13 ideas
| 1813 | All reasoning endlessly leads to further reasoning (Mode 12) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Twelfth mode: all reasoning leads on to further reasoning, and this process goes on forever. | |
| From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.10 |
| 1815 | Reasoning needs arbitrary faith in preliminary hypotheses (Mode 14) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Fourteenth mode: reasoning requires arbitrary faith in preliminary hypotheses. | |
| From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.10 |
| 1812 | All discussion is full of uncertainty and contradiction (Mode 11) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Eleventh mode: all topics of discussion are full of uncertainty and contradiction. | |
| From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.10 |
| 1811 | Proofs often presuppose the thing to be proved (Mode 15) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Fifteenth mode: proofs often presuppose the thing to be proved. | |
| From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.10 |
| 10911 | Part-whole is the key relation among truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
| Full Idea: The most important (ontological) relations holding among truth-makers are the part and whole relations. | |
| From: Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §6) | |
| A reaction: Hence Peter Simons goes off and writes the best known book on mereology. Looks very promising to me. |
| 10906 | Moments (objects which cannot exist alone) may serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
| Full Idea: A 'moment' is an existentially dependent or non-self-sufficient object, that is, an object which is of such a nature that it cannot exist alone, ....... and we suggest that moments could serve as truth-makers. | |
| From: Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §2) | |
| A reaction: [These three writers invented the term 'truth-maker'] |
| 10907 | The truth-maker for a sentence may not be unique, or may be a combination, or several separate items [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
| Full Idea: A proposition may have a minimal truth-maker which is not unique, or a sentence may be made true by no single truth-maker but only by several jointly, or again only by several separately. | |
| From: Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §3) |
| 10909 | Truth-makers cannot be the designata of the sentences they make true [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
| Full Idea: Truth-makers cannot be the designata of the sentences they make true, because sentences with more than one truth-maker would then be ambiguous, and 'a' and 'a exists' would have the same designatum. | |
| From: Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §3) |
| 10912 | Despite negative propositions, truthmakers are not logical complexes, but ordinary experiences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
| Full Idea: Because of negative propositions, investigators of truth-makers have said that they are special non-objectual entities with a logical complexity, but we think a theory is possible in which the truth relation is tied to ordinary and scientific experience. | |
| From: Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §6) |
| 10908 | Correspondence has to invoke facts or states of affairs, just to serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
| Full Idea: The correspondence theory of truth invokes a special category of non-objectual entities - facts, states of affairs, or whatever - simply to serve as truth-makers. | |
| From: Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §3) |
| 16519 | No one can conceive of a possible substance, apart from those which God has created [Arnauld] |
| Full Idea: I am much mistaken if there is anyone who dares to say that he can conceive of a purely possible substance, …for although one talks so much of them, one never conceives them except according to the notion of those which God has created. | |
| From: Antoine Arnauld (Letters to Leibniz [1686], 1686.05.13), quoted by David Wiggins - Sameness and Substance 4.2 | |
| A reaction: This idea cashes out in the 'necessitism' of Tim Williamson, and views on the Barcan formulae in modal logic. |
| 8850 | Agrippa's Trilemma: justification is infinite, or ends arbitrarily, or is circular [Agrippa, by Williams,M] |
| Full Idea: Agrippa's Trilemma offers three possible outcomes for a regress of justification: the chain goes on for ever (infinite); or the chain stops at an unjustified proposition (arbitrary); or the chain eventually includes the original proposition (circular). | |
| From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60], §2) by Michael Williams - Without Immediate Justification §2 | |
| A reaction: This summarises Ideas 1911, 1913 and 1914. Agrippa's Trilemma is now a standard starting point for modern discussions of foundations. Personally I reject 2, and am torn between 1 (+ social consensus) and 3 (with a benign, coherent circle). |
| 1814 | Everything is perceived in relation to another thing (Mode 13) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Thirteenth mode: everything is always perceived in relation to something else. | |
| From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.10 |