111 ideas
19579 | The history of philosophy is just experiments in how to do philosophy [Novalis] |
Full Idea: The history of philosophy up to now is nothing but a history of attempts to discover how to do philosophy. | |
From: Novalis (Logological Fragments I [1798], 01) | |
A reaction: I take post-Fregean analytic metaphysics to be another experiment in how to do philosophy. I suspect that the experiment of Husserl, Heidegger, Derrida etc has been a failure. |
19583 | Philosophy only begins when it studies itself [Novalis] |
Full Idea: All philosophy begins where philosophizing philosophises itself. | |
From: Novalis (Logological Fragments I [1798], 79) | |
A reaction: The modern trend for doing metaphilosophy strikes me as wholly admirable, though I suspect that the enemies of philosophy (who are legion) see it as a decadence. |
22026 | Philosophy is homesickness - the urge to be at home everywhere [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Philosophy is actually homesickness - the urge to be everywhere at home. | |
From: Novalis (General Draft [1799], 45) | |
A reaction: The idea of home [heimat] is powerful in German culture. The point of romanticism was seen as largely concerning restless souls like Byron and his heroes, who do not feel at home. Hence ironic detachment. |
19588 | The highest aim of philosophy is to combine all philosophies into a unity [Novalis] |
Full Idea: He attains the maximum of a philosopher who combines all philosophies into a single philosophy | |
From: Novalis (Logological Fragments II [1798], 31) | |
A reaction: I have found the epigraph for my big book! Recently a few narrowly analytical philosophers have attempted big books about everything (Sider, Heil, Chalmers), and they get a huge round of applause from me. |
19598 | Philosophy relies on our whole system of learning, and can thus never be complete [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Now all learning is connected - thus philosophy will never be complete. Only in the complete system of all learning will philosophy be truly visible. | |
From: Novalis (Logological Fragments II [1798], 39) | |
A reaction: Philosophy is evidently the unifying subject, which reveals the point of all the other subjects. It matches my maxim that 'science is the servant of philosophy'. |
19586 | Philosophers feed on problems, hoping they are digestible, and spiced with paradox [Novalis] |
Full Idea: The philosopher lives on problems as the human being does on food. An insoluble problem is an indigestible food. What spice is to food, the paradoxical is to problems. | |
From: Novalis (Logological Fragments II [1798], 09) | |
A reaction: Novalis would presumably have disliked Hegel's dialectic, where the best food seems to be the indigestible. |
21634 | Metaphysics is (supposedly) first the ontology, then in general what things are like [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Metaphysics can be divided into two parts: first ontology, which is supposed to tell us what there is in general. The second part is the rest of metaphysics, which is supposed to tell us what these things are like, in various general ways. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 01.1) | |
A reaction: Hofweber is a fairly sceptical guide to metaphysics, but this has been the standard view for the last decade. Before that, Quine had set an agenda of mere ontology. |
19587 | Philosophy aims to produce a priori an absolute and artistic world system [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Philosophy ...is the art of producing all our conceptions according to an absolute, artistic idea and of developing the thought of a world system a priori out of the depths of our spirit. | |
From: Novalis (Logological Fragments II [1798], 19) | |
A reaction: A lovely statement of the dream of building world systems by pure thought - embodying perfectly the view of philosophy despised by logical positivists and modern logical metaphysicians. The Novalis view will never die! I like 'artistic'. |
16415 | Esoteric metaphysics aims to be top science, investigating ultimate reality [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Esoteric metaphysics appeals to those, I conjecture, who deep down hold that philosophy is the queen of sciences after all, since it investigates what the world is REALLY like. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ambitious, yet modest, Metaphysics [2009], 2) | |
A reaction: He mentions Kit Fine and Jonathan Schaffer as esoteric metaphysicians. I see a pyramid of increasing generality and abstraction, with metaphysics at the top. This doesn't make it 'queen', though, because uncertainties multiply higher up. |
22611 | Metaphysics can criticise interpretations of science theories, and give good feedback [Ingthorsson] |
Full Idea: Metaphysics is capable of critical scrutiny of the way the empirical sciences make sense of their own theories, and can provide them with very useful feedback. | |
From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 1.9) | |
A reaction: I agree with this, but I don't think it is the main job of metaphysics, which has its own agenda, using science as some of its raw material. |
16413 | Science has discovered properties of things, so there are properties - so who needs metaphysics? [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Material science has found that some features of metals make them more susceptible to corrosion but more resistant to fracture. Thus this immediately implies that there are features, i.e. properties. What is left for metaphysics to do? | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ambitious, yet modest, Metaphysics [2009], 1.1) | |
