Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for New Scientist writers, E.J. Lowe and Roy Sorensen

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285 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is the mapping of possibilities [Lowe, by Mumford]
     Full Idea: Metaphysics can be judged as the mapping of possibilities.
     From: report of E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 1) by Stephen Mumford - Laws in Nature 2.2
Science needs metaphysics to weed out its presuppositions [Lowe, by Hofweber]
     Full Idea: Lowe argues that the sciences need metaphysics to discharge the assumptions that they simply made at the outset.
     From: report of E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998]) by Thomas Hofweber - Ambitious, yet modest, Metaphysics 1.2
     A reaction: Hofweber doesn't buy this, and neither do I. I don't think science 'needs' metaphysics (or barely needs it), but I do think metaphysics needs a fair degree of science. It is high-level abstraction based on the facts.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Metaphysics aims to identify categories of being, and show their interdependency [Lowe]
     Full Idea: The central task of metaphysics is to chart the possibilities of existence by identifying the categories of being and the relations of ontological dependency in which beings of different categories stand to one another.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Two Notions of Being: Entity and Essence [2008], Intro)
     A reaction: I am beginning to think that he is right about the second one, and that dependency and grounding relations are the name of the game. I don't have Lowe's confidence that philosophers can parcel up reality in neat and true ways.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Metaphysics is concerned with the fundamental structure of reality as a whole [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Metaphysics is concerned with the fundamental structure of reality as a whole.
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.2)
     A reaction: I think it is vital to hang on to this big definition, focusing on ontology, and not retreat (like Kant) to the epistemological question of how humans happen to see reality, even if we are stuck with being humans.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Only metaphysics can decide whether identity survives through change [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Only metaphysics can vindicate a judgement that a caterpillar survives to become a butterfly, but a pig does not survive to become pork, or that water survives as ice, but that paper does not survive as ash.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 8.2)
     A reaction: The works of Lowe, and other modern heroes, have shown that these real questions can be pursued intensively into areas where no scientist, or even theologian, would dare to tread.
Metaphysics tells us what there could be, rather than what there is [Lowe]
     Full Idea: I do not claim that metaphysics on its own can, in general, tell us what there is. Rather - to a first approximation - I hold that metaphysics by itself only tells us what there could be.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 1.3)
     A reaction: If there is going to be a modern defence of metaphysics, in an age dominated by empirical science, this sounds pretty good to me. Presumably it also says what there couldn't be. The challenge is to offer authority for any claims made.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Maybe such concepts as causation, identity and existence are primitive and irreducible [Lowe]
     Full Idea: It may well be that after all our attempts at analysis, we have to accept the notions of causality, identity and existence as being primitive and irreducible.
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.191)
     A reaction: They may be irreducible, but it seems possible that the relationships between them might be revealed (as between Platonic Forms). To exist is to have identity and causal powers?
Philosophy aims not at the 'analysis of concepts', but at understanding the essences of things [Lowe]
     Full Idea: The central task of philosophy is the cultivation of insights into natures or essences, and not the 'analysis of concepts', with which it is apt to be confused.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Two Notions of Being: Entity and Essence [2008], 1)
     A reaction: This immediately strikes me as a false dichotomy. I like the idea of trying to understand the true natures of things, but how are we going to do it in our armchairs?
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
The paradox of analysis says that any conceptual analysis must be either trivial or false [Sorensen]
     Full Idea: The paradox of analysis says if a conceptual analysis states exactly what the original statement says, then the analysis is trivial; if it says something different from the original, then the analysis is mistaken. All analyses are trivial or false.
     From: Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], 8.5)
     A reaction: [source is G.E. Moore] Good analyses typically give explanations, or necessary and sufficient conditions, or inferential relations. At their most trivial they at least produce a more profound dictionary than your usual lexicographer. Not guilty.
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 2. Positivism
If all that exists is what is being measured, what about the people and instruments doing the measuring? [Lowe]
     Full Idea: If we think, in a positivistic spirit, that only measurements and observations exist, this is strikingly naïve. The scientists and their instruments can't be composed merely of measurements.
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.234)
     A reaction: A strong rebuff to crude positivism and 'operationalism'. Such mistakes are the usual confusion of epistemology and ontology.
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought
Two long understandable sentences can have an unintelligible conjunction [Sorensen]
     Full Idea: If there is an upper bound on the length of understandable sentences, then two understandable sentences can have an unintelligible conjunction.
     From: Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], 6.4)
     A reaction: Not a huge paradox about the use of the word 'and', perhaps, but a nice little warning to be clear about what is being claimed before you cheerfully assert a screamingly obvious law of thought, such as conjunction.
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
It is more extravagant, in general, to revise one's logic than to augment one's ontology [Lowe]
     Full Idea: It is more extravagant, in general, to revise one's logic than to augment one's ontology.
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.219)
     A reaction: Meaning there are stronger principles of thought which can trump Ockham's Razor. A few more entities won't hurt. Sound right.
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
A definition of a circle will show what it is, and show its generating principle [Lowe]
     Full Idea: If the definition of a circle is based on 'locus of a point', this tells us what a circle is, and it does so by revealing its generating principle, what it takes for a circle to come into being.
     From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 6)
     A reaction: Lowe says that real definitions, as essences, do not always have to spell out a 'generating principle', but they do in this case. Another approach would be to try to map dependence relations between truths about circles, and see what is basic.
Defining an ellipse by conic sections reveals necessities, but not the essence of an ellipse [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Defining an ellipse in terms of the oblique intersection of a cone and a plane (rather than in terms of the sum of the distance between the foci) gives us a necessary property, but not the essence, because the terms are extrinsic to its nature.
     From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 6)
     A reaction: [compressed wording] Helpful and illuminating. If you say some figure is what results when one thing intersects another, that doesn't tell you what the result actually is. Geometrical essences may be a bit vague, but they are quite meaningful.
An essence is what an entity is, revealed by a real definition; this is not an entity in its own right [Lowe]
     Full Idea: An entity's essence is just what that entity is, revealed by its real definition. This isn't a distinct entity, but either the entity itself, or (my view) no entity at all. ..We should not reify essence, as that leads to an infinite regress of essences.
     From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 6)
     A reaction: The regress problem is a real one, if we wish to treat an essence as some proper and distinct part of an entity. If it is a mechanism, for example, the presumably a mechanism has an essence. No, it doesn't! Levels of explanation!
2. Reason / D. Definition / 11. Ostensive Definition
Simple things like 'red' can be given real ostensive definitions [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Is it true that we cannot say, non-circularly, what red is? We cannot find a complex synonym for it, but I think we can provide red with an ostensive real definition.
     From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 6)
     A reaction: I'm not quite sure how 'real' this definition would be, if it depends on observers (some of whom may be colourblind). In what sense is this act of ostensions a 'definition'? You must distinguish the colour from the texture or shape.
2. Reason / D. Definition / 12. Paraphrase
How can a theory of meaning show the ontological commitments of two paraphrases of one idea? [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Nothing purely within the theory of meaning is capable of telling us which of two sentences which are paraphrases of one another more accurately reflects the ontological commitments of those who utter them.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 2.3)
     A reaction: This is an attack on the semantic approach to ontology, associated with Quine. Cf. Idea 7923. I have always had an aversion to that approach, and received opinion is beginning to agree. "There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio..."
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
Propositions are made true, in virtue of something which explains its truth [Lowe]
     Full Idea: If a proposition is 'made' true, it has to be true 'in virtue of' something, meaning a relationship of metaphysical explanation. Thus a true proposition must have truth conferred on it in some way that explains how it gets to be true.
     From: E.J. Lowe (An essentialist approach to Truth-making [2009], p.202)
     A reaction: It is good to ask what we mean by 'makes'. I like essentialist explanations, but this may be misplaced. Observing that y makes x true seems to be rather less than actually explaining how it does it. What would such explanations look like?
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
If nothing exists, no truthmakers could make 'Nothing exists' true [Sorensen]
     Full Idea: If nothing exists, then there are no truthmakers that could make 'Nothing exists' true.
     From: Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], 11.2)
     A reaction: [He cites David Lewis] We may be confusing truth with facts. I take facts to be independent of minds, but truth only makes sense as a concept in the presence of minds which are endeavouring to think well.
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Which toothbrush is the truthmaker for 'buy one, get one free'? [Sorensen]
     Full Idea: If I buy two toothbrushes on a 'buy one, get one free' offer, which one did I buy and which one did I get free? Those who believe that each contingent truth has a truthmaker are forced to believe that 'buy one, get one free' is false.
     From: Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], 11.6)
     A reaction: Nice. There really is no fact of which toothbrush is the free one. The underlying proposition must presumably be 'two for the price of one'. But you could hardly fault the first slogan under the Trades Descriptions Act.
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
Maybe facts are just true propositions [Lowe]
     Full Idea: If facts are 'proposition-like' or 'thinkable' (we speak of 'knowing' or 'understanding' facts) might they not simply be true propositions?
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11.2)
     A reaction: They certainly can't be if we are going to use facts as what makes propositions true. The proposal would be empty without out some other account of truth (probably a dubious one). Facts are truth-makers?
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
One-to-one correspondence would need countable, individuable items [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Where there is one-to-one correspondence there must certainly be countable, and therefore individuable items of some kind.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11.6)
     A reaction: Lowe is criticising precise notions of 'a fact'. We can respond by relaxing the notion of 'one-to-one', if critics are going to be fussy about exactly what the items are. "There is a huge wave coming" doesn't need a precise notion of a wave to be true.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
A set is a 'number of things', not a 'collection', because nothing actually collects the members [Lowe]
     Full Idea: A set is 'a number of things', not a 'collection'. Nothing literally 'collects' the members of a set, such as the set of planets of the sun, unless it be a Fregean 'concept' under which they fall.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.6)
     A reaction: I'm tempted to say that the sun has collected a set of planets (they're the ones that rotate around it). Why can't we have natural sets, which have been collected by nature? A question of the intension, as well as the extension....
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
I don't believe in the empty set, because (lacking members) it lacks identity-conditions [Lowe]
     Full Idea: It is not clear to me that the empty set has well-defined identity-conditions. A set has these only to the extent that its members do - but the empty set has none.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 12.3 n8)
     A reaction: The empty set is widely used by those who base their metaphysics of maths on sets. It defines zero, and hence is the starting poing for Peano's Postulates (Idea 5897). It might not have identity in itself, but you know where you have arrived after 2 - 2.
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
No attempt to deny bivalence has ever been accepted [Sorensen]
     Full Idea: The history of deviant logics is without a single success. Bivalence has been denied at least since Aristotle, yet no anti-bivalent theory has ever left the philosophical nursery.
     From: Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], Intro)
     A reaction: This is part of a claim that nothing in reality is vague - it is just our ignorance of the truth or falsity of some propositions. Personally I don't see why 'Grandad is bald' has to have a determinate truth value.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
We now see that generalizations use variables rather than abstract entities [Sorensen]
     Full Idea: As philosophers gradually freed themselves from the assumption that all words are names, ..they realised that generalizations really use variables rather than names of abstract entities.
     From: Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], 8.4)
     A reaction: This looks like a key thought in trying to understand abstraction - though I don't think you can shake it off that easily. (For all x)(x-is-a-bird then x-has-wings) seems to require a generalised concept of a bird to give a value to the variable.
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
It is better if the existential quantifier refers to 'something', rather than a 'thing' which needs individuation [Lowe]
     Full Idea: If we take the existential quantifier to mean 'there is at least one thing that' then its value must qualify as one thing, individuable in principle. ...So I propose to read it as 'there is something that', which implies nothing about individuability.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11)
     A reaction: All sorts of doubts about the existential quantifier seem to be creeping in nowadays (e.g. Ideas 6067, 6069, 8250). Personally I am drawn to the sound of 'free logic', Idea 8250, which drops existential claims. This would reduce metaphysical confusion.
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
Syntactical methods of proof need only structure, where semantic methods (truth-tables) need truth [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Syntactical methods of proof (e.g.'natural deduction') have regard only to the formal structure of premises and conclusions, whereas semantic methods (e.g. truth-tables) consider their possible interpretations as expressing true or false propositions.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 8)
     A reaction: This is highly significant, because the first method of reasoning could be mechanical, whereas the second requires truth, and hence meaning, and hence (presumably) consciousness. Is full rationality possible with 'natural deduction'?
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 3. Antinomies
Denying problems, or being romantically defeated by them, won't make them go away [Sorensen]
     Full Idea: An unsolvable problem is still a problem, despite Wittgenstein's view that there are no genuine philosophical problems, and Kant's romantic defeatism in his treatment of the antinomies of pure reason.
     From: Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], 4.3)
     A reaction: I like the spin put on Kant, that he is a romantic in his defeatism. He certainly seems reluctant to slash at the Gordian knot, e.g. by being a bit more drastically sceptical about free will.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / a. Achilles paradox
An infinite series of tasks can't be completed because it has no last member [Lowe]
     Full Idea: It appears to be impossible to complete an infinite series of tasks, since such a series has, by definition, no last member.
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.290)
     A reaction: This pinpoints the problem. So are there infinite tasks in a paradox of subdivision like the Achilles?
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
Banning self-reference would outlaw 'This very sentence is in English' [Sorensen]
     Full Idea: The old objection to the ban on self-reference is that it is too broad; it bans innocent sentences such as 'This very sentence is in English'.
     From: Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], 11.1)
     A reaction: Tricky. What is the sigificant difference between 'this sentence is in English' and 'this sentence is a lie'? The first concerns context and is partly metalinguistic. The second concerns semantics and truth. Concept and content..
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
It might be argued that mathematics does not, or should not, aim at truth [Lowe]
     Full Idea: It might be argued that mathematics does not, or should not, aim at truth.
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.375)
     A reaction: Intriguing. Sounds wrong to me. At least maths seems to need the idea of the 'correct' answer. If, however, maths is a huge pattern, there is no correctness, just the pattern. We can be wrong, but maths can't be wrong. Ah, I see…!
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
Numbers are universals, being sets whose instances are sets of appropriate cardinality [Lowe]
     Full Idea: My view is that numbers are universals, beings kinds of sets (that is, kinds whose particular instances are individual sets of appropriate cardinality).
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10)
     A reaction: [That is, 12 is the set of all sets which have 12 members] This would mean, I take it, that if the number of objects in existence was reduced to 11, 12 would cease to exist, which sounds wrong. Or are we allowed imagined instances?
