Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Moses Schönfinkel, Theophrastus and Francois-Marie Voltaire

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4 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
17699 Variables are auxiliary notions, and not part of the 'eternal' essence of logic [Schönfinkel]
     Full Idea: A variable in a proposition of logic ....has the status of a mere auxiliary notion that is really inappropriate to the constant, 'eternal' essence of the propositions of logic.
     From: Moses Schönfinkel (Building Blocks of Mathematical Logic [1924], §1)
     A reaction: He presumably thinks that what the variables stand for (and he mentions 'argument places' and 'operators') will be included in the essence. My attention was caught by the thought that he takes logic to have an essence.
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
20921 How can we state relativism of sweet and sour, if they have no determinate nature? [Theophrastus]
     Full Idea: How could what is bitter for us be sweet and sour for others, if there is not some determinate nature for them?
     From: Theophrastus (On the Senses [c.321 BCE], 70)
     A reaction: The remark is aimed at Democritus. This is part of the general question of how you can even talk about relativism, without attaching stable meanings to the concepts employed.
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
7844 The Golden Rule is accepted everywhere, and gives a fixed target for morality [Voltaire]
     Full Idea: Pascal asks where we can find a fixed point in morality. The answer is in that single maxim accepted by all nations: "Do not do to others what you would not like to have done to you".
     From: Francois-Marie Voltaire (Philosophical Letters from England [1733], 25)
     A reaction: Should I only offer to my guests foods which I myself like? If I don't mind a bit of pain, is it all right to inflict it? It is a sensible rule, but not precise enough for philosophy.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
5990 Theophrastus doubted whether nature could be explained teleologically [Theophrastus, by Gottschalk]
     Full Idea: Theophrastus questioned Aristotle's teaching on the extent to which teleological explanations could be applied to the natural world.
     From: report of Theophrastus (On Metaphysics (frags) [c.320 BCE]) by H.B. Gottschalk - Aristotelianism
     A reaction: It is interesting to see that Aristotle's own immediate successor had doubts about teleology. We usually assume that the ancients were teleological, and this was rejected in the seventeenth century (e.g. Idea 4826).