70 ideas
11051 | Frege's logical approach dominates the analytical tradition [Hanna] |
Full Idea: Pure logic constantly controls Frege's philosophy, and in turn Frege's logically oriented philosophy constantly controls the analytic tradition. | |
From: Robert Hanna (Rationality and Logic [2006], 1.1) | |
A reaction: Hanna seeks to reintroduce the dreaded psychological aspect of logic, and I say 'good for him'. |
11054 | Scientism says most knowledge comes from the exact sciences [Hanna] |
Full Idea: Scientism says that the exact sciences are the leading sources of knowledge about the world. | |
From: Robert Hanna (Rationality and Logic [2006], 1.2) | |
A reaction: I almost agree, but I would describe the exact sciences as the chief 'evidence' for our knowledge, with the chief 'source' being our own ability to make coherent sense of the evidence. Exact sciences rest on mathematics. |
11070 | 'Denying the antecedent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ¬φ, so ¬ψ [Hanna] |
Full Idea: The fallacy of 'denying the antecedent' is of the form φ→ψ, ¬φ, so ¬ψ. | |
From: Robert Hanna (Rationality and Logic [2006], 5.4) |
11071 | 'Affirming the consequent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ψ, so φ [Hanna] |
Full Idea: The fallacy of 'affirming the consequent' is of the form φ→ψ, ψ, so φ. | |
From: Robert Hanna (Rationality and Logic [2006], 5.4) |
11088 | We can list at least fourteen informal fallacies [Hanna] |
Full Idea: Informal fallacies: appeals to force, circumstantial factors, ignorance, pity, popular consensus, authority, generalisation, confused causes, begging the question, complex questions, irrelevance, equivocation, black-and-white, slippery slope etc. | |
From: Robert Hanna (Rationality and Logic [2006], 7.3) |
11059 | Circular arguments are formally valid, though informally inadmissible [Hanna] |
Full Idea: A circular argument - one whose conclusion is to be found among its premises - is inadmissible in most informal contexts, even though it is formally valid. | |
From: Robert Hanna (Rationality and Logic [2006], 2.1) | |
A reaction: Presumably this is a matter of conversational implicature - that you are under a conventional obligation to say things which go somewhere, rather than circling around their starting place. |
11089 | Formally, composition and division fallacies occur in mereology [Hanna] |
Full Idea: Informal fallacies of composition and division go over into formal fallacies of mereological logic. | |
From: Robert Hanna (Rationality and Logic [2006], 7.3) |
11058 | Logic is explanatorily and ontologically dependent on rational animals [Hanna] |
Full Idea: Logic is explanatorily and ontologically dependent on rational animals. | |
From: Robert Hanna (Rationality and Logic [2006], 1.6) | |
A reaction: This is a splendid defiance of the standard Fregean view of logic as having an inner validity of its own, having nothing to do with the psychology of thinkers. But if Hanna is right, why does logical consequence seem to be necessary? |
11072 | Logic is personal and variable, but it has a universal core [Hanna] |
Full Idea: Beyond an innate and thus universally share protologic, each reasoner's mental logic is only more or less similar to the mental logic of any other reasoner. | |
From: Robert Hanna (Rationality and Logic [2006], 5.7) | |
A reaction: This is the main thesis of Hanna's book. I like the combination of this idea with Stephen Read's remark that each student should work out a personal logic which has their own private endorsement. |
11061 | Intensional consequence is based on the content of the concepts [Hanna] |
Full Idea: In intensional logic the consequence relation is based on the form or content of the concepts or properties expressed by the predicates. | |
From: Robert Hanna (Rationality and Logic [2006], 2.2) |
11063 | Logicism struggles because there is no decent theory of analyticity [Hanna] |
Full Idea: All versions of the thesis that arithmetic is reducible to logic remain questionable as long as no good theory of analyticity is available. | |
From: Robert Hanna (Rationality and Logic [2006], 2.4) | |
A reaction: He rejects the attempts by Frege, Wittgenstein and Carnap to provide a theory of analyticity. |
11055 | Supervenience can add covariation, upward dependence, and nomological connection [Hanna] |
Full Idea: 'Strong supervenience' involves necessary covariation of the properties, and upward dependence of higher level on lower level. ...If we add a nomological connection between the two, then we have 'superdupervenience'. | |
From: Robert Hanna (Rationality and Logic [2006], 1.2) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Very helpful. A superdupervenient relationship between mind and brain would be rather baffling if they were not essentially the same thing. (which is what I take them to be). |
11083 | A sentence is necessary if it is true in a set of worlds, and nonfalse in the other worlds [Hanna] |