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
Simple counting is more basic than spotting that one-to-one correlation makes sets equinumerous [Lowe]
     Full Idea: That one-to-one correlated sets of objects are equinumerous is a more sophisticated achievement than the simple ability to count sets of objects.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 2.9)
     A reaction: This is an objection to Frege's way of defining numbers, in terms of equinumerous sets. I take pattern-recognition to be the foundation of number, and so spotting a pattern would have to precede spotting that two patterns were identical.
Fs and Gs are identical in number if they one-to-one correlate with one another [Lowe]
     Full Idea: What is now known as Hume's Principle says the number of Fs is identical with the number of Gs if and only if the Fs and the Gs are one-to-one correlated with one another.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.3)
     A reaction: This seems popular as a tool in attempts to get the concept of number off the ground. Although correlations don't seem to require numbers ('find yourself a partner'), at some point you have to count the correlations. Sets come first, to identify the Fs.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
Sets are instances of numbers (rather than 'collections'); numbers explain sets, not vice versa [Lowe]
     Full Idea: I favour an account of sets which sees them as being instances of numbers, thereby avoiding the unhelpful metaphor which speaks of a set as being a 'collection' of things. This reverses the normal view, which explains numbers in terms of sets.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10)
     A reaction: Cf. Idea 8297. Either a set is basic, or a number is. We might graft onto Lowe's view an account of numbers in terms of patterns, which would give an empirical basis to the picture, and give us numbers which could be used to explain sets.
If 2 is a particular, then adding particulars to themselves does nothing, and 2+2=2 [Lowe]
     Full Idea: If 2 is a particular, 'adding' it to itself can, it would seem, only leave us with 2, not another number. (If 'Socrates + Socrates' denotes anything, it most plausibly just denotes Socrates).
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.7)
     A reaction: This suggest Kant's claim that arithmetical sums are synthetic (Idea 5558). It is a nice question why, when you put two 2s together, they come up with something new. Addition is movement. Among patterns, or along abstract sequences.
If there are infinite numbers and finite concrete objects, this implies that numbers are abstract objects [Lowe]
     Full Idea: The Peano postulates imply an infinity of numbers, but there are probably not infinitely many concrete objects in existence, so natural numbers must be abstract objects.
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.375)
     A reaction: Presumably they are abstract objects even if they aren't universals. 'Abstract' is an essential term in our ontological vocabulary to cover such cases. Perhaps possible concrete objects are infinite.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
Does the existence of numbers matter, in the way space, time and persons do? [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Does it really matter whether the numbers actually exist - in anything like the way in which it matters that space and time or persons actually exist?
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.6)
     A reaction: Nice question! It might matter a lot. I take the question of numbers to be a key test case, popular with philosophers because they are the simplest and commonest candidates for abstract existence. The ontological status of values is the real issue.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
All possible worlds contain abstracta (e.g. numbers), which means they contain concrete objects [Lowe]
     Full Idea: One could argue that some abstract objects exist in all possible worlds (e.g. natural numbers) and that abstract objects always depend for their existence upon concrete objects, and conclude that some concrete objects exist in all possible worlds.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 12.1)
     A reaction: We're all in the dark on this one, but I quite like this argument. I can't conceive of a reality that lacks natural numbers, and the truths that accompany them, and I personally think that numbers arise from the patterns of physical reality.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
Nominalists deny abstract objects, because we can have no reason to believe in their existence [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Nominalists tend to deny the existence of abstract objects since, given their purported nature (non-causal), we can have no reason to believe in their existence.
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.372)
     A reaction: A good point. Aristotle worried about the causal inadequacy of the Forms. My mind can conceive of a 'thing' with no causal powers, just sitting there.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
Current physics says matter and antimatter should have reduced to light at the big bang [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: Our best theories of physics imply we shouldn't be here. The big bang ought to have produced equal amounts of matter and antimatter particles, which would have almost immediately annihilated each other, leaving nothing but light.
     From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2015.05.23)
     A reaction: This is not, of course, a rejection of physics, but a puzzle about the current standard model of physics.
CP violation shows a decay imbalance in matter and antimatter, leading to matter's dominance [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: The phenomenon of charge-parity (CP) violation says that under certain circumstances antiparticles decay at different rates from their matter counterpart. ...This might explain matter's dominance in the universe, but the effect is too small.
     From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2015.05.23)
     A reaction: Physicists are currently studying CP violations, hoping to explain why there is any matter in the universe. This will not, I presume, explain why matter and antimatter arrived in the first place.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Perhaps possession of causal power is the hallmark of existence (and a reason to deny the void) [Lowe]
     Full Idea: For some metaphysicians, possession of causal power is the very hallmark of real existence (and is one reason, for instance, why some have denied the existence of the void or absolute space).
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.2)
     A reaction: You could try saying that space has the power of making movement possible. The 'hallmark' of something doesn't define what it is. Existence without causal power seems logically possible and imaginable, but unlikely. Epiphenomena have this problem.
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Change can be of composition (the component parts), or quality (properties), or substance [Lowe]
     Full Idea: There seem to be three kinds of change: compositional change (of component parts), qualitative change (of properties), or substantial change (when underlying essence begins or ceases).
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.59)
     A reaction: Notice this gives 'components' a more prominent ontological status than usual. Is this computer a component of my study?
Maybe particles are unchanging, and intrinsic change in things is their rearrangement [Lowe, by Lewis]
     Full Idea: Lowe's solution the 'temporary intrinsics' problem is that particles have no temporary intrinsic properties; they may be safely supposed to endure, and large things consist of those enduring particles, undergoing rearrangement but no intrinsic change.
     From: report of E.J. Lowe (Lewis on Perdurance versus Endurance [1987]) by David Lewis - Rearrangement of Particles II
     A reaction: A mere rearrangement of particles doesn't sound the same as a change in properties, which must involve causal powers in some way.
Heraclitus says change is new creation, and Spinoza that it is just phases of the one substance [Lowe]
     Full Idea: The extreme views on change are the Heraclitan view - that every change brings into existence an entirely new entity, and destroys what existed before, and the Spinozan view - that all changes are phase changes within a single substance.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 8.2)
     A reaction: The views in between are that bundles of properties shift their contents, or that many substances undergo changes in their properties. The unification of physics might be aiming to vindicate Spinoza. Temporal parts (Lewis) are close to Heraclitus.
Four theories of qualitative change are 'a is F now', or 'a is F-at-t', or 'a-at-t is F', or 'a is-at-t F' [Lowe, by PG]
     Full Idea: Qualitative change is seen as either (i) 'Presentism' - 'a is F now', or (ii) 'relational properties' - 'a is F-at-t', or (iii) 'temporal parts' - 'a-at-t is F', or (iv) 'adverbial' - 'a is-a-t F'.
     From: report of E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.44) by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: The traditional view would let a stay the same over time, and change its property (ii). Lewis favours (iii). My suspicion is that thinking collapses if you abandon the tradtional view.
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
Events are changes or non-changes in properties and relations of persisting objects [Lowe]
     Full Idea: My own broadly Aristotelian view is that events are changes (and unchanges) in the properties and relations of persisting objects.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 4.4)
     A reaction: This needs an account of what it is that persists, and the philosophers' (but not physicists') concept of 'substance' fills this role. It is rather hard to give identity-conditions for an event if it is an 'unchange'. How would you count such events?
Numerically distinct events of the same kind (like two battles) can coincide in space and time [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Numerically distinct events of the same kind (like two battles) can plausible coincide in space and time.
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.225)
     A reaction: This is certainly discouraging for anyone who wanted to make events ontologically basic. Physicalist need to be able to individuate events in a reductive way.
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
Maybe modern physics requires an event-ontology, rather than a thing-ontology [Lowe]
     Full Idea: It is sometimes said that modern physics requires us to espouse an event-ontology, rather than a thing-ontology.
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.233)
     A reaction: It has to be a mistake to build our philosophical ontology on current physics, because even the physicists say they don't understand the latter very well.
Events are ontologically indispensable for singular causal explanations [Lowe]
     Full Idea: We must include events in our ontology because they figure indispensably in singular causal explanations.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.5)
     A reaction: Hm. Spirits figure indispensably in supernatural explanations. It would be quite a task to prove that events really are indispensable to causal explanations. Why would nomological or counterfactual causal explanations not have the same need?
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
Maybe an event is the exemplification of a property at a time [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Maybe an event is the exemplification of a property at a time.
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.229)
     A reaction: What exactly would 'exemplify' mean here? This probably turns out to be circular when you attempt to explain what a property is.
Events are changes in the properties of or relations between things [Lowe]
     Full Idea: My own preference is for a conception of events which reduces them to changes in the properties of or relations between things.
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.245)
     A reaction: Changes of property and changes of relations are two very different things. Is a 'near miss' an event? If so, is any movement an event? If movement is relative, then so are events.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
Are facts wholly abstract, or can they contain some concrete constituents? [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Philosophers who invoke facts are divided over whether facts are wholly abstract entities or are complexes capable of containing concrete objects as constituents.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11.2)
     A reaction: If externalism about concepts was true (see Thought|Content|Broad Content), this would support the second (more concrete) view of facts. The correspondence theory of truth would love to plug belief into the concrete world. Me too.
Facts cannot be wholly abstract if they enter into causal relations [Lowe]
     Full Idea: There is a difficulty for any view of facts which sees them as being wholly abstract entities, and yet also being causal relata; for it seems that only concrete entities, existing in time and space, can enter into causal relations.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11.3)
     A reaction: There seems a lot of ambiguity in the air here, between epistemology and ontology (surprise!). I take causation to be a physical activity in the concrete world. Our understanding of it is expressed with abstractions. 'Fact' seems to have two meanings.
The problem with the structured complex view of facts is what binds the constituents [Lowe]
     Full Idea: The most notorious problem besetting the view that facts are structured complexes of constituents is the question of what it is that binds the supposed constituents into the fact. The ordered triple doesn't make Mars red.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11.5)
     A reaction: Lowe denies that facts are complex entities on this basis. You only have the problem if Mars and its redness are two 'things'. If redness is intrinsically a dependent item, we may escape. I wish they wouldn't use colours as examples. See Idea 5456.
It is whimsical to try to count facts - how many facts did I learn before breakfast? [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Although 'fact' is grammatically a count noun, it strikes us as being at best whimsical to talk about enumerating facts - to talk, for instance, about how many facts I learned today before breakfast.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 12.4)
     A reaction: I always liked the question 'how many facts are there in this room?' One might make a serious attempt to decide how many facts I learned before breakfast, and reach a reasonable approximation, especially if one didn't open the newspaper.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / e. Facts rejected
Facts are needed for truth-making and causation, but they seem to lack identity criteria [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Facts seem to be indispensable as truth-makers and perhaps as causal relata, ..but if we must only include in our ontology things for which we can state a criterion of identity (Quine), ..we seem to be faced with a dilemma.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11)
     A reaction: Lowe proposes to relax the identification requirement (see Idea 8312). This seems a good strategy. An awful lot of strange philosophy arises from insisting on strict conditions for our understanding, and then finding everywhere failure to achieve it.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
Vague words have hidden boundaries [Sorensen]
     Full Idea: Vague words have hidden boundaries. The subtraction of a single grain of sand might turn a heap into a non-heap.
     From: Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], Intro)
     A reaction: The first sentence could be the slogan for the epistemic view of vagueness. The opposite view is Sainsbury's - that vague words are those which do not have any boundaries. Sorensen admits his view is highly counterintuitive. I think I prefer Sainsbury.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
Two of the main rivals for the foundations of ontology are substances, and facts or states-of-affairs [Lowe]
     Full Idea: One of the chief rivals to my own substance-based ontology is the view that holds facts or states of affairs to be the building-blocks of the world.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], Pref)
     A reaction: I think I side with Lowe, even though I am uneasy about the gap between the philosopher's 'substance' and the basic entities of physics. Facts are hard to individuate, and seem to be composed of more basic elements.
Some abstractions exist despite lacking causal powers, because explanation needs them [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Some abstract objects, notably certain universals, need to be invoked for explanatory purposes, even if it cannot be said that they themselves possess causal powers or enter into causal relations.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.2)
     A reaction: I am unconvinced that an entity with no causal powers could be any kind of explanation, given that, by definition, it can't do anything. You would have to think that the world of pure reason functioned without the aid of causal powers.
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
Ontological categories are not natural kinds: the latter can only be distinguished using the former [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Ontological categories should not be confused with natural kinds: for natural kinds can only be differentiated in a principled way relative to an accepted framework of ontological categories.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 8.2)
     A reaction: I presume that the natural kinds are likely to be contingent facts about the actual world (though they may entail necessary laws), whereas I like to think, unfashionably, that categories aim at deconstructing the mind of God (roughly).
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
The top division of categories is either abstract/concrete, or universal/particular, or necessary/contingent [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Some metaphysicians take the highest division to be between abstract and concrete entities, others take it to be between universals and particulars (my own preference, though it is not crucial), and others between necessary and contingent entities.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 8.3)
     A reaction: The first division may be blurred, and I am doubtful about universals, so I favour the third. Intuition tells me that there is nothing more basic than the distinction between what is true in all worlds and what is only true in some. The former is bedrock.
Lowe divides things into universals and particulars, then kinds and properties, and abstract/concrete [Lowe, by Westerhoff]
     Full Idea: Lowe's Ontological Categories: ENTITIES - {Universals - [Kinds - (Non-natural)(Natural)] [Properties, Relations]} {Particulars - [Abstracta - (Sets)(others)] [Concreta - (Objects)(Non-Objects)]} etc
     From: report of E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], p.181) by Jan Westerhoff - Ontological Categories §01
     A reaction: [my linear representation of a tree diagram; bracket-styles show levels] Lowe's levels below these divide according to whether things are 'substances' or not. I've heard Kit Fine tease Lowe for being too simplistic about ontology.
The main categories of existence are either universal and particular, or abstract and concrete [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Some metaphysicians think the fundamental categories of existence are universals and particulars, while other prefer the division between abstract and concrete.
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.15)
     A reaction: Interestingly, in trying to choose between these, it is tempting to think about the capacities of the brain. Which is the cart and which is the horse?
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
Modes are beings that are related both to substances and to universals [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Modes are real beings that stand in non-contingent formal ontological relations both to individual substances and to immanent universals.
