15 ideas
15375 | If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting] |
Full Idea: The common feature of every designating term is that designation may change from state to state - thus it can be formalized by a function from states to objects. | |
From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], 3) | |
A reaction: Specifying the objects sounds OK, but specifying states sounds rather tough. |
15376 | Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting] |
Full Idea: To first order modal logic (with quantification over objects) we can add a second kind of quantification, over intensions. An intensional object, or individual concept, will be modelled by a function from states to objects. | |
From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], 3.3) |
15378 | Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting] |
Full Idea: Awareness logic enriched Hintikka's epistemic models with an awareness function, mapping each state to the set of formulas we are aware of at that state. This reflects some bound on the resources we can bring to bear. | |
From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], 3.6.1) | |
A reaction: [He cites Fagin and Halpern 1988 for this] |
15379 | Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting] |
Full Idea: In justification logics, the logics of knowledge are extended by making reasons explicit. A logic of proof terms was created, with a semantics. In this, mathematical truths are known for explicit reasons, and these provide a measure of complexity. | |
From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], 3.6.1) |
11026 | Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting] |
Full Idea: Mathematics is typically extensional throughout (we write 3+2=2+3 despite the two terms having different meanings). ..Classical first-order logic is extensional by design since it primarily evolved to model the reasoning of mathematics. | |
From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], §1) |
3299 | In logic identity involves reflexivity (x=x), symmetry (if x=y, then y=x) and transitivity (if x=y and y=z, then x=z) [Baillie] |
Full Idea: In logic identity is an equivalence relation, which involves reflexivity (x=x), symmetry (if x=y, then y=x), and transitivity (if x=y and y=z, then x=z). | |
From: James Baillie (Problems in Personal Identity [1993], Intr p.4) |
11028 | λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting] |
Full Idea: λ-abstraction can be used to abstract and disambiguate a predicate. De re is [λx◊P(x)](f) - f has the possible-P property - and de dicto is ◊[λxP(x)](f) - possibly f has the P-property. Also applies to □. | |
From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], §3.3) | |
A reaction: Compare the Barcan formula. Originated with Church in the 1930s, and Carnap 1947, but revived by Stalnaker and Thomason 1968. Because it refers to the predicate, it has a role in intensional versions of logic, especially modal logic. |
16066 | Additional or removal of any part changes a thing, so people are never the same person [Epicharmus] |
Full Idea: If you add or take away a pebble, the same number does not remain. If you add to a length or cut off from it, the former measure does not remain. So human beings grow or waste away. Both you and I were, and shall be, other men. | |
From: Epicharmus (comedies (frags) [c.470 BCE], B02), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 03.12 | |
A reaction: [The original is in dialogue form from a play. The context is a joke about not paying a debt.] Note the early date for this metaphysical puzzle. My new favourite reply is Chrysippus's Idea 16059; identity actually requires change. |
15377 | Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting] |
Full Idea: Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds quite naturally. | |
From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], 3.4) | |
A reaction: A definite description can pick out the same object in another possible world, or a very similar one, or an object which has almost nothing in common with the others. |
436 | A dog seems handsome to another a dog, and even a pig to another pig [Epicharmus] |
Full Idea: Dog seems very handsome to dog, and ox to ox, and donkey very handsome to donkey, and even pig to pig. | |
From: Epicharmus (comedies (frags) [c.470 BCE], B05), quoted by (who?) - where? |
442 | Pleasures are like pirates - if you are caught they drown you in a sea of pleasures [Epicharmus] |
Full Idea: Pleasures for mortals are like impious pirates, for the man who is caught by pleasures is immediately drowned in a sea of them. | |
From: Epicharmus (comedies (frags) [c.470 BCE], B44), quoted by (who?) - where? | |
A reaction: Not all slopes are slippery. Plenty of people hold themselves to strict rules about alcohol or gambling. People have occasional treats. |
440 | Hands wash hands; give that you may get [Epicharmus] |
Full Idea: The hand washes the hand; give something and you may get something. | |
From: Epicharmus (comedies (frags) [c.470 BCE], B30), quoted by (who?) - where? |
441 | Against a villain, villainy is not a useless weapon [Epicharmus] |
Full Idea: Against a villain, villainy is not a useless weapon. | |
From: Epicharmus (comedies (frags) [c.470 BCE], B32), quoted by (who?) - where? |
439 | God knows everything, and nothing is impossible for him [Epicharmus] |
Full Idea: Nothing escapes the divine, this you must realise. God himself is our overseer, and nothing is impossible for him. | |
From: Epicharmus (comedies (frags) [c.470 BCE], B23), quoted by (who?) - where? |
443 | Human logos is an aspect of divine logos, and is sufficient for successful living [Epicharmus] |
Full Idea: Man has calculation, but there is also the divine logos. But human logos is sprung from the divine logos, and it brings to each man his means of life, and his maintenance. | |
From: Epicharmus (comedies (frags) [c.470 BCE], B57), quoted by (who?) - where? |