Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Norman Malcolm, Berit Brogaard and Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G

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9 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory

13451	The two best understood conceptions of set are the Iterative and the Limitation of Size [Rayo/Uzquiano]
	Full Idea: The two best understood conceptions of set are the Iterative Conception and the Limitation of Size Conception.
	From: Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.2.2)

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / m. Axiom of Separation

13452	Some set theories give up Separation in exchange for a universal set [Rayo/Uzquiano]
	Full Idea: There are set theories that countenance exceptions to the Principle of Separation in exchange for a universal set.
	From: Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.2.2)

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification

13449	We could have unrestricted quantification without having an all-inclusive domain [Rayo/Uzquiano]
	Full Idea: The possibility of unrestricted quantification does not immediately presuppose the existence of an all-inclusive domain. One could deny an all-inclusive domain but grant that some quantifications are sometimes unrestricted.
	From: Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.1)
	A reaction: Thus you can quantify over anything you like, but only from what is available. Eat what you like (in this restaurant).

13450	Absolute generality is impossible, if there are indefinitely extensible concepts like sets and ordinals [Rayo/Uzquiano]
	Full Idea: There are doubts about whether absolute generality is possible, if there are certain concepts which are indefinitely extensible, lacking definite extensions, and yielding an ever more inclusive hierarchy. Sets and ordinals are paradigm cases.
	From: Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.2.1)

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification

13453	Perhaps second-order quantifications cover concepts of objects, rather than plain objects [Rayo/Uzquiano]
	Full Idea: If one thought of second-order quantification as quantification over first-level Fregean concepts [note: one under which only objects fall], talk of domains might be regimented as talk of first-level concepts, which are not objects.
	From: Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.2.2)
	A reaction: That is (I take it), don't quantify over objects, but quantify over concepts, but only those under which known objects fall. One might thus achieve naïve comprehension without paradoxes. Sound like fun.

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy

14644	If my conception of pain derives from me, it is a contradiction to speak of another's pain [Malcolm]
	Full Idea: If I obtain my conception of pain from pain that I experience, then it will be a part of my conception of pain that I am the only being that can experience it. For me it will be contradiction to speak of another's pain.
	From: Norman Malcolm (Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations' [1954]), quoted by Alvin Plantinga - De Re and De Dicto p.44
	A reaction: This obviously has the private language argument in the background. It seems to point towards a behaviourist view, that I derive pain from external behaviour in the first instance. So how do I connect the behaviour to the feeling?

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought

18424	If two people can have phenomenally identical experiences, they can't involve the self [Brogaard]
	Full Idea: It is plausible that you and I can have perceptual experiences with the same phenomenology of two trees at different distances from us (perhaps at different times). ..So our perceptual experiences cannot contain you or me in the content of representation.
	From: Berit Brogaard (Perceptual Content and Monadic Truth [2009], p.223), quoted by Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh - The Inessential Indexical 08.2
	A reaction: If you accept the example, which seems reasonable, then that pretty conclusively shows that perception is not inherently indexical.

19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning

13448	The domain of an assertion is restricted by context, either semantically or pragmatically [Rayo/Uzquiano]
	Full Idea: We generally take an assertion's domain of discourse to be implicitly restricted by context. [Note: the standard approach is that this restriction is a semantic phenomenon, but Kent Bach (2000) argues that it is a pragmatic phenomenon]
	From: Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.1)
	A reaction: I think Kent Bach is very very right about this. Follow any conversation, and ask what the domain is at any moment. The reference of a word like 'they' can drift across things, with no semantics to guide us, but only clues from context and common sense.

28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof

1422	God's existence is either necessary or impossible, and no one has shown that the concept of God is contradictory [Malcolm]
	Full Idea: God's existence is either impossible or necessary. It can be the former only if the concept of such a being is self-contradictory or in some way logically absurd. Assuming that this is not so, it follows that He necessarily exists.
	From: Norman Malcolm (Anselm's Argument [1959], §2)
	A reaction: The concept of God suggests paradoxes of omniscience, omnipotence and free will, so self-contradiction seems possible. How should we respond if the argument suggests God is necessary, but evidence suggests God is highly unlikely?