     From: E.J. Lowe (An essentialist approach to Truth-making [2009], p.212)
     A reaction: Not sure I understand this, but I pass it on. 'Modes' seem to invite the Razor, if we already have substances and universals. I am no clear about 'instantiation' because I now have the word 'mode' to play with.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Is 'the Thames is broad in London' relational, or adverbial, or segmental? [Lowe]
     Full Idea: "The Thames is broad in London" might be taken as 'The Thames is broad-in-London', or as 'The Thames is-in-London broad', or as 'The Thames-in-London is broad'. I would urge the superiority of the second one, as an analysis of the normal meaning.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 5.8)
     A reaction: He uses the example to attack the perdurance view of objects (i.e. the third analysis). I think I agree with Lowe, but I'm not sure, and I just love the example. Read the second as 'The Thames is (in London) broad'? 'Is' of existence, or predication?
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
I prefer 'modes' to 'tropes', because it emphasises their dependence [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Some philosophers call particularised properties of objects 'tropes', but I prefer the older term 'mode' (or 'individual accident'), because this term rightly has the implication that such entities are existentially dependent ones, depending on objects.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 8.3)
     A reaction: A nice illustration of the fact that philosophical terminology is not as metaphysically innocent as it sometimes pretends to be. I agree with Lowe.
Trope theory says blueness is a real feature of objects, but not the same as an identical blue found elsewhere [Lowe]
     Full Idea: The trope theorist holds that the blueness of a blue chair really exists as much as the chair, but is not identified with the blueness of anything else, even if it resembles it exactly.
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.361)
     A reaction: You are left with explaining how 'resemblance' works if you cannot spot some 'thing' in common. It is an inviting idea, though, because it avoids the ontological baggage of universals.
Maybe a cushion is just a bundle of tropes, such as roundness, blueness and softness [Lowe]
     Full Idea: The trope theorist says that a cushion is just a 'bundle' of tropes, such as roundness, blueness and softness.
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.362)
     A reaction: Certainly if you dispense with the idea of substance (which is clearly bad science even if it is good metaphysics), something like this is what remains of a cushion, though it sounds more epistemological than ontological. Only philosophers care about this
Tropes seem to be abstract entities, because they can't exist alone, but must come in bundles [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Tropes seem to be abstract entities because, unlike concrete entities, they are ontologically dependent; ..there are no 'free' tropes, and they must always be bundled with other appropriate tropes to exist.
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.367)
     A reaction: Only a Platonist would think that a universal property could 'exist alone'. I presume Aristotle thought universals were real, though bound up with substances.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
Why cannot a trope float off and join another bundle? [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Why cannot a certain trope 'float free' of the trope-bundle to which it belongs and migrate to another bundle?
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 9.8)
     A reaction: Tropes are said to be dependent on their possessors, but at the same time to exist as particulars. Lowe's suggestion is that you can't have it both ways. A particular sphericity with no sphere does not even make sense.
Tropes cannot have clear identity-conditions, so they are not objects [Lowe]
     Full Idea: I do not believe that tropes or modes can have well-defined or fully determinate identity-conditions, and hence do not believe that they should be thought of as 'objects'.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 8.3)
     A reaction: Lowe's account would still allow them to be 'entities'. Any proposal that they have an existence of their own, apart from the objects on which they depend, sounds very misguided. We won't make progress if we don't identify the real properties.
How can tropes depend on objects for their identity, if objects are just bundles of tropes? [Lowe]
     Full Idea: It seems that tropes are identity-dependent upon their possessors, but it is difficult to square this claim with the thesis that the possessors of tropes are themselves just bundles of tropes.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 9.8)
     A reaction: This circularity in all attempts to individuate tropes is Lowe's main reason for rejecting them. It does seem that the sphericity of a ball must be either identified against other (universal) sphericities, or by the sphere that has the property.
Does a ball snug in plaster have one trope, or two which coincide? [Lowe]
     Full Idea: If a round ball fits snugly into a round piece of plaster, do they contain the same roundness trope, or do they contain numerically distinct but exactly similar and coinciding roundness tropes?
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 9.8)
     A reaction: A microscope would distinguish them, and they are made of different types of matter. Is a hole in a piece of paper a circular cut and a circular area of space? Neither example looks good for tropes.
Tropes have existence independently of any entities [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Pure trope theorists must apparently hold that each trope has its identity underivatively, not that it depends for it on or owes it to other entities of any sort.
     From: E.J. Lowe (An essentialist approach to Truth-making [2009], p.207)
     A reaction: Lowe defends dependent 'modes' of things, against independent 'tropes'. Good, but he then has to say what the thing is (a modeless 'substance'?), because it can't just be a bundle of modes or tropes.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
The category of universals can be sub-divided into properties and relations [Lowe]
     Full Idea: One might want to divide the category of 'universals' into two sub-categories of properties and relations.
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.15)
     A reaction: This means a Platonic form like 'horse' ends up as a cluster of properties and relations. Is a substance not also a universal?
Sortal terms for universals involve a substance, whereas adjectival terms do not [Lowe]
     Full Idea: I want to distinguish 'substantial' universals from 'non-substantial' universals. The former are denoted by sortal terms, such as 'statue' and 'tiger', whereas the latter are denoted by adjectival terms, such as 'red' and 'spherical'.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 9.3)
     A reaction: It is an interesting question whether or not (assuming you are committed to universals) a universal necessarily implies an associated substance. If a property is a power, it must be a power of something. Nominalists will deny his distinction.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Real universals are needed to explain laws of nature [Lowe]
     Full Idea: I base my case for realism about universals on the need to explain the status of natural laws.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 9.6)
     A reaction: I need black magic to explain why my watch has disappeared. The key question, then, would be what we understand by the 'laws of nature'. I am inclined to think that scientific essentialism (qv) can build laws out of natural kinds. Idea 6614.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
Particulars are instantiations, and universals are instantiables [Lowe]
     Full Idea: A particular is something (not necessarily an object) which instantiates but is not itself instantiated. Universals, on the other hand, necessarily have instances (or, at least, are instantiable).
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.4)
     A reaction: This is Lowe's proposal for distinction. It at least establishes the direction of dependency, but I find the notion of 'instantiation' to be as obscure and problematic as the Platonic notion of 'partaking' (see in Ontology|Universals|Platonic Forms).
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
Nominalists believe that only particulars exist [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Nominalists believe that only particulars exist.
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.352)
     A reaction: A neat definition. Hence they deny universals. I suspect that nominalism is incoherent. Rational thought seems easy to create with universals, impossible with just particulars. Robotics is nominalist, which is why it will fail.
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe]
     Full Idea: A problem for resemblance nominalism is that in saying that two particulars 'resemble' one another, it is necessary to specify in what respect they do so (e.g. colour, shape, size), and this threatens to reintroduce what appears to be talk of universals.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.7)
     A reaction: We see resemblance between faces instantly, long before we can specify the 'respects' of the resemblance. This supports the Humean hard-wired view of resemblance, rather than some appeal to Platonic universals.
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
'Is non-self-exemplifying' is a predicate which cannot denote a property (as it would be a contradiction) [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Not every meaningful predicate expresses an existing property; thus 'is non-self-exemplifying' cannot refer to a property, because the property would contradict the predicate.
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.100)
     A reaction: Needs thought. The example is based on Russell's so-called Barber's Paradox. If it can't be a property, can it be a predicate?
Not all predicates can be properties - 'is non-self-exemplifying', for example [Lowe]
     Full Idea: We cannot assume that every meaningful predicate necessarily expresses a property that some entity could possess. The predicate 'is non-self-exemplifying' is meaningful, yet it would be contradictory for there to be any such property.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Individuation [2003])
     A reaction: This clinches what I would take to be a foregone conclusion - that you can't know what the world contains just by examining the predicates of the English language. However, I suppose predicates are needed to know properties.
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
If 'blueness' is a set of particulars, there is danger of circularity, or using universals, in identifying the set [Lowe]
     Full Idea: If sets are particulars, a nominalist may say that 'blueness' is a set of particulars, but which set? If the particulars 'are blue' this threatens circularity - though resemblance is usually appealed to to avoid this.
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.355)
     A reaction: This supports my suspicion that nominalism is superficially attractive and 'scientific', but when you dig deep into it the theory won't get off the ground without universals.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Perhaps concrete objects are entities which are in space-time and subject to causality [Lowe]
     Full Idea: An obvious suggestion is that concrete objects are denizens of space-time, and hence subject to causality, though Hale objects that languages are plausibly abstract and yet undergo change and so presumably exist in time.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 2.10)
     A reaction: The identity-conditions for a language are pretty loose. Choosing a counterexample from the mental life of human beings begs a billion questions. I can't think of a problem case beyond the world of human culture.
To be an object at all requires identity-conditions [Lowe]
     Full Idea: The only metaphysically defensible notion of an object is precisely that of an entity which possesses determinate identity-conditions.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 1.3)
     A reaction: I think he includes abstract objects in this. I suspect this view of muddling epistemology and ontology. Or overemphasising our conventions, rather than reality.
Our commitment to the existence of objects should depend on their explanatory value [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Whether objects of a given kind should be thought actually to exist should, in general, be taken to turn on considerations of whether an inclusion of such objects in one's ontology has explanatory value.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 2.3)
     A reaction: Blatantly fictional objects, such as fairies, might have wonderful explanatory value (they place dewdrops on flowers). Our ontological commitments cannot be decided one at a time, because consistency of the whole picture is the key value.
Objects are entities with full identity-conditions, but there are entities other than objects [Lowe]
     Full Idea: I distinguish objects as those entities - whether abstract or concrete, universal or particular - which possess fully determinate identity-conditions, but there are, or may be, entities other than objects.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 7)
     A reaction: A wave on the sea is a candidate for being an entity but not an object. The distinction is probably not quite common usage, but it strikes as one which philosophers should universally adopt. Lots of entities, and some of them are objects.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
Bodies, properties, relations, events, numbers, sets and propositions are 'things' if they exist [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Not only material bodies but also properties, relations, events, numbers, sets, and propositions are—if they are acknowledged as existing—to be accounted ‘things’.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Things [1995])
     A reaction: There might be lots of borderline cases here. Is the sky a thing? Is air a thing? How is transparency a thing? Is minus-one a thing? Is an incomplete proposition a thing? Etc.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
An object is an entity which has identity-conditions [Lowe]
     Full Idea: To be an object is simply to be an entity possessing determinate identity-conditions.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 2.3)
     A reaction: This is a nice clear-cut claim, which sounds good, except that there may be a blurring of ontology and epistemology. Presumably the conditions are for the concept, not for an actual act of identification. Maybe we are too stupid to conceive them.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Some things (such as electrons) can be countable, while lacking proper identity [Lowe]
     Full Idea: There can be determinate countability even where there is not determinate identity; it is not in dispute that there are two electrons in the shell of a neutral helium atom, even though the identity of electrons is not determinate.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 3.3)
     A reaction: If the electrons could merge like water drops, we would be unable to say when they became one object. You can roughly count waves on the sea, but when you seek an exact total, the identity problem intrudes and prevents precise counting.
Neither mere matter nor pure form can individuate a sphere, so it must be a combination [Lowe]
     Full Idea: A sphere's matter could not be what makes it one sphere, since matter lacks intrinsic unity, ..and the form cannot make it that very sphere, since an identical sphere may exemplify that universal. So it is a combination of form and matter.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Individuation [2003], 5)
     A reaction: But how do two aspects of the sphere, neither of which has the power to individuate, achieve individuation when they are combined? Like parents, I suppose. Two totally identical spheres can only be individuated by location.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
Criteria of identity cannot individuate objects, because they are shared among different types [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Criteria of identity never unambiguously determine the kind of objects to which they apply, since many different types of objects can be governed by the same criteria. Cats and dogs share the criterion of identity for animals in general.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.3)
     A reaction: So how do you individuate the type of an object? You could identify 'the thing I dug up yesterday' without being able to individuate it. You can individuate 'the cleverest person in Britain' without being able to identify them.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
Diversity of two tigers is their difference in space-time; difference of matter is a consequence [Lowe]
     Full Idea: What really makes for the diversity of two tigers is their difference in space-time location, from which their difference in component matter at any time merely follows as a consequence.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 9.5)
     A reaction: I daresay this is how we manage to identify the diversity of a pair of tigers (epistemology), but is that what their diversity consists in (ontology)? That they employ different matter seems relevant. If you feed one, the other stays hungry (causation).
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Individuation principles identify what kind it is; identity criteria distinguish items of the same kind [Lowe]
     Full Idea: A principle of individuation tells us what is to count as one instance of a given kind, such as one ship. A criterion of identity is what makes for the identity or diversity of items of a given kind, to distinguish this ship from that ship.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 9.5)
     A reaction: So individuation picks out type/qualitative identity, and identifying picks out token/numerical identity. This agrees with Idea 7926, but is a shift from the usage Lowe mentions in Idea 8290. Common usage makes the technical terms unclear.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
Conventionalists see the world as an amorphous lump without identities, but are we part of the lump? [Lowe]
     Full Idea: For the conventionalist the world is doomed to merge into an amorphous lump with no real individuality or differentiation, ..but we can hardly make our own identity in the world in the way we are supposed to conventionally create identity for objects.
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.113)
     A reaction: Very nice argument! We need to 'cut nature at the joints' (Plato), and one joint is screamingly obvious - that between observer and world. You could try denying this, but it would be a bizarre view.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
A 'substance' is an object which doesn't depend for existence on other objects [Lowe]
     Full Idea: A 'substance' might be defined to be an object which does not depend for its existence upon any other object (where dependency is defined in terms of necessity.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 1.3)
     A reaction: I'm inclined to leave out 'substance', which has too much historical baggage, and talk of minimal things having 'identity', and proper things having 'essence'.
On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Later philosophers emphasised different strands of Aristotle's concept of substances: Leibniz (in his theory of monads) emphasised their unity; Spinoza emphasised their ontological independence; Locke emphasised their role in relation to qualities.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.4)
     A reaction: Note that this Aristotelian idea had not been jettisoned in the late seventeenth century, unlike other Aristotelianisms. I think it is only with the success of atomism in chemistry that the idea of substance is forced to recede.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
Statues can't survive much change to their shape, unlike lumps of bronze, which must retain material [Lowe]
     Full Idea: A statue is a kind of object which cannot survive much change to its shape, unlike a lump of bronze, which cannot survive any change to its material composition.
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.70)
     A reaction: Also the statue could survive being hollowed out, changing its material composition. Hence a statue is not just a lump of bronze, but we knew that.
The essence of lumps and statues shows that two objects coincide but are numerically distinct [Lowe]
     Full Idea: It is a metaphysically necessary truth, obtaining in virtue of the essences of such objects (of what a bronze statue and a lump of bronze are) that when it exists a bronze statue coincides with a lump of bronze, which is numerically distinct from it.
