23 ideas
23531 | Philosophers should interpret the world, by expressing its possibilities [Berardi] |
Full Idea: The philosopher's task is to interpret the world, that is, to capture its tendency and above all to enunciate the possibilities inscribed therein. …The politician's eye does not see the possible, being attracted instead by the probable. | |
From: Franco 'Bifo' Berardi (The Second Coming [2019], How to) | |
A reaction: An inspiring idea! He is rejecting Marx's aim of changing the world, which had 'catastrophic' results. But I love his view of interpretation as spotting tendencies and possibilities. This fits my preferred ontology of dispositions and powers. |
9376 | A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact [Boghossian] |
Full Idea: It doesn't follow from the fact that a given sentence is being used to implicitly define one of its ingredient terms, that it is not a factual statement. 'This stick is a meter long at t' may define an ingredient terms and express something factual. | |
From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §III) | |
A reaction: This looks like a rather good point, but it is tied in with a difficulty about definition, which is deciding which sentences are using a term, and which ones are defining it. If I say 'this stick in Paris is a meter long', I'm not defining it. |
6345 | Minimalism is incoherent, as it implies that truth both is and is not a property [Boghossian, by Horwich] |
Full Idea: Boghossian argues that minimalism is incoherent because it says truth both is and is not a property; the essence of minimalism is that, unlike traditional theories, truth is not a property, yet properties are needed to explain the theory. | |
From: report of Paul Boghossian (The Status of Content [1990]) by Paul Horwich - Truth (2nd edn) Post.8 | |
A reaction: I doubt whether this is really going to work as a demolition, because it seems to me that no philosophers are even remotely clear about what a property is. If properties are defined causally, it is not quite clear how truth would ever be a property. |
9375 | Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian] |
Full Idea: Conventualism is a factualist view: it presupposes that sentences of logic have truth values. It differs from a realist view in its conception of the source of those truth values, not on their existence. I call the denial of truths Non-Factualism. | |
From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §III) | |
A reaction: It barely seems to count as truth is we say 'p is true because we say so'. It is a truth about an agreement, not a truth about logic. Driving on the left isn't a truth about which side of the road is best. |
23538 | Nothingness only exists in consciousness [Berardi] |
Full Idea: Consciousness is the only place where nothingness exists. | |
From: Franco 'Bifo' Berardi (The Second Coming [2019], II 'Expanding') | |
A reaction: Not sure about this, but an interesting remark from someone with a Hegelian background. We certainly have a concept of nothingness (a mental file of it, even). |
9369 | 'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation [Boghossian] |
Full Idea: Isn't it overwhelmingly obvious that 'Either snow is white or it isn't' was true before anyone stipulated a meaning for it, and that it would have been true even if no one had thought about it, or chosen it to be expressed by one of our sentences? | |
From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §I) | |
A reaction: Boghossian would have to believe in propositions (unexpressed truths) to hold this - which he does. I take the notion of truth to only have relevance when there are minds around. Otherwise the so-called 'truths' are just the facts. |
9367 | The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition [Boghossian] |
Full Idea: The central impetus behind the analytic explanation of the a priori is a desire to explain the possibility of a priori knowledge without having to postulate a special evidence-gathering faculty of intuition. | |
From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §I) | |
A reaction: I don't see at all why one has to postulate a 'faculty' in order to talk about intuition. I take an intuition to be an apprehension of a probable truth, combined with an inability to articulate how the conclusion was arrived at. |
9373 | That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants [Boghossian] |
Full Idea: The analytic theory of the apriority of logic arose indirectly, as a by-product of the attempt to explain in what a grasp of the meaning of the logical constants consists. | |
From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §III) | |
A reaction: Preumably he is referring to Wittgenstein's anguish over the meaning of the word 'not' in his World War I notebooks. He first defined the constants by truth tables, then asserted that they were purely conventional - so logic is conventional. |
9380 | We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it [Boghossian] |
Full Idea: If there is no sentence I must hold true if it is to mean what it does, then there is no basis on which to argue that I am entitled to hold it true without evidence. | |
From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §III) | |
A reaction: He is exploring Quine's view. Truth by convention depends on agreeing which part of the usage of a term constitutes its defining sentence(s), and that may be rather tricky. Boghossian says this slides into the 'dreaded indeterminacy of meaning'. |
9384 | We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory [Boghossian] |
Full Idea: It is consistent with a belief's being a priori in the strong sense that we should have pragmatic reasons for dropping it from our best overall theory. | |
From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], n 6) | |
A reaction: Does 'dropping it' from the theory mean just ignoring it, or actually denying it? C.I. Lewis is the ancestor of this view. Could it be our 'best' theory, while conflicting with beliefs that were strongly a priori? Pragmatism can embrace falsehoods. |
9374 | If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? [Boghossian] |
Full Idea: If we learn geometrical truths by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? | |
From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §III) | |
A reaction: This refers to the development of non-Euclidean geometries, though the main misleading concerns parallels, which involves infinity. Boghossian cites 'distance' as a concept the Euclideans had misunderstood. Why shouldn't intuitions be wrong? |
23532 | The delusion of free will brings a sense of guilt [Berardi] |
