16083
|
Aristotelian matter seriously threatens the intrinsic unity and substantiality of its object [Gill,ML]
|
|
Full Idea:
On the interpretation of Aristotelian matter that I shall propose, matter seriously threatens the intrinsic unity, and hence the substantiality, of the object to which it contributes.
|
|
From:
Mary Louise Gill (Aristotle on Substance [1989], Intro)
|
|
A reaction:
Presumably the thought is that if an object is form+matter (hylomorphism), then forms are essentially unified, but matter is essentially unified and sloppy.
|
5692
|
Introspection is not perception, because there are no extra qualities apart from the mental events themselves [Rosenthal]
|
|
Full Idea:
Introspection cannot be a form of perceiving, since that invariably involves sensory qualities, and no qualities occur in introspection other than those of the sensations and perceptions we introspect; there are no additional qualities.
|
|
From:
David M. Rosenthal (Instrospection [1998])
|
|
A reaction:
This sounds pretty conclusive. Presumably introspection is best described as meta-thought rather than perception, which means that it involves beliefs and judgements, rather than new perceptual qualities. It has to be conceptual, and probably linguistic.
|
17006
|
Prime matter has no place in Aristotle's theories, and passages claiming it are misread [Gill,ML]
|
|
Full Idea:
I argue that prime matter has no place in Aristotle's elemental theory. ..References to prime matter are found in Aristotle's work because his theory was thought to need the doctrine. If I am right, these passages will all admit of another interpretation.
|
|
From:
Mary Louise Gill (Aristotle on Substance [1989], App)
|
|
A reaction:
If correct, this strikes me as important for the history of ideas, because scholastics got themselves in a right tangle over prime matter. See Pasnau on it. It pushed the 17th century into corpuscularianism.
|