33 ideas
12132 | Indiscernibility is a necessary and sufficient condition for identity [Brody] |
Full Idea: Enduring objects should be taken as fundamental in an ontology, and for all such objects indiscernibility is both a necessary and sufficient condition for identity. | |
From: Baruch Brody (Identity and Essence [1980], 3) | |
A reaction: Brody offers a substantial defence, but I don't find it plausible. Apart from Black's well known twin spheres example (Idea 10195), discernibility is relative to the powers of the observer. Two similar people in the mist aren't thereby identical. |
15834 | Brody bases sortal essentialism on properties required throughout something's existence [Brody, by Mackie,P] |
Full Idea: Brody bases sortal essentialism on the notion of a property that an individual must possess throughout its existence if it possesses it at any time in its existence. | |
From: report of Baruch Brody (Identity and Essence [1980]) by Penelope Mackie - How Things Might Have Been 7.1 | |
A reaction: Brody tends to treat categories as properties, which I dislike. How do you assess 'must' here? A person may possess a mole throughout life without it being essential. |
16235 | Persistence conditions cannot contradict, so there must be a 'dominant sortal' [Burke,M, by Hawley] |
Full Idea: Burke says a single object cannot have incompatible persistence conditions, for this would entail that there are events in which the object would both survive and perish. He says one sortal 'dominates' the other (sweater dominates thread). | |
From: report of Michael Burke (Dion and Theon: an essentialist solution [1994]) by Katherine Hawley - How Things Persist 5.3 | |
A reaction: This I take to be the most extreme version of sortal essentialism, and strikes me as incredibly gerrymandered and unacceptable. It is just too anthropocentric to count as genuine metaphysics. I may care more about the thread. |
14753 | The 'dominant' of two coinciding sortals is the one that entails the widest range of properties [Burke,M, by Sider] |
Full Idea: Burke claims that the 'dominant' sortal is the one whose satisfaction entails possession of the widest range of properties. For example, the statue (unlike the lump of clay) also possesses aesthetic properties, and hence is dominant. | |
From: report of Michael Burke (Dion and Theon: an essentialist solution [1994]) by Theodore Sider - Four Dimensionalism 5.4 | |
A reaction: [there are three papers by Burke on this; see all the quotations from Burke] Presumably one sortal could entail a single very important property, and the other sortal entail a huge range of trivial properties. What does being a 'thing' entail? |
16072 | 'The rock' either refers to an object, or to a collection of parts, or to some stuff [Burke,M, by Wasserman] |
Full Idea: Burke distinguishes three different readings of 'the rock'. It can be a singular description denoting an object, or a plural description denoting all the little pieces of rock, or a mass description the relevant rocky stuff. | |
From: report of Michael Burke (Dion and Theon: an essentialist solution [1994]) by Ryan Wasserman - Material Constitution 5 | |
A reaction: Idea 16068 is an objection to the second reading. Only the first reading seems plausible, so we must just get over all the difficulties philosophers have unearthed about knowing exactly what an 'object' is. I offer you essentialism. Rocks have unity. |
14751 | Tib goes out of existence when the tail is lost, because Tib was never the 'cat' [Burke,M, by Sider] |
Full Idea: Burke argues that Tib (the whole cat apart from its tail) goes out of existence when the tail is lost. His essentialist principle is that if something is ever of a particular sort (such as 'cat') then it is always of that sort. Tib is not initially a cat. | |
From: report of Michael Burke (Dion and Theon: an essentialist solution [1994]) by Theodore Sider - Four Dimensionalism 5.4 | |
A reaction: This I take to be a souped up version of Wiggins, and I just don't buy that identity conditions are decided by sortals, when it seems obvious that sortals are parasitic on identities. |
16071 | Sculpting a lump of clay destroys one object, and replaces it with another one [Burke,M, by Wasserman] |
Full Idea: On Burke's view, the process of sculpting a lump of clay into a statue destroys one object (a mere lump of clay) and replaces it with another (a statue). | |
From: report of Michael Burke (Dion and Theon: an essentialist solution [1994]) by Ryan Wasserman - Material Constitution 5 | |
A reaction: There is something right about this, but how many intermediate objects are created during the transition. It seems to make the notion of an object very conventional. |
16234 | Burke says when two object coincide, one of them is destroyed in the process [Burke,M, by Hawley] |
