25 ideas
22234 | Post-structuralism focused on exterior determinants of thought, rather than the thinker [Oksala] |
Full Idea: Post-structuralism was characterised by the denial of the human being as the privileged object of philosophical analysis, focusing instead on the social, linguistic and unconscious determinants of thought. | |
From: Johanna Oksala (How to Read Foucault [2007], Intro) | |
A reaction: I'm new to this, and so far this sounds the same as structralism, so I'll have to keep going. I presume it is the same as the rejection of the author when interpreting literature (as in Barthes?). Structuralism was 'non-historical'. |
16554 | Activities have place, rate, duration, entities, properties, modes, direction, polarity, energy and range [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
Full Idea: Activities can be identified spatiotemporally, and individuated by rate, duration, and types of entity and property that engage in them. They also have modes of operation, directionality, polarity, energy requirements and a range. | |
From: Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 3) | |
A reaction: This is their attempt at making 'activity' one of the two central concepts of ontology, along with 'entity'. A helpful analysis. It just seems to be one way of slicing the cake. |
16556 | Penicillin causes nothing; the cause is what penicillin does [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
Full Idea: It is not the penicillin that causes the pneumonia to disappear, but what the penicillin does. | |
From: Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 3.1) | |
A reaction: This is a very neat example for illustrating how we slip into 'entity' talk, when the reality we are addressing actually concerns processes. Without the 'what it does', penicillin can't participate in causation at all. |
16066 | Additional or removal of any part changes a thing, so people are never the same person [Epicharmus] |
Full Idea: If you add or take away a pebble, the same number does not remain. If you add to a length or cut off from it, the former measure does not remain. So human beings grow or waste away. Both you and I were, and shall be, other men. | |
From: Epicharmus (comedies (frags) [c.470 BCE], B02), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 03.12 | |
A reaction: [The original is in dialogue form from a play. The context is a joke about not paying a debt.] Note the early date for this metaphysical puzzle. My new favourite reply is Chrysippus's Idea 16059; identity actually requires change. |
16562 | We understand something by presenting its low-level entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
Full Idea: The intelligibility of a phenomenon consists in the mechanisms being portrayed in terms of a field's bottom out entities and activities. | |
From: Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 7) | |
A reaction: In other words, we understand complex things by reducing them to things we do understand. It would, though, be illuminating to see a nest of interconnected activities, even if we understood none of them. |
436 | A dog seems handsome to another a dog, and even a pig to another pig [Epicharmus] |
Full Idea: Dog seems very handsome to dog, and ox to ox, and donkey very handsome to donkey, and even pig to pig. | |
From: Epicharmus (comedies (frags) [c.470 BCE], B05), quoted by (who?) - where? |
16563 | The explanation is not the regularity, but the activity sustaining it [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
Full Idea: It is not regularities that explain but the activities that sustain the regularities. | |
From: Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 7) | |
A reaction: Good, but we had better not characterise the 'activities' in terms of regularities. |
16555 | Functions are not properties of objects, they are activities contributing to mechanisms [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
Full Idea: It is common to speak of functions as properties 'had by' entities, …but they should rather be understood in terms of the activities by virtue of which entities contribute to the workings of a mechanism. | |
From: Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 3) | |
A reaction: I'm certainly quite passionately in favour of cutting down on describing the world almost entirely in terms of entities which have properties. An 'activity', though, is a bit of an elusive concept. |
16528 | Mechanisms are not just push-pull systems [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
Full Idea: One should not think of mechanisms as exclusively mechanical (push-pull) systems. | |
From: Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 1) | |
A reaction: The difficulty seems to be that you could broaden the concept of 'mechanism' indefinitely, so that it covered history, mathematics, populations, cultural change, and even mathematics. Where to stop? |
16529 | Mechanisms are systems organised to produce regular change [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
Full Idea: Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they are productive of regular change from start or set-up to finish or termination conditions. | |
From: Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 1) | |
A reaction: This is their initial formal definition of a mechanism. Note that a mere 'activity' can be included. Presumably the mechanism might have an outcome that was not the intended outcome. Does a random element disqualify it? Are hands mechanisms? |
16530 | A mechanism explains a phenomenon by showing how it was produced [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
Full Idea: To give a description of a mechanism for a phenomenon is to explain that phenomenon, i.e. to explain how it was produced. | |
From: Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 1) | |
A reaction: To 'show how' something happens needs a bit of precisification. It is probably analytic that 'showing how' means 'revealing the mechanism', though 'mechanism' then becomes the tricky concept. |
16553 | Our account of mechanism combines both entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
Full Idea: We emphasise the activities in mechanisms. This is explicitly dualist. Substantivalists speak of entities with dispositions to act. Process ontologists reify activities and try to reduce entities to processes. We try to capture both intuitions. | |
From: Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 3) | |
