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16061
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If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
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Full Idea:
Logical supervenience, restricted to individuals, seems to imply strong reduction. It is said that where the B-facts logically supervene on the A-facts, the B-facts simply re-describe what the A-facts describe, and the B-facts come along 'for free'.
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From:
Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C)
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A reaction:
This seems to be taking 'logically' to mean 'analytically'. Presumably an entailment is logically supervenient on its premisses, and may therefore be very revealing, even if some people think such things are analytic.
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5078
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Kant and Mill both try to explain right and wrong, without a divine lawgiver [Taylor,R]
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Full Idea:
Kant and Mill were in total agreement in trying to give content to the distinction between moral right and wrong, without recourse to any divine lawgiver.
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From:
Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.14)
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A reaction:
A nice analysis, in tune with MacIntyre and others, who see such attempts as failures. It is hard, however, to deny the claims of rational principles, or of suffering, in our moral framework. I agree with Taylor's move back to virtue, but it ain't simple.
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5067
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Morality based on 'forbid', 'permit' and 'require' implies someone who does these things [Taylor,R]
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Full Idea:
If morality is based on wrong (meaning 'forbidden'), right ('permitted'), and obligatory ('required'), we are led to ask 'Who is it that thus permits, forbids or requires that certain things be done or not done?'
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From:
Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.2)
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A reaction:
Clear reinforcement for Nietzsche's attack on conventional morals, which Taylor sees as a relic of medieval religious attitudes. Taylor says Kant offered a non-religious version of the same authority. I agree. Back to the Greek pursuit of excellence!
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5079
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Pleasure can have a location, and be momentary, and come and go - but happiness can't [Taylor,R]
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Full Idea:
Pleasures can be located in a particular part of the body, and can be momentary, and come and go, but this is not the case with happiness.
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From:
Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.16)
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A reaction:
Probably no one ever thought that pleasure and happiness were actually identical - merely that pleasure is the only cause and source of happiness. These are good objections to that hypothesis. Pleasure simply isn't 'the good'.
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5068
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'Eudaimonia' means 'having a good demon', implying supreme good fortune [Taylor,R]
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Full Idea:
The word 'eudaimonia' means literally 'having a good demon', which is apt, because it suggests some kind of supreme good fortune, of the sort which might be thought of as a bestowal.
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From:
Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.5)
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A reaction:
Beware of etymology. This implies that eudaimonia is almost entirely beyond a person's control, but Aristotle doesn't think that. A combination of education and effort can build on some natural gifts to create a fully successful life.
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5077
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The modern idea of obligation seems to have lost the idea of an obligation 'to' something [Taylor,R]
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Full Idea:
In modern moral thinking, obligation is something every responsible person is supposed to have, but it is not an obligation to the state, or society, or humanity, or even to God. It is an obligation standing by itself.
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From:
Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.12)
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A reaction:
This nicely pinpoints how some our moral attitudes are relics of religion. Taylor wants a return to virtue, but one could respond by opting for the social contract (with very clear obligations) or Kantian 'contractualism' (answering to rational beings).
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5066
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If we are made in God's image, pursuit of excellence is replaced by duty to obey God [Taylor,R]
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Full Idea:
Once people are declared to be images of God, just by virtue of minimal humanity, they have, therefore, no greater individual excellence to aspire to, and their purpose became one of obligation, that is, obedience to God's will.
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From:
Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.2)
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A reaction:
An interesting and plausible historical analysis. There is a second motivation for the change, though, in Grotius's desire to develop a more legalistic morality, focusing on actions rather than character. Taylor's point is more interesting, though.
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