62 ideas
20388 | 'Necessary' conditions are requirements, and 'sufficient' conditions are guarantees [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: A 'necessary' condition for something's being an X is condition that all Xs must satisfy. ...A 'sufficient' condition for something's being an X is a condition that, when satisfied, guarantees that what satisfies it is an X. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 2.1) | |
A reaction: By summarising this I arrive at the requirement/guarantee formulation, which I am rather pleased with. What is required for rain, and what guarantees rain? |
20389 | A definition of a thing gives all the requirements which add up to a guarantee of it [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: If we specify the 'necessary' conditions that are 'sufficient' for something's being an X, that is a combination of conditions such that all and only Xs meet them, which is the hallmark of a definition of X-hood. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 2.1) | |
A reaction: There are, of course, many other ways to define something, as shown in the 2.D Reason | Definition section of this database. This nicely summarises the classical view. |
20391 | Feminists warn that ideologies use timeless objective definitions as a tool of repression [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: According to the feminist critique, ideologies that operate as tools of political repression are falsely represented as definitions possessing a timeless, natural, asocial, universal objectivity. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 2.2) | |
A reaction: I suppose this does not just apply to definitions, but to all expressions of ideologically repressive strategy. I'm trying to think of an example of a specifically feminist problem case. Davies doesn't cite anyone. |
3593 | The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: The trouble with appeal to facts in the correspondence theory is that, in general, we have no way of indicating what fact a sentence, when true, corresponds to other than asserting the sentence. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.12) |
3584 | Justification needs coherence, while truth might be ideal coherence [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: Contemporary coherence theorists are advancing a theory of justification, not of truth, …with those who argue that truth is also coherence explaining it in terms of ideal coherence, or coherence at the limit of enquiry. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.10) |
3585 | Coherence needs positive links, not just absence of conflict [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: It is often claimed that coherence is more than 'absence of conflict' between beliefs; it also involves 'positive connections'. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.10) |
3599 | Deduction shows entailments, not what to believe [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: The rules of deduction are rules of entailment, not rules of inference. They tell us what follows from what, not what to believe on the basis of what. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.18) |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
Full Idea: It seems unavoidable that the facts about logically necessary relations between levels of facts are themselves logically distinct further facts, irreducible to the microphysical facts. | |
From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C) | |
A reaction: I'm beginning to think that rejecting every theory of reality that is proposed by carefully exposing some infinite regress hidden in it is a rather lazy way to do philosophy. Almost as bad as rejecting anything if it can't be defined. |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
Full Idea: Logical supervenience, restricted to individuals, seems to imply strong reduction. It is said that where the B-facts logically supervene on the A-facts, the B-facts simply re-describe what the A-facts describe, and the B-facts come along 'for free'. | |
From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C) | |
A reaction: This seems to be taking 'logically' to mean 'analytically'. Presumably an entailment is logically supervenient on its premisses, and may therefore be very revealing, even if some people think such things are analytic. |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
Full Idea: The root intuition behind nonreductive materialism is that reality is composed of ontologically distinct layers or levels. …The upper levels depend on the physical without reducing to it. | |
From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], B) | |
A reaction: A nice clear statement of a view which I take to be false. This relationship is the sort of thing that drives people fishing for an account of it to use the word 'supervenience', which just says two things seem to hang out together. Fluffy materialism. |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
Full Idea: Jessica Wilson (1999) says what makes physicalist accounts different from emergentism etc. is that each individual causal power associated with a supervenient property is numerically identical with a causal power associated with its base property. | |
From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], n 11) | |
A reaction: Hence the key thought in so-called (serious, rather than self-evident) 'emergentism' is so-called 'downward causation', which I take to be an idle daydream. |
3591 | We could never pin down how many beliefs we have [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: Asking how many beliefs I have is like asking how many drops of water there are in a bucket. If I believe my dog is in the garden, do I also believe he is not in the house, or in Siberia? | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.11) |
3582 | Propositions make error possible, so basic experiential knowledge is impossible [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: Propositional content is inseparable from possible error. Therefore no judgement, however modest, is indubitable. So if basic experiential knowledge has to be indubitable, there is no such knowledge. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 8) |
3592 | Phenomenalism is a form of idealism [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: Phenomenalism is a form of idealism. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.12) |