A reaction: [A quotation of selected fragments] The problem here seems to be the raising of an 'activity' to a central role in ontology, when it doesn't seem to be primitive, and will typically be analysed in a variety of ways. |
16559 | Descriptions of explanatory mechanisms have a bottom level, where going further is irrelevant [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
Full Idea: Nested hierachical descriptions of mechanisms typically bottom out in lowest level mechanisms. …Bottoming out is relative …the explanation comes to an end, and description of lower-level mechanisms would be irrelevant. | |
From: Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 5.1) | |
A reaction: This seems to me exactly the right story about mechanism, and it is a story I am associating with essentialism. The relevance is ties to understanding. The lower level is either fully understood, or totally baffling. |
16564 | There are four types of bottom-level activities which will explain phenomena [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
Full Idea: There are four bottom-out kinds of activities: geometrico-mechanical, electro-chemical, electro-magnetic and energetic. These are abstract means of production that can be fruitfully applied in particular cases to explain phenomena. | |
From: Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 7) | |
A reaction: I like that. It gives a nice core for a metaphysics for physicalists. I suspect that 'mechanical' can be reduced to something else, and that 'energetic' will disappear in the final story. |
16561 | We can abstract by taking an exemplary case and ignoring the detail [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
Full Idea: Abstractions may be constructed by taking an exemplary case or instance and removing detail. | |
From: Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 5.3) | |
A reaction: I love 'removing detail'. That's it. Simple. I think this process is the basis of our whole capacity to formulate abstract concepts. Forget Frege - he's just describing the results of the process. How do we decide what is 'detail'? Essentialism! |
442 | Pleasures are like pirates - if you are caught they drown you in a sea of pleasures [Epicharmus] |
Full Idea: Pleasures for mortals are like impious pirates, for the man who is caught by pleasures is immediately drowned in a sea of them. | |
From: Epicharmus (comedies (frags) [c.470 BCE], B44), quoted by (who?) - where? | |
A reaction: Not all slopes are slippery. Plenty of people hold themselves to strict rules about alcohol or gambling. People have occasional treats. |
440 | Hands wash hands; give that you may get [Epicharmus] |
Full Idea: The hand washes the hand; give something and you may get something. | |
From: Epicharmus (comedies (frags) [c.470 BCE], B30), quoted by (who?) - where? |
441 | Against a villain, villainy is not a useless weapon [Epicharmus] |
Full Idea: Against a villain, villainy is not a useless weapon. | |
From: Epicharmus (comedies (frags) [c.470 BCE], B32), quoted by (who?) - where? |
20582 | World government needs a shared global identity [Oksala] |
Full Idea: Critics have argued that a global 'demos' would require a shared global identity. | |
From: Johanna Oksala (Political Philosophy: all that matters [2013], Ch.9 'Epi') | |
A reaction: The great divisions are religion and language. The great unifiers are sport, arts and entertainment, plus basic human needs like food, health and housing. The reply is that there cannot be identity without differences, so global democracy is out. |
20568 | The principles Rawls arrives at do not just conform to benevolence, but also result from choices [Oksala] |
Full Idea: The advantage of Rawls's method is that the principles the individual chooses are not only fair according to some abstract principle of benevolence, but also the result of rational choice. | |
From: Johanna Oksala (Political Philosophy: all that matters [2013], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: That is a very nice way of putting the beauty of Rawls's idea. In modern political philosophy you hear far more criticisms of Rawls than praise. If a philosopher is criticised a lot, it is probably because they have stated their views clearly. |
20578 | Anarchists prefer local and communal government [Oksala] |
Full Idea: Anarchists advocate forms of governance such as communes and associations that are as local and close to the direct control of the people as possible. | |
From: Johanna Oksala (Political Philosophy: all that matters [2013], Ch.8) | |
A reaction: Which might explain why recent conservative governments have steadily eliminated local government in Britain. |
20574 | Utilitarianism neglects responsibility, duties and rights [Oksala] |
Full Idea: A focus solely on utility excludes considerations of personal responsibility and duty, as well as considerations of the basic rights of individuals. | |
From: Johanna Oksala (Political Philosophy: all that matters [2013], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: [He cites these as the common modern criticisms] The defence is to explain the value of each of these in utilitarian terms. There is a general problem (conceded by Mill) of motivation in utilitarianism. There's not much in it for me! |
16558 | Laws of nature have very little application in biology [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
Full Idea: The traditional notion of a law of nature has few, if any, applications in neurobiology or molecular biology. | |
From: Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 3.2) | |
A reaction: This is a simple and self-evident fact, and bad news for anyone who want to build their entire ontology around laws of nature. I take such a notion to be fairly empty, except as a convenient heuristic device. |
439 | God knows everything, and nothing is impossible for him [Epicharmus] |
Full Idea: Nothing escapes the divine, this you must realise. God himself is our overseer, and nothing is impossible for him. | |
From: Epicharmus (comedies (frags) [c.470 BCE], B23), quoted by (who?) - where? |
443 | Human logos is an aspect of divine logos, and is sufficient for successful living [Epicharmus] |
Full Idea: Man has calculation, but there is also the divine logos. But human logos is sprung from the divine logos, and it brings to each man his means of life, and his maintenance. | |
From: Epicharmus (comedies (frags) [c.470 BCE], B57), quoted by (who?) - where? |