67 ideas
| 6259 | Why can't a wise man doubt everything? [Montaigne] |
| Full Idea: Why cannot a wise man dare to doubt anything and everything? | |
| From: Michel de Montaigne (Apology for Raymond Sebond [1580], p.0562) | |
| A reaction: This question seems to be the start of the Enlightenment Project, of attempting to prove everything. MacIntyre warns of the dangers of this in ethical theory. The story of modern philosophy is the discovery of its impossibility. E.g. Davidson on truth. |
| 6263 | No wisdom could make us comfortably walk a wide beam if it was high in the air [Montaigne] |
| Full Idea: Take a beam wide enough to walk along: suspend it between two towers: there is no philosophical wisdom, however firm, which could make us walk along it just as we would if we were on the ground. | |
| From: Michel de Montaigne (Apology for Raymond Sebond [1580], p.0672) | |
| A reaction: This proposes great scepticism about the practical application of philosophical wisdom, but if we talk in terms of the wise assessment of risk in any undertaking, our caution on the raised beam makes perfectly good sense. |
| 23122 | Montaigne was the founding father of liberalism [Montaigne, by Gopnik] |
| Full Idea: The first liberal, the founding father if we have one, is the great sixteenth century French essayist Michel de Montaigne. | |
| From: report of Michel de Montaigne (On Cruelty [1580]) by Adam Gopnik - A Thousand Small Sanities 1 | |
| A reaction: He says this not on the basis of his politicies or achievements, but his general attitudes and values. It may be another hundred years before we can identify another obvious liberal (Locke?). |
| 6258 | Virtue is the distinctive mark of truth, and its greatest product [Montaigne] |
| Full Idea: The distinctive mark of the Truth we hold ought to be virtue, which is the most exacting mark of Truth, the closest one to heaven and the most worthy thing that Truth produces. | |
| From: Michel de Montaigne (Apology for Raymond Sebond [1580], p.0493) | |
| A reaction: A long way from Tarski and minimalist theories of truth! But not so far from pragmatism. Personally I think Montaigne is making an important claim, which virtue theorists should be attempting to incorporate into their theory. Aristotle would sympathise. |
| 9535 | 'Contradictory' propositions always differ in truth-value [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: Two propositions are 'contradictory' if they are never both true and never both false either, which means that ¬(A↔B) is a tautology. | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.3) |
| 9511 | We write the conditional 'if P (antecedent) then Q (consequent)' as P→Q [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: We write 'if P then Q' as P→Q. This is called a 'conditional', with P as its 'antecedent', and Q as its 'consequent'. | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 1.2) | |
| A reaction: P→Q can also be written as ¬P∨Q. |
| 9510 | That proposition that either P or Q is their 'disjunction', written P∨Q [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: If P and Q are any two propositions, the proposition that either P or Q is called the 'disjunction' of P and Q, and is written P∨Q. | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 1.3) | |
| A reaction: This is inclusive-or (meaning 'P, or Q, or both'), and not exlusive-or (Boolean XOR), which means 'P, or Q, but not both'. The ∨ sign is sometimes called 'vel' (Latin). |
| 9509 | That proposition that both P and Q is their 'conjunction', written P∧Q [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: If P and Q are any two propositions, the proposition that both P and Q is called the 'conjunction' of P and Q, and is written P∧Q. | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 1.3) | |
| A reaction: [I use the more fashionable inverted-v '∧', rather than Lemmon's '&', which no longer seems to be used] P∧Q can also be defined as ¬(¬P∨¬Q) |
| 9508 | The sign |- may be read as 'therefore' [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: I introduce the sign |- to mean 'we may validly conclude'. To call it the 'assertion sign' is misleading. It may conveniently be read as 'therefore'. | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 1.2) | |
| A reaction: [Actually no gap between the vertical and horizontal strokes of the sign] As well as meaning 'assertion', it may also mean 'it is a theorem that' (with no proof shown). |
| 9512 | We write the 'negation' of P (not-P) as ¬ [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: We write 'not-P' as ¬P. This is called the 'negation' of P. The 'double negation' of P (not not-P) would be written as ¬¬P. | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 1.2) | |
| A reaction: Lemmons use of -P is no longer in use for 'not'. A tilde sign (squiggle) is also used for 'not', but some interpreters give that a subtly different meaning (involving vagueness). The sign ¬ is sometimes called 'hook' or 'corner'. |