     From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 6)
     A reaction: I think it is nonsense to treat the lump and statue as two objects. It is essential that a statue be made of a lump, and essential that a lump have a shape, so to treat the lump and the shape as two different objects is a failure to grasp the essence.
The essence of a bronze statue shows that it could be made of different bronze [Lowe]
     Full Idea: It is a metaphysical possibility, obtaining in virtue of the essences of such objects, that the same bronze statue should coincide with different lumps of bronze at different times. (..they have different persistence conditions).
     From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 6)
     A reaction: If the fame of a statue were that it had been made by melting down the shield of Achilles (say), then the bronze it was made of would be its most important feature. Essences are more contextual than Lowe might wish.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
Holes, shadows and spots of light can coincide without being identical [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Holes are things of such a kind that they can coincide without being identical - as are, for example, shadows and spots of light.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Two Notions of Being: Entity and Essence [2008], 1)
     A reaction: His point is that they thereby fail one of the standard tests for being an 'object'.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
An offer of 'free coffee or juice' could slowly shift from exclusive 'or' to inclusive 'or' [Sorensen]
     Full Idea: Sometimes an exclusive 'or' gradually develops into an inclusive 'or'. A restaurant offers 'free coffee or juice'. The customers ask for both, and gradually they are given it, first as a courtesy, and eventually as an expectation.
     From: Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], 7.2)
     A reaction: [compressed] A very nice example - of the rot of vagueness even seeping into the basic logical connectives. We don't have to accept it, though. Each instance of usage of 'or', by manager or customer, might be clearly one or the other.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
The identity of composite objects isn't fixed by original composition, because how do you identify the origin? [Lowe]
     Full Idea: It is not at all clear that the identity of a composite object can be fixed by the identity of its original composition, since there are good grounds for claiming that the reverse is in fact the case.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 7.5)
     A reaction: That is, how could you identify the origin if you didn't know what it was that had originated? Nice point. See also Idea 8274. Vicars must make sure they baptise the right baby.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
Grasping an essence is just grasping a real definition [Lowe]
     Full Idea: All that grasping an essence amounts to is understanding a real definition, that is, understanding a special kind of proposition.
     From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 7)
     A reaction: He refuses to 'reify' an essence, and says it is not an entity, so he seems to think that the definition is the essence, but Aristotle and I take the essence to be what is picked out by the correct definition - not the definition itself.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
All things must have an essence (a 'what it is'), or we would be unable to think about them [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Things must have an essence, in the sense of 'what it is to be the individual of that kind', or it would make no sense to say we can talk or think comprehendingly about things at all. If we don't know what it is, how can we think about it?
     From: E.J. Lowe (Two Notions of Being: Entity and Essence [2008], 2)
     A reaction: Lowe presents this as a sort of Master Argument for essences. I think he is working with the wrong notion of essence. All he means is that things must have identities to be objects of thought. Why equate identity with essence, and waste a good concept?
Explanation can't give an account of essence, because it is too multi-faceted [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Explanation is a multifaceted one, with many species (logical, mathematical, causal, teleological, and psychological), ..so it is not a notion fit to be appealed to in order to frame a perspicuous account of essence. That is one species of explanation.
     From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 6)
     A reaction: This directly attacks the core of my thesis! His parenthetical list does not give types of explanation. If I say this explanation is 'psychological', that says nothing about what explanation is. All of his instances could rest on essences.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
Knowing an essence is just knowing what the thing is, not knowing some further thing [Lowe]
     Full Idea: To know something's essence is not to be acquainted with some further thing of a special kind, but simply to understand what exactly that thing is.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Two Notions of Being: Entity and Essence [2008], 2)
     A reaction: I think he is wrong about this, or at least is working with an unhelpful notion of essence. Identity is one thing, and essence is another. I take essences to be certain selected features of things, which explain their nature.
If we must know some entity to know an essence, we lack a faculty to do that [Lowe]
     Full Idea: If knowledge of essence were by acquaintance of a special kind of entity, we would doubt our ability to grasp the essence of things. For what faculty could be involved in this special kind of acquaintance?
     From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 7)
     A reaction: This is Lockean empirical scepticism about essences, but I take the view that sometimes you can be acquainted with an essence, but more often you correctly infer it from you acquaintance - and this is just what scientists do.
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
A 'substance' is a thing that remains the same when its properties change [Lowe]
     Full Idea: By 'substance', in the context of the mind, we mean a persisting object or thing which can undergo changes in its properties over time while remaining one and the same thing.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 2)
     A reaction: A neat account of the traditional philosophical notion of a substance. It invites the obvious question of how you know that a thing is the same if all of its properties seem to have changed (as with Descartes' wax). Epistemology discredits ontology.
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
An object 'endures' if it is always wholly present, and 'perdures' if different parts exist at different times [Lowe]
     Full Idea: The 'endurance' view is that an object persists by being 'wholly present' at more than one time, and the 'perdurance' view is that an object has different temporal parts which exist at different times.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 5)
     A reaction: It is tempting to say that only a philosopher would come up with a view as bizarre as the second one. Trying to imagine God's view of time has led to a lot of confusion. Endurance seems to need substance, so bundle views of objects encourage perdurance.
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
How can you identify temporal parts of tomatoes without referring to tomatoes? [Lowe]
     Full Idea: The temporal parts approach to identity appears to be viciously circular, for how are the 'temporal parts' of tomatoes to be individuated and identified save by reference to the very tomatoes of which they are parts?
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 5.3)
     A reaction: (This attacks the 'perdurance' view - Idea 8271) Something wrong here. Isn't Lowe begging the question, by assuming that a tomato at an instant IS the tomato? To know what a tomato is, you must spend time with it.
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
If 5% replacement preserves a ship, we can replace 4% and 4% again, and still retain the ship [Lowe]
     Full Idea: If we say that up to 5% of a ship's parts can be replaced without the ship ceasing to exist, we could replace 4% and then 4% again, and it would retain its identity, if identity is transitive.
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.26)
     A reaction: One suspected that all attempts at precision with the ship of Theseus were doomed, but this nicely demonstrates it.
A renovation or a reconstruction of an original ship would be accepted, as long as the other one didn't exist [Lowe]
     Full Idea: If a ship is renovated without reconstruction of original parts, we happily identify the renovation with the original; if there was a reconstruction without the renovated version, we would identify the reconstruction with the original.
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.27)
     A reaction: This really shakes our belief in identity as a natural rather than mental phenomenon. The existence of clones undermines our normal idea of personal identity.
If old parts are stored and then appropriated, they are no longer part of the original (which is the renovated ship). [Lowe]
     Full Idea: The parts of a ship in a warehouse belong to no ship at all, ..and once they are appropriated by another ship they cease to be parts of the original, ..so it seems that the renovated ship (not the reconstruction) is identified with the original.
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.31)
     A reaction: The parts in the warehouse could belong to the original (they might even labelled), but assigning them to a new ship does indeed look like a crucial break in the continuity.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
A clear idea of the kind of an object must precede a criterion of identity for it [Lowe]
     Full Idea: As Locke clearly understood, one must first have a clear conception of what kind of object one is dealing with in order to extract a criterion of identity for objects of that kind from that conception.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.3)
     A reaction: Archaeologist face objects which they can number, remember and take pride in, without having a clue what kind of thing they are dealing with. The two processes may not be entirely distinct.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
One view is that two objects of the same type are only distinguished by differing in matter [Lowe]
     Full Idea: One venerable tradition, exemplified in Aquinas, has it that matter is the 'principle of individuation', that is, that all that can be guaranteed to distinguish two concrete thing of the same kind is the different matter of which they are composed.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 9.5)
     A reaction: This seems to be 'identity-conditions' rather than 'individuation', according to Idea 7926. The problem would be how to identify that particular matter, apart from its composing that particular object. Replacing planks on a ship seems unimportant.
Each thing has to be of a general kind, because it belongs to some category [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Any individual thing must be a thing of some general kind - because, at the very least, it must belong to some ontological category.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Two Notions of Being: Entity and Essence [2008], 2)
     A reaction: Where does the law that 'everything must have a category' come from? I'm baffled by remarks of this kind. Where do we get the categories from? From observing the individuals. So which has priority? Not the categories. Is God a kind?
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
Identity of Indiscernibles (same properties, same thing) ) is not Leibniz's Law (same thing, same properties) [Lowe]
     Full Idea: The Identity of Indiscernibles (no two objects can possess exactly the same properties) is not the same as Leibniz's Law (what is true of a thing is true of what is identical with that thing).
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.62)
     A reaction: Two things can't be the same because we can't discern the difference, which may be our inadequacy. But if they actually have identical properties, it is hard to see how they could be different. A universe with just two perfect spheres is couterexample.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
'Conceptual' necessity is narrow logical necessity, true because of concepts and logical laws [Lowe]
     Full Idea: I can accept 'conceptual' necessity, as long as it is only identified with 'narrow' logical necessity. For I take it that the 'conceptually' necessary is that which is true solely in virtue of concepts together with the laws of logic.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 1.4)
     A reaction: In the narrow version of logical necessity (Idea 8260) some definitions are required in addition to the mere laws of logic. This implies that the concepts are dependent of definitions, which is a bit restrictive. Aren't we allowed undefined concepts?
Logical necessities, based on laws of logic, are a proper sub-class of metaphysical necessities [Lowe]
     Full Idea: If logically necessary truths are consequences of the laws of logic, then I think they are only a proper sub-class of the class of metaphysically necessary truths.
     From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 1)
     A reaction: The problem for this is unusual and bizarre systems of logic, or systems that contradict one another. This idea is only plausible if you talk about the truths derived from some roughly 'classical' core of logic. 'Tonk' won't do it!
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical necessity is logical necessity 'broadly construed' [Lowe, by Lynch/Glasgow]
     Full Idea: Lowe (1998) defines metaphysical necessity in terms of logical necessity 'broadly contrued'.
     From: report of E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998]) by Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM - The Impossibility of Superdupervenience n 3
     A reaction: [I seem to have missed this simple thought in Lowe 1998 - must revisit]. Both metaphysical and logical necessity can be taken as 'true in all possible worlds', but that doesn't make them the same truths.
'Metaphysical' necessity is absolute and objective - the strongest kind of necessity [Lowe]
     Full Idea: By 'metaphysical' necessity I mean necessity of the strongest possible kind - absolute necessity - and I take it to be an objective kind of necessity, rather than being something mind-dependent.
     From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 1)
     A reaction: See Bob Hale for the possibility that 'absolute' and 'metaphysical' necessity might come apart. I think I believe in metaphysical necessity, but I'm uneasy about 'absolute' necessity. That may be discredited by the sceptics.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Logical necessity can be 'strict' (laws), or 'narrow' (laws and definitions), or 'broad' (all logical worlds) [Lowe]
     Full Idea: 'Strict' logical necessity is true by the laws of logic alone; 'narrow' logical necessity is true by the laws of logic plus definitions of non-logical terms; 'broad' logical necessity is true in every possible world where the laws of logic hold.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 1.4)
     A reaction: Lowe then says the third is close to 'metaphysical' necessity. I am unable to distinguish the third from the first. You can't claim that a logical implication holds in this world, but not in another possible world which has the same rules of implication.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
It is impossible to reach a valid false conclusion from true premises, so reason itself depends on possibility [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Reasoning itself depends upon a grasp of possibilities, because a valid argument is one in which it is not possible for the conclusion to be false if the premises are true.
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.11)
     A reaction: A very valuable corrective to my pessimistic view of philosophers' attempts to understand metaphysical necessity. But if we can only grasp natural necessity, then all reason is naturalistic.
The metaphysically possible is what acceptable principles and categories will permit [Lowe]
     Full Idea: What is 'metaphysically' possible hinges …on the question of whether acceptable metaphysical principles and categories permit the existence of some state of affairs.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 1.3)
     A reaction: Lowe breezes along with confident assertions like this. I once heard Kit Fine tease him for over-confidence. All you do is work out 'acceptable' principles and categories, and you've cracked it!
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 2. Epistemic possibility
'Epistemic' necessity is better called 'certainty' [Lowe]
     Full Idea: 'Epistemic' necessity is more properly to be called 'certainty'.
     From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 1)
     A reaction: Sounds wrong. Surely I can be totally certain of a contingent truth?
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
If an essence implies p, then p is an essential truth, and hence metaphysically necessary [Lowe]
     Full Idea: If we can truly affirm that it is part of the essence of some entity that p is the case, then p is an essential truth and so a metaphysically necessary truth.
     From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 6)
     A reaction: This feels too quick. He is trying to expound the idea (which I like) that necessity derives from essences, and not vice versa. Is it a metaphysical necessity that there are no moths in my wardrobe, because mothballs have driven them away? Maybe.
Metaphysical necessity is either an essential truth, or rests on essential truths [Lowe]
     Full Idea: A metaphysically necessary truth is a truth which is either an essential truth or a truth that obtains in virtue of the essences of two or more distinct things. Hence all metaphysical necessity is grounded in essence.
     From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 6)
     A reaction: Lowe is endeavouring to give an exposition of the approach advocated by Kit Fine. I divide necessities 'because of' things (such as essences) from necessities 'for' things, such as situations or events.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
We might eliminate 'possible' and 'necessary' in favour of quantification over possible worlds [Lowe]
     Full Idea: It may be possible to eliminate the modal operators (in English, 'is possible' and 'is necessary') in favour of quantifier expressions with variables ranging over possible worlds.
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.121)
     A reaction: Hence 'necessary' becomes 'exists/is true in all possible worlds'. Deep problems, but at least we must show that referring to 'possible' worlds isn't a circular explanation of 'is possible'.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Does every abstract possible world exist in every possible world? [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Possible worlds, conceived of as abstracta, surely exist 'in every possible world'.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 12)
     A reaction: A possible very infinite regress, if a particular possible world is distinguished from another only by being perceived from Actual Word 1 or Actual World 2.. How many possible worlds are there? The standard answer is 'lots', rather than infinity.
We could give up possible worlds if we based necessity on essences [Lowe]
     Full Idea: If we explicate the notion of metaphysical necessity in terms of the notion of essence, rather than vice versa, this may enable us to dispense with the language of possible worlds as a means of explicating modal statements.