Full Idea: Michael Burke argues that a sweater is identical with the thread that consitutes it, that both were created at the moment when they began to coincide, and that the original thread was destroyed in the process. | |
From: report of Michael Burke (Dion and Theon: an essentialist solution [1994]) by Katherine Hawley - How Things Persist 5.3 | |
A reaction: [Burke's ideas are spread over three articles] It is the thread which is destroyed, because the sweater is the 'dominant sortal' (which strikes me as a particularlyd desperate concept). |
13278 | Maybe the clay becomes a different lump when it becomes a statue [Burke,M, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Burke has argued in a series of papers that the lump of clay which constitutes the statue is numerically distinct from the lump of clay which exists before or after the statue exists. The first is a statue, while the second is merely a lump of clay. | |
From: report of Michael Burke (Dion and Theon: an essentialist solution [1994]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects | |
A reaction: Koslicki objects that this introduces radically different persistence conditions from normal. It would mean that a pile of sugar was a different pile of sugar every time a grain moved (even slightly). You couldn't step into the same sugar twice. |
14750 | Two entities can coincide as one, but only one of them (the dominant sortal) fixes persistence conditions [Burke,M, by Sider] |
Full Idea: Michael Burke has given an account that avoids distinguishing coinciding entities. ...The statue/lump satisfies both 'lump' and 'statue', but only the latter determines that object's persistence conditions, and so is that object's 'dominant sortal'. | |
From: report of Michael Burke (Dion and Theon: an essentialist solution [1994]) by Theodore Sider - Four Dimensionalism 5.4 | |
A reaction: Presumably a lump on its own can have its own persistance conditions (as a 'lump'), but those would presumably be lost if you shaped it into a statue. Burke concedes that. Can of worms. Using a book as a doorstop... |
12140 | Modern emphasis is on properties had essentially; traditional emphasis is on sort-defining properties [Brody] |
Full Idea: The modern emphasis has been on the connection between essential properties and the properties that an object must have essentially. But traditionally there is also the connection between essential properties and the sort of thing that it is. | |
From: Baruch Brody (Identity and Essence [1980], 5.6) | |
A reaction: These are the modal essence and the definitional essence. My view is that he has missed out a crucial third (Aristotelian) view, which is that essences are explanatory. This third view can subsume the other two. |
11895 | A sortal essence is a property which once possessed always possessed [Brody, by Mackie,P] |
Full Idea: Brody bases sortal essentialism on the notion of a property that an individual must possess throughout its existence if it possesses it at any time in its existence. ...'Once an F, always an F'. ...Being a parrot is not a temporary occupation. | |
From: report of Baruch Brody (Identity and Essence [1980]) by Penelope Mackie - How Things Might Have Been 7.1 | |
A reaction: Hm. Would being less than fifty metres tall qualify as a sortal essence, for a giraffe or a uranium rod? If there is one thing an essential property should be, it is important. How do we assess importance? By explanatory power! Watch this space. |
12141 | Maybe essential properties are those which determine a natural kind? [Brody] |
Full Idea: We can advance the thesis that all essential properties either determine a natural kind or are part of an essential property that does determine a natural kind. | |
From: Baruch Brody (Identity and Essence [1980]) | |
A reaction: A useful clear statement of the view. I am opposed to it, because I take it to be of the essence of Socrates that he is philosophical, but humans are not essentially philosophical, and philosophers are unlikely to be a natural kind. |
12137 | De re essentialism standardly says all possible objects identical with a have a's essential properties [Brody] |
Full Idea: To say that an object a has a property P essentially is to say that it has P, and in all of certain worlds (all possible, all in which something identical with it exists, ...) the object identical with it has P. This is the standard de re interpretation. | |
From: Baruch Brody (Identity and Essence [1980], 5.4) | |
A reaction: This view always has to be qualified by excluding trivially necessary properties, but that exclusion shows clearly that the notion of essential is more concerned with non-triviality than it is with necessity. |
12142 | Essentially, a has P, always had P, must have had P, and has never had a future without P [Brody] |
Full Idea: 'a has property P essentially' means 'a has P, a always had P, there is no possible past in which P exists without P, and there is no moment of time at which a has had P and at which there is a possible future in which a exists without P' | |
