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8083
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Boole applied normal algebra to logic, aiming at an algebra of thought [Boole, by Devlin]
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Full Idea:
Boole proposed to use the entire apparatus of a school algebra class, with operations such as addition and multiplication, methods to solve equations, and the like, to produce an algebra of thought.
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From:
report of George Boole (The Laws of Thought [1854]) by Keith Devlin - Goodbye Descartes Ch.3
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A reaction:
The Stoics didn’t use any algebraic notation for their study of propositions, so Boole's idea launched full blown propositional logic, and the rest of modern logic followed. Nice one.
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8686
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Boole made logic more mathematical, with algebra, quantifiers and probability [Boole, by Friend]
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Full Idea:
Boole (followed by Frege) began to turn logic from a branch of philosophy into a branch of mathematics. He brought an algebraic approach to propositions, and introduced the notion of a quantifier and a type of probabilistic reasoning.
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From:
report of George Boole (The Laws of Thought [1854], 3.2) by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics
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A reaction:
The result was that logic not only became more mathematical, but also more specialised. We now have two types of philosopher, those steeped in mathematical logic and the rest. They don't always sing from the same songsheet.
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13453
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Perhaps second-order quantifications cover concepts of objects, rather than plain objects [Rayo/Uzquiano]
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Full Idea:
If one thought of second-order quantification as quantification over first-level Fregean concepts [note: one under which only objects fall], talk of domains might be regimented as talk of first-level concepts, which are not objects.
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From:
Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.2.2)
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A reaction:
That is (I take it), don't quantify over objects, but quantify over concepts, but only those under which known objects fall. One might thus achieve naïve comprehension without paradoxes. Sound like fun.
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22277
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Boole's method was axiomatic, achieving economy, plus multiple interpretations [Boole, by Potter]
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Full Idea:
Boole's work was an early example of the axiomatic method, whereby intellectual economy is achieved by studying a set of axioms in which the primitive terms have multiple interpretations.
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From:
report of George Boole (The Laws of Thought [1854]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 02 'Boole'
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A reaction:
Unclear about this. I suppose the axioms are just syntactic, and a range of semantic interpretations can be applied. Are De Morgan's Laws interpretations, or implications of the syntactic axioms? The latter, I think.
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12314
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Audience-relative explanation, or metaphysical explanation based on information? [Stanford]
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Full Idea:
Rather than an 'interest-relative' notion of explanation (Putnam), it can be informational content which makes an explanation, which is an 'audience-invariant' contraint, which is not pragmatic, but mainly epistemological and also partly metaphysical.
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From:
Michael Stanford (Explanation: the state of play [1991], p.172)
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A reaction:
[compressed summary of Ruben 1990] Examples given are that Rome burning explains Nero fiddling, even if no one ever says so, and learning that George III had porphyria explains his madness.
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13448
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The domain of an assertion is restricted by context, either semantically or pragmatically [Rayo/Uzquiano]
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Full Idea:
We generally take an assertion's domain of discourse to be implicitly restricted by context. [Note: the standard approach is that this restriction is a semantic phenomenon, but Kent Bach (2000) argues that it is a pragmatic phenomenon]
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From:
Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.1)
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A reaction:
I think Kent Bach is very very right about this. Follow any conversation, and ask what the domain is at any moment. The reference of a word like 'they' can drift across things, with no semantics to guide us, but only clues from context and common sense.
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