| 9513 | We write 'P if and only if Q' as P↔Q; it is also P iff Q, or (P→Q)∧(Q→P) [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: We write 'P if and only if Q' as P↔Q. It is called the 'biconditional', often abbreviate in writing as 'iff'. It also says that P is both sufficient and necessary for Q, and may be written out in full as (P→Q)∧(Q→P). | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 1.4) | |
| A reaction: If this symbol is found in a sequence, the first move in a proof is to expand it to the full version. |
| 9514 | If A and B are 'interderivable' from one another we may write A -||- B [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: If we say that A and B are 'interderivable' from one another (that is, A |- B and B |- A), then we may write A -||- B. | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 1.5) |
| 9516 | A 'well-formed formula' follows the rules for variables, ¬, →, ∧, ∨, and ↔ [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: A 'well-formed formula' of the propositional calculus is a sequence of symbols which follows the rules for variables, ¬, →, ∧, ∨, and ↔. | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.1) |
| 9517 | The 'scope' of a connective is the connective, the linked formulae, and the brackets [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: The 'scope' of a connective in a certain formula is the formulae linked by the connective, together with the connective itself and the (theoretically) encircling brackets | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.1) |
| 9519 | A 'substitution-instance' is a wff formed by consistent replacing variables with wffs [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: A 'substitution-instance' is a wff which results by replacing one or more variables throughout with the same wffs (the same wff replacing each variable). | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.2) |
| 9529 | A wff is 'inconsistent' if all assignments to variables result in the value F [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: If a well-formed formula of propositional calculus takes the value F for all possible assignments of truth-values to its variables, it is said to be 'inconsistent'. | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.3) |
| 9531 | 'Contrary' propositions are never both true, so that ¬(A∧B) is a tautology [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: If A and B are expressible in propositional calculus notation, they are 'contrary' if they are never both true, which may be tested by the truth-table for ¬(A∧B), which is a tautology if they are contrary. | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.3) |
| 9534 | Two propositions are 'equivalent' if they mirror one another's truth-value [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: Two propositions are 'equivalent' if whenever A is true B is true, and whenever B is true A is true, in which case A↔B is a tautology. | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.3) |
| 9530 | A wff is 'contingent' if produces at least one T and at least one F [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: If a well-formed formula of propositional calculus takes at least one T and at least one F for all the assignments of truth-values to its variables, it is said to be 'contingent'. | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.3) |
| 9532 | 'Subcontrary' propositions are never both false, so that A∨B is a tautology [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: If A and B are expressible in propositional calculus notation, they are 'subcontrary' if they are never both false, which may be tested by the truth-table for A∨B, which is a tautology if they are subcontrary. | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.3) |
| 9533 | A 'implies' B if B is true whenever A is true (so that A→B is tautologous) [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: One proposition A 'implies' a proposition B if whenever A is true B is true (but not necessarily conversely), which is only the case if A→B is tautologous. Hence B 'is implied' by A. | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.3) |
| 9528 | A wff is a 'tautology' if all assignments to variables result in the value T [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: If a well-formed formula of propositional calculus takes the value T for all possible assignments of truth-values to its variables, it is said to be a 'tautology'. | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.3) |
| 9518 | A 'theorem' is the conclusion of a provable sequent with zero assumptions [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: A 'theorem' of logic is the conclusion of a provable sequent in which the number of assumptions is zero. | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.2) | |
| A reaction: This is what Quine and others call a 'logical truth'. |
