11 ideas
20100 | Classical liberalism seeks freedom of opinion, of private life, of expression, and of property [Micklethwait/Wooldridge] |
Full Idea: The classical liberals agreed on a basic list of freedoms: of opinion (including religion), of private life, of expression, and of property | |
From: Micklethwait,J/Wooldridge,A (The Fourth Revolution [2014], 9) | |
A reaction: Mill is main articulator of this. Modern neo-liberals focus on economic freedom. Neither of them seem to make freedom of opportunity central, though I suspect our modern Liberal Party would. |
20921 | How can we state relativism of sweet and sour, if they have no determinate nature? [Theophrastus] |
Full Idea: How could what is bitter for us be sweet and sour for others, if there is not some determinate nature for them? | |
From: Theophrastus (On the Senses [c.321 BCE], 70) | |
A reaction: The remark is aimed at Democritus. This is part of the general question of how you can even talk about relativism, without attaching stable meanings to the concepts employed. |
5503 | Maybe personal identity is not vital in survival, and other continuations would suffice [Martin/Barresi] |
Full Idea: A modern question is whether personal identity is primarily what matters in survival; that is, people might cease and be continued by others whose continuation the original people would value as much. | |
From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.3) | |
A reaction: When put like this, the proposal seems hard to grasp. It only makes sense if you don't really believe in a thing called 'personal identity'. I don't see how you can believe in it without also believing that for you it has central importance. |
5504 | Maybe we should see persons in four dimensions, with stages or time-slices at an instant [Martin/Barresi] |
Full Idea: Some recent philosophers have argued that we should replace the three-dimensional view of persons with a four-dimensional view according to which only time-slices, or 'stages', of persons exist at short intervals of time. | |
From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.3) | |
A reaction: At first glance this seems to neatly eliminate lots of traditional worries. But why would I want to retain my identity, if someone threatened to brainwash me. I also want to disown my inadequate earlier selves. Interesting, though. Lewis. |
5502 | Locke's intrinsic view of personal identity has been replaced by an externalist view [Martin/Barresi] |
Full Idea: In modern times the Lockean intrinsic relations view of personal identity has been superseded by an extrinsic relations view (also called the 'closest-continuer' or 'externalist' view). | |
From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.1) | |
A reaction: Sounds sweeping. My suspicion is that there is a raging fashion for externalist views of everything (justification, content etc.), but this will pass. I take Parfit to be the source of the modern views. |
20097 | The welfare state aims at freedom from want, and equality of opportunity [Micklethwait/Wooldridge] |
Full Idea: In the classical liberal tradition freedom meant freedom from external control, and equality meant equality before the law. In the welfare state (of Beatrice Webb) freedom was reinterpreted as freedom from want, and equality as equality of opportunity. | |
From: Micklethwait,J/Wooldridge,A (The Fourth Revolution [2014], 3) | |
A reaction: The authors call this the 'third revolution' in government, after 17th century centralisation and early 19th century accountability. Tawney 1931 is the key text. |
20099 | For communists history is driven by the proletariat [Micklethwait/Wooldridge] |
Full Idea: For the communists the proletariat rather than the state was the locomotive of history. | |
From: Micklethwait,J/Wooldridge,A (The Fourth Revolution [2014], 3) | |
A reaction: I feel increasingly reluctant to support any party which appears to mainly represent the interests of a single social class, no matter how large that class may be. An attraction of liberalism is that it makes no reference to class. |
20098 | Fans of economic freedom claim that capitalism is self-correcting [Micklethwait/Wooldridge] |
Full Idea: The central laissez-faire conceit is that capitalism is a self-correcting mechanism. | |
From: Micklethwait,J/Wooldridge,A (The Fourth Revolution [2014], 3) | |
A reaction: This was Keynes's rather left-wing criticism of standard capitalist views. These resurfaced in the 1980s with mantras about the virtues of 'market forces'. |
20096 | Roman law entrenched property rights [Micklethwait/Wooldridge] |
Full Idea: Roman law entrenched property rights. | |
From: Micklethwait,J/Wooldridge,A (The Fourth Revolution [2014], 1 Intro) | |
A reaction: Normally attributed to Locke, so this is a good corrective. Was the principle gradually forgotten before Locke? |
5990 | Theophrastus doubted whether nature could be explained teleologically [Theophrastus, by Gottschalk] |
Full Idea: Theophrastus questioned Aristotle's teaching on the extent to which teleological explanations could be applied to the natural world. | |
From: report of Theophrastus (On Metaphysics (frags) [c.320 BCE]) by H.B. Gottschalk - Aristotelianism | |
A reaction: It is interesting to see that Aristotle's own immediate successor had doubts about teleology. We usually assume that the ancients were teleological, and this was rejected in the seventeenth century (e.g. Idea 4826). |
5505 | For Aristotle the psyche perishes with the body (except possibly 'nous') [Martin/Barresi] |
Full Idea: In Aristotle's view, with the possible exception of 'nous' the psyche and all its parts come into being at the same time as its associated body; it is inseparable from the body, and perishes along with it. | |
From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.8) | |
A reaction: It is suggested that he thought there was only one 'nous', which all humans share (p.9). If he wants to claim that one part is immortal, he doesn't have much evidence. If psyche is the form of the body, it is bound to perish. |