Full Idea: On my view, necessity is the truth of a sentence in every member of a set of possible worlds, together with its nonfalsity in every other possible worlds. | |
From: Robert Hanna (Rationality and Logic [2006], 6.6) |
11086 | Metaphysical necessity can be 'weak' (same as logical) and 'strong' (based on essences) [Hanna] |
Full Idea: Weak metaphysical necessity is either over the set of all logically possible worlds (in which case it is the same as logical necessity), or it is of a smaller set of worlds, and is determined by the underlying essence or nature of the actual world. | |
From: Robert Hanna (Rationality and Logic [2006], 6.6) | |
A reaction: I take the first to be of no interest, as I have no interest in a world which is somehow rated as logically possible, but is not naturally possible. The second type should the principle aim of all human cognitive enquiry. The strong version is synthetic. |
11084 | Logical necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds, because of laws and concepts [Hanna] |
Full Idea: Logical necessity is the truth of a sentence by virtue of logical laws or intrinsic conceptual connections alone, and thus true in all logically possible worlds. Put in traditional terms, logical necessity is analyticity. | |
From: Robert Hanna (Rationality and Logic [2006], 6.6) |
11085 | Nomological necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds with our laws [Hanna] |
Full Idea: Physical or nomological necessity is the truth of a sentence in all logically possible worlds governed by our actual laws of nature. | |
From: Robert Hanna (Rationality and Logic [2006], 6.6) | |
A reaction: Personally I think 'natural necessity' is the best label for this, as it avoids firm commitment to reductive physicalism, and it also avoids commitment to actual necessitating laws. |
11077 | Intuition includes apriority, clarity, modality, authority, fallibility and no inferences [Hanna] |
Full Idea: The nine features of intuition are: a mental act, apriority, content-comprehensiveness, clarity and distinctness, strict-modality-attributivity, authoritativeness,noninferentiality, cognitive indispensability, and fallibility. | |
From: Robert Hanna (Rationality and Logic [2006], 6.4) | |
A reaction: [See Hanna for a full explanation of this lot] Seems like a good stab at it. Note the trade-off between authority and fallibility. |
11080 | Intuition is more like memory, imagination or understanding, than like perception [Hanna] |
Full Idea: There is no reason why intuition should be cognitively analogous not to sense perception but instead to either memory, imagination, or conceptual understanding. | |
From: Robert Hanna (Rationality and Logic [2006], 6.5) | |
A reaction: It is Russell's spotting the analogy with memory that made me come to believe that a priori knowledge is possible, as long as we accept it as being fallible. [Hanna has a good discussion of intuition; he votes for the imagination analogy] |
11078 | Intuition is only outside the 'space of reasons' if all reasons are inferential [Hanna] |
Full Idea: Intuition is outside the 'space of reasons' if we assume that all reasons are inferential, but inside if we assume that reasons need not always be inferential. | |
From: Robert Hanna (Rationality and Logic [2006], 6.4) | |
A reaction: I take it that intuition can be firmly inside the space of reasons, and that not all reasons are inferential. |
11053 | Explanatory reduction is stronger than ontological reduction [Hanna] |
Full Idea: As standardly construed, reduction can be either explanatory or ontological. Explanatory reduction is the strongest sort of reduction. ...Ontological reduction can still have an 'explanatory gap'. | |
From: Robert Hanna (Rationality and Logic [2006], 1.1) |
11081 | Imagination grasps abstracta, generates images, and has its own correctness conditions [Hanna] |
Full Idea: Three features of imagination are that its objects can be abstract, that it generates spatial images directly available to introspection, and its correctness conditions are not based on either efficacious causation or effective tracking. | |
From: Robert Hanna (Rationality and Logic [2006], 6.6) | |
A reaction: Hanna makes the imagination faculty central to our grasp of his proto-logic. |
4669 | Persons are conscious, they relate, they think, they feel, and they are self-aware [Glover] |
Full Idea: We think of 'persons' as conscious, able to form relationships, capable of thought, having emotional responses, and having some sense of their own identity. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §9.4) | |
A reaction: A notable addition to Locke's definition is the capacity for relationships. So are autistic children not persons? Is feeling necessary? Mr Spock is then in trouble. |
11082 | Should we take the 'depictivist' or the 'descriptivist/propositionalist' view of mental imagery? [Hanna] |
Full Idea: In the debate in cognitive science on the nature of mental imagery, there is a 'depictivist' side (Johnson-Laird, Kosslyn, Shepard - good images are isomorphic), and a 'descriptivist' or 'propositionalist' side (Pylyshyn and others). | |
