquered by love [Anon (Dham)]
     Full Idea: Hate is not conquered by hate: hate is conquered by love. This is the law eternal.
     From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §1.5)
     A reaction: [N.B. This thought was not invented by Jesus] The challenge to this view might be the tit-for-tat strategy of game theory, which says that hate is actually conquered by a combination of hate and love, judiciously applied.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
Even divine pleasure will not satisfy the wise, as it is insatiable, and leads to pain [Anon (Dham)]
     Full Idea: Since a shower of gold coins could not satisfy craving desires and the end of all pleasure is pain, how could a wise man find satisfaction even in the pleasures of the gods?
     From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §14.186)
     A reaction: I'm never sure how so many ancient thinkers arrived at this implausible view. They seem to think that no one knows when to stop, and that every drink leads to hangover. What is actually wrong with moderate sensible pleasure?
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
The foolish gradually fill with evil, like a slowly-filled water-jar [Anon (Dham)]
     Full Idea: The falling of drops of water will in time fill a water-jar. Even so the foolish man becomes full of evil, although he gather it little by little.
     From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §9.121)
     A reaction: This coincides closely with Aristotle's view of moral education. Maybe a wise man can maintain one small vice. Not all slopes are slippery.
The wise gradually fill with good, like a slowly-filled water-jar [Anon (Dham)]
     Full Idea: The falling of drops of water will in time fill a water-jar. Even so the wise man becomes full of good, although he gather it little by little.
     From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §9.122)
     A reaction: Again, this is like Aristotle's proposal of how to educate people in virtue. In my experience, there is no guarantee that small acts of politeness and charity will eventually guarantee goodness of character. Thought is also needed.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Don't befriend fools; either find superior friends, or travel alone [Anon (Dham)]
     Full Idea: If on the great journey of life a man cannot find one who is better or at least as good as himself, let him joyfully travel alone: a fool cannot help him on his journey.
     From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §5.61)
     A reaction: This is a slightly disturbing aspect of Buddhism, possibly leading to contradiction. It urges friendship and love, but the finest people will have virtually no friends, and solitude is presented as a finer state than friendship.
29. Religion / C. Spiritual Disciplines / 3. Buddhism
Speak the truth, yield not to anger, give what you can to him who asks [Anon (Dham)]
     Full Idea: Speak the truth, yield not to anger, give what you can to him who asks: these three steps lead you to the gods
     From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §17.224)
     A reaction: I don't recall either the Old or New Testament, or the Koran, placing great emphasis on speaking the truth. The injunction to give is not so simple. Give to greedy children, to alcoholics, to criminals, to the rich, to fools, to yourself?