| 9398 | ∧I: Given A and B, we may derive A∧B [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: And-Introduction (&I): Given A and B, we may derive A∧B as conclusion. This depends on their previous assumptions. | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 1.5) |
| 9397 | CP: Given a proof of B from A as assumption, we may derive A→B [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: Conditional Proof (CP): Given a proof of B from A as assumption, we may derive A→B as conclusion, on the remaining assumptions (if any). | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 1.5) |
| 9394 | MPP: Given A and A→B, we may derive B [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: Modus Ponendo Ponens (MPP): Given A and A→B, we may derive B as a conclusion. B will rest on any assumptions that have been made. | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 1.5) |
| 9401 | ∨E: Derive C from A∨B, if C can be derived both from A and from B [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: Or-Elimination (∨E): Given A∨B, we may derive C if it is proved from A as assumption and from B as assumption. This will also depend on prior assumptions. | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 1.5) |
| 9396 | DN: Given A, we may derive ¬¬A [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: Double Negation (DN): Given A, we may derive ¬¬A as a conclusion, and vice versa. The conclusion depends on the assumptions of the premiss. | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 1.5) |
| 9393 | A: we may assume any proposition at any stage [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: Assumptions (A): any proposition may be introduced at any stage of a proof. | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 1.5) |
| 9399 | ∧E: Given A∧B, we may derive either A or B separately [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: And-Elimination (∧E): Given A∧B, we may derive either A or B separately. The conclusions will depend on the assumptions of the premiss. | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 1.5) |
| 9402 | RAA: If assuming A will prove B∧¬B, then derive ¬A [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: Reduction ad Absurdum (RAA): Given a proof of B∧¬B from A as assumption, we may derive ¬A as conclusion, depending on the remaining assumptions (if any). | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 1.5) |
| 9395 | MTT: Given ¬B and A→B, we derive ¬A [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: Modus Tollendo Tollens (MTT): Given ¬B and A→B, we derive ¬A as a conclusion. ¬A depends on any assumptions that have been made | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 1.5) |
| 9400 | ∨I: Given either A or B separately, we may derive A∨B [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: Or-Introduction (∨I): Given either A or B separately, we may derive A∨B as conclusion. This depends on the assumption of the premisses. | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 1.5) |
| 9521 | 'Modus tollendo ponens' (MTP) says ¬P, P ∨ Q |- Q [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: 'Modus tollendo ponens' (MTP) says that if a disjunction holds and also the negation of one of its disjuncts, then the other disjunct holds. Thus ¬P, P ∨ Q |- Q may be introduced as a theorem. | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.2) | |
| A reaction: Unlike Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens, this is a derived rule. |
| 9522 | 'Modus ponendo tollens' (MPT) says P, ¬(P ∧ Q) |- ¬Q [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: 'Modus ponendo tollens' (MPT) says that if the negation of a conjunction holds and also one of its conjuncts, then the negation of the other conjunct holds. Thus P, ¬(P ∧ Q) |- ¬Q may be introduced as a theorem. | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.2) | |
| A reaction: Unlike Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens, this is a derived rule. |
| 9525 | We can change conditionals into negated conjunctions with P→Q -||- ¬(P ∧ ¬Q) [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: The proof that P→Q -||- ¬(P ∧ ¬Q) is useful for enabling us to change conditionals into negated conjunctions | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.2) |
| 9524 | We can change conditionals into disjunctions with P→Q -||- ¬P ∨ Q [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: The proof that P→Q -||- ¬P ∨ Q is useful for enabling us to change conditionals into disjunctions. | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.2) |
| 9523 | De Morgan's Laws make negated conjunctions/disjunctions into non-negated disjunctions/conjunctions [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: The forms of De Morgan's Laws [P∨Q -||- ¬(¬P ∧ ¬Q); ¬(P∨Q) -||- ¬P ∧ ¬Q; ¬(P∧Q) -||- ¬P ∨ ¬Q); P∧Q -||- ¬(¬P∨¬Q)] transform negated conjunctions and disjunctions into non-negated disjunctions and conjunctions respectively. | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.2) |
