10 ideas
12066 | Aristotelian and Kripkean essentialism are very different theories [Witt] |
Full Idea: The differences between Aristotelian essentialism and Kripke's essentialism are so fundamental and pervasive that it is a serious distortion of both views to think of essentialism as a single theory. | |
From: Charlotte Witt (Substance and Essence in Aristotle [1989], Intro) | |
A reaction: This seems to me to be very important, because there is a glib assumption that when essentialism is needed for modal logic, that we must immediately have embraced what Aristotle was saying. Aristotle was better than Kripke. |
12067 | An Aristotelian essence is a nonlinguistic correlate of the definition [Witt] |
Full Idea: An Aristotelian essence is a nonlinguistic correlate of the definition of the entity in question. | |
From: Charlotte Witt (Substance and Essence in Aristotle [1989], Intro) | |
A reaction: This is a simple and necessity corrective to the simplistic idea that Aristotle thought that essences just were definitions. Aristotle believes in real essences, not linguistic essences. |
12082 | If unity is a matter of degree, then essence may also be a matter of degree [Witt] |
Full Idea: By holding that the most unified beings have essences in an unqualified sense, while allowing that other beings have them in a qualified sense - we can think of unity as a matter of degree. | |
From: Charlotte Witt (Substance and Essence in Aristotle [1989], 4.3) | |
A reaction: This is Witt's somewhat unorthodox view of how we should read Aristotle. I am sympathetic, if essences are really explanatory. That means they are unstable, and would indeed be likely to come in degrees. |
12089 | Essences mainly explain the existence of unified substance [Witt] |
Full Idea: The central function of essence is to explain the actual existence of a unified substance. | |
From: Charlotte Witt (Substance and Essence in Aristotle [1989], 5 n1) | |
A reaction: She is offering an interpretation of Aristotle. Since existence is an active and not a passive matter, the identity of the entity will include its dispositions etc., I presume. |
12102 | Essential properties of origin are too radically individual for an Aristotelian essence [Witt] |
Full Idea: The radical individuality of essential properties of origin makes them unsuitable for inclusion in an Aristotelian essence. | |
From: Charlotte Witt (Substance and Essence in Aristotle [1989], 6.2) | |
A reaction: Nevertheless, Aristotle believes in individual essences, though these seem to be fixed by definitions, which are composed of combinations of universals. The uniqueness is of the whole definition, not of its parts. |
8417 | Direct realism is false, because defeasibility questions are essential to perceptual knowledge [Galloway] |
Full Idea: Since awareness of defeasibility issues is an essential prerequisite for any genuine perceptual knowledge of even straightforward physical objects, any realist theory of perception must be indirect or representative, rather than direct. | |
From: David Galloway (lectures [2007]), quoted by PG - lecture notes | |
A reaction: [a very compressed summary] A very interesting claim. The issue might be over what direct realism is actually claiming. If it claims full-blown knowledge, then the criticism seems good. But it might survive if it claimed rather less. |
12314 | Audience-relative explanation, or metaphysical explanation based on information? [Stanford] |
Full Idea: Rather than an 'interest-relative' notion of explanation (Putnam), it can be informational content which makes an explanation, which is an 'audience-invariant' contraint, which is not pragmatic, but mainly epistemological and also partly metaphysical. | |
From: Michael Stanford (Explanation: the state of play [1991], p.172) | |
A reaction: [compressed summary of Ruben 1990] Examples given are that Rome burning explains Nero fiddling, even if no one ever says so, and learning that George III had porphyria explains his madness. |
12313 | Explanation is for curiosity, control, understanding, to make meaningful, or to give authority [Stanford] |
Full Idea: There are a number of reasons why we explain: out of sheer curiosity, to increase our control of a situation, to help understanding by simplifying or making familiar, to confer meaning or significance, and to give scientific authority to some statement. | |
From: Michael Stanford (Explanation: the state of play [1991], p.172) |
12315 | We can explain by showing constitution, as well as showing causes [Stanford] |
Full Idea: The powerful engine of my car can be explained by an examination of each of its parts, but it is not caused by them. They do not cause the engine; they constitute it. | |
From: Michael Stanford (Explanation: the state of play [1991], p.174) | |
A reaction: [example from Ruben 1990:221] This could be challenged, since there is clearly a causal connection between the constitution and the whole. We distinguish engine parts which contribute to the power from those which do not. |
12085 | Reality is directional [Witt] |
Full Idea: Reality is directional. | |
From: Charlotte Witt (Substance and Essence in Aristotle [1989], 4.5) | |
A reaction: [Plucked from context! She attributes the view to Aristotle] This slogan beautifully summarises the 'scientific essentialist' view of reality, based not on so-called 'laws', but on the active powers of the stuffs of reality. |