From: Robert Hanna (Rationality and Logic [2006], 6.6) | |
A reaction: Hanna votes firmly in favour of the first view, and implies that they have more or less won the debate. |
11047 | Hegelian holistic rationality is the capacity to seek coherence [Hanna] |
Full Idea: The 'holistic' (Hegelian) sense of rationality means the capacity for systematically seeking coherence (or 'reflective equilibrium') across a network or web of beliefs, desires, emotions, intentions and volitions. Traditionally 'the truth is the whole'. | |
From: Robert Hanna (Rationality and Logic [2006], Intro) | |
A reaction: On the whole this is my preferred view (which sounds Quinean as well as Hegelian), though I reject the notion that truth is a whole. I take coherence to be the hallmark of justification, though not of truth, and reason aims to justify. |
11048 | Humean Instrumental rationality is the capacity to seek contingent truths [Hanna] |
Full Idea: The 'instrumental' (Humean) sense of rationality means a capacity for generating or recognizing contingent truths, contextually normative rules, consequentialist obligations, and hypothetical 'ought' claims. Reason is 'the slave of the passions'. | |
From: Robert Hanna (Rationality and Logic [2006], Intro) |
11046 | Kantian principled rationality is recognition of a priori universal truths [Hanna] |
Full Idea: The 'principled' (Kantian) sense of rationality means the possession of a capacity for generating or recognizing necessary truths, a priori beliefs, strictly universal normative rules, nonconsequentialist moral obligations, and categorical 'ought' claims. | |
From: Robert Hanna (Rationality and Logic [2006], Intro) |
11067 | Rational animals have a normative concept of necessity [Hanna] |
Full Idea: A rational animal is one that is a normative-reflective possessor of the concepts of necessity, certainty and unconditional obligation. | |
From: Robert Hanna (Rationality and Logic [2006], 4.0) | |
A reaction: The addition of obligation shows the Kantian roots of this. It isn't enough just to possess a few concepts. You wouldn't count as rational if you didn't desire truth, as well as understanding it. Robots be warned. |
11068 | One tradition says talking is the essence of rationality; the other says the essence is logic [Hanna] |
Full Idea: In the tradition of Descartes, Chomsky and Davidson, rational animals are essentially talking animals. But in the view of Kant, and perhaps Fodor, it is the cognitive capacity for logic that is the essence of human rationality. | |
From: Robert Hanna (Rationality and Logic [2006], 4.9) |
11045 | Most psychologists are now cognitivists [Hanna] |
Full Idea: Most psychologists have now dropped behaviourism and adopted cognitivism: the thesis that the rational human mind is essentially an active innately specified information-processor. | |
From: Robert Hanna (Rationality and Logic [2006], Intro) |
4656 | A problem arises in any moral system that allows more than one absolute right [Glover] |
Full Idea: A problem arises in any moral system that allows more than one absolute right. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §5.6) | |
A reaction: Presumably the right to rest on Sunday doesn't conflict with the right to disabled parking on weekdays. He has, though, a point… |
4657 | Double Effect: no bad acts with good consequences, but possibly good acts despite bad consequences [Glover] |
Full Idea: The doctrine of double effect says (crudely) it is wrong to intentionally do a bad act for its good consequences, but it may be permissible to do a good act despite its foreseeable bad consequences. (..Shoot an innocent man to avoid his agonising death?) | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §6) | |
A reaction: Glover rejects this principle, because he is a utilitarian. The principle implies a doubtful sharp distinction between an act and its consequences. If you foresee bad consequences, why do you go ahead and do it? I doubt if there are purely good acts. |
4658 | Acts and Omissions: bad consequences are morally better if they result from an omission rather than an act [Glover] |
Full Idea: The acts and omissions doctrine says failure to perform an act, when there are foreseen bad consequences of the failure, is usually better than performing a different act which has the same foreseen consequences. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §7) | |
A reaction: Is it better if my neglect causes famine in Ethiopia than if my theft causes it? Glover (a consequentialist) rejects this. Depends. What are reasonable expectations? Acts set an example. Minor bad acts are clearly better than callous negligence. |
4659 | It doesn't seem worse to switch off a life-support machine than to forget to switch it on [Glover] |
Full Idea: If someone is being kept alive on a respirator and I switch it off, this makes death no more certain than if, when attaching the patient to the machine, I fail to switch it on. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §7.4) | |
