Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Metrodorus (Lamp), Gregory Currie and Peter Klein

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6 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence

8833	Why should we prefer coherent beliefs? [Klein,P]
	Full Idea: A key question for a coherentist is, why should he or she adopt a coherent set of beliefs rather than an incoherent set?
	From: Peter Klein (Infinitism solution to regress problem [2005], 'Step 1')
	A reaction: The point of the question is that the coherentist may have to revert to other criteria in answering it. One could equally ask, why should I believe in tables just because I vividly experience them? Or, why believe 2+2=4, just because it is obvious?

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma

8834	Infinitism avoids a regress, circularity or arbitrariness, by saying warrant just increases [Klein,P]
	Full Idea: Infinitism can solve the regress problem, because it endorses a warrant-emergent form of reasoning in which warrant increases as the series of reasons lengthens. The theory can avoid both circularity and arbitrariness.
	From: Peter Klein (Infinitism solution to regress problem [2005], 'Step 2')
	A reaction: It nicely avoids arbitrariness by offering a reason for absolutely every belief. I think the way to go may to combine individual Infinitism with a social account of where to set the bar of acceptable justification.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations

8838	If justification is endless, no link in the chain is ultimately justified [Ginet on Klein,P]
	Full Idea: An endless chain of inferential justifications can never ultimately explain why any link in the chain is justified.
	From: comment on Peter Klein (Infinitism solution to regress problem [2005]) by Carl Ginet - Infinitism not solution to regress problem p.148
	A reaction: This strikes me as a mere yearning for foundations. I don't see sense-experience or the natural light of human reason (or the word of God, for that matter) as in any way 'ultimate'. It's all evidence to be evaluated.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification

8839	Reasons acquire warrant through being part of a lengthening series [Klein,P]
	Full Idea: The infinitist holds that finding a reason, and then another reason for that reason, places it at the beginning of a series where each gains warrant as part of the series. ..Rational credibility increases as the series lengthens.
	From: Peter Klein (Infinitism solution to regress problem [2005], p.137)
	A reaction: A striking problem here for Klein is the status of the first reason, prior to it being supported by a series. Surprisingly, it seems that it would not yet be a justification. Coherence accounts have the same problem, if coherence is the only criterion.

21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 7. Ontology of Art

20444	If paintings could be perfectly duplicated, it would be a multiple art form [Currie, by Bacharach]
	Full Idea: Currie claims that, in principle, all art forms are multiple. A superxerox machine, duplicating a painting molecule by molecule, would show that paintings are singular only contingently.
	From: report of Gregory Currie (An Ontology of Art [1988]) by Sondra Bacharach - Arthur C. Danto 3
	A reaction: This strikes me as correct. An original painting would then have the same status as the manuscript of a poem, giving it an authority, and being moving by its personal contact with the artist. But worth far less than current original paintings.

23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 2. Hedonism

5954	All inventions of the mind aim at pleasure, and those that don't are worthless [Metrodorus of Lamp., by Plutarch]
	Full Idea: Metrodorus says that all the wonderful, ingenious and brilliant inventions of the mind have been contrived for the sake of pleasure of the flesh or for the sake of looking forward to it, and any accomplishment not leading to this end is worthless.
	From: report of Metrodorus (Lamp) (fragments/reports [c.291 BCE], Fr 6) by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes §1125
	A reaction: It is very hard to think of counterexamples! Would anyone bother to work out the theorems of number theory if they didn't enjoy doing it? Would any sensible person make great sacrifices if they didn't think that increased happiness would result?