     From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 6)
     A reaction: This is the approach I favour, though I am not convinced that the two approaches are in competition, since essentialism gives the driving force for necessity, whereas possible worlds map the logic and semantics of it.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
Causal theories of belief make all beliefs true, and can't explain belief about the future [Lowe]
     Full Idea: The causal theory of beliefs seems condemned to treat all beliefs as true, which is absurd, …and we do not want to say that tomorrow's rain 'causes' today's belief that it will rain tomorrow.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 4)
     A reaction: This is aimed at Fodor. A false belief might be caused by reality if one had one's internal wires crossed, and a belief about the future might be caused by events happening now. This theory is not dead.
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
Perhaps 'I' no more refers than the 'it' in 'it is raining' [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Perhaps the 'I' in 'I think' no more serves to pick out a certain object than does the 'it' in 'it is raining'.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 2)
     A reaction: A nice example to remind us that not all English pronouns have genuine reference. You could reply that 'it' does refer, to the weather; or that you can switch to 'you think', but not to 'they/we are raining'.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
'Ecological' approaches say we don't infer information, but pick it up directly from reality [Lowe]
     Full Idea: The 'ecological' approach to perception resists the idea that our brains have to construct information about our environment by inference from sensations, because the information is already present in the environment, available to well-tuned senses.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 6)
     A reaction: The psychologist J.J.Gibson is the source of this view. This pushes us towards direct realism, and away from representative theories, which are based too much on problems arising from illusions (which are freak cases). Interesting.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
While space may just be appearance, time and change can't be, because the appearances change [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Although the appearance of distance and so of space may conceivably be no more than an appearance (as Berkeley held), the appearance of change and so of time cannot be no more than appearance - for the appearance of change involves change (in minds).
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 7.9)
     A reaction: This would seem to place some sort of limit on idealism. Since it doesn't offer a barrier to solipsism, though, it is not much consolation. We mustn't forget that Parmenides and Zeno of Elea proved that change is just an illusion.
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
It is propositional attitudes which can be a priori, not the propositions themselves [Sorensen]
     Full Idea: The primary bearer of apriority is the propositional attitude (believing, knowing, guessing and so on) rather than the proposition itself. A proposition could be a priori to homo sapiens but a posteriori to Neandethals.
     From: Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], 6.3)
     A reaction: A putative supreme being is quite useful here, who might even see the necessity of Arsenal beating Manchester United next Saturday. Unlike infants, adults know a priori that square pegs won't fit round holes.
Attributing apriority to a proposition is attributing a cognitive ability to someone [Sorensen]
     Full Idea: Every attribution of apriority to a proposition is tacitly an attribution of a cognitive ability to some thinker.
     From: Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], 6.3)
     A reaction: The ability would include a range of background knowledge, as well as a sheer power of intellect. If you know all of Euclid's theorems, you will spot facts about geometrical figues quicker than me. His point is important.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / a. Qualities in perception
Properties or qualities are essentially adjectival, not objectual [Lowe]
     Full Idea: I consider properties or qualities to be essentially adjectival rather than objectual in nature (and the same applies to relations, though they are adjectival to more than one object).
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 7.1)
     A reaction: Personally I am inclined to say that properties are either real causal powers (functions of objects?), such as being sharp, or else they are subjective ways of distinguishing things (e.g. colours). Or fictions. 'Adjectival' is too vague.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
The colour bands of the spectrum arise from our biology; they do not exist in the physics [Sorensen]
     Full Idea: The bands of colour in a colour spectrum do not correspond to objective discontinuities in light wavelengths. These apparently external bands arise from our biology rather than simple physics.
     From: Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], Intro)
     A reaction: If any more arguments are needed to endorse the fact that some qualities are clearly secondary (and, to my amazement, such arguments seem to be very much needed), I would take this to be one of the final conclusive pieces of evidence.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
One must be able to visually recognise a table, as well as knowing its form [Lowe]
     Full Idea: A bare knowledge that tables have a particular form will not enable one to recognise a table visually, unless one knows how something with such a form typically appears or looks from a variety of different angles.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 6)
     A reaction: This seems to be a rather significant point, if we are trying to work out how concepts and models operate in the process of perception. Lowe points out that with electrons, we have some knowledge of the form, but no capacity for recognition.
Computationalists object that the 'ecological' approach can't tell us how we get the information [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Computational psychologists object to the 'ecological' approach to perception (with its externalist, direct realist picture), because it leaves us entirely in the dark as to how our senses 'pick up' information about the environment.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 6)
     A reaction: I find myself siding with the computationalists, but then I have always favoured the representational view of perception among philosophers. Lowe comments that both approaches neglect actual experience. We construct models, e.g. of London.
Comparing shapes is proportional in time to the angle of rotation [Lowe]
     Full Idea: When two objects, one of them rotated, are compared, the length of time it takes the subjects to determine they are of the same shape is roughly proportional to the size of angle of rotation, ...which suggests analogue modes of representation.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 7)
     A reaction: I consider this to be highly significant for our whole understanding of the mind, which I think of as a set of models organised like a database. Think about the weather, phenomenalism, London, the Renaissance, your leg. You play with models.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
The 'disjunctive' theory of perception says true perceptions and hallucinations need have nothing in common [Lowe]
     Full Idea: The 'disjunctive' theory of perception says that we have either veridical perception or else hallucination, but there is no common element in the form of a 'perceptual experience' which would be present in either case and merely caused in different ways.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 6)
     A reaction: McDowell is associated with this view. It seems to be another attempt to get rid of sense-data. It seems odd, though, to say that a hallucination of a dagger has nothing in common at all with experience of real daggers. Why did hallucinations evolve?
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
We are unable to perceive a nose (on the back of a mask) as concave [Sorensen]
     Full Idea: The human perceptual system appears unable to represent a nose as concave rather than convex. If you look at the concave side of a mask, you see the features as convex.
     From: Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], 4.3)
     A reaction: I don't think that is quite true. You wouldn't put a mask on if you thought it was convex. It is usually when seen at a distance with strong cross-lighting that the effect emerges. Nevertheless, it is an important point.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe]
     Full Idea: According to one school of thought, perception is simply a mode of belief-acquisition,and there is no reason to suppose that any element of sensation is literally involved in perception.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.3)
     A reaction: Blindsight would be an obvious supporting case for this view. I think this point is crucial in understanding what is wrong with Jackson's 'knowledge argument' (involving Mary, see Idea 7377). Sensation gives knowledge, so it can't be knowledge.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Only a causal theory of perception will respect the facts of physiology and physics ...meaning a theory which maintains that for a subject to perceive a physical object the subject should enjoy some appropriate perceptual experience caused by the object.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.3)
     A reaction: If I hallucinate an object, then presumably I am not allowed to say that I 'perceive' it, but that seems to make the causal theory an idle tautology. If we are in virtual reality then there aren't any objects.
A causal theorist can be a direct realist, if all objects of perception are external [Lowe]
     Full Idea: A causal theorist can be a 'direct realist' in the sense that he can hold that the only objects of perception are external objects.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 6)
     A reaction: There still seem to be problems with perceiving reflections, or very distant objects (the time-lag problem), or perceiving 'secondary' qualities.
If blindsight shows we don't need perceptual experiences, the causal theory is wrong [Lowe]
     Full Idea: If we don't need to have perceptual experiences in order to see things (as 'blindsight' might suggest), the causal theory of perception cannot be correct.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 6)
     A reaction: This is because the causal theory implies a chain of events culminating in experience as the last stage. There is no suggestion, though, that unconscious perception would be non-causal, as it bypasses all the problems about consciousness.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
How could one paraphrase very complex sense-data reports adverbially? [Lowe]
     Full Idea: How could one paraphrase the sense-datum report 'I am aware of a red square sense-datum to the right of a blue round sense-datum' in an adverbial way? 'I am appeared to redly and squarely and roundly and bluely'?
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 5)
     A reaction: It is a nice question, but not an instant refutation of the adverbial theory. Vision may be a complex tangle of modes of seeing things, rather than a large collection of sense-data. As I look out of the window, how many sense-data do I experience?
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
'Intuitions' are just unreliable 'hunches'; over centuries intuitions change enormously [Lowe]
     Full Idea: I suspect that 'intuitions' and 'hunches' are pretty much the same thing, and pretty useless as sources of knowledge. …Things that seemed intuitively true to our forebears a century or two ago often by no means seem intuitively true to us now.
     From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 2)
     A reaction: I don't accept this. Intuitions change a lot over the centuries because the reliable knowledge which informs intuitions has also changed a lot. Arguments and evidence may nail individual truths, but coherence must rest on intuition.
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
There are memories of facts, memories of practical skills, and autobiographical memory [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Memory of facts is quite different from memory of practical skills, and both are quite distinct from what is sometimes called personal or autobiographical memory.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch.10)
     A reaction: If we accept David Marshall's proposal (Idea 6668), then all of the mind is memory, of many different types, and so the above analysis will be much too simple.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
Bayesians build near-certainty from lots of reasonably probable beliefs [Sorensen]
     Full Idea: Bayesians demonstrate that a self-correcting agent can build an imposing edifice of near-certain knowledge from numerous beliefs that are only slightly more probable than not.
     From: Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], 6.1)
     A reaction: This strikes me as highly significant for the coherence account of justification, even if one is sceptical about the arithmetical approach to belief of Bayesianism. It seems obvious that lots of quite likely facts build towards certainty, Watson.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
Psychologists say illusions only occur in unnatural and passive situations [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Psychologists point out that illusions almost always occur in unnatural environments in which subjects are prevented from exploiting the natural interplay between perception and action.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 6)
     A reaction: It has always struck me that philosophers make a great deal out of illusions, but I don't think I have ever had one. I don't know anyone who has seen a non-existent dagger.
Illusions are not a reason for skepticism, but a source of interesting scientific information [Sorensen]
     Full Idea: Philosophers tend to associate illusions with skepticism. But since illusions are signs of modular construction, they are actually reason for scientific hope. Illusions have been very useful in helping us to understand vision.
     From: Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], 1.4)
     A reaction: This is a nice reversal of the usual view. If I see double, it reveals to me that my eyes are not aligned properly. Anyone led to scepticism by illusions should pay more attention to themselves, and less to the reality they hope to know directly.
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
A system can infer the structure of the world by making predictions about it [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: If we can train a system for prediction, it can essentially infer the structure of the world it's looking at by doing this prediction.
     From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2015.12.12)
     A reaction: [AI expert] This seems to be powerful support for the centrality of mathematical laws of nature in achieving understanding of the world. We may downplay the 'mere' ability to predict, but this idea says that the rewards of prediction are very great.
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
Unfalsifiability may be a failure in an empirical theory, but it is a virtue in metaphysics [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Although unfalsifiability is probably a defect in scientific hypothesis, because it is deprived of empirical content, it seems rather to be a virtue in a metaphysical hypothesis.
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.241)
     A reaction: Presumably nothing could ever be found to count against a necessary truth. A nice point. 'Find me an instance where 2+2 is not 4'.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / c. Direction of explanation
If the flagpole causally explains the shadow, the shadow cannot explain the flagpole [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Two distinct entities cannot explain each other, in the same sense of 'explain'. If the height of the flagpole causally explains the length of the shadow, the shadow cannot explain the flagpole, though it may predict the latter.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Individuation [2003], 12)
     A reaction: This seems related to the question of the direction of time/causation. Some explanations can be benignly circular, as when a married couple have a passion for chinese food. [S.Bromberger 1966 invented the flagpole case].
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / d. Explaining people
The behaviour of persons and social groups seems to need rational rather than causal explanation [Lowe]
     Full Idea: There are some entities which exist in time and space (such as persons or social groups) of which the behaviour seems to be subject to rational rather than merely causal explanation.
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.2)
     A reaction: This begs of the question of whether 'rational' can be reduced to causal. We can't manage causal explanations of the very complex, so we use broad-brush second-best explanations?
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind
Externalists say minds depend on environment for their very existence and identity [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Externalism maintains that our minds 'reach out' into our physical environment, at least in the sense that our states of mind can depend for their very existence and identity upon what things that environment contains.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 6)
     A reaction: A nice statement of the externalist view. Does this mean that a brain in a vat would not have a mind? Does a photograph 'reach out' to its subject-matter?
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
The main questions are: is mind distinct from body, and does it have unique properties? [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Philosophy of mind seems to address the questions of whether the mind is distinct from the body, and whether the mind has properties, such as consciousness, which are unique to it.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Intro)
     A reaction: Simple enough, but the modern debate seems to centre on the second question, which is here stated nice and clearly. Of course, wild garlic has a unique smell, but that doesn't quite qualify as a 'unique property'. Are the properties of mind unpredictable?
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
'Phenomenal' consciousness is of qualities; 'apperceptive' consciousness includes beliefs and desires [Lowe]
     Full Idea: There is 'phenomenal' consciousness, which is what is distinctive of qualitative states of experience, and 'apperceptive' consciousness, which is awareness of all of one's mental states, including beliefs and desires.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 3)
     A reaction: I am not convinced that this distinction is sharp enough to be useful, though I approve of trying to analyse the components of consciousness. Is there 'intentional' consciousness? Desires, and even beliefs, can have qualities.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 7. Blindsight
The brain may have two systems for vision, with only the older one intact in blindsight [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Some physiologists maintain that the human brain is equipped with two different visual systems, an older one and a more recently evolved one, only the first of which is intact in blindsight subjects.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 6)
     A reaction: Ramachandran (on TV) suggested that lizards lack the newer system, and therefore may not actually be conscious. The proposal of two systems seems to make nice sense of an odd phenomenon. We clearly have a non-conscious route to visual information.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Properties are facets of objects, only discussable separately by an act of abstraction [Lowe]
     Full Idea: In no sense is a property a 'constituent' of an object: it is merely a 'facet' or 'aspect' of an object - something which we can talk about or think of separately from that object only by an act of abstraction.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Individuation [2003], 8)
     A reaction: This appears to be in tune with traditional abstractionism, even though Lowe is committed to the reality of universals. To what do I refer when I say 'I like your car, apart from its colour'?
Neural networks can extract the car-ness of a car, or the chair-ness of a chair [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: Early neural nets were really good at recognising general categories, such as a car or a chair. Those networks are good at extracting the 'chair-ness' or the 'car-ness' of the object.
     From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2015.12.12)
     A reaction: [Interview with Yann LeCun, Facebook AI director] Fregean philosophers such as Geach think that extracting features is a ridiculous idea, but if even a machine can do it then I suspect that human beings can (and do) manage it too.