3579 | Sense data avoid the danger of misrepresenting the world [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: The point of insisting on the absolute immediacy of sense data is that representation always seems to involve the possibility of misrepresentation. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 8) |
3581 | Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: Acquaintance with sense data is supposed to be a form of non-propositional knowledge, but how can something be non-propositional and yet knowledge? | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 8) |
3564 | Is it people who are justified, or propositions? [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: What exactly is supposed to be 'justified': a person's believing some particular proposition, or the proposition that he believes? | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 1) | |
A reaction: A key distinction. See my comment on Idea 3752. What would justify a sign saying 'treasure buried here'? People can be justified in believing falsehoods. How could a false proposition be justified? |
8851 | Coherentists say that regress problems are assuming 'linear' justification [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: From the point of view of the coherentist, Agrippa's Dilemma fails because it presupposes a 'linear' conception of justifying inference. | |
From: Michael Williams (Without Immediate Justification [2005], §2) | |
A reaction: [He cites Bonjour 1985 for this view] Since a belief may have several justifications, and one belief could justify a host of others, there certainly isn't a simple line of justifications. I agree with the coherentist picture here. |
3595 | What works always takes precedence over theories [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: A theory that represents working practices as unworkable is a bad theory. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.13) | |
A reaction: Good point. There's a lot of this about in epistemology, especially accusations of circularity or infinite regress, which (if true) don't somehow seem to worry the cove on the Clapham omnibus. |
8849 | Traditional foundationalism is radically internalist [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: Traditional foundationalism is radically internalist. The justification-making factors for beliefs, basic and otherwise, are all open to view, and perhaps even actual objects of awareness. I am always in a position to know that I know. | |
From: Michael Williams (Without Immediate Justification [2005], §1) | |
A reaction: This is a helpful if one is trying to draw a map of the debate. An externalist foundationalism would have to terminate in the external fact which was the object of knowledge (via some reliable channel), but that is the truth, not the justification. |
8853 | Basic judgements are immune from error because they have no content [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: Basic judgements threaten to buy their immunity from error at the cost of being drained of descriptive content altogether. | |
From: Michael Williams (Without Immediate Justification [2005], §4) | |
A reaction: This is probably the key objection to foundationalism. As you import sufficient content into basic experiences to enable them to actually justify a set of beliefs, you find you have imported all sorts of comparisons and classifications as well. |
3580 | Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: If we are to treat experience as the foundation of knowledge, then experience must itself be understood to involve propositional content. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: This sounds right, but since pure 'experience' obviously doesn't have propositional content, because it needs interpretation and evaluation, then this strategy won't work. |
8855 | Sensory experience may be fixed, but it can still be misdescribed [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: The fact that experiential contents cannot be other than they are, as far as sensory awareness goes, does not imply that we cannot misdescribe them, as in misreporting the number of speckles on a speckled hen (Chisholm's example). | |
From: Michael Williams (Without Immediate Justification [2005], §4) | |
A reaction: [Chisholm 1942 is cited] Such experiences couldn't be basic beliefs if there was a conflict between their intrinsic nature and the description I used in discussing them. |
3578 | Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences? [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: Empirical foundationists must decide whether knowledge ultimately rests on either beliefs or judgements about experience, or on the experiences or sensations themselves. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: This clarifies the key issue very nicely, and I firmly vote for the former option. The simplest point is that error is possible about what sensations are taken to be of, so they won't do on their own. |
3576 | Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: The foundationalists dilemma is to define a basis for knowledge modest enough to be secure but rich enough to be adequate. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 7) | |
A reaction: ..And that is just what they are unable to do, precisely because adequate support would have to have enough content to be defeasibe or fallible. |
3577 | Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: A strongly justificationist view of rationality may not be so rational; we want the truth, but avoiding all errors and maximising our number of true beliefs are not the same thing. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 7) | |
A reaction: An interesting dilemma - to avoid all errors, believing nothing; to maximise true belief, believe everything. It is rational to follow intuition, guesses, and a wing and a prayer - once you are experienced and educated. |
3590 | Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: Coherence theory implicitly assigns the criteria of coherence a special status. …In so far as this status is assigned a priori, the coherence theory represents a rationalistic variant of foundationalism. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.11) | |