A reaction: In practice, though, neglect is more excusable than a bad act, and (crucially) bad actions always indicate a bad character, whereas neglect may indicate a good person who is very busy. Neglect can, of course, be very wicked. |
4660 | Harmful omissions are unavoidable, while most harmful acts can be avoided [Glover] |
Full Idea: Harmful omissions are unavoidable, while most harmful acts can be avoided. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §7.8) | |
A reaction: This does suggest why we get angry with bad actions, but are very tolerant of omissions. It is also easier to motivate positive actions than to worry about things undone. Omissions can be disgraceful. |
4661 | What matters is not intrinsic value of life or rights, but worthwhile and desired life, and avoidance of pain [Glover] |
Full Idea: It is not wrong to kill because of the intrinsic value of life or consciousness, or because people have a right to life, but because we shouldn't reduce worthwhile life, or thwart someone's desire to live, or inflict fear or pain. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §8.1) | |
A reaction: This is a utilitarian view. It is not clear how we decide 'worthwhile' without a notion of intrinsic value. It is unclear why this desire is respected if many other desires are not. |
4648 | 'Death' is best seen as irreversible loss of consciousness, since this is why we care about brain function [Glover] |
Full Idea: It seems best to define 'death' in terms of irreversible loss of consciousness itself, since it is from this alone that our interest in the electrical activity of the brain derives. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §3.3) | |
A reaction: I see the point, but this implies no further interest in a loved one who will not regain consciousness. What about subconscious acitivity, or dreamlike states without proper awareness of the external world? |
3785 | You can't separate acts from the people performing them [Glover] |
Full Idea: A mistake of consequentialists is to treat actions as though they can somehow be isolated from the people performing them. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Introductions to Utilitarianism and its Critics [1990], Pt Five) | |
A reaction: I agree. The weather produces consequences. Morality is about people. Crocodiles, for example, are exempt. |
3786 | Aggression in defence may be beneficial but morally corrupting [Glover] |
Full Idea: Forming the intention to use nuclear retaliation if attacked may both be the best way to avoid the catastrophe of nuclear war and at the same time be morally corrupting. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Introductions to Utilitarianism and its Critics [1990], Pt Five) | |
A reaction: A famous moment in 2017 when Jeremy Corbyn refused to say he would be willing to use the weapons, if elected. It would be hard to sustain a determination to do it, and then reject it at the crucial moment. |
4650 | The quality of a life is not altogether independent of its length [Glover] |
Full Idea: The quality of a life is not altogether independent of its length. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §3.9) | |
A reaction: A nice illustration of the fact that neat distinctions nearly always begin to blur when you think about reality. But a blurred distinction is still a distinction… |
5954 | All inventions of the mind aim at pleasure, and those that don't are worthless [Metrodorus of Lamp., by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Metrodorus says that all the wonderful, ingenious and brilliant inventions of the mind have been contrived for the sake of pleasure of the flesh or for the sake of looking forward to it, and any accomplishment not leading to this end is worthless. | |
From: report of Metrodorus (Lamp) (fragments/reports [c.291 BCE], Fr 6) by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes §1125 | |
A reaction: It is very hard to think of counterexamples! Would anyone bother to work out the theorems of number theory if they didn't enjoy doing it? Would any sensible person make great sacrifices if they didn't think that increased happiness would result? |
3784 | Duty prohibits some acts, whatever their consequences [Glover] |
Full Idea: The deontological view is that some acts are absolutely prohibited, regardless of consequences. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Introductions to Utilitarianism and its Critics [1990], Pt Five) |
3782 | Satisfaction of desires is not at all the same as achieving happiness [Glover, by PG] |
Full Idea: Objections to utilitarianism as maximisation of preferences: faded past desires or the desires of the dead; obtaining desires and happiness are different; fewer desires are easier to satisfy; pain is good if it can be removed. | |
From: report of Jonathan Glover (Introductions to Utilitarianism and its Critics [1990], Pt Two) by PG - Db (ideas) |