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons
Persons are selves - subjects of experience, with reflexive self-knowledge [Lowe]
     Full Idea: I suggest that persons are selves - that is, they are subjects of experience which have the capacity to recognised themselves as being individual subjects of experience; selves possess reflexive self-knowledge.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch.10)
     A reaction: I would express this as 'a capacity for meta-thought'. I increasingly see that as the hallmark of homo sapiens, and the key quality I look for in assessing the intelligence of aliens. Very intelligent people are exceptionally self-aware.
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / b. Self as brain
If my brain could survive on its own, I cannot be identical with my whole body [Lowe]
     Full Idea: If, as seems intuitively plausible, I could survive with my brain detached from the rest of my body, I most certainly cannot be identical with my whole body.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch.10)
     A reaction: A key mistake is to treat the notion of 'I' as all-or-nothing. My surviving brain is much more like me than my surviving kidney, but the notion of my brain saying to my family 'it's me in that jar over there' sounds wrong. It is a bit of me.
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
It seems impossible to get generally applicable mental concepts from self-observation [Lowe]
     Full Idea: It seems impossible for me to acquire perfectly general concepts of thought and feeling, applicable to other people as well as to myself, purely from some queer kind of mental self-observation, but this is what the observational model demands.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch.10)
     A reaction: I don't understand the word 'queer' here, which seems part of an odd modern fashion for denigrating introspection. It is right, though, that the acquisition of general mental concepts from my mind seems to depend on analogy, which is a suspect method.
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe]
     Full Idea: There is the question of the identity of a person over or across time ('diachronic' personal identity), and there is also the question of what makes for personal identity at a time ('synchronic' personal identity).
     From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.5)
     A reaction: This seems to me to be the first and most important distinction in the philosophy of personal identity, and they regularly get run together. Locke, for example, has an account of synchronic identity, which is often ignored. It applies to objects too.
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
All human languages have an equivalent of the word 'I' [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Every human language appears to have a word or expression equivalent to the English word 'I'.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch.10)
     A reaction: If this is true (what is his evidence?) I take it to be very significant support for what I take to be obvious anyway, that the mind/brain has a central controlling core, which understands and decides, and which is the most valued part of us.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
The idea that Cartesian souls are made of some ghostly 'immaterial' stuff is quite unwarranted [Lowe]
     Full Idea: The vulgar notion, propagated by some modern physicalist philosophers, that Cartesian souls are supposed to be made of some sort of ghostly, 'immaterial' stuff - a near contradiction in terms - is quite unwarranted.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 9.5)
     A reaction: A nice illustration of the service which can be offered by this database. See Idea 3423 for an illustration of the sort of thing which Lowe is attacking. See Idea 5011 for a quotation from Descartes on the subject. I leave the decision with my visitor...
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them? [Lowe]
     Full Idea: The idea that 'qualia' exist but are causally inert is difficult to sustain: for if they are causally inert, how can we even know about them?
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 3)
     A reaction: The brain might be a special case. I can't know about a 'causally inert' object in my kitchen, but I might know about it if in some way I AM that object. Personally, though, I think everything that exists is causally active.
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
You can only identify behaviour by ascribing belief, so the behaviour can't explain the belief [Lowe]
     Full Idea: One must already understand what it means to ascribe to someone a belief that it is raining in order to be able to generate the items on the list of rain-behaviour, so the list cannot be used to explain what it means to ascribe to someone such a belief.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 3)
     A reaction: This is thought by many to be a decisive objection of behaviourism, because it makes the enterprise hopelessly circular. If I put up an umbrella when it was dry, you would probably infer that I believed it was raining.
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
A computer program is equivalent to the person AND the manual [Lowe]
     Full Idea: A computer executing its program is not equivalent to the English-speaker in the Chinese Room, but to the combination of the English-speaker and the operation manual.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 8)
     A reaction: Searle replies that there would be no understanding even if the person learned the manual off by heart. However, if we ask 'Is there any understanding of the universe in Newton's book?' the answer has to be 'yes'. So the manual contains understanding.
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
Functionalism commits us to bizarre possibilities, such as 'zombies' [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Functionalism seems to commit us to bizarre possibilities, such as 'zombies'.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 3)
     A reaction: This goes with the tendency of functionalism to imply epiphenomenalism - that is, to make the intrinsic character of mental states irrelevant to thinking. I'd love to eavesdrop on two zombies in an art gallery.
Functionalism can't distinguish our experiences in spectrum inversion [Lowe]
     Full Idea: It seems that functionalism can recognise no difference between my colour experiences and yours, in the case of spectrum inversion, suggesting that it fails to characterise colour experience adequately, by omitting its qualitative character.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 3)
     A reaction: This is a standard objection to functionalism, but then it is an objection to most other theories as well. Even dualism just offers a mystery as to why experiences have qualities. Observing a patch of red involves about three billion brain connections.
Functionalism only discusses relational properties of mental states, not intrinsic properties [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Functionalism has nothing positive to say about the intrinsic properties of mental states, only something about their relational properties.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 3)
     A reaction: This seems to me highly significant. All references to function (e.g. in Aristotle) invite the question of what enables something to have that function. Maybe the core question of philosophy of mind is whether mental states are intrinsic or relational.
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain [Lowe]
     Full Idea: The rejection of type-type identity and acceptance of token-token identity is referred to as 'non-reductive physicalism', and is usually link with the idea that mental state types are not identical with physical state types, but 'supervene' on them.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 3)
     A reaction: A nice summary of the view (built on the arguments of Davidson) which has also become known as 'property dualism'. Personally I regard it as dangerous nonsense. If two things 'supervene' on one another, the first question to ask is: why?
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Physicalists must believe in narrow content (because thoughts are merely the brain states) [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Physicalists will, it seems, be committed to the notion of narrow content, because if a person and their counterpart are neurological duplicates, they must exemplify the same mental state types, and thus possess beliefs with the same contents.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 4)
     A reaction: Very important. How many philosophers currently believe in both wide content and reductive physicalism? However, if content is physical brain-plus-environment, we might reply that the whole package must be identical for same content. Cf Idea 7884!
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
Eliminativism is incoherent if it eliminates reason and truth as well as propositional attitudes [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Eliminative materialism may be accused of incoherence, insofar as is threatens to eliminate reason and truth along with the propositional attitudes.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 3)
     A reaction: Lowe does not enlarge on this intriguing suggestion. I don't see a threat to truth, if brain events represent the outer world, as they can do it more or less well. Logic is built on truth. Reason grows out of logic. Evidence seems okay… Hm.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
Some behaviourists believe thought is just suppressed speech [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Some behaviourists have held the view that thinking just is, in effect, suppressed speech.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 7)
     A reaction: He cites J.B.Watson. This would imply that infants and animals can't think. Introspecting my own case, I don't believe it. When I am navigating through a town, for example, I directly relate to my mental map; I see little sign of anything verbal.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
No one has yet devised a rationality test [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: The financial sector has been clamouring for a rationality test for years.
     From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2013.10.29)
     A reaction: Many aspects of intelligence tests do actually pick out what I would call rationality (which includes 'rational intuition', a new favourite of mine). But they are mixed in with rather mechanical geeky sort of tests.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
People are wildly inaccurate in estimating probabilities about an observed event [Lowe]
     Full Idea: In the 'cab problem' (what colour was the cab in the accident?) most people estimate an 80% probability of it being a blue cab, but Bayes' Theorem calculates the probability at 41%, suggesting people put too much faith in eyewitness testimony.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 8)
     A reaction: For details of the 'cab problem', see Lowe p.200. My suspicion is that people get into a tangle when confronted with numbers in a theoretical situation, but are much better at it when faced with a real life problem, like 'who ate my chocolate?'
'Base rate neglect' makes people favour the evidence over its background [Lowe]
     Full Idea: 'Base rate neglect' (attending to the witness or evidence, and ignoring background information) is responsible for doctors exaggerating the significance of positive results in diagnosis of relatively rare medical conditions.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 8)
     A reaction: This seems to be one of the clearest cases where people's behaviour is irrational, though I suspect that people are much more rational about things if the case is simple and non-numerical. However, people are very credulous about wonderful events.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 7. Intelligence
About a third of variation in human intelligence is environmental [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: Possibly a third of the variation in our intelligence is down to the environment in which we grew up - nutrition and education, for example.
     From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2013.10.29)
     A reaction: This presumably leaves the other two-thirds to derive from genetics. I am a big believer in environment. Swapping babies between extremes of cultural environment would hugely affect intelligence, say I.
People can be highly intelligent, yet very stupid [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: You really can be highly intelligent, and at the same time very stupid.
     From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2013.10.29)
     A reaction: This is closely related to my observation (from a lifetime of study) that a talent for philosophy has a very limited correlation with standard notions of high intelligence. What matters is how conscious reasoning and intuition relate. Greek 'phronesis'.
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 1. Psychology
Psychologists measure personality along five dimensions [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: Psychologists have long thought that measuring on a scale of just five personality dimensions - agreeableness, extroversion, neuroticism, conscientiousness and openness to new experiences - can capture all human variations in behaviour and attitude.
     From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2015.06.13)
     A reaction: Researchers are considering a sixth - called 'honesty-humility' - which is roughly how devious people are. The five mentioned here seem to be a well entrenched orthodoxy among professional psychologists. Is personality more superficial than character?
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe]
     Full Idea: 'Mentalese' would be neither conventional nor a means of public communication so that even to call it a language is seriously misleading.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.7)
     A reaction: It is, however, supposed to contain symbolic representations which are then used as tokens for computation, so it seems close to a language, if (for example) symbolic logic or mathematics were accepted as languages. But who understands it?
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
The 'Frame Problem' is how to program the appropriate application of general knowledge [Lowe]
     Full Idea: The 'Frame Problem' in artificial intelligence is how to write a program which not only embodies people's general knowledge, but specifies how that knowledge is to be applied appropriately, when circumstances can't be specified in advance.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 8)
     A reaction: As Lowe observes, this is a problem, but not necessarily an impossibility. There should be a way to symbolically map the concepts of knowledge onto the concepts of perception, just as we must do.
Computers can't be rational, because they lack motivation and curiosity [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Lack of motivation and curiosity are perhaps the most fundamental reason for denying that computers could be, in any literal sense, rational beings.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 9)
     A reaction: I don't see why programmers couldn't move those two priorities to the top of the list in the program. When you switch on a robot, its first words could be 'Teach me something!', or 'Let's do something interesting!' Every piece of software has priorities.
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / c. Turing Test
The Turing test is too behaviourist, and too verbal in its methods [Lowe]
     Full Idea: The Turing test is open to the objection that it is inspired by behaviourist assumptions and focuses too narrowly on verbal evidence of intelligence.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 8)
     A reaction: This is part of the objection that the test exhibits human chauvinism, and robots and aliens are wasting their time trying to pass it. You need human behaviour, especially speech, to do well. Inarticulate people can exhibit high practical intelligence.
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
The naturalistic views of how content is created are the causal theory and the teleological theory [Lowe]
     Full Idea: The leading naturalistic theories of what it is that confers a specific content upon a given attitudinal state are the causal theory, and the teleological theory, both of which contain serious difficulties.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 4)
     A reaction: 'Causal' theories (Fodor) say the world directly causes content; 'teleological' theories (Millikan, Papineau) are based on the evolutionary purpose of content for the subject. I agree that neither seems adequate…
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
Twin Earth cases imply that even beliefs about kinds of stuff are indexical [Lowe]
     Full Idea: The implication of considerations of Twin Earth cases is that even beliefs about the properties of kinds of stuff are implicitly indexical, or context-dependent, in character.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 4)
     A reaction: This is a significant connection, between debates about the nature of indexicals (such as 'I' and 'this') and externalism about content generally. Is there no distinction between objective reference and contextual reference?
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
A concept is a way of thinking of things or kinds, whether or not they exist [Lowe]
     Full Idea: The nearest I can get to a quick definition is to say that a concept is a way of thinking of some thing or kind of things, whether or not a really existent thing or kind of things.
     From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 2)
     A reaction: The focus on 'things' seems rather narrow. Are relations things? He makes concepts sound adverbial, so that there is thinking going on, and then we add 'ways' of doing it. Thinking depends on concepts, not concepts on thinking.
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
Abstractions are non-spatial, or dependent, or derived from concepts [Lowe]
     Full Idea: There are three conceptions of abstractness: 1) non-spatial entities, the opposite of 'concrete' (e.g. numbers and universals); 2) an entity logically incapable of a separate existence (e.g. an apple's colour); 3) Fregean abstractions from concepts.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.1)
     A reaction: [Lowe p.218 explains the third one] Lowe rejects the third one, and it is a moot point whether the second one could actually be classed as an entity (do they have identity-conditions?), so the big issue is the first one.
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 5. Abstracta by Negation
The centre of mass of the solar system is a non-causal abstract object, despite having a location [Lowe]
     Full Idea: The centre of mass of the solar system seems to lack causal powers, and so is an abstract object, even though it has a location and movement.
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.368)
     A reaction: Nice example, with rich ramifications. Abstraction is deeply tied into our understanding of the physical world, and our concept of identity.
Concrete and abstract objects are distinct because the former have causal powers and relations [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Concrete objects possess causal powers and relations, but abstract objects are incapable of having causal powers or relations.
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.368)
     A reaction: Is this an observation or a definition? One might claim that an abstraction (such as a political ideal) can acquire causal power through a conscious mnd.
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
You can think of a direction without a line, but a direction existing with no lines is inconceivable [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Although one can separate 'in thought' a direction from any line of which it is the direction, one cannot conceive of a direction existing in the absence of any line possessing that direction.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.3)
     A reaction: Intriguing. If I ask you to imagine a line going in a certain direction, don't you need the direction before you can think of the line? 'That line is going in the wrong direction'. Maybe abstract ideas only exist 'in thought'. Lowe is a realist here.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe]
     Full Idea: If meaning is a private mental picture, what does 'the cat is NOT on the mat' mean, and how does it differ from 'the dog is not on the mat?'.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.7)
     A reaction: Not insurmountable. We picture an empty mat, combined with a cat (or whatever) located somewhere else. A mental 'picture' of something shouldn't be contrued as a single image in a neat black frame.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
The negation of a meaningful sentence must itself be meaningful [Sorensen]
     Full Idea: The negation of any meaningful sentence must itself be meaningful.
     From: Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], 8.1)
     A reaction: Nice. Compare 'there is another prime number beyond the highest one we have found' with its negation. The first seems verifiable in principle, but the second one doesn't. So the verificationist must deny Sorensen's idea?
