8 ideas
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| Full Idea: It seems unavoidable that the facts about logically necessary relations between levels of facts are themselves logically distinct further facts, irreducible to the microphysical facts. | |
| From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C) | |
| A reaction: I'm beginning to think that rejecting every theory of reality that is proposed by carefully exposing some infinite regress hidden in it is a rather lazy way to do philosophy. Almost as bad as rejecting anything if it can't be defined. |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| Full Idea: Logical supervenience, restricted to individuals, seems to imply strong reduction. It is said that where the B-facts logically supervene on the A-facts, the B-facts simply re-describe what the A-facts describe, and the B-facts come along 'for free'. | |
| From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be taking 'logically' to mean 'analytically'. Presumably an entailment is logically supervenient on its premisses, and may therefore be very revealing, even if some people think such things are analytic. |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| Full Idea: The root intuition behind nonreductive materialism is that reality is composed of ontologically distinct layers or levels. …The upper levels depend on the physical without reducing to it. | |
| From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], B) | |
| A reaction: A nice clear statement of a view which I take to be false. This relationship is the sort of thing that drives people fishing for an account of it to use the word 'supervenience', which just says two things seem to hang out together. Fluffy materialism. |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| Full Idea: Jessica Wilson (1999) says what makes physicalist accounts different from emergentism etc. is that each individual causal power associated with a supervenient property is numerically identical with a causal power associated with its base property. | |
| From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], n 11) | |
| A reaction: Hence the key thought in so-called (serious, rather than self-evident) 'emergentism' is so-called 'downward causation', which I take to be an idle daydream. |
| 4688 | We imagine small and large objects scaled to the same size, suggesting a fixed capacity for imagination [Lavers] |
| Full Idea: If we think of a pea, and then of the Eiffel Tower, they seem to occupy the same space in our consciousness, suggesting that we scale our images to fit the available hardware, just as computer imagery is limited by the screen and memory available. | |
| From: Michael Lavers (talk [2003]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas) | |
| A reaction: Nice point. It is especially good because it reinforces a physicalist view of the mind from introspection, where most other evidence is external observation of brains (as Nietzsche reinforces determinism by introspection). |
| 7598 | Zoroaster and the Hebrew prophets evolved different versions of monotheism [Zoroaster, by Armstrong,K] |
| Full Idea: Zoroaster and the Hebrew prophets evolved different versions of monotheism. | |
| From: report of Zoroaster (The Gathas (seventeen hymns) [c.900 BCE]) by Karen Armstrong - A History of God Ch.1 | |
| A reaction: This seems to be the consensus on the origins of monotheism, which places the development much earlier than the appearance of the idea in Greek philosophy. |
| 7472 | Zarathustra was the first to present a god who is an abstract concept [Zoroaster] |
| Full Idea: Zarathustra's achievement was for the first time to present a god who is an abstract concept - he broke with the tradition of a pantheon of gods. | |
| From: Zoroaster (The Gathas (seventeen hymns) [c.900 BCE]), quoted by Peter Watson - Ideas Ch.05 | |
| A reaction: The more abstract the gods become, the harder it is to challenge their existence. |
| 20672 | Zoroastrianism saw the world as a battle between good evil gods [Zoroaster, by Harari] |
| Full Idea: Zoroastrianism saw the world as a cosmic battle between the good god Ahura Mazda and the evil god Angra Mainyu. | |
| From: report of Zoroaster (The Gathas (seventeen hymns) [c.900 BCE]) by Yuval Noah Harari - Sapiens: brief history of humankind 12 'Battle' | |
| A reaction: Hm. This contradicts the impression I had gained that it was monotheist. |