A reaction: Nice move, to accuse coherence theorists of foundationalism! Wrong, though, because the a priori principles of coherence are not basic beliefs, but evolved pragmatic procedures (or something...). |
3589 | Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected? [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: Why should political theory ever have much to do with quantum physics, or pet care with parliamentary history? | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.11) | |
A reaction: This hardly demolishes the coherence account of justification, since your views on pet care had better be coherent, for your pet's sake. It's a pity people can make their politics cohere with their ethics. |
3571 | Externalism does not require knowing that you know [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: From an externalist point of view, knowing about one's reliability is not required for 'first-order' knowledge. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: Ah. 'First-order knowledge' - what's that? What we used to call 'true belief', I would say. Adequate for animals, and a good guide to daily life, but uncritical and unjustifiable. |
3574 | Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: A problem with pure externalism is that it ignores the social dimension of knowledge. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: This seems to be contradicted by Idea 3573, which allows a social dimension to agreement over what is reliable. I am inclined to take knowledge as an entirely social concept. |
3567 | How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts? [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: It is not clear what would even be meant by supposing that there are causal relations to mathematical facts. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: I agree, though platonists seem to be willing to entertain the possibility that there are causal relations, for which no further explanation can be given. Better is knowledge without a causal relation. |
3569 | In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: According to Goldman's early causal theory of knowledge, my belief that p counts as knowledge if and only if it is caused by the fact that p. This is sufficient as well as necessary, and so does not involve justification. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: I take his theory simply to be false because what causes a belief is not what justifies it. I expect my mother to ring; the phone rings; I 'know' it is my mother (and it is), because I strongly expect it. |
3586 | Only a belief can justify a belief [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: Justification requires logical rather than causal connections. That is the point of the slogan that only a belief can justify a belief. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: It seems better to talk of 'rational' connections, rather than 'logical' connections. It isn't 'logical' to believe that someone despises me because their lip is faintly curled. |
3573 | Externalist reliability refers to a range of conventional conditions [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: The radical externalists' key notion is 'reliability', which is a normative condition governing adequate performance, involving reference to a range of conditions which we decide rather than discover. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: If we can decide whether a source is reliable, we can also decide whether a reliable source has performed well on this occasion, and that will always take precedence. |
3565 | Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: I may reach a belief using a procedure that is in fact reliable, but which I ought to distrust. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 1) | |
A reaction: The tramp on the park bench who gives good share tips. The clock that is finally working, but has been going haywire for weeks. Reliabilism is a bad theory. |
3566 | We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 1) |
8852 | In the context of scepticism, externalism does not seem to be an option [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: In the peculiar context of the skeptical challenge, it is easy to persuade oneself that externalism is not an option. | |
From: Michael Williams (Without Immediate Justification [2005], §3) | |
A reaction: This is because externalism sees justification as largely non-conscious, but when faced with scepticism, the justifications need to be spelled out, and therefore internalised. So are sceptical discussions basic, or freakish anomalies? |
3594 | Scepticism just reveals our limited ability to explain things [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: All the sceptic's arguments show is that there are limits to our capacity to give reasons or cite evidence. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.13) |
3575 | Scepticism can involve discrepancy, relativity, infinity, assumption and circularity [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: The classical Five Modes of Scepticism are Discrepancy (people always disagree), Relativity ('according to you'), Infinity (infinite regress of questions), Assumption (ending in dogma) and Circularity (end up where you started). | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: I take Relativity to be different from scepticism (because, roughly, it says there is nothing to know), and the others go with Agrippa's Trilemma of justification, which may have solutions. |
3587 | Seeing electrons in a cloud chamber requires theory [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: Armed with enough theory, we can see electrons in a cloud chamber. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.10) |
3588 | Foundationalists base meaning in words, coherentists base it in sentences [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: In the foundationalist picture the meaning of individual words (defined ostensively) is primary, and that of sentences is derivative. For coherentists sentences come first, with meaning understood functionally or inferentially. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: Coherentism about language doesn't imply coherentism about justification. On language I vote for foundationalism, because I am impressed by the phenomenon of compositionality. |