| 9527 | The Distributive Laws can rearrange a pair of conjunctions or disjunctions [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: The Distributive Laws say that P ∧ (Q∨R) -||- (P∧Q) ∨ (P∧R), and that P ∨ (Q∨R) -||- (P∨Q) ∧ (P∨R) | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.2) |
| 9526 | We can change conjunctions into negated conditionals with P→Q -||- ¬(P → ¬Q) [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: The proof that P∧Q -||- ¬(P → ¬Q) is useful for enabling us to change conjunctions into negated conditionals. | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.2) |
| 9537 | Truth-tables are good for showing invalidity [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: The truth-table approach enables us to show the invalidity of argument-patterns, as well as their validity. | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.4) |
| 9538 | A truth-table test is entirely mechanical, but this won't work for more complex logic [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: A truth-table test is entirely mechanical, ..and in propositional logic we can even generate proofs mechanically for tautological sequences, ..but this mechanical approach breaks down with predicate calculus, and proof-discovery is an imaginative process. | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.5) |
| 9536 | If any of the nine rules of propositional logic are applied to tautologies, the result is a tautology [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: If any application of the nine derivation rules of propositional logic is made on tautologous sequents, we have demonstrated that the result is always a tautologous sequent. Thus the system is consistent. | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.4) | |
| A reaction: The term 'sound' tends to be used now, rather than 'consistent'. See Lemmon for the proofs of each of the nine rules. |
| 9539 | Propositional logic is complete, since all of its tautologous sequents are derivable [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: A logical system is complete is all expressions of a specified kind are derivable in it. If we specify tautologous sequent-expressions, then propositional logic is complete, because we can show that all tautologous sequents are derivable. | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.5) | |
| A reaction: [See Lemmon 2.5 for details of the proofs] |
| 13909 | Write '(∀x)(...)' to mean 'take any x: then...', and '(∃x)(...)' to mean 'there is an x such that....' [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: Just as '(∀x)(...)' is to mean 'take any x: then....', so we write '(∃x)(...)' to mean 'there is an x such that....' | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 3.1) | |
| A reaction: [Actually Lemmon gives the universal quantifier symbol as '(x)', but the inverted A ('∀') seems to have replaced it these days] |
| 13902 | 'Gm' says m has property G, and 'Pmn' says m has relation P to n [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: A predicate letter followed by one name expresses a property ('Gm'), and a predicate-letter followed by two names expresses a relation ('Pmn'). We could write 'Pmno' for a complex relation like betweenness. | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 3.1) |
| 13911 | The 'symbols' are bracket, connective, term, variable, predicate letter, reverse-E [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: I define a 'symbol' (of the predicate calculus) as either a bracket or a logical connective or a term or an individual variable or a predicate-letter or reverse-E (∃). | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 4.1) |
| 13910 | Our notation uses 'predicate-letters' (for 'properties'), 'variables', 'proper names', 'connectives' and 'quantifiers' [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: Quantifier-notation might be thus: first, render into sentences about 'properties', and use 'predicate-letters' for them; second, introduce 'variables'; third, introduce propositional logic 'connectives' and 'quantifiers'. Plus letters for 'proper names'. | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 3.1) |
| 13904 | Universal Elimination (UE) lets us infer that an object has F, from all things having F [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: Our rule of universal quantifier elimination (UE) lets us infer that any particular object has F from the premiss that all things have F. It is a natural extension of &E (and-elimination), as universal propositions generally affirm a complex conjunction. | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 3.2) |