From: Baruch Brody (Identity and Essence [1980], 6) | |
A reaction: This is Brody's own final account of essentialism. This is a carefully qualified form of the view that essential properties are, on the whole, the necessary properties, which view I take to be fundamentally mistaken. |
12143 | An object having a property essentially is equivalent to its having it necessarily [Brody] |
Full Idea: An object having a property essentially is equivalent to its having it necessarily. | |
From: Baruch Brody (Identity and Essence [1980], 6.1) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as blatantly false. Personally I am toying with the very unorthodox view that essential properties are not at all necessary, and that something can retain its identity while changing its essential character. A philosopher with Alzheimers. |
12144 | Essentialism is justified if the essential properties of things explain their other properties [Brody] |
Full Idea: The reasonableness of the essentialist hypothesis will be proportional to the extent that we can, as a result, use a's possession of P to explain a's other properties, ...and there is an inability to explain otherwise why a has P. | |
From: Baruch Brody (Identity and Essence [1980], 6.3) | |
A reaction: Brody as a rather liberal notion of properties. I would hope that we can do rather more than explain a's non-essential properties. If the non-essential properties were entailed by the essential ones, would they not then also be essential? |
12139 | Mereological essentialism says that every part that ensures the existence is essential [Brody] |
Full Idea: Mereological essentialism (whose leading advocate is Chisholm) says that for every x and y, if x is ever part of y, then y is necessarily such that x is part of y at any time that y exists. | |
From: Baruch Brody (Identity and Essence [1980], 5.6) | |
A reaction: This sounds implausible, especially given the transitivity of parthood. Not only are the planks that constitute Theseus's Ship now essential to it, but all the parts of the planks, every last chip, are as well. |
12135 | Interrupted objects have two first moments of existence, which could be two beginnings [Brody] |
Full Idea: If 'beginning of existence' meant 'first moment of existence after a period of nonexistence', then objects with interrupted existence have two beginnings of existence. | |
From: Baruch Brody (Identity and Essence [1980], 4.1) | |
A reaction: One might still maintain that the first beginning was essential to the object, since that is the event that defined it - and that would clarify the reason why we are supposed to think the origins are essential. I say the origin explains it. |
12130 | a and b share all properties; so they share being-identical-with-a; so a = b [Brody] |
Full Idea: Suppose that a and b have all of their properties in common. a certainly has the property of-being-identical-with-a. So, by supposition, does b. Then a = b. | |
From: Baruch Brody (Identity and Essence [1980], 1.2) | |
A reaction: Brody defends this argument, and seems to think that it proves the identity of indiscernibles. As far as I can see it totally begs the question, since we can only assume that both have the property of being-identical-with-a if we have assumed a = b. |
12138 | Identity across possible worlds is prior to rigid designation [Brody] |
Full Idea: Identity across possible worlds is prior to rigid designation. | |
From: Baruch Brody (Identity and Essence [1980], 5.4) | |
A reaction: An interesting view. We might stipulate that any possible Aristotle is 'our Aristotle', but you would still need criteria for deciding which possible Aristotle's would qualify. Long-frozen Aristotles, stupid Aristotles, alien Aristotle's, deformed... |
5901 | Is 'productive of happiness' the definition of 'right', or the cause of it? [Ross on Bentham] |
Full Idea: Bentham has not made up his mind whether he thinks that 'right' means 'productive of the general happiness', or that being productive of the general happiness is what makes acts right (and he would have thought the difference unimportant). | |
From: comment on Jeremy Bentham (Intro to Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789]) by W. David Ross - The Right and the Good §I | |
A reaction: The issue is whether rightness exists as a concept separate from happiness. I take it Bentham would vote for the first reading, as he has no interest in what is right, apart from increasing happiness. |
5934 | Of Bentham's 'dimensions' of pleasure, only intensity and duration matter [Ross on Bentham] |
Full Idea: Most of Bentham's 'dimensions' of pleasure refer to further pleasures, or are irrelevant to the pleasure; we are left with intensity and duration as the characteristics on which depend the value of a pleasure qua pleasure, and there is nothing to add. | |
