20 ideas
| 22189 | Why abandon a theory if you don't have a better one? [Gorham] |
| Full Idea: There is no sense in abandoning a successful theory if you have nothing to replace it with. | |
| From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 2) | |
| A reaction: This is also a problem for infererence to the best explanation. What to do if your best explanation is not very good? The simple message is do not rush to dump a theory when faced with an anomaly. |
| 22190 | If a theory is more informative it is less probable [Gorham] |
| Full Idea: Popper's theory implies that more informative theories seem to be less probable. | |
| From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 3) | |
| A reaction: [On p.75 Gorham replies to this objection] The point is that to be more testable they must be more detailed. He's not wrong. Theories are meant to be general, so they sweep up the details. But they need precise generalities and specifics. |
| 22192 | Is Newton simpler with universal simultaneity, or Einstein simpler without absolute time? [Gorham] |
| Full Idea: Is Newton's theory simpler than Einstein's, since there is only one relation of simultaneity in absolute time, or is Einstein's simpler because it dispenses with absolute time altogether? | |
| From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
| A reaction: A nice question, to which a good scientist might be willing to offer an answer. Since simultaneity is crucial but the existence of time is not, I would vote for Newton as the simpler. |
| 22194 | Structural Realism says mathematical structures persist after theory rejection [Gorham] |
| Full Idea: Structural Realists say that modern science achieves a true or 'truer' account of the world only with respect to its mathematical structure rather than its intrinsic qualities or nature. The structure carries over to new theories. | |
| From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
| A reaction: At first glance I am unconvinced that when an old theory is replaced it neverthess contains some sort of 'mathematical structure' which endures and is worth preserving. No doubt Worrall, French and co have examples. |
| 22195 | Structural Realists must show the mathematics is both crucial and separate [Gorham] |
| Full Idea: Structural Realists must show that it is the mathematical aspects of the theories, not their content, that account for their success ….and that their structure and content can be clearly separated. | |
| From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
| A reaction: Their approach certainly seems to rely on mathematical types of science, so it presumably fits biology, geology and even astronomy less well. |
| 22197 | Theories aren't just for organising present experience if they concern the past or future [Gorham] |
| Full Idea: The strangeness of interpreting theories as mere tools for organising present experience is brought out clearly in sciences like cosmology and paleontology, which largely concern events in the remote past or future. | |
| From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
| A reaction: Not conclusive. An anti-realist has to interpret those sciences in terms of the current observations that are available. |
| 22196 | For most scientists their concepts are not just useful, but are meant to be true and accurate [Gorham] |
| Full Idea: The main difficulty with instrumentalism is its implausible account ot the meaning of theoretical claims and concepts. Most scientists take them to be straightforward attempts to describe the world. Most say they are useful because they are accurate. | |
| From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
| A reaction: Instrumentalism is seen as a Pragmatist view, and Dewey is cited. |
| 22193 | Consilience makes the component sciences more likely [Gorham] |
| Full Idea: The more unification and integration is found among the modern sciences, the less likely it seems it will have all been a dream. | |
| From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
| A reaction: I believe this strongly. Ancient theories which were complex, wide ranging and false do not impress me. This is part of my coherence view of justification. |
| 14644 | If my conception of pain derives from me, it is a contradiction to speak of another's pain [Malcolm] |
| Full Idea: If I obtain my conception of pain from pain that I experience, then it will be a part of my conception of pain that I am the only being that can experience it. For me it will be contradiction to speak of another's pain. | |
| From: Norman Malcolm (Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations' [1954]), quoted by Alvin Plantinga - De Re and De Dicto p.44 | |
| A reaction: This obviously has the private language argument in the background. It seems to point towards a behaviourist view, that I derive pain from external behaviour in the first instance. So how do I connect the behaviour to the feeling? |
| 7127 | If men are good you should keep promises, but they aren't, so you needn't [Machiavelli] |
| Full Idea: If all men were good, promising-breaking would not be good, but because they are bad and do not keep their promises to you, you likewise do not have to keep yours to them. | |
| From: Niccolo Machiavelli (The Prince [1513], Ch.18) | |
| A reaction: A rather depressing proposal to get your promise-breaking in first, based on the pessimistic view that people cannot be improved. The subsequent history of ethics in Europe showed Machiavelli to be wrong. Gentlemen began to keep their word. |
| 6309 | The principle foundations of all states are good laws and good armies [Machiavelli] |
| Full Idea: The principle foundations of all states are good laws and good armies. | |
| From: Niccolo Machiavelli (The Prince [1513], Ch.11) | |
