6 ideas
14644 | If my conception of pain derives from me, it is a contradiction to speak of another's pain [Malcolm] |
Full Idea: If I obtain my conception of pain from pain that I experience, then it will be a part of my conception of pain that I am the only being that can experience it. For me it will be contradiction to speak of another's pain. | |
From: Norman Malcolm (Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations' [1954]), quoted by Alvin Plantinga - De Re and De Dicto p.44 | |
A reaction: This obviously has the private language argument in the background. It seems to point towards a behaviourist view, that I derive pain from external behaviour in the first instance. So how do I connect the behaviour to the feeling? |
18088 | Intentionality is the mark of dispositions, not of the mental [Place] |
Full Idea: My thesis is that intentionality is the mark, not of the mental, but of the dispositional. | |
From: Ullin T. Place (Intentionality and the Physical: reply to Mumford [1999], 1) | |
A reaction: An idea with few friends, but I really like it, because it offers the prospect of a unified account of physical nature and the mind/brain. It seems reasonable to say my mind is essentially a bunch of dispositions. Mind is representations + dispositions. |
20422 | The experience of expression and communication are intermingled in art [Croce] |
Full Idea: It is very difficult to perceive the frontier between expression and communication in actual fact, for the two processes usually alternate rapidly and are almost intermingled. | |
From: Benedetto Croce (The Essence of Aesthetic [1912]), quoted by Gary Kemp - Croce and Collingwood | |
A reaction: [text unsure] I think he is getting at seeing the painting (or whatever) as a physical object, and seeing it as the experience which results from the object. The alternation of the objective and subjective views. Reminds me of Thomas Nagel. |
7270 | Historical interpretation aims to recapture the author's view of the work [Croce] |
Full Idea: Historical interpretation enables us to see a work of art as its author saw it in the moment of production. | |
From: Benedetto Croce (Aesthetic as Science of Expression [1902], §II), quoted by W Wimsatt/W Beardsley - The Intentional Fallacy §II | |
A reaction: Wimsatt and Beardsley quote this as the romantic antithesis of their own view, but there is a blurring between understanding a work and judging. Personally I consider intentions essential for understanding, and valuable for judgement. |
18089 | Dispositions are not general laws, but laws of the natures of individual entities [Place] |
Full Idea: Dispositions are the substantive laws, not, as for Armstrong, of nature in general, but of the nature of individual entities whose dispositional properties they are. | |
From: Ullin T. Place (Intentionality and the Physical: reply to Mumford [1999], 6) | |
A reaction: [He notes that Nancy Cartwright 1989 agrees with him] I like this a lot. I tend to denegrate 'laws', because of their dubious ontological status, but this restores laws to the picture, in the place where they belong, in the stuff of the world. |
1422 | God's existence is either necessary or impossible, and no one has shown that the concept of God is contradictory [Malcolm] |
Full Idea: God's existence is either impossible or necessary. It can be the former only if the concept of such a being is self-contradictory or in some way logically absurd. Assuming that this is not so, it follows that He necessarily exists. | |
From: Norman Malcolm (Anselm's Argument [1959], §2) | |
A reaction: The concept of God suggests paradoxes of omniscience, omnipotence and free will, so self-contradiction seems possible. How should we respond if the argument suggests God is necessary, but evidence suggests God is highly unlikely? |