Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Marga Reimer, Thomas Grundmann and Lamargue,P/Olson,SH

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11 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
18946 Unreflectively, we all assume there are nonexistents, and we can refer to them [Reimer]
     Full Idea: As speakers of the language, we unreflectively assume that there are nonexistents, and that reference to them is possible.
     From: Marga Reimer (The Problem of Empty Names [2001], p.499), quoted by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 4
     A reaction: Sarah Swoyer quotes this as a good solution to the problem of empty names, and I like it. It introduces a two-tier picture of our understanding of the world, as 'unreflective' and 'reflective', but that seems good. We accept numbers 'unreflectively'.
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
19718 Indefeasibility does not imply infallibility [Grundmann]
     Full Idea: Infallibility does not follow from indefeasibility.
     From: Thomas Grundmann (Defeasibility Theory [2011], 'Significance')
     A reaction: If very little evidence exists then this could clearly be the case. It is especially true of historical and archaeological evidence.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
19717 Can a defeater itself be defeated? [Grundmann]
     Full Idea: Can the original justification of a belief be regained through a successful defeat of a defeater?
     From: Thomas Grundmann (Defeasibility Theory [2011], 'Defeater-Defs')
     A reaction: [Jäger 2005 addresses this] I would have thought the answer is yes. I aspire to coherent justifications, so I don't see justifications as a chain of defeat and counter-defeat, but as collective groups of support and challenge.
19716 Simple reliabilism can't cope with defeaters of reliably produced beliefs [Grundmann]
     Full Idea: An unmodified reliabilism does not accommodate defeaters, and surely there can be defeaters against reliably produced beliefs?
     From: Thomas Grundmann (Defeasibility Theory [2011], 'Defeaters')
     A reaction: [He cites Bonjour 1980] Reliabilism has plenty of problems anyway, since a generally reliable process can obviously occasionally produce a bad result. 20:20 vision is not perfect vision. Internalist seem to like defeaters.
19715 You can 'rebut' previous beliefs, 'undercut' the power of evidence, or 'reason-defeat' the truth [Grundmann]
     Full Idea: There are 'rebutting' defeaters against the truth of a previously justified belief, 'undercutting' defeaters against the power of the evidence, and 'reason-defeating' defeaters against the truth of the reason for the belief.
     From: Thomas Grundmann (Defeasibility Theory [2011], 'How')
     A reaction: That is (I think) that you can defeat the background, the likelihood, or the truth. He cites Pollock 1986, and implies that these are standard distinctions about defeaters.
19713 Defeasibility theory needs to exclude defeaters which are true but misleading [Grundmann]
     Full Idea: Advocates of the defeasibility theory have tried to exclude true pieces of information that are misleading defeaters.
     From: Thomas Grundmann (Defeasibility Theory [2011], 'What')
     A reaction: He gives as an example the genuine news of a claim that the suspect has a twin.
19714 Knowledge requires that there are no facts which would defeat its justification [Grundmann]
     Full Idea: The 'defeasibility theory' of knowledge claims that knowledge is only present if there are no facts that - if they were known - would be genuine defeaters of the relevant justification.
     From: Thomas Grundmann (Defeasibility Theory [2011], 'What')
     A reaction: Something not right here. A genuine defeater would ensure the proposition was false, so it would simply fail the truth test. So we need a 'defeater' for a truth, which must therefore by definition be misleading. Many qualifications have to be invoked.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
19719 'Moderate' foundationalism has basic justification which is defeasible [Grundmann]
     Full Idea: Theories that combine basic justification with the defeasibility of this justification are referred to as 'moderate' foundationalism.
     From: Thomas Grundmann (Defeasibility Theory [2011], 'Significance')
     A reaction: I could be more sympathetic to this sort of foundationalism. But it begins to sound more like Neurath's boat (see Quine) than like Descartes' metaphor of building foundations.
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics
20327 Modern attention has moved from the intrinsic properties of art to its relational properties [Lamarque/Olson]
     Full Idea: In modern discussions, rather than look for intrinsic properties of objects, including aesthetic or formal properties, attention has turned to extrinsic or relational properties, notably of a social, historical, or 'institutional' nature.
     From: Lamargue,P/Olson,SH (Introductions to 'Aesthetics and the Phil of Art' [2004], Pt 1)
     A reaction: Lots of modern branches of philosophy have made this move, which seems to me like a defeat. We want to know why things have the relations they do. Just mapping the relations is superficial Humeanism.
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 1. Defining Art
20326 Early 20th cent attempts at defining art focused on significant form, intuition, expression, unity [Lamarque/Olson]
     Full Idea: In the early twentieth century there were numerous attempts at defining the essence art. Significant form, intuition, the expression of emotion, organic unity, and other notions, were offered to this end.
     From: Lamargue,P/Olson,SH (Introductions to 'Aesthetics and the Phil of Art' [2004], Pt 1)
     A reaction: As far as I can see the whole of aesthetics was demolished in one blow by Marcel Duchamp's urinal. Artists announce: we will tell you what art is; you should just sit and listen. Compare the invention of an anarchic sport.
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 7. Ontology of Art
20330 The dualistic view says works of art are either abstract objects (types), or physical objects [Lamarque/Olson]
     Full Idea: The dualistic view of the arts holds that works of art come in two fundamentally different kinds: those that are abstract entities, i.e. types, and those that are physical objects (tokens).
     From: Lamargue,P/Olson,SH (Introductions to 'Aesthetics and the Phil of Art' [2004], Pt 2)
     A reaction: Paintings are the main reason for retaining physical objects. Strawson 1974 argues that paintings are only physical because we cannot yet perfectly reproduce them. I agree. Works of art are types, not tokens.