3787 | Rule-utilitarianism is either act-utilitarianism, or not really utilitarian [Glover] |
Full Idea: Rule-utilitarianism seems either to collapse into act-utilitarianism, or else it is only partly utilitarian. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Introductions to Utilitarianism and its Critics [1990], Pt Six) |
3783 | How can utilitarianism decide the ideal population size? [Glover] |
Full Idea: There are deep problems for utilitarianism in trying to work out what the ideal population size would be. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Introductions to Utilitarianism and its Critics [1990], Pt Four) |
4675 | The sanctity of life doctrine implies a serious increase of abnormality among the population [Glover] |
Full Idea: Accepting views about the sanctity of life of the foetus commits us to a policy of drastically increasing the proportion of the population who are seriously abnormal. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §11.7) | |
A reaction: This is a utilitarian view, and one with which I sympathise. We can't steamroller women's feelings for some greater dream about humanity, but the larger picture is vital to the discussion. |
4654 | Autonomy favours present opinions over future ones, and says nothing about the interests of potential people [Glover] |
Full Idea: Respect for autonomy seems to give priority to decisions based on your present outlook, even if your future outlook will be quite different, and it gives no support for any sort of paternalism, or for considering the interests of potential people. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §5.3) | |
A reaction: The first point does give a plausible justification for paternalism. Potential people are not a problem if respect for autonomy is not the only valuable thing. We presumably desire that future humans will be autonomous. |
4655 | If a whole community did not mind death, respect for autonomy suggests that you could kill them all [Glover] |
Full Idea: If you found a whole community who did not mind dying (because it is no more to regret than going to sleep), then according to the autonomy principle there would be no objection to killing the whole community. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §5.3) | |
A reaction: I presume you would at least ask them if they desired death! They might regret being put to sleep. And respect for autonomy need not be the only value. |
4680 | Autonomy seems to acquire greater weight when the decision is more important to a person [Glover] |
Full Idea: The appeal to autonomy has much more force where the person's decision is of great importance to them (as in suicide), than it has when it concerns a lesser decision (such as whether to wear a seatbelt). | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §13.5) | |
A reaction: This is presumably uncontroversial. Planning regulations show the intrusiveness on an individual is crucial. I trim your hedge, or your hair, or your tonsils, or your beliefs… |
4670 | Being alive is not intrinsically good, and there is no 'right to life' [Glover] |
Full Idea: There is nothing intrinsically good in a person being alive, and the idea of a 'right to life' should be rejected. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §11.1) | |
A reaction: If pleasure or benefit can be intrinsically good, I don't see why life can't be. The notion of a 'natural' or 'self-evident' right does look dubious to me. Rights are earned and given. Robinson Crusoe has no rights. |
4668 | You can't have a right to something you can't desire, so a foetus has no 'right' to life [Glover] |
Full Idea: It seems that the bearers of rights must at least have the capacity to desire what they have a right to, which is something the foetus does not have. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §9.4) | |
A reaction: Obviously we could say a person has a right to something they don't desire (such as freedom). How about: a mental defective has the right not to be laughed at, even if they don't understand the mockery? |
4649 | If someone's life is 'worth living', that gives one direct reason not to kill him [Glover] |
Full Idea: I am arguing that, if someone's life is worth living, this is one reason why it is directly wrong to kill him. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §3.7) | |
A reaction: This is an attempt to find a modern utilitarian criterion of value. A problem case would be someone for whom only sadism made their life worth living. |
4651 | Utilitarians object to killing directly (pain, and lost happiness), and to side-effects (loss to others, and precedents) [Glover] |
Full Idea: Utilitarians have two direct objections to killing (the fear and pain, and the loss of future happiness), and two concerns about side-effects (the loss to friends and community, and the bad precedent and public anxiety caused). | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §4.4) | |
A reaction: This invites obvious counterexamples, of somewhat unhappy, lonely people, who can be quietly killed with no qualms. Who will be callous enough to do this deed for us? |