| A reaction: We may be wondering, since 1945, whether a good army is any longer essential, but it would be a foolish modern state which didn't at least form a strong alliance with a state which had a strong army. Fertile land is a huge benefit to a state. |
| 6306 | People are vengeful, so be generous to them, or destroy them [Machiavelli] |
| Full Idea: Men should be either treated generously or destroyed, because they take revenge for slight injuries. | |
| From: Niccolo Machiavelli (The Prince [1513], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: This sounds like good advice, and works quite well in school teaching too. It seems like advice drawn from the growth of the Roman Empire, rather than from dealing with sophisticated and educated people. |
| 6305 | To retain a conquered state, wipe out the ruling family, and preserve everything else [Machiavelli] |
| Full Idea: If a ruler acquires a state and is determined to keep it, he observes two cautions: he wipes out the family of their long-established princes; and he does not change either their laws or their taxes; in a short time they will unite with his old princedom. | |
| From: Niccolo Machiavelli (The Prince [1513], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: This nicely illustrates the firmness of purpose for which Machiavelli has become a byword. The question is whether Machiavelli had enough empirical evidence to support this induction. The British in India seem to have been successful without it. |
| 6308 | A sensible conqueror does all his harmful deeds immediately, because people soon forget [Machiavelli] |
| Full Idea: A prudent conqueror makes a list of all the harmful deeds he must do, and does them all at once, so that he need not repeat them every day, which then makes men feel secure, and gains their support by treating them well. | |
| From: Niccolo Machiavelli (The Prince [1513], Ch.8) | |
| A reaction: This might work for a new government in a democracy, or a new boss in a business. It sounds horribly true; dreadful deeds done a long time ago can be completely forgotten, as when reformed criminals become celebrities. |
| 6307 | A desire to conquer, and men who do it, are always praised, or not blamed [Machiavelli] |
| Full Idea: It is very natural and normal to wish to conquer, and when men do it who can, they always will be praised, or not blamed. | |
| From: Niccolo Machiavelli (The Prince [1513], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: This view seems shocking to us, but it seems to me that this was a widely held view up until the time of Nietzsche, but came to a swift end with the invention of the machine gun in about 1885, followed by the heavy bomber and atomic bomb. |
| 7486 | Machiavelli emancipated politics from religion [Machiavelli, by Watson] |
| Full Idea: Machiavelli emancipated politics from religion. | |
| From: report of Niccolo Machiavelli (The Prince [1513]) by Peter Watson - Ideas Ch.24 | |
| A reaction: Interestingly, he seems to have done it by saying that ideals are irrelevant to politics, but gradually secular ideals crept back in (sometimes disastrously). A balance needs to be struck on idealism. |
| 19813 | All legislators invoke God in support of extraordinary laws, because their justification is not obvious [Machiavelli] |
| Full Idea: There has never been a single legislator who, in proposing extraordinary laws, did not have recourse to God, for otherwise they would not be accepted, since many benefits known to a prudent man do not have evident persuasive reasons. | |
| From: Niccolo Machiavelli (The Discourses [1520], 1.11), quoted by Jean-Jacques Rousseau - The Social Contract (tr Cress) II.7 n8 | |
| A reaction: It does seem to be an important role for God and state religion, to give support to decisions and laws which might not be intrinsically popular. |
| 7126 | Rulers should preserve the foundations of religion, to ensure good behaviour and unity [Machiavelli] |
| Full Idea: It is the duty of the rulers of a republic or a kingdom to preserve the foundations of the religion they hold; if they do this, it will be an easy thing for them to keep their state religious, and consequently good and united. | |
| From: Niccolo Machiavelli (The Discourses [1520], I.12) | |
| A reaction: This is the germ of Marx's view, that the sole role of religion is political, as a tool used by the ruling classes to keep the populace in their place. The same idea can be found in Critias (Idea 542). But what is wrong with some central moral guidance? |
| 22198 | Aristotelian physics has circular celestial motion and linear earthly motion [Gorham] |
| Full Idea: Aristotelian physics assumed that celestial motion is naturally circular and eternal while terrestrial motion is naturally toward the center of the earth and final. | |
| From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
| A reaction: The overthrow of this by Galileo and then Newton may have been the most dramatic revolution of the new science. It opened up the possibility of universal laws of physics. |
| 1422 | God's existence is either necessary or impossible, and no one has shown that the concept of God is contradictory [Malcolm] |
| Full Idea: God's existence is either impossible or necessary. It can be the former only if the concept of such a being is self-contradictory or in some way logically absurd. Assuming that this is not so, it follows that He necessarily exists. | |
| From: Norman Malcolm (Anselm's Argument [1959], §2) | |
| A reaction: The concept of God suggests paradoxes of omniscience, omnipotence and free will, so self-contradiction seems possible. How should we respond if the argument suggests God is necessary, but evidence suggests God is highly unlikely? |