A reaction: Presumably economists have discovered 'features' of economies that cause unemployment, and literary critics have discovered 'features' of novels that make them good. |
21666 | 'Fundamentality' is either a superficial idea, or much too obscure [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: The dilemma of neo-Aristotelian metaphysics is that on an ordinary reading of prioriy, 'fundamentality' won't give the intended results, and on a metaphysical reading it turns into esoteric metaphysics. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 13.4.2) | |
A reaction: Hofweber is hostile to 'esoteric' metaphysics, but sympathetic to 'egalitarian' metaphysics, which anyone can understand (with a bit of effort). |
19574 | If man sacrifices truth he sacrifices himself, by acting against his own convictions [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Man has his being in truth - if he sacrifices truth he sacrifices himself. Whoever betrays truth betrays himself. It is not a question of lying - but of acting against one's conviction. | |
From: Novalis (Miscellaneous Observations [1798], 038) | |
A reaction: Does he condone lying here, as long as you don't believe the lie? We would call it loss of integrity. |
19571 | Delusion and truth differ in their life functions [Novalis] |
Full Idea: The distinction between delusion and truth lies in the difference in their life functions. | |
From: Novalis (Miscellaneous Observations [1798], 008) | |
A reaction: Pure pragmatism, it seems. We might expect doubts about objective truth from a leading light of the Romantic movement. |
21640 | 'It's true that Fido is a dog' conjures up a contrast class, of 'it's false' or 'it's unlikely' [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: 'It's true that Fido is a dog' gives rise to a contrastive focus on 'true', with the contrast class probably depending on members like 'it's false that...' or 'it's unlikely that...'. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 02.6.3) | |
A reaction: If we introduce (from linguistics) the idea of a 'contrast class', then Ramsey's famous example begins to sound meaningful. It might occur in a discussion of 'did Antony actually say 'Friends, Romans. countrymen'?' |
17990 | Instances of minimal truth miss out propositions inexpressible in current English [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: A standard objection to minimalist truth is the 'incompleteness objection'. Since there are propositions inexpressible in present English the concept of truth isn't captured by all the instances of the Tarski biconditional. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Inexpressible Properties and Propositions [2006], 5.3) | |
A reaction: Sounds like a good objection. |
22609 | Philosophers accepted first-order logic, because they took science to be descriptive, not explanatory [Ingthorsson] |
Full Idea: First-order predicate logic was accepted so easily by the philosophical community …because philosophy was already geared toward a neo-Humean view of both science and philosophy as primarily descriptive rather than explanatory. | |
From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 1.8) | |
A reaction: The point, I think, is that explanatory thinking needs second-order logic, where the properties (or powers) are players in the game, and not just adjuncts of the catalogue of objects. I find this idea mind-expanding. (That's a good thing). |
21657 | Since properties can have properties, some theorists rank them in 'types' [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Since properties themselves can have properties there is a well-known division in the theory of properties between those who take a typed and those who take a type-free approach. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 08.5) | |
A reaction: I take this idea to be about linguistic predicates, and about semantics which draws on model theory. To see it as about actual 'properties' in the physical world makes no sense. |
19597 | Logic (the theory of relations) should be applied to mathematics [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Ought not logic, the theory of relations, be applied to mathematics? | |
From: Novalis (Logological Fragments II [1798], 38) | |
A reaction: Bolzano was 19 when his was written. I presume Novalis would have been excited by set theory (even though he was a hyper-romantic). |
21653 | Maybe not even names are referential, but are just by used by speakers to refer [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: A more radical alternative which takes names not to be referring even in the broader sense, but only takes speakers to refer with uses of names. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 08.1) | |
A reaction: Given that you can make up nicknames and silly nonce names for people, this seems plausible. I may say a name in a crowded room and three people look up. |
10001 | An adjective contributes semantically to a noun phrase [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: The semantic value of a determiner (an adjective) is a function from semantic values to nouns to semantic values of full noun phrases. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Number Determiners, Numbers, Arithmetic [2005], §3.1) | |
A reaction: This kind of states the obvious (assuming one has a compositional view of sentences), but his point is that you can't just eliminate adjectival uses of numbers by analysing them away, as if they didn't do anything. |