From: comment on Jeremy Bentham (Intro to Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789]) by W. David Ross - The Right and the Good §VI | |
A reaction: I agree. When Bentham produces his list he seems to be trying to add a bogus enrichment to what is really a rather crude and basic notion of the aim of life. Your simple hedonist appears to only desire high intensity and long duration. |
5271 | Prejudice apart, push-pin has equal value with music and poetry [Bentham] |
Full Idea: Prejudice apart, the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts and science of music and poetry. | |
From: Jeremy Bentham (Constitutional Code I [1827], p.139), quoted by J.R. Dinwiddy - Bentham p.114 | |
A reaction: Mill quoted this with implied outrage, but Bentham was attacking public subsidies to the arts when he said it. It is a basic idea in the debate on pleasure - that pleasures are only distinguished by their intensity, not some other value. |
3777 | Pleasure and pain control all human desires and duties [Bentham] |
Full Idea: Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. | |
From: Jeremy Bentham (Intro to Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789], I.1) | |
A reaction: Ridiculous. Both halves are false. We pursue things for other reasons, and to deny this makes his idea a tautology. Deep ecology has nothing to do with human pleasure or pain. |
3554 | Bentham thinks happiness is feeling good, but why use morality to achieve that? [Annas on Bentham] |
Full Idea: It is easy to fall into Bentham's mindless assumption that happiness must be a specific state of feeling good about something, but it is mysterious why anyone would think morality a good strategy for achieving this. | |
From: comment on Jeremy Bentham (Intro to Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789]) by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness 2.7 |
3781 | The value of pleasures and pains is their force [Bentham] |
Full Idea: It behoves the legislator to understand the force of pleasures and pains, which is their value. | |
From: Jeremy Bentham (Intro to Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789], IV.1) |
20977 | Natural rights are nonsense, and unspecified natural rights is nonsense on stilts [Bentham] |
Full Idea: Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense — nonsense upon stilts. | |
From: Jeremy Bentham (Anarchical Fallacies: on the Declaration of Rights [1796]) | |
A reaction: If you want your opinion to be remembered, express it memorably! I take natural rights to be the basic principles and values which are obvious to almost everyone when they come for formulate legal rights (which are the only true rights). |
3778 | The community's interest is a sum of individual interests [Bentham] |
Full Idea: The interest of the community is the sum of the interests of the several members who compose it. | |
From: Jeremy Bentham (Intro to Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789], I.4) |
21003 | Only laws can produce real rights; rights from 'law of nature' are imaginary [Bentham] |
Full Idea: Right, the substantive right, is the child of law; from real laws come real rights; but from imaginary laws, from 'law of nature' can come only imaginary rights. | |
From: Jeremy Bentham (Anarchical Fallacies: on the Declaration of Rights [1796], II.523), quoted by Amartya Sen - The Idea of Justice 17 'Ethics' | |
A reaction: I am coming to agree with this. What are called 'natural rights' are just self-evident good reasons why someone should be allowed a right. A right can, of course, come from an informal agreement. The question is: why award that particular legal right? |
20280 | Large mature animals are more rational than babies. But all that really matters is - can they suffer? [Bentham] |
Full Idea: A full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational animal than an infant of a day, or even a month, old. But suppose they be otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer? | |
From: Jeremy Bentham (Intro to Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789], XVIII 1 n), quoted by Peter Singer - Practical Ethics 03 | |
A reaction: This is certainly an inspiring, and even shocking question, which never seems to have been so directly asked before in the entire history of European thought. Awesome. |
3779 | Unnatural, when it means anything, means infrequent [Bentham] |
Full Idea: Unnatural, when it means anything, means unfrequent. | |
From: Jeremy Bentham (Intro to Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789], II.14 n8.9) |
3780 | We must judge a thing morally to know if it conforms to God's will [Bentham] |
Full Idea: It is necessary to know first whether a thing is right in order to know from thence whether it be conformable to the will of God. | |
From: Jeremy Bentham (Intro to Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789], II.18) |