14 ideas
9254 | In philosophy the truth can only be reached via the ruins of the false [Prichard] |
Full Idea: In philosophy the truth can only be reached via the ruins of the false. | |
From: H.A. Prichard (What is the Basis of Moral Obligation? [1925]) | |
A reaction: A lovely remark! In a flash you suddenly see why philosophers expend such vast energy on such unpromising views of reality (e.g. idealism, panpsychism). This might be the best definition of philosophy I have yet discovered. |
9198 | It is no longer possible to be a sage, but we can practice the exercise of wisdom [Hadot] |
Full Idea: Personally I firmly believe, perhaps naively, that it is possible for modern man to live, not as a sage (sophos) - most of the ancients did not hold this to be possible - but as a practitioner of the ever-fragile exercise of wisdom. | |
From: Pierre Hadot (Philosophy as a way of life [1987], 7) | |
A reaction: It seems to me quite plausible that the philosophical life might yet become a widespread ideal, even though philosophers seem to still be sheltering from storms two thousand years after Plato gave us that image. |
9197 | The logos represents a demand for universal rationality [Hadot] |
Full Idea: The logos represents a demand for universal rationality. | |
From: Pierre Hadot (Philosophy as a way of life [1987], 3.3) | |
A reaction: That is at one end of the spectrum. At the other, in parts of 'Theaetetus', it is just a polite request to be given a few reasons, instead of a splattering of hopes and prejudices. |
14644 | If my conception of pain derives from me, it is a contradiction to speak of another's pain [Malcolm] |
Full Idea: If I obtain my conception of pain from pain that I experience, then it will be a part of my conception of pain that I am the only being that can experience it. For me it will be contradiction to speak of another's pain. | |
From: Norman Malcolm (Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations' [1954]), quoted by Alvin Plantinga - De Re and De Dicto p.44 | |
A reaction: This obviously has the private language argument in the background. It seems to point towards a behaviourist view, that I derive pain from external behaviour in the first instance. So how do I connect the behaviour to the feeling? |
9261 | The 'Ethics' is disappointing, because it fails to try to justify our duties [Prichard] |
Full Idea: Reading the 'Ethics' is so disappointing, because Aristotle does not try to convince us that we really ought to do what our non-reflective consciousness has hitherto believed we ought to do. | |
From: H.A. Prichard (Does moral phil rest on a mistake? [1912]) | |
A reaction: Aristotle didn't speak the language of 'duty' (see Idea 2172), but he could work it into his account if Prichard asked nicely. I take the truly virtuous person to be, above all, a wonderful citizen. Duties are contractual; good deeds flow from virtue. |
9196 | The pleasure of existing is the only genuine pleasure [Hadot] |
Full Idea: For epicureans, the only genuine pleasure there is is the pleasure of existing. | |
From: Pierre Hadot (Philosophy as a way of life [1987], 3.1) | |
A reaction: I don't know Hadot's source for this claim, but it is a nice idea, which I shall endeavour to incorporate into my own attitude to daily living. I'm not quite clear, though, why the pleasure of music is not a 'genuine' one. |
9262 | The mistake is to think we can prove what can only be seen directly in moral thinking [Prichard] |
Full Idea: Moral Philosophy rests on the mistake of supposing the possibility of proving what can only be apprehended directly by an act of moral thinking. | |
From: H.A. Prichard (Does moral phil rest on a mistake? [1912]) | |
A reaction: This is a beginning of the rebellion against the Enlightenment Project in ethics, which is why Prichard has become popular. At bottom he is offering intuition ('direct moral thinking'), which is a frustratingly thin concept. |
9256 | I see the need to pay a debt in a particular instance, and any instance will do [Prichard] |
Full Idea: How can I be brought to see the truth of the principle of paying a debt except in connection with a particular instance? For this purpose any instance will do. If I cannot see that I ought to pay this debt, I shall not see that I ought to a debt. | |
From: H.A. Prichard (What is the Basis of Moral Obligation? [1925]) | |
A reaction: This isn't quite particularism, which would (I think) say that the degree of obligation will never be quite the same in any two situations, and so one instance will not suffice to understand the duty. |
9257 | The complexities of life make it almost impossible to assess morality from a universal viewpoint [Prichard] |
Full Idea: Owing to the complication of human relations, the problem of what one ought to do from the point of view of life as a whole is one of intense difficulty. | |
From: H.A. Prichard (What is the Basis of Moral Obligation? [1925]) | |
A reaction: I suspect that the difficulty is not the problems engendered by complexity, but that there is no answer available from the most objective point of view. Morality simply is a matter of how daily life is conducted, with medium-term goals only. |
9260 | Virtues won't generate an obligation, so it isn't a basis for morality [Prichard] |
Full Idea: It is untrue to urge that, since courage is a virtue, we ought to act courageously. We feel an obligation to act, but not from a certain desire. The action is done from obligation, so isn't an act of courage. ..In fact, virtue is no basis for morality. | |
From: H.A. Prichard (Does moral phil rest on a mistake? [1912]) | |
A reaction: One of the few interesting and direct attacks on virtue theory, before its modern revival. Prichard urges a perception of what is valuable (or good) as the basis for obligation and right action. He is right that values come first, in virtue and elsewhere. |
9259 | We feel obligations to overcome our own failings, and these are not relations to other people [Prichard] |
Full Idea: The relation involved in an obligation need not be a relation to another at all. Thus we should admit that there is an obligation to overcome our natural timidity or greediness, and this involves no relations to others. | |
From: H.A. Prichard (Does moral phil rest on a mistake? [1912]) | |
A reaction: An interesting un-Aristotelian and individualistic view of virtue. Why would we want to rid ourselves of timidity or greediness? Either it is self-interested, or we wish to be better citizens. See Richard Taylor on duty. |
9255 | Seeing the goodness of an effect creates the duty to produce it, not the desire [Prichard] |
Full Idea: The appreciation of the goodness of the effect is different from desire for the effect, and will originate not the desire but the sense of obligation to produce it. | |
From: H.A. Prichard (What is the Basis of Moral Obligation? [1925]) | |
A reaction: A wonderful rebuttal of Hume, and a much better account of duty than Kant's idea that it arises from reason. Perception of value is what generates duty. And (with Frankfurt) we may say that love is what generates value. |
9258 | If pain were instrinsically wrong, it would be immoral to inflict it on ourselves [Prichard] |
Full Idea: If the badness of pain were the reason why we ought not to inflict pain on another, it would equally be a reason why we ought not to inflict pain on ourselves; yet, though we would call such behaviour foolish, we wouldn't think it wrong. | |
From: H.A. Prichard (Does moral phil rest on a mistake? [1912], n4) | |
A reaction: A very nice point. Note that it will equally well apply to 'benefit' or 'preferences', or any other ideal which utilitarians set out to maximise. It may not be bad to hurt yourself, but it might still be bad to harm yourself. |
1422 | God's existence is either necessary or impossible, and no one has shown that the concept of God is contradictory [Malcolm] |
Full Idea: God's existence is either impossible or necessary. It can be the former only if the concept of such a being is self-contradictory or in some way logically absurd. Assuming that this is not so, it follows that He necessarily exists. | |
From: Norman Malcolm (Anselm's Argument [1959], §2) | |
A reaction: The concept of God suggests paradoxes of omniscience, omnipotence and free will, so self-contradiction seems possible. How should we respond if the argument suggests God is necessary, but evidence suggests God is highly unlikely? |