Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Marga Reimer, Deborah Achtenberg and Nicole Oresme

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers

---

4 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names

18946	Unreflectively, we all assume there are nonexistents, and we can refer to them [Reimer]
	Full Idea: As speakers of the language, we unreflectively assume that there are nonexistents, and that reference to them is possible.
	From: Marga Reimer (The Problem of Empty Names [2001], p.499), quoted by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 4
	A reaction: Sarah Swoyer quotes this as a good solution to the problem of empty names, and I like it. It introduces a two-tier picture of our understanding of the world, as 'unreflective' and 'reflective', but that seems good. We accept numbers 'unreflectively'.

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 9. Qualities

16705	Whiteness isn't created in an alteration, because it is just this-being-white [Oresme]
	Full Idea: If it is said that whiteness begins to be through alteration, this does not hold, because whiteness is nothing other than this-being-white.
	From: Nicole Oresme (On 'Generation and Corruption' [1349], I.2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 19.3
	A reaction: This innocent-looking remark is dynamite, because it rejects the separability of qualities, which threatens the doctrine of Transubstantiation.

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 6. Successive Things

16695	Successive entities are in flux, flowing in existence, with different parts at different times [Oresme]
	Full Idea: For any time, some of a successive entity exists in one of its parts, and a totally different such exists in another part. …It is in continuous flux and transition, ..and flows in existence if it does not have the same existence over a whole time.
	From: Nicole Oresme (On 'Physics' [1346], III.6, dist.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.1
	A reaction: Pasnau says the successive entity is the whole made up of these changing parts, so it sounds very like the temporal stages view of Sider and Hawley.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism

4375	Evaluations are not disguised emotions; instead, emotion is a type of evaluation [Achtenberg]
	Full Idea: The emotivist gets things backwards: evaluations are not disguised emotions; instead, emotions are types of evaluation.
	From: Deborah Achtenberg (Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics [2002], 6.1)
	A reaction: A nice comment, though a bit optimistic. It is certainly a valuable corrective to emotivist to pin down the cognitive and evaluative aspects of emotion, rather than regarding them as 'raw' feelings.