Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Mahavastu, J. Alberto Coffa and Francis de Vitoria

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10 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
Choice suggests that intensions are not needed to ensure classes [Coffa]
     Full Idea: The axiom of choice was an assumption that implicitly questioned the necessity of intensions to guarantee the presence of classes.
     From: J. Alberto Coffa (The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap [1991], 7 'Log')
     A reaction: The point is that Choice just picks out members for no particular reason. So classes, it seems, don't need a reason to exist.
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
The semantic tradition aimed to explain the a priori semantically, not by Kantian intuition [Coffa]
     Full Idea: The semantic tradition's problem was the a priori; its enemy, Kantian pure intuition; its purpose, to develop a conception of the a priori in which pure intuition played no role; its strategy, to base that theory on a development of semantics.
     From: J. Alberto Coffa (The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap [1991], 2 Intro)
     A reaction: It seems to me that intuition, in the modern sense, has been unnecessarily demonised. I would define it as 'rational insights which cannot be fully articulated'. Sherlock Holmes embodies it.
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
Platonism defines the a priori in a way that makes it unknowable [Coffa]
     Full Idea: The trouble with Platonism had always been its inability to define a priori knowledge in a way that made it possible for human beings to have it.
     From: J. Alberto Coffa (The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap [1991], 7 'What')
     A reaction: This is the famous argument of Benacerraf 1973.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
Mathematics generalises by using variables [Coffa]
     Full Idea: The instrument of generality in mathematics is the variable.
     From: J. Alberto Coffa (The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap [1991], 4 'The conc')
     A reaction: I like the idea that there are variables in ordinary speech, pronouns being the most obvious example. 'Cats' is a variable involving quantification over a domain of lovable fluffy mammals.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
The only just cause for a war is a wrong received [Vitoria]
     Full Idea: There is a single and only just cause for commencing a war, namely, a wrong received.
     From: Francis de Vitoria (On the Law of War [1525], p.170), quoted by Michael Walzer - Just and Unjust Wars 04
     A reaction: Walzer affirms this as one the principles of international law. In particular, mere differences of religion or politics cannot justify a war. The tricky bit is when the participants don't agree on the severity of the wrong.
Leaders can only attack foreigners who have done wrong (as with their own subjects) [Vitoria]
     Full Idea: A political leader cannot have greater authority over foreigners than over his own subjects; but he may not draw the sword against his own subjects unless they have done wrong; therefore he can only do so against foreigners in the same circumstances.
     From: Francis de Vitoria (On the Law of War [1525], p.303), quoted by Jeff McMahan - Killing in War 1.4
     A reaction: The question would then be whether they have 'done some wrong' against this leader, or against some other people (such as their fellow citizens). That would be the 'intervention' justification. Are they engaged in the wrong, or responsible for it?
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / c. Combatants
Princes should not justify a war to their subjects, and doing so would undermine the state [Vitoria]
     Full Idea: A prince is not able and ought not always to render reasons for the war to its subjects, and if the subjects cannot serve in the war except they be satisfied of its justice, the state would fall into grave peril.
     From: Francis de Vitoria (On the Law of War [1525], p.176), quoted by Michael Walzer - Just and Unjust Wars 03
     A reaction: This medieval view depends entirely on the absolute sovereignty of princes, and confidence that princes are wise and innately just. No student of history should believe such wicked nonsense.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / d. Non-combatants
Sacking a city is lawful if it motivates the attacking troops [Vitoria]
     Full Idea: It is not unlawful to put a city to sack, if it is necessary for the conduct of the war …as a spur to the courage of the troops.
     From: Francis de Vitoria (On the Law of War [1525], p.184), quoted by Michael Walzer - Just and Unjust Wars 08
     A reaction: Hideous. Presumably this would include raping the women. Could you motivate a football team in a similar way? Or to get your children to pass exams?
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
Relativity is as absolutist about space-time as Newton was about space [Coffa]
     Full Idea: If the theory of relativity might be thought to support an idealist construal of space and time, it is no less absolutistic about space-time than Newton's theory was about space.
     From: J. Alberto Coffa (The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap [1991])
     A reaction: [He cites Minkowski, Weyl and Cartan for this conclusion] Coffa is clearly a bit cross about philosophers who draw naive idealist and relativist conclusions from relativity.
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / e. Miracles
The Buddha made flowers float in the air, to impress people, and make them listen [Mahavastu]
     Full Idea: When the young Brahmin threw her two lotuses, they stood suspended in the air. This was one of the miracles by which the Buddhas impress people, to make them listen to the truth.
     From: Mahavastu (The Great Event [c.200], I.231-9)
     A reaction: Presumably this is the reason that Jesus did miracles. It is hard to spot the truth among the myriad of lies, if there is no supporting miracle to give authority to the speaker.