6 ideas
| 17699 | Variables are auxiliary notions, and not part of the 'eternal' essence of logic [Schönfinkel] |
| Full Idea: A variable in a proposition of logic ....has the status of a mere auxiliary notion that is really inappropriate to the constant, 'eternal' essence of the propositions of logic. | |
| From: Moses Schönfinkel (Building Blocks of Mathematical Logic [1924], §1) | |
| A reaction: He presumably thinks that what the variables stand for (and he mentions 'argument places' and 'operators') will be included in the essence. My attention was caught by the thought that he takes logic to have an essence. |
| 19701 | Fallibilism is consistent with dogmatism or scepticism, and is not alternative to them [Dougherty] |
| Full Idea: There has been a tendency to treat fallibilism as an alternative to either dogmatism or scepticism. ...But it is much better to think of fallibilism as consistent with either dogmatism or skepticism. | |
| From: Trent Dougherty (Fallibilism [2011], 'Closure') | |
| A reaction: It seems perfectly reasonably to describe oneself as a 'fallibilist dogmatist' (perhaps from the Pope?), or a 'fallibilist sceptic' (perhaps from Peter Unger?), so this idea sounds correct. |
| 19700 | It is best to see the fallibility in the reasons, rather than in the agents or the knowledge [Dougherty] |
| Full Idea: It seems best to take fallible reasons as the basic notion of fallibilism. So fallible knowers are agents who know what they know on the basis of fallible reasons. Fallible knowledge will be knowledge on basis of fallible reasons. | |
| From: Trent Dougherty (Fallibilism [2011], 'Cognates') | |
| A reaction: This is because an ideal knower would be compelled by the evidence, so if fallibilism is universal it must reside in the evidence and not in the knower (bottom p.131). |
| 19702 | We can't normally say that we know something 'but it might be false' [Dougherty] |
| Full Idea: It will ordinarily be conversationally inappropriate to say 'I know that p, but p might be false' even if it is true, since this would mislead an interlocutor to infer that that possibility was an epistemically significant one. | |
| From: Trent Dougherty (Fallibilism [2011], 'Epistemic') | |
| A reaction: This seems to imply hypocrisy when a fallibilist philosopher claims (in non-philosophical company) to know something. Fair enough. Philosophers are in a permanent state of hypocrisy about what they are really thinking. That's the fun of it. |
| 22595 | Liberty is the triumph of the individual, over both despotic government and enslaving majorities [Constant] |
| Full Idea: Lliberty is the triumph of the individual, as much over a government which seeks to rule by despotic methods, as over the masses who seek to render the minority the slave of the majority. | |
| From: Benjamin Constant (Principles of Politics [1806]), quoted by Ian Dunt - How to be a Liberal 4 | |
| A reaction: [No page given] Dunt describes Constant's book as the first really systematic account of liberalism. Very important to have rights against the majority, as well as against government. |
| 22597 | Minority rights are everyone's rights, because we all have turns in the minority [Constant] |
| Full Idea: To defend the rights of minorities is to defend the rights of all. Everyone in turn finds himself in the minority. | |
| From: Benjamin Constant (Principles of Politics [1806]), quoted by Ian Dunt - How to be a Liberal 4 | |
| A reaction: Very conformist people, who are often the most oppressive, are rarely in the minority, and are unlikely to be impressed by this idea. |