Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Moses Schönfinkel, Otto Neurath and Roderick Firth

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5 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Philosophy is not separate from or above empirical science [Neurath]
     Full Idea: There is no such thing as philosophy as a basic or universal science alongside or above the various fields of the one empirical science.
     From: Otto Neurath (works [1930]), quoted by Simon Critchley - Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro Ch.6
     A reaction: This is what you get for becoming an empiricist. If philosophy is the quest for human wisdom, it seems to me highly unlikely that physical sciences will provide it. Human interests and values and understanding play absolutely no role in physics.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
Variables are auxiliary notions, and not part of the 'eternal' essence of logic [Schönfinkel]
     Full Idea: A variable in a proposition of logic ....has the status of a mere auxiliary notion that is really inappropriate to the constant, 'eternal' essence of the propositions of logic.
     From: Moses Schönfinkel (Building Blocks of Mathematical Logic [1924], §1)
     A reaction: He presumably thinks that what the variables stand for (and he mentions 'argument places' and 'operators') will be included in the essence. My attention was caught by the thought that he takes logic to have an essence.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
We are not conscious of pure liquidity, but of the liquidity of water [Firth]
     Full Idea: We are not conscious of liquidity, coldness, and solidity, but of the liquidity of water, the coldness of ice, and the solidity of rocks.
     From: Roderick Firth (Sense Data and the Percept Theory [1949]), quoted by Howard Robinson - Perception 1.7
     A reaction: A nice point, but it might not be entirely true in a blindfold test, where one might only report properties like 'sticky' or 'warm', without having any clear concept of the substance being experienced. Firth is proposing the 'percept theory'.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
If we are rebuilding our ship at sea, we should jettison some cargo [Boolos on Neurath]
     Full Idea: If we are sailors rebuilding our ship plank by plank on the open sea, then I know of some cargo we might want to jettison.
     From: comment on Otto Neurath (Protocol Sentences [1932]) by George Boolos - Must We Believe in Set Theory? p.128
     A reaction: This may just be an assertion of Ockham's Razor, but the interest is that the Neurath image demands internal standards of economy etc, whereas reality itself seems to be a right mess.
We must always rebuild our ship on the open sea; we can't reconstruct it properly in dry-dock [Neurath]
     Full Idea: We are like sailors who must rebuild their ship out on the open sea, never able to dismantle it in a dry-dock and reconstruct it there out of the best materials.
     From: Otto Neurath (Protocol Sentences [1932]), quoted by Alex Orenstein - W.V. Quine Ch.8
     A reaction: This is the classic statement of the anti-foundationalist picture of knowledge. It is often quoted by Quine. A tricky issue. I have a lot of sympathy with Bonjour's rationalist foundationalism.