4671 | What is wrong with killing someone, if another equally worthwhile life is substituted? [Glover] |
Full Idea: If the only objection to killing (or not conceiving) is the impersonal one of not reducing the amount of worthwhile life, there seems nothing wrong with eliminating one worthwhile life if another is substituted. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §11.1) | |
A reaction: This invites us to value a life in itself, rather than for what it makes possible (e.g. 'worthwhile' activity). It doesn't follow that the life is 'sacred' - only that it has some intrinsic value. And why not? |
4676 | The 'no trade-off' position: killing is only justified if it prevents other deaths [Glover] |
Full Idea: The 'no trade-off' position: killing may be justified if it prevents other deaths, but not in defence of the quality of other lives, or by the miserable life of the person killed. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §12.2) | |
A reaction: As a utilitarian, Glover opposes this, since death is not the only source of unhappiness. Would we (if necessary) kill a terrorist who was burning down all our art galleries or churches? I would, if it was the only way. |
4685 | Societies spend a lot to save known persons, but very little to reduce fatal accidents [Glover] |
Full Idea: There is often a big discrepancy between what a society will spend on saving the life of a known person in peril, and what it will spend to reduce the future level of fatal accidents. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §16.3) | |
A reaction: This is a good point in favour of utilitarian approaches, which ask for impersonal calculation (which presumably embody an ideal of justice, buried somewhere in utilitarianism). But it isn't just 'sentimentality'. |
4681 | The Nazi mass murders seem to have originated in their euthanasia programme [Glover] |
Full Idea: It is argued that the mass murders of the Nazi period had their small beginnings in the Nazi euthanasia programme. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §14.2) | |
A reaction: This is the 'slippery slope' problem, and it seems undeniable that killing gets easier as you do more of it (e.g. on a farm). But not all slopes are slippery, if the focus is retained on reasons and justifications. |
4682 | Euthanasia is voluntary (patient's wish), or involuntary (ignore wish), or non-voluntary (no wish possible) [Glover] |
Full Idea: Voluntary euthanasia is done at the request of the person themselves. Involuntary euthanasia is killing someone in their own interests, but disregarding views they could express. Non-voluntary euthanasia is killing someone who cannot express any views. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §15.1) | |
A reaction: Seems a clear and satisfactory distinction, despite the possibility of borderline cases. A look of pain on a face? An inarticulate person? Deliberate ambiguity? Misunderstanding? |
4683 | Involuntary euthanasia is wrong because it violates autonomy, and it has appalling side-effects [Glover] |
Full Idea: Involuntary euthanasia can normally be ruled out, because it falls foul of the autonomy objection, and it is likely to have appalling side-effects. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §15.1) | |
A reaction: The only defence of it is if the prospects are utterly horrible and the subject cannot grasp them. However, is this true of children or the very old. Paternalism may be appropriate, if the decider has reliably depressing knowledge? |
4684 | Maybe extreme treatment is not saving life, but prolonging the act of dying [Glover] |
Full Idea: It is often suggested that medical intervention which goes beyond easing pain or distress is not saving life but 'prolonging the act of dying'. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §15.6) | |
A reaction: This is an important idea to keep in mind, but still a very difficult call to make. It needs to be presented to those who fight for life, at any cost in money, time, medical resources, or suffering. May people probably give up unnecessarily. |
4673 | Abortion differs morally from deliberate non-conception only in its side-effects [Glover] |
Full Idea: Abortion differs morally from deliberate non-conception only in its side-effects. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §11.4) | |
A reaction: This conclusion follows from a denial of any intrinsic value to a foetus, which in turns seems to imply that an adult human has no intrinsic value. Something must have intrinsic value, or nothing has any value at all. |
4652 | If killing is wrong because it destroys future happiness, not conceiving a happy child is also wrong [Glover] |
Full Idea: The main utilitarian objection to killing (that it results in the loss of future years of happiness) seems an equally powerful objection to deliberately not conceiving a happy child. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §4.4) | |