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
Direct reference doesn't seem to require that thinkers know what it is they are thinking about [Lowe]
     Full Idea: It may be objected that currently prevailing causal or 'direct' theories of reference precisely deny that a thinker must know what it is the he or she is thinking about in order to be able to think about it.
     From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 7)
     A reaction: Lowe says that at least sometimes we have to know that we are thinking about, so this account of reference can't be universally true. My solution is to pull identity and essence apart. You only need identity, not essence, for reference.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
Propositions are what settle problems of ambiguity in sentences [Sorensen]
     Full Idea: Propositions play the role of dis-ambiguators; they are the things between which utterances are ambiguous.
     From: Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], 7.7)
     A reaction: I have become a great fan of propositions, and I think this is one of the key reasons for believing in them. The proposition is what we attempt to pin down when asked 'what exactly did you mean by what you just said?'
The same proposition provides contents for the that-clause of an utterance and a belief [Lowe]
     Full Idea: We use the same that-clause ('that snow is white') to specify the contents of both a person's utterances and of their beliefs, because it is the same proposition.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 4)
     A reaction: Certainly to say 'he believes that we should declare war' seems to refer to something non-linguistic, but it doesn't demonstrate that anything concrete or real is being referred to. It may be an abstract account of dispositions and desires.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
If propositions are abstract entities, how can minds depend on their causal powers? [Lowe]
     Full Idea: If propositions are abstract entities, more like the objects of mathematics, it seems mysterious that states of mind should depend for their causal powers upon the propositions which allegedly constitute their 'contents'.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], 70)
     A reaction: Compare standard objections to Platonic Forms (e.g. Idea 3353). You can't believe in abstract propositions, but be a reductive physicalist about the mind. So propositions are dynamic brain structures. Easy.
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
The three main theories of action involve the will, or belief-plus-desire, or an agent [Lowe]
     Full Idea: The two alternatives to volitionism in explaining action are (firstly) certain complexes of belief and desire, and (secondly) causation by an agent.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 9)
     A reaction: A helpful framework. A key test case seems to that of trying to perform an action and failing (e.g. through paralysis), and this goes against the whole 'agent' being the most basic concept. One also needs room for reasons, and this supports volitionism.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Libet gives empirical support for the will, as a kind of 'executive' mental operation [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Libet's experiments (on conscious and non-conscious choice) seem to provide empirical support for the concept of 'volition', conceived as a special kind of 'executive' mental operation.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 9)
     A reaction: Despite the strictures of Hobbes (Idea 2362) and Williams (Idea 2171), the will strikes me as a genuine item, clearly observable by introspection, and offering the best explanation of human behaviour. I take it to be part of the brain's frontal lobes.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
We feel belief and desire as reasons for choice, not causes of choice [Lowe]
     Full Idea: When we choose how to act in the light of our beliefs and desires, we do not feel our choices to be caused by them, but we conceive of them as giving us reasons to choose.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 9)
     A reaction: I agree, though this 'feeling' could be a delusion, and we certainly don't need to start talking about a 'free' will. The best account of action seems to be that the will operates on the raw material of beliefs and desires. The will is our 'decision box'.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
People's actions are explained either by their motives, or their reasons, or the causes [Lowe]
     Full Idea: When we ask why people act in the ways that they do, we are sometimes enquiring into people's motives, at other times we want to uncover their reasons, and at others we want to know the causes of their actions.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 9)
     A reaction: Helpful distinctions. Any one of these explanations might be collapsed into the others. Kantians, utilitarians and contractarians can study reasons, nihilists can study causes, and virtue theorists I take to be concerned with motives.
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 4. Free market
I can buy any litre of water, but not every litre of water [Sorensen]
     Full Idea: I am entitled to buy any litre of water, but I am not entitled to buy every litre of water.
     From: Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], 6.3)
     A reaction: A decent social system must somehow draw a line between buying up all the water and buying up all the paintings of Vermeer. Even the latter seems wicked, but it is hard to pin down the reason.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
If the concept of a cause says it precedes its effect, that rules out backward causation by definition [Lowe]
     Full Idea: You can't include in your concept of causation a clause stipulating that the cause occurred earlier than the effect, because that would rule out backward causation by definition.
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.176)
     A reaction: It may, though, be the case that backward causes can't occur, and time is essential to causes. The problem is our inability to know this for sure.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
It seems proper to say that only substances (rather than events) have causal powers [Lowe]
     Full Idea: It seems proper to say that events of themselves possess no causal powers; only persisting objects (individual substances) possess causal powers.
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.211)
     A reaction: This requires events to be reduced to substances, which invites Aristotle's question of where the movement comes from. In physcis, 'energy' is the key concept.
The theories of fact causation and event causation are both worth serious consideration [Lowe]
     Full Idea: The theories of fact causation and event causation are both worth serious consideration.
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.173)
     A reaction: This is slippery ground because both 'facts' and 'events' have uncertain ontological status, and seem partly conventional rather than natural. Events might be natural surges or transformations of energy?
To cite facts as the elements in causation is to confuse states of affairs with states of objects [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Philosophers who have advocated facts as being causal relata have confused them with states, such as a stone's being heavy; they are guilty of confusing states of affairs with states of objects.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11.3)
     A reaction: A state of an object can be individuated rather more precisely than a fact or state of affairs. There are, of course, vast numbers of states of objects, but only a few states of affairs, involved in (say) the fall of the Berlin Wall.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
Causal overdetermination is either actual overdetermination, or pre-emption, or the fail-safe case [Lowe]
     Full Idea: In causation there is 'overdetermination' (c and d occurred, and were both sufficient for e), 'pre-emption' (c and d occurred, and d would have stepped in if c hadn't), or 'fail-safe' (if c hadn't occurred, d would have occurred and done it).
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.179)
     A reaction: Two safety nets together, two safety nets spaced apart, or a second net which pops in if the first breaks. Nice distinctions.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Causation may be instances of laws (seen either as constant conjunctions, or as necessities) [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Causation relations between events may an instance of a causal law, with laws either interpreted as constant conjunctions (Hume), or as necessitation among universals (Armstrong).
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.190)
     A reaction: Hume's version is a thin idea of a law, but we can dream about the metaphysical status of laws, even if we don't know much about them. Lowe says a cause without a law is perfectly intelligible.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
Hume showed that causation could at most be natural necessity, never metaphysical necessity [Lowe]
     Full Idea: One thing Hume has taught us is that the necessity which causation involves is at most 'natural' or 'physical' necessity, not metaphysical necessity.
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.182)
     A reaction: Given Hume's epistemological scepticism, I don't think he would claim to have shown such a thing. See G.Strawson's book. Metaphysical necessity of causation is possible, but unknowable.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
The normative view says laws show the natural behaviour of natural kind members [Lowe, by Mumford/Anjum]
     Full Idea: For Lowe law statements are in a sense about what 'ought' to be the case. The 'ought' is not an explicitly moral or anthropomorphic one but instead tells us what is the natural behaviour of kind members.
     From: report of E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002]) by S.Mumford/R.Lill Anjum - Getting Causes from Powers 8.6
     A reaction: This is the 'normative' view of laws (as opposed to the intentional, dispositional, or regularity accounts). They cite Lowe 1989 Ch.8. The obvious immediate problem is things which evolved for one purpose and end up being used for another.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
H2O isn't necessary, because different laws of nature might affect how O and H combine [Lowe]
     Full Idea: It is not metaphysically necessary that water is composed of H2O molecules, because the natural laws governing the chemical behaviour of hydrogen and oxygen atoms could have been significantly different, so they might not have composed that substance.
     From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 6)
     A reaction: I fear this may be incoherent, as science. See Bird on why salt must dissolve in water. There can't (I suspect) be a law which keeps O and H the same, and yet makes them combine differently.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
'If he wasn't born he wouldn't have died' doesn't mean birth causes death, so causation isn't counterfactual [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Counterfactual analyses of event causation don't seem to work, because 'if Napoleon hadn't been born he wouldn't have died' is true, but doesn't mean his birth caused his death.
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.161)
     A reaction: Nice counterexample, which looks pretty conclusive. Birth makes death possible; it creates the necessary conditions within which it can be caused.
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
If motion is change of distance between objects, it involves no intrinsic change in the objects [Lowe]
     Full Idea: If motion just is change of distance between two objects, it does not involve any kind of intrinsic change in the objects in question.
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.242)
     A reaction: It sound respectably relativistic, but I doubt the definition. x is moving relative to y, then y attains x's velocity, so x ceases to move? Maybe.
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / d. Gravity
Gravity is unusual, in that it always attracts and never repels [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: Gravity is an odd sort of force, not least because it only ever works one way. Electromagnetism attracts and repels, but with gravity there are only positive masses always attract.
     From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 05)
     A reaction: This leads to speculation about anti-gravity, but there is no current evidence for it.
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / d. Entropy
Entropy is the only time-asymmetric law, so time may be linked to entropy [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: All our physical laws are time-symmetric, ...so things can run forwards or backwards. But entropy is an exception, saying that disorder increases over time. Many physicists therefore suspect that the flow of time is linked to entropy.
     From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2017.02.04)
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / b. General relativity
In the Big Bang general relativity fails, because gravity is too powerful [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: At the origin of the universe gravity becomes so powerful that general relativity breaks down, giving infinity for every answer.
     From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 09)
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / a. Electrodynamics
Quantum electrodynamics incorporates special relativity and quantum mechanics [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: The theory of electromagnetism that incorporates both special relativity and quantum mechanics is quantum electrodynamics (QED). It was developed by Dirac and others, and perfected in the 1940s. The field is a collection of quanta.
     From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02)
     A reaction: This builds on Maxwell's earlier classical theory. QED is said to be the best theory in all of physics.
Light moves at a constant space-time speed, but its direction is in neither space nor time [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: A light ray always moves at one unit of space per unit of time - a constant diagonal on the graph. ...But the direction that light rays travel in is neither space nor time, and is called 'null'. It is on the edge between space and time.
     From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2013.06.15)
     A reaction: Don't understand this, but it sounds fun.
Photons have zero rest mass, so virtual photons have infinite range [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: Photons, the field quanta of the electromagnetic force, have zero rest mass, so virtual photons can exist indefinitely and travel any distance, meaning the electromagnetic force has an infinite range.
     From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02)
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / b. Fields
In the standard model all the fundamental force fields merge at extremely high energies [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: The standard model says that the fields of all fundamental forces should merge at extremely high energies, meaning there is also a unified, high-energy field out there.
     From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 03)
     A reaction: Not quite sure what 'out there' means. This idea is linked to the quest for dark energy. Is this unified phenomenon only found near the Big Bang?
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / c. Electrons
Electrons move fast, so are subject to special relativity [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: Electrons in atoms move at high speeds, so they are subject to the special theory of relativity.
     From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02)
     A reaction: Presumably this implies a frame of reference, and defining velocities relative to other electrons. Plus time-dilation?
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / d. Quantum mechanics
Quantum states are measured by external time, of unknown origin [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: When we measure the evolution of a quantum state, it is to the beat of an external timepiece of unknown provenance.
     From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2013.06.15)
     A reaction: It is best not to leap to philosophical conclusions when studying modern physics. Evidently time has a very different status in quantum mechanics and in relativity theory.
The Schrödinger equation describes the evolution of an object's wave function in Hilbert space [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: A quantum object's state is described by a wave function living in Hilbert space, encompassing all of its possible states. We see how the wave function evolves in time, moving from one state to another, using the Schrödinger equation.
     From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2013.06.15)
     A reaction: [These idea are basic explanations for non-scientific philosophers - please forgive anything that makes you wince]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 3. Chromodynamics / a. Chromodynamics
The strong force is repulsive at short distances, strong at medium, and fades at long [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: Experiments show that the nuclear binding force does not follow the inverse square law, but is repulsive at the shortest distances, then attractive, then fades away rapidly as distance increases further.
     From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02)
     A reaction: So how does it know when to be strong? Magnetism doesn't vary according to distance, and light obeys the inverse square law, because everything is decided at the output. - See 21151 for an explanation. It interacts after departure.
Gluons, the particles carrying the strong force, interact because of their colour charge [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: In QCD the particles that carry the strong force are called gluons. ...Gluons carry their own colour charges, so they can interact with each other (unlike photons) via the strong nuclear force (which limits the range of the force).
     From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02)
     A reaction: So the force varies in strength with distance because the degree of separation among the spreading gluons varies? The force has one range, which is squashed when close, effective at medium, and loses touch with distance?
The strong force binds quarks tight, and the nucleus more weakly [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: The strong force holds quarks together within protons and neutrons, and residual effects of the strong force bind protons (whch repel one another) and neutrons together in nuclei.
     From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02)
     A reaction: So the force is much stronger between quarks (which can't escape), and only 'residual' in the nucleus, which must be why smashing nuclei open is fairly easy, but smashin protons open needs higher energies.
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 3. Chromodynamics / b. Quarks
Quarks in threes can build hadrons with spin ½ or with spin 3/2 [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: Quarks in threes can build hadrons with spin ½ (proton, duu; neutron, ddu; lambda, dus), or with spin 3/2 (omega-minus, sss).
     From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 01)
Classifying hadrons revealed two symmetry patterns, produced by three basic elements [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: Classifying hadrons according to charge, strangeness and spin revealed patterns of eight and ten particles (SU(3) symmetery). The mathematics then showed that these are built from a basic group of only three members.
     From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 01)
Three different colours of quark (as in the proton) can cancel out to give no colour [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: Just as mixing three colours of light gives white, so the three colour charges of quarks can add up to give no colour. This is what happens in the proton, which always contains one blue-charge quark, one red and one green.
     From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02)
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / b. Standard model
The four fundamental forces (gravity, electromagnetism, weak and strong) are the effects of particles [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: There are four fundamental forces: gravity, electromagnetism, and the weak and strong nuclear forces. Particle physics has so far failed to encompass the force of gravity. The forces that shape our world are themselves the effect of particles.
     From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02)
     A reaction: Philosophers must take note of the fact that forces are the effects of particles. Common sense pictures forces imposed on particles, like throwing a tennis ball, but the particles are actually the sources of force. The gravitino is speculative.
The weak force explains beta decay, and the change of type by quarks and leptons [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: The beta decay of the neutron (into a proton, an electron and an antineutrino) can be described in terms of the weak force, which is 10,000 times weaker than the strong force. It allows the quarks and leptons to change from one type to another.
     From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02)
     A reaction: This seems to make it the key source of radioactivity. Perhaps it should be called the Force of Change?