| 13906 | With finite named objects, we can generalise with &-Intro, but otherwise we need ∀-Intro [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: If there are just three objects and each has F, then by an extension of &I we are sure everything has F. This is of no avail, however, if our universe is infinitely large or if not all objects have names. We need a new device, Universal Introduction, UI. | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 3.2) |
| 13908 | UE all-to-one; UI one-to-all; EI arbitrary-to-one; EE proof-to-one [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: Univ Elim UE - if everything is F, then something is F; Univ Intro UI - if an arbitrary thing is F, everything is F; Exist Intro EI - if an arbitrary thing is F, something is F; Exist Elim EE - if a proof needed an object, there is one. | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 3.3) | |
| A reaction: [My summary of Lemmon's four main rules for predicate calculus] This is the natural deduction approach, of trying to present the logic entirely in terms of introduction and elimination rules. See Bostock on that. |
| 13901 | Predicate logic uses propositional connectives and variables, plus new introduction and elimination rules [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: In predicate calculus we take over the propositional connectives and propositional variables - but we need additional rules for handling quantifiers: four rules, an introduction and elimination rule for the universal and existential quantifiers. | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965]) | |
| A reaction: This is Lemmon's natural deduction approach (invented by Gentzen), which is largely built on introduction and elimination rules. |
| 13903 | Universal elimination if you start with the universal, introduction if you want to end with it [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: The elimination rule for the universal quantifier concerns the use of a universal proposition as a premiss to establish some conclusion, whilst the introduction rule concerns what is required by way of a premiss for a universal proposition as conclusion. | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 3.2) | |
| A reaction: So if you start with the universal, you need to eliminate it, and if you start without it you need to introduce it. |
| 13905 | If there is a finite domain and all objects have names, complex conjunctions can replace universal quantifiers [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: If all objects in a given universe had names which we knew and there were only finitely many of them, then we could always replace a universal proposition about that universe by a complex conjunction. | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 3.2) |
| 13900 | 'Some Frenchmen are generous' is rendered by (∃x)(Fx→Gx), and not with the conditional → [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: It is a common mistake to render 'some Frenchmen are generous' by (∃x)(Fx→Gx) rather than the correct (∃x)(Fx&Gx). 'All Frenchmen are generous' is properly rendered by a conditional, and true if there are no Frenchmen. | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 3.1) | |
| A reaction: The existential quantifier implies the existence of an x, but the universal quantifier does not. |
| 9520 | The paradoxes of material implication are P |- Q → P, and ¬P |- P → Q [Lemmon] |
| Full Idea: The paradoxes of material implication are P |- Q → P, and ¬P |- P → Q. That is, since Napoleon was French, then if the moon is blue then Napoleon was French; and since Napoleon was not Chinese, then if Napoleon was Chinese, the moon is blue. | |
| From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.2) | |
| A reaction: This is why the symbol → does not really mean the 'if...then' of ordinary English. Russell named it 'material implication' to show that it was a distinctively logical operator. |
| 6262 | We lack some sense or other, and hence objects may have hidden features [Montaigne] |
| Full Idea: We may all lack some sense or other; because of that defect, most of the features of objects may be concealed from us. | |
| From: Michel de Montaigne (Apology for Raymond Sebond [1580], p.0666) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as simple, straightforward common sense, and right. I cannot make sense of the claim that reality really is just the way it appears. We do not have a built-in neutrino detector, for example. |
| 6260 | Sceptics say there is truth, but no means of making or testing lasting judgements [Montaigne] |
| Full Idea: Pyrrhonians say that truth and falsehood exist; within us we have means of looking for them, but not of making any lasting judgements: we have no touchstone. | |
| From: Michel de Montaigne (Apology for Raymond Sebond [1580], p.0564) | |
| A reaction: This states the key difference between sceptics and relativists. The latter are more extreme as they say there is no such thing as truth. The former concede truth, and their scepticism is about the abilities of human beings. I am an anti-relativist. |