A reaction: This makes perfect sense, unless you give intrinsic value to existing lives, but none at all to potential lives. Virtue ethics helps here, but genetic engineering is a nightmare for Aristotle. |
4665 | Conception isn't the fixed boundary for a person's beginning, because twins are possible within two weeks [Glover] |
Full Idea: It is suggested that conception cannot be the boundary for the beginning of a genetic person, because monozygotic twins can split at any time during the first two weeks. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §9.3) | |
A reaction: Interesting, but not convincing. If I suddenly learned that I could fission into twins tomorrow, I would be no less of a single person today. |
4662 | Defenders of abortion focus on early pregnancy, while opponents focus on later stages [Glover] |
Full Idea: Defenders of at least some abortions tend to focus on the early stages of pregnancy, when an embryo is very different from a baby, while opponents tend to focus on the later stages of pregnancy, when abortion resembles infanticide. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §9) | |
A reaction: Seems true. If we ask which part of pregnancy we should focus on, the only plausible picture seems to be 'all of it', despite the confusing picture which results. |
4663 | If abortion is wrong, it is because a foetus is a human being or a person (or potentially so) [Glover] |
Full Idea: The case against abortion rests either on the claim that the foetus is a human being (or a potential human being), or on the different claim that the foetus is a person (or potential person). | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §9) | |
A reaction: The obvious problem with 'potential' is that every time Jack meets Jill there is a potential birth. And an early foetus is barely human, and clearly not a person. |
4664 | If abortion is wrong because of the 'potential' person, that makes contraception wrong too [Glover] |
Full Idea: It is hard to see how the 'potential' argument can succeed against abortion without also succeeding against contraception. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §9.2) | |
A reaction: It would even make it wrong not to introduce a given man to a given woman, if you thought they might be attracted! Maybe 'incipient' would be a better word than 'potential'? A person has been 'initiated'? Do words matter that much? |
4666 | If viability is a test or boundary at the beginning of life, it should also be so for frail old people [Glover] |
Full Idea: Supporters of the theory that 'viability' is the boundary at one end of life have to explain why it is not equally relevant at the other end. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §9.3) | |
A reaction: A very nice problem for what looks at first like an intuitively good test. Someone dependent on a dialysis machine is not 'viable'. Before modern medicine, this objection was much less forceful. But I'm not 'viable' if I have to be fed. |
4672 | Apart from side effects, it seems best to replace an inadequate foetus with one which has a better chance [Glover] |
Full Idea: If a foetus or baby has a poor chance of a worthwhile life, it may be directly wrong not to replace it by a baby with a better chance - though this consideration may be outweighed by side-effects. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §11.1) | |
A reaction: I can't disagree with this. In early pregnancy, if we object to termination, why can't we object if the more 'worthwhile' child is not conceived. We want good human lives. |
4674 | It is always right for a qualified person to perform an abortion when requested by the mother [Glover] |
Full Idea: I think it is always right for a qualified person capable of performing an abortion to do so when requested by the mother. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §11.4) | |
A reaction: There seems to be a question if the father is vehemently opposed. Glover concedes the right of a doctor to refuse. What if it is late in pregnancy, the baby will be instantly adopted, and the mother's motive seems malicious? |
4667 | How would we judge abortion if mothers had transparent wombs? [Glover] |
Full Idea: How would we react to abortion if mothers had transparent wombs, so that foetuses were visible? | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §9.3) | |
A reaction: Nice. Ultrasound scans have done this. The feeling of 'quickening' has always made a difference. Should these empathies affect our judgements? |
4679 | One test for a worthwhile life is to assess the amount of life for which you would rather be unconscious [Glover] |
Full Idea: One test for a worthwhile life is to assess the amount of life for which you would rather be unconscious. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §13.2) | |
A reaction: A nicely chilling question. Enthusiasts want never to sleep. If I would prefer to be unconscious 20 hours every day (for a long period), there doesn't seem much point, does there? |