20387 | Aesthetic experience involves perception, but also imagination and understanding [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: It was suggested that aesthetic experience isn't solely perceptual. It's infused by a cognitive but non-conceptual process described by Kant as involving the free play of the imagination and the understanding. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 1.2) | |
A reaction: This fits literature very well, painting quite well, and music hardly at all. |
20385 | The faculty of 'taste' was posited to explain why only some people had aesthetic appreciation [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: To explain why not everyone who is prepared to encounter a thing's aesthetic properties can recognise them, ...eighteenth century theorists posited the existence of a special faculty of aesthetic perception, that of taste. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 1.2) | |
A reaction: But there seem to be two aspects to taste - first the capacity to enjoy some sorts of art, and second the ability to discriminate the good from the bad. The latter is 'standards' of taste (Hume's title). Do non-musical people lack taste? |
20386 | The sublime is negative in awareness of insignificance, and positive in showing understanding [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: An example of the sublime is the vastness of the night sky. ...It includes negative feelings of insignificance in the face of nature's indifference, power and magnitude, but is positive in that we are capable of comprehending such matters. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 1.2) | |
A reaction: The negative part seems to be a very intellectual experience, with close links to religion, and may be the experience that leads to deism (belief in God's indifference). |
20384 | The idea that art forms are linked into a single concept began in the 1740s [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: The first to link the art forms together explicitly and to separate them from other disciplines and activities were the authors of encyclopedias and books in the 1740s and 1750s. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 1.2) | |
A reaction: Intriguing that no individual seems to get the credit (or blame). Presumably our modern Aesthetics (applied to art) couldn't exist before this move was made - and yet there is plenty of aesthetic discussion in early Greek philosophy. |
20390 | Defining art as representation or expression or form were all undermined by the avant-garde [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: The avant-garde art of the twentieth century played a significant role in defeating definitions that had prevailed in earlier times, such as ones maintaining that art is representation, expression or significant form | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 2.2) | |
A reaction: I really think the first rule of philosophical aesthetics is 'ignore Marcel Duchamp'. We wouldn't give up our idea of philosophy if someone managed to publish a long string of expletives in a philosophy journal. Would we?? |
20392 | 'Aesthetic functionalism' says art is what is intended to create aesthetic experiences [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: 'Aesthetic functionalism' maintains that something is an artwork if it is intended to provide the person who contemplates it for its own sake with an aesthetic experience of a significant magnitude on the basis of its aesthetic features. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 2.5) | |
A reaction: [Beardsley is cited as having this view] For this you need to know what an aesthetic 'feature' is, and you'd have to indepdently recognise aesthetic experience. |
20405 | Music may be expressive by being 'associated' with other emotional words or events [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: One view explains music's expressiveness as 'associative'. Through being regularly associated with emotionally charged words or events, particular musical ideas become associated with emotions or moods. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 6.4) | |
A reaction: This is a more promising theory. I take the feeling in music to be parasitic on other feelings we have, and other triggers that evoke them. I'm particularly struck with story-telling (which Levinson and Robinson also like). |
20403 | It seems unlikely that sad music expresses a composer's sadness; it takes ages to write [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: The 'expression theory' holds that if music is sad that is because it expresses the composer's sadness, ...but composers take a long time composing sad works, and may even been gleeful at receiving payment for it. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 6.4) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Pretty conclusive. I see composing as like acting. Just as you can put on a happy or sad face, so a composer can discover music that feels sad or happy. Three movement sonatas don't fit expression at all. |
20393 | The 'institutional' theory says art is just something appropriately placed in the 'artworld' [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: The 'institutional' theory says to be an artwork, an artwork must be appropriately placed within a web of practices, roles and frameworks that comprise an informally organised institution, the artworld. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 2.5) | |
A reaction: [He cites George Dickie] This theory seems to entirely developed to cope with the defiant gesture of Marcel Duchamp. Once I am an established artist, I have the authority to label anything I like as a work of art. Silly. |
20402 | Music is too definite to be put into words (not too indefinite!) [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: Mendelssohn said that what music expresses is not too indefinite to put into words but, on the contrary, it is too definite. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 6.4) | |
A reaction: Not sure whether that is true, but it is a lovely remark. It certainly challenges the naive philosophical view that words are the most precise mode of expression. |
20395 | The title of a painting can be vital, and the artist decrees who the portrait represents [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: The title as given by the artist is something we might need to know (Brueghel's 'Icarus', for example), ...and if a painting depicts one of two twins, it will be the artist's intention that settles which one it is. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 3.5) | |