Three particles enable the weak force: W+ and W- are charged, and Z° is not [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: The quantum field theory of the weak force needs three carrier particles. The W+ and W- are electrically charged, and enable the weak force to change the charge of a particle. The Z° is uncharged, and mediates weak interactions with no charge change.
     From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02)
The weak force particles are heavy, so the force has a short range [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: The W and Z particles are heavy, and so cannot travel far from their parents. The weak force therefore has a very short range.
     From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02)
Why do the charges of the very different proton and electron perfectly match up? [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: Why do the proton and electron charges mirror each other so perfectly when they are such different particles?
     From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 04)
     A reaction: We seem to have reached a common stage in science, where we have a wonderful descriptive model (the Standard Model), but we cannot explain why what is modelled is the way it is.
The Standard Model cannot explain dark energy, survival of matter, gravity, or force strength [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: The standard model cannot explain dark matter, or dark energy (which is causing expansion to accelerate). It cannot explain how matter survived annihilation with anti-matter in the Big Bang, or explain gravity. The strength of each force is unexplained.
     From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 06)
     A reaction: [compressed] P.141 adds that the model has to be manipulated to keep the Higgs mass low enough.
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / c. Particle properties
Spin is a built-in ration of angular momentum [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: Spin is a built-in ration of angular momentum.
     From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 01)
     A reaction: As an outsider all I can do is collect descriptions of such properties from the experts. The experts appear to be happy with the numbers inserted in the equations.
Quarks have red, green or blue colour charge (akin to electric charge) [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: Quarks have a property akin to electric charge, called their colour charge. It comes in three varieties, red, green and blue.
     From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02)
Fermions, with spin ½, are antisocial, and cannot share quantum states [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: Particles with half-integer spin, such as electrons, protons or quarks (all spin ½) have an asymmetry in their wavefunction that makes them antisocial. These particles (Fermions) cannot share a quantum state.
     From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02)
     A reaction: This is said to explain the complexity of matter, with carbon an especially good example.
Spin is akin to rotation, and is easily measured in a magnetic field [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: Spin is a quantum-mechanical property of a particle akin to rotation about its own axis. Particles of different spins respond to magnetic fields in different ways, so it is a relatively easy thing to measure.
     From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 04)
     A reaction: I wish I knew what 'akin to' meant. Maybe particles are not rigid bodies, so they cannot spin in the way a top can? It must be an electro-magnetic property. Idea 21166 says spin has two possible directions.
Particles are spread out, with wave-like properties, and higher energy shortens the wavelength [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: Particles obeying the laws of quantum mechanics have wave-like properties - moving as a quantum wave-function, spread out in space, with wavelengths that get shorter as their energy increases.
     From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02)
     A reaction: Thus X-rays are dangerous, but long wave radio is not. De Broglie's equation.
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / d. Mass
The mass of protons and neutrinos is mostly binding energy, not the quarks [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: Most of a proton's or neutrino's mass is contained in the interaction energies of a 'sea' of quarks, antiquarks and gluons that bind them. ...You might feel solid, but in fact you're 99 per cent binding energy.
     From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 04)
     A reaction: This is because energy is equivalent to mass (although gluons are said to have energy but no mass - puzzled by that). This is a fact which needs a bit of time to digest. Once you've grasped we are full of space, you still have understood it.
Gravitional mass turns out to be the same as inertial mass [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: There are two types of mass: gravitational mass quantifies how strongly an object feels gravity, while inertial mass quantifies an object's resistance to acceleration. There proven equality is at the heart of General Relativity.
     From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 05)
     A reaction: It had never occurred to me that these two values might come apart. Doesn't their identical values demonstrate that they are in fact the same thing? Sounds like Hesperus/Phosphorus to me. The book calls it 'mysterious'.
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / e. Protons
Neutrons are slightly heavier than protons, and decay into them by emitting an electron [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: The proton (938.3 MeV) is lighter than the neutron (939.6 MeV) and does not decay, but the heavier neutron can change into a proton by emitting an electron. (If you gather a bucketful of neutrons, after ten minutes only half of them would be left).
     From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 01)
     A reaction: Protons are more or less eternal, but some theories have them decaying after billions of years. Smashing protons together is a popular pastime for physicists.
Top, bottom, charm and strange quarks quickly decay into up and down [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: Quarks can change from one variety to another, and the top, bottom, charm and strange quarks all rapidly decay to the up and down quarks of everyday life.
     From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 01)
     A reaction: Hence the universe is largely composed of up and down quarks and electrons. The other quarks seem to be more important in the early universe.
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / f. Neutrinos
Neutrinos were proposed as the missing energy in neutron beta decay [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: When a neutron decays into a proton and an electron (one example of beta decay), the energy of the two particles adds up to less than the starting energy of the neutron. Pauli and Fermi concluded that a neutrino (an electron antineutrino) is emitted.
     From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 01)
     A reaction: I'm wondering how much they could infer about the nature of the new particle (which was only confirmed 26 years later).
Only neutrinos spin anticlockwise [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: Neutrinos are the only particles that seem just to spin anticlockwise.
     From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 06)
     A reaction: See 21166. Anti-neutrino spin is the opposite way. Which way up do you hold the neutrino when pronouncing that it is 'anticlockwise?
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / g. Anti-matter
Standard antineutrinos have opposite spin and opposite lepton number [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: In the conventional standard model neutrinos have antiparticles - which spin in the opposite direction, and have the opposite lepton number.
     From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 05)
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 5. Unified Models / a. Electro-weak unity
The symmetry of unified electromagnetic and weak forces was broken by the Higgs field [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: In the very early hot universe the electromagnetic and weak nuclear forces were one. The early emergence of the Higgs field led to electroweak symmetry breaking. The W and Z bosons grew fat, and the photon raced away mass-free.
     From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 07)
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 5. Unified Models / b. String theory
It is impossible for find a model of actuality among the innumerable models in string theory [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: String theory has more than 10-to-the-500th solutions, each describing a different sort of universe, so it is nigh-on impossible to find the one solution that corresponds to our geometrically flat, expanding space-time full of particles.
     From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2015.11.07)
String theory needs at least 10 space-time dimensions [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: String theory needs at least 10 space-time dimensions to be mathematically consistent.
     From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2013.06.15)
     A reaction: Apparently because of 'Ads/CFT', it may be possible to swap this situation for a more tractable 4-dimensional version.
String theory is now part of 11-dimensional M-Theory, involving p-branes [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: String theory has now been incorporated into Ed Witten's M-Theory, which is a mathematical framework that lives in 11-dimensional space-time, involving higher-dimensional objects called p-branes, of which strings are a special case.
     From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 09)
In string theory space-time has a grainy indivisible substructure [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: String theory suggests that space-time has a grainy substructure - you can't keep chopping it indefinitely into smaller and smaller pieces.
     From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2015.11.07)
     A reaction: Presumably the proposal is that strings are the true 'atoms'.
Supersymmetric string theory can be expressed using loop quantum gravity [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: String theory, together with its supersymmetric particles, has recently been rewritten in the space-time described by loop quantum gravity (which says that space-time ust be made from finite chunks).
     From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 09)
String theory might be tested by colliding strings to make bigger 'stringballs' [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: A future accelerator might create 'stringballs', when two strings slam into one another and, rather than combining to form a stretched string, make a tangled ball. Finding them would prove string theory.
     From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 08)
     A reaction: This is the only possible test for string theory which I have seen suggested. How do you 'slam strings together'?
String theory offers a quantum theory of gravity, by describing the graviton [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: String theory works as a quantum theory of gravity because string vibrations can describe gravitons, the hypothetical carriers of the gravitational force.
     From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 09)
     A reaction: Presumably the main aim of a quantum theory of gravity is to include gravitons within particle theory. This idea has to be a main attraction of string theory. Compare Idea 21166.
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 5. Unified Models / c. Supersymmetry
Only supersymmetry offers to incorporate gravity into the scheme [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: Peter Higgs says he is a fan of supersymmetry, largely because it seems to be the only route by which gravity can be brought into the scheme.
     From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 03)
     A reaction: Peter Higgs proposed the Higgs boson (now discovered). This seems a very good reason to favour supersymmetry. A grand unified theory that left out gravity doesn't seem to be unified quite grandly enough.
Supersymmetry has extra heavy bosons and heavy fermions [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: Supersymmetry posits heavy boson partners for all fermions, and heavy fermions for all bosons.
     From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02)
     A reaction: The main Fermions are electron, proton and quark. Do extra bosons imply extra forces? Peter Higgs favours supersymmetry.
Supersymmetry says particles and superpartners were unities, but then split [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: The key to supersymmetry is that in the high-energy soup of the early universe, particles and their superpartners were indistinguishable. Each pair existed as single massless entities. With expansion and cooling this supersymmetry broke down.
     From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 08)
The evidence for supersymmetry keeps failing to appear [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: The old front-runner theory, supersymmetry, has fallen from grace as the Large Hadron Collider keeps failing to find it.
     From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 07)
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
Hilbert Space is an abstraction representing all possible states of a quantum system [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: The elements of the abstract mathematical entity called Hilbert Space represent all the possible states of a quantum system
     From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 1017.02.04)
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
Surfaces, lines and points are not, strictly speaking, parts of space, but 'limits', which are abstract [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Surfaces, lines and points are not, strictly speaking, parts of space at all, but just 'limits' of certain kinds, and as such 'abstract' entities.
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.254)
     A reaction: This is fairly crucial when dealing with Zeno's paradoxes. How many points in a line? How long to get through a point?
Points are limits of parts of space, so parts of space cannot be aggregates of them [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Points are limits of parts of space, in which case parts of space cannot be aggregates of them.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 3.9)
     A reaction: To try to build space out of points (how many per cc?) is fairly obviously asking for trouble, but Lowe articulates nicely why it is a non-starter.
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
The Higgs field means even low energy space is not empty [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: The point about the Higgs field is that even the lowest-energy state of space is not empty.
     From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02)
     A reaction: So where is the Higgs field located? Even if there is no utterly empty space, the concept of location implies a concept of space more basic than the fields (about 16, I gather) which occupy it. You can't describe movement without a concept of location.
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 5. Relational Space
If space is entirely relational, what makes a boundary, or a place unoccupied by physical objects? [Lowe]
     Full Idea: If space does not exist at all, but is only relations between objects, what could one possibly mean by saying that there is a place which is unoccupied by any material object? And what determines whether space is bounded?
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.264)
     A reaction: Correct. People who assert that space is only relational have been misled by what we can know about space, not what it is.
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
Space-time may be a geometrical manifestation of quantum entanglement [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: A promising theory (based on the 'Maldacena duality' - that string equations for gravity are the same as quantum equations for surface area) is that space-time is really just geometrical manifestations of quantum entanglement.
     From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2015.11.07)
     A reaction: This is a speculation which might unite the incompatible quantum and general relativity theories.
Einstein's merging of time with space has left us confused about the nature of time [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: Our hunt for the most basic ingredients of reality has left us muddled about the status of time. One culprit for this was Einstein, whose theory of general relativity merged time with space.
     From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2017.02.04)
Relativity makes time and space jointly basic; quantum theory splits them, and prioritises time [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: Relativity says space and time are on the same footing - together they are the fabric of reality. Quantum mechanics, on the other hand, treats time and space differently, with time occasionally seeming more fundamental.
     From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2013.06.15)
     A reaction: Interesting. When talking about time, people glibly cite relativistic space-time to tell you that time is just another dimension. Now I can reply 'Aaah, but what about time in quantum mechanics? Eh? Eh?'. Excellent.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Quantum theory relies on a clock outside the system - but where is it located? [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: After general relativity, quantum mechanics reinstated our familiar notion of time. The buzzing of the quantum world plays out according to the authoritative tick of a clock outside the described system, ...but where is this clock doing its ticking?
     From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2017.02.04)
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow
Entropy is puzzling, so we may need to build new laws which include time directionality [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: Smolin observes that if entropy increases, the early universe must have been highly ordered, which we cannot explain. Maybe we need to build time directionality into the laws, instead of making time depend on entropy.
     From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2017.02.04)
     A reaction: [compressed]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 7. Black Holes
General relativity predicts black holes, as former massive stars, and as galaxy centres [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: Black holes are predicted by general relativity, and are thought to exist where massive stars once lived, as well as at the heart of every galaxy.
     From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2013.06.15)
     A reaction: Since black holes now seem to be a certainty, that is one hell of an impressive prediction.
Black holes have entropy, but general relativity says they are unstructured, and lack entropy [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: Black holes have a temperature, and hence entropy. ...But if a black hole are just an extreme scrunching of smooth space-time, it should have no substructure, and thus no entropy. This is probably the most obvious incompleteness of general relativity.
     From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2015.11.07)
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 8. Dark Matter
84.5 percent of the universe is made of dark matter [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: Dark matter makes up 84.5 percent of the universe's matter.
     From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2013.10.29)
Dark matter must have mass, to produce gravity, and no electric charge, to not reflect light [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: Whatever dark matter is made of, it must have mass to feel and generate gravity; but no electric charge, so it does not interact with light. The leading candidate has been the weakly interacting massive particle (WIMP), much heavier than a proton.
     From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 08)
     A reaction: Note that it must 'generate' gravity. The idea of a law of gravity which is externally imposed on matter is long dead. Heavy WIMPs have not yet been detected.
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
We are halfway to synthesising any molecule we want [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: Ei-ichi Negishi (Nobel chemist of 2010) says 'the ultimate goal is to be able to synthesise any molecule we want. We are probably about halfway there'.
     From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2010.10.16)
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 3. Periodic Table
Chemistry just needs the periodic table, and protons, electrons and neutrinos [New Sci.]
     Full Idea: Ei-ichi Negishi (Nobel chemist of 2010) says 'I work with the periodic table in front of me at all times, and approach all challenges in terms of three particles, positively charged protons, negatively charged electrons, and neutral neutrinos'.
     From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2010.10.16)
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
God cannot experience unwanted pain, so God cannot understand human beings [Sorensen]
     Full Idea: Theologians worry that God may be an alien being. God cannot feel pain since pain is endured against one's will. God is all powerful and suffers nothing against His Will. To understand pain, one must experience pain. So God's power walls him off from us.
     From: Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], 3.2)
     A reaction: I can't think of a good theological reply to this. God, and Jesus too (presumably), can only experience pain if they volunteer for it. It is inconceivable that they could be desperate for it to stop, but were unable to achieve that.