Full Idea: A sense of guilt is linked to the delusion of free will. | |
From: Franco 'Bifo' Berardi (The Second Coming [2019], How to) | |
A reaction: I agree that free will is a delusion, but I'm not sure about this. Clearly if you think you are 'ultimately' responsible for all of your actions this will increase guilt, but belief in free will is compatible with various excuses for actions. |
9378 | If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job? [Boghossian] |
Full Idea: Conceptual Role Semantics must explain what properties an inference or sentence involving a logical constant must have, if that inference or sentence is to be constitutive of its meaning. | |
From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §III) | |
A reaction: This is my perennial request that if something is to be defined by its function (or role), we must try to explain what properties it has that make its function possible, and those properties will be the more basic explanation. |
9377 | 'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences [Boghossian] |
Full Idea: 'Conceptual role semantics' says the logical constants mean what they do by virtue of figuring in certain inferences and/or sentences involving them and not others, ..so some inferences and sentences are constitutive of an expression's meaning. | |
From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §III) | |
A reaction: If the meaning of the terms derives from the sentences in which they figure, that seems to be meaning-as-use. The view that it depends on the inferences seems very different, and is a more interesting but more risky claim. |
9372 | Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same? [Boghossian] |
Full Idea: Could there be a fact of the matter about what each expression means, but no fact of the matter about whether they mean the same? | |
From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §II) | |
A reaction: He is discussing Quine's attack on synonymy, and his scepticism about meaning. Boghossian and I believe in propositions, so we have no trouble with two statements having the same meaning. Denial of propositions breeds trouble. |
17721 | There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Boghossian, by Jenkins] |
Full Idea: Boghossian distinguishes metaphysical analyticity (truth purely in virtue of meaning, debunked by Quine, he says) from epistemic analyticity (knowability purely in virtue of understanding - a notion in good standing). | |
From: report of Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996]) by Carrie Jenkins - Grounding Concepts 2.4 | |
A reaction: [compressed] This fits with Jenkins's claim that we have a priori knowledge just through understanding and relating our concepts. She, however, rejects that idea that a priori is analytic. |
9368 | Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning [Boghossian] |
Full Idea: The epistemological notion of analyticity: a statement is 'true by virtue of meaning' provided that grasp of its meaning alone suffices for justified belief in its truth; the metaphysical reading is that it owes its truth to its meaning, not to facts. | |
From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §I) | |
A reaction: Kripke thinks it is neither, but is a purely semantic notion. How could grasp of meaning alone be a good justification if it wasn't meaning which was the sole cause of the statement's truth? I'm not convinced by his distinction. |
4377 | Intellectualism is an excessive emphasis on reasoning in moral philosophy [Burnyeat] |
Full Idea: Intellectualism, a one-sided preoccupation with reason and reasoning, is a perennial failing in moral philosophy. | |
From: Myles F. Burnyeat (Aristotle on Learning to be Good [1980], p.70) | |
A reaction: But Kant's reply would be that while there is much more to moral behaviour, the only part which matters in morality is the reasoning part. And Socrates' view (ignorance is evil) is not obviously wrong. |
23537 | American white men trusted the philosophy of winning, and then discovered losing [Berardi] |
Full Idea: American white men trusted the promises of neoliberal selfishness, they trusted the philosophy of winning, then discovered losing. | |
From: Franco 'Bifo' Berardi (The Second Coming [2019], I 'Fascism') | |
A reaction: The most pernicious terminology in the English-speaking world is the labelling of people as 'winners' and 'losers'. We celebrate the one winner, and ignore everyone else. Celebrity, excessive wealth, honourable titles. |
23536 | Community is now a nostalgic memory, which no longer exists [Berardi] |
Full Idea: Community is only a nostalgic memory of a past condition of belonging that exists no longer. Regret, not a living experience. | |
From: Franco 'Bifo' Berardi (The Second Coming [2019], I 'Fascism') | |
A reaction: It is hard to disagree with this. Local heroes in my town make lovely efforts to improve the place (with flowers, sculptures) but most of us don't know who they are. Capitalist competition erodes community. |
23534 | Communism failed to unite western workers with the oppressed of the south [Berardi] |
Full Idea: Communist internationalism was the only attempt to reconcile the workers of the West and the oppressed population of the Global South, and this attempt failed. | |
From: Franco 'Bifo' Berardi (The Second Coming [2019], I 'Hundred') | |
A reaction: It was unfortunate that communism was launched in Russia, which we now see (in 2023) as poisoned by imperialist ambitions, and quite unsuited to international idealism. The Chinese are notably active in Africa. |
23533 | The economy has replaced medieval theocracy at the centre of our society [Berardi] |
Full Idea: The economy has progressively acquired the central place in the system of knowledge and research. Re-enacting the privilege of theocracy in the Middle Ages. | |
From: Franco 'Bifo' Berardi (The Second Coming [2019], I 'Knowledge') | |
A reaction: Illuminating. This is indeed how the economy is treated, centring on Gross National Product (no matter how distributed), and economic league tables. Is it even a quasi-religion? |
23535 | Western workers turn to nationalism, to avert the effects of globalisation [Berardi] |
Full Idea: Western workers are following nationalist agendas in order to avert the effects of globalization, and resorting to nationalist and racist forms of identification. | |
From: Franco 'Bifo' Berardi (The Second Coming [2019], I 'Hundred') | |
A reaction: By 'globalisation' must be meant the impersonal work and exploitation that results from huge ruthless anonymous companies. People barely know who they are working for, so it can't give them an identity. |