Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Nicolas Malebranche, Benedetto Croce and R Martin / J Barresi

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9 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
Everything that exists is either a being, or some mode of a being [Malebranche]
     Full Idea: It is absolutely necessary that everything in the world be either a being or a mode [manière] of a being.
     From: Nicolas Malebranche (The Search After Truth [1675], III.2.8.ii), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 13.4
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
Maybe we should see persons in four dimensions, with stages or time-slices at an instant [Martin/Barresi]
     Full Idea: Some recent philosophers have argued that we should replace the three-dimensional view of persons with a four-dimensional view according to which only time-slices, or 'stages', of persons exist at short intervals of time.
     From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.3)
     A reaction: At first glance this seems to neatly eliminate lots of traditional worries. But why would I want to retain my identity, if someone threatened to brainwash me. I also want to disown my inadequate earlier selves. Interesting, though. Lewis.
Maybe personal identity is not vital in survival, and other continuations would suffice [Martin/Barresi]
     Full Idea: A modern question is whether personal identity is primarily what matters in survival; that is, people might cease and be continued by others whose continuation the original people would value as much.
     From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.3)
     A reaction: When put like this, the proposal seems hard to grasp. It only makes sense if you don't really believe in a thing called 'personal identity'. I don't see how you can believe in it without also believing that for you it has central importance.
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
Locke's intrinsic view of personal identity has been replaced by an externalist view [Martin/Barresi]
     Full Idea: In modern times the Lockean intrinsic relations view of personal identity has been superseded by an extrinsic relations view (also called the 'closest-continuer' or 'externalist' view).
     From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.1)
     A reaction: Sounds sweeping. My suspicion is that there is a raging fashion for externalist views of everything (justification, content etc.), but this will pass. I take Parfit to be the source of the modern views.
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 4. Art as Expression
The experience of expression and communication are intermingled in art [Croce]
     Full Idea: It is very difficult to perceive the frontier between expression and communication in actual fact, for the two processes usually alternate rapidly and are almost intermingled.
     From: Benedetto Croce (The Essence of Aesthetic [1912]), quoted by Gary Kemp - Croce and Collingwood
     A reaction: [text unsure] I think he is getting at seeing the painting (or whatever) as a physical object, and seeing it as the experience which results from the object. The alternation of the objective and subjective views. Reminds me of Thomas Nagel.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 1. Artistic Intentions
Historical interpretation aims to recapture the author's view of the work [Croce]
     Full Idea: Historical interpretation enables us to see a work of art as its author saw it in the moment of production.
     From: Benedetto Croce (Aesthetic as Science of Expression [1902], §II), quoted by W Wimsatt/W Beardsley - The Intentional Fallacy §II
     A reaction: Wimsatt and Beardsley quote this as the romantic antithesis of their own view, but there is a blurring between understanding a work and judging. Personally I consider intentions essential for understanding, and valuable for judgement.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
In a true cause we see a necessary connection [Malebranche]
     Full Idea: A true cause is one in which the mind perceives a necessary connection between the cause and its effect.
     From: Nicolas Malebranche (The Search After Truth [1675], 1.649 (450)), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 5
     A reaction: Presumably Hume was ignorant of 'true' causes, since he says he never saw this connection. But then is the perception done by the mind, or by the senses?
A true cause must involve a necessary connection between cause and effect [Malebranche]
     Full Idea: A true cause as I understand it is one such that the mind perceives a necessary connection between it and its effects.
     From: Nicolas Malebranche (The Union of Body and Soul [1675], p.116)
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
For Aristotle the psyche perishes with the body (except possibly 'nous') [Martin/Barresi]
     Full Idea: In Aristotle's view, with the possible exception of 'nous' the psyche and all its parts come into being at the same time as its associated body; it is inseparable from the body, and perishes along with it.
     From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.8)
     A reaction: It is suggested that he thought there was only one 'nous', which all humans share (p.9). If he wants to claim that one part is immortal, he doesn't have much evidence. If psyche is the form of the body, it is bound to perish.