A reaction: Those two points strike me as conclusively in favour of the importance of an artist's perceived intentions. |
20396 | We must know what the work is meant to be, to evaluate the artist's achievement [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: Learning that a work is a copy of an earlier work, or is done in the style of some other artist, is relevant to an evaluation of what its creator has achieved. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 3.6) | |
A reaction: A simple but powerful point. We evaluate a forgery as an achievement, and the original plate of a great print as the focus of the achievement. We can assess the achievement of a poem in any printed copy. But what about perfect painting replicas? |
20399 | Intentionalism says either meaning just is intention, or ('moderate') meaning is successful intention [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: 'Actual intentionalism' holds that work's meaning is what its author intended, ...while 'moderate actual intentionalism' allows that the author's intention determines the work's meaning only if that intention is carried through successfully. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 5.3) | |
A reaction: [He cites Noel Carroll for the moderate version] D.H. Lawrence, probably with a dose of Freud, said 'trust the work, not the artist' (of Moby Dick, I think). The thought is that authors only half know intentions, and works reveal them. |
20401 | The meaning is given by the audience's best guess at the author's intentions [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: According to the 'hypothetical intentionalist', the work's meaning is determined by the intentions the audience is best justified in attributing to the author, whether or not these are the ones the author actually had. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 5.4) | |
A reaction: [Nehamas, Levinson and Jenefer Robinson are cited] This opens the door for psychiatric interpretations of 'Hamlet', and so on. The experts disagree over the nature of the audience needed to do the job. |
20397 | If we could perfectly clone the Mona Lisa, the original would still be special [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: If we could duplicate 'Mona Lisa', we're likely to be concerned to track the original and keep it separate from its clones, even if we judge that the clone isn't inferior to the original when the goal is art appreciation. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 4.3) | |
A reaction: But why? Is it just a sentimental attachment to what Leonardo worked on? Does the original manuscript of a work of literature have the same importance? We treasure such things, but not for aesthetic reasons. |
20398 | Art that is multiply instanced may require at least one instance [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: Some multiply instanced artworks, such as novel and poems, must have at least one instance. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 4.4) | |
A reaction: This is a comment on the idea that all artworks, even oil paintings and buildings are potentially multiply instanced (so the work is the type - Wollheim's view, not one of the tokens). |
20404 | Music isn't just sad because it makes the listener feel sad [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: The 'arousal' theory says music is sad because it moves the hearer to sadness, ...but this seems to get things back to front, because we normally think it is because the music is sad that it moves the listener to sadness. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 6.4) | |
A reaction: The objection is right. If Beethoven's 'Ode to Joy' always makes me feel sad (because it is so hopelessly optimistic), then that makes the music sad. Is the theory saying that there are no feelings in the music? |
22704 | Immorality may or may not be an artistic defect [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: Immorality in art is sometimes an artistic defect and sometimes not. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 8.7) | |
A reaction: Davies seems to avoid the 'immoralist' view, that immorality in a work of art can sometimes be a strength. A sharp distinction is needed, I think, between the morality of what is depicted, and the morality of the whole artwork. |
22705 | If the depiction of evil is glorified, that is an artistic flaw [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: One case when the depiction of immorality becomes an artistic flaw …is when it is presented in brutal detail in a way that glorifies it. The celebration of evil corrodes the work's artistic value. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 8.7) | |
A reaction: This doesn't allow for the case where the evil is celebrated in one part of a novel, yet the novel as a whole does not endorse the evil. The Marquis de Sade seems to have fully celebrated what we take to be evil. |
22707 | It is an artistic defect if excessive moral outrage distorts the story, and narrows our sympathies [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: The positive moral stance of a story can be an artistic defect where it shapes the story in an inappropriate fashion. If it displays disproportionate moral outrage, …it reveals a lack of toleration, compassion, or insight into its subject-matter. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 8.7) | |
A reaction: There could be narrative irony in a story told by an angry and puritanical person, which continually condemns wickedness, with the reader expected to have a more tolerant attitude. Hard to think of any examples of this problem. |
22706 | A work which seeks approval for immorality, but alienates the audience, is a failure [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: A work that looks for the audience's sympathetic approval and alienates them instead, because it's both morally repulsive and incoherent in what it requires them to suppose, isn't an artistic success. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 8.7) | |
A reaction: The implication seems to be that works are only successful if they achieve what the creator consciously intended. Lawrence said trust the novel, not the novelist. Milton's Satan is a famous example of heroism not intended by the author. |