| 6261 | The soul is in the brain, as shown by head injuries [Montaigne] |
| Full Idea: The seat of the powers of the soul is in the brain, as is clearly shown by the fact that wounds and accidents affecting the head immediately harm the faculties of the soul. | |
| From: Michel de Montaigne (Apology for Raymond Sebond [1580], p.0614) | |
| A reaction: At last someone has finally got the facts clear. It seems surprising that the Greeks never clearly grasped this piece of irrefutable evidence - even those Greeks who speculated that the brain was the key. Here we have a fixed fact of philosophy of mind. |
| 7496 | Rules and duties are based on the will, as that is all we control [Montaigne] |
| Full Idea: Since actions and performances are not wholly in our power and since nothing is really in our power but our will - it is on the will that all the rules and duties of Man are based and established. | |
| From: Michel de Montaigne (I.7 Our deeds are judged by intention [1580], p.0028) | |
| A reaction: This is almost Kant's claim that the only truly good thing is a good will (e.g. Idea 3711). Aristotle disagrees, because a virtuous person should also have good desires. We may will to have good desires, but virtue requires actually having them. |
| 7495 | Apart from the fear, dying is an easy duty [Montaigne] |
| Full Idea: If our fears did not lend it weight, dying would be one of our lighter duties. | |
| From: Michel de Montaigne (III.12 On physiognomy [1580], p.1191) | |
| A reaction: An Epicurean thought. 'Duties' is nice - presumably death qualifies as a duty, because Nature requires it of us (we each of us 'owe nature a death'). The remark appears to me to be true. |
| 22269 | We must fight fiercely to hang on to the few pleasures which survive into old age [Montaigne] |
| Full Idea: I am training and sharpening my appetite for those pleasures that are left. ...We must cling tooth and claw to the use of the pleasures of this life which the advancing years, one after another, rip from our grasp. | |
| From: Michel de Montaigne (I.39 On Solitude [1580], p.276) | |
| A reaction: That may be one of the most inspiring ideas I have read about pleasure. |
| 20482 | Virtue inspires Stoics, but I want a good temperament [Montaigne] |
| Full Idea: What Stoics did from virtue I teach myself to do from temperament. | |
| From: Michel de Montaigne (III.10 On Restraining your Will [1580], p.1153) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be an Aristotelian criticism of Stoicism. They venerate virtue above everything, but Aristotle says you must integrate virtue into your very being, so that right actions flow from you, with very little need for premeditation. |
| 20480 | There is not much point in only becoming good near the end of your life [Montaigne] |
| Full Idea: It is almost better never to become a good man at all than to do so tardily, understanding how to live when you have no life left. | |
| From: Michel de Montaigne (III.10 On Restraining your Will [1580], p.1142) | |
| A reaction: A very nice perspective, which I don't recall Aristotle mentioning. It does, though, reinforce Aristotle's belief that early training is essential. |
| 21006 | If women share rights with men, they will exhibit similar virtues [Wollstonecraft] |
| Full Idea: Let woman share the rights and she will emulate the virtues of man; for she must grow more perfect when emancipated, or justify that authority that chains such a weak being to her duty. | |
| From: Mary Wollstonecraft (Vindication of the Rights of Women [1792], p.294), quoted by Amartya Sen - The Idea of Justice 18 'Wrath' | |
| A reaction: Presumably this implies that if emancipation led to women exceeding men in such virtues, there would be some justification for imposing the chains on the men rather than the women. Consider wars. Probably best to just abandon chains. |
| 20481 | Nothing we say can be worse than unsaying it in the face of authority [Montaigne] |
| Full Idea: Nothing which a gentleman says can seem worse than the shame of his unsaying it under duress from authority. | |
| From: Michel de Montaigne (III.10 On Restraining your Will [1580], p.1153) | |
| A reaction: The point is that you have to fight every day for free speech, because no matter what the law says, there are always people in power who want to shut you up. |
| 20479 | People at home care far more than soldiers risking death about the outcome of wars [Montaigne] |
| Full Idea: How many soldiers put themselves at risk every day in wars which they care little about, rushing into danger in battles the loss of which will not make them lose a night's sleep. Meanwhile a man at home is more passionate about the war than the soldier. | |
| From: Michel de Montaigne (III.10 On Restraining your Will [1580], p.1139) | |
| A reaction: It depends whether you are a mercenary (which the majority probably were in 1680), and what are the implications of defeat. |