21636 | 'Singular terms' are not found in modern linguistics, and are not the same as noun phrases [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Being a 'singular term' is not a category in contemporary syntactic theory and it doesn't correspond to any of the notions employed there like that of a singular noun phrase or the like. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 02.3) | |
A reaction: Hofweber has researched such things. This is an important objection to the reliance of modern Fregeans on the ontological commitments of singular terms (as proof that there are 'mathematical objects'). |
21637 | If two processes are said to be identical, that doesn't make their terms refer to entities [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Identity between objects occurs in 'How Mary makes a chocolate cake is identical to how my grandfather used to make it', but does this show that 'how Mary makes a chocolate cake' aims to pick out an entity? | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 02.3) | |
A reaction: This is a counterexample to the Fregean thought that the criterion for the existence of the referent of a singular term is its capacity to participate in an identity relation. Defenders of the Fregean view are aware of such examples. |
16416 | The quantifier in logic is not like the ordinary English one (which has empty names, non-denoting terms etc) [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: The inferential role of the existential quantifier in first order logic does not carry over to the existential quantifier in English (we have empty names, singular terms that are not even in the business of denoting, and so on). | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ambitious, yet modest, Metaphysics [2009], 2) |
21643 | The inferential quantifier focuses on truth; the domain quantifier focuses on reality [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: When we ask 'is there a number?' in its inferential role (or internalist) reading, then we ask whether or not there is a true instance of 't is a number'. When we ask in its domain conditions (externalist) reading, we ask if the world contains a number. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 03.6) | |
A reaction: Hofweber's key distinction. The distinction between making truth prior and making reference prior is intriguing and important. The internalist version is close to substitutional quantification. Only the externalist view needs robust reference. |
10007 | Quantifiers for domains and for inference come apart if there are no entities [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Quantifiers have two functions in communication - to range over a domain of entities, and to have an inferential role (e.g. F(t)→'something is F'). In ordinary language these two come apart for singular terms not standing for any entities. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Number Determiners, Numbers, Arithmetic [2005], §6.3) | |
A reaction: This simple observations seems to me to be wonderfully illuminating of a whole raft of problems, the sort which logicians get steamed up about, and ordinary speakers don't. Context is the key to 90% of philosophical difficulties (?). See Idea 10008. |
17988 | Quantification can't all be substitutional; some reference is obviously to objects [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: The view that all quantification is substitutional is not very plausible in general. Some uses of quantifiers clearly seem to have the function to make a claim about a domain of objects out there, no matter how they relate to the terms in our language. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Inexpressible Properties and Propositions [2006], 2.1) | |
A reaction: Robust realists like myself are hardly going to say that quantification is just an internal language game. |
19581 | A problem is a solid mass, which the mind must break up [Novalis] |
Full Idea: A problem is a solid, synthetic mass which is broken up by means of the penetrating power of the mind. | |
From: Novalis (Logological Fragments I [1798], 04) |
10002 | '2 + 2 = 4' can be read as either singular or plural [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: There are two ways to read to read '2 + 2 = 4', as singular ('two and two is four'), and as plural ('two and two are four'). | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Number Determiners, Numbers, Arithmetic [2005], §4.1) | |
A reaction: Hofweber doesn't notice that this phenomenon occurs elsewhere in English. 'The team is playing well', or 'the team are splitting up'; it simply depends whether you are holding the group in though as an entity, or as individuals. Important for numbers. |
21644 | Numbers are used as singular terms, as adjectives, and as symbols [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Number words have a singular term use, and adjectival (or determiner) use, and the symbolic use. The main question is how they relate to each other. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 05.1) | |
A reaction: Thus 'the number four is even', 'there are four moons', and '4 comes after 3'. |
21646 | The Amazonian Piraha language is said to have no number words [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: The now famous Piraha language, of the Amazon region in Brazil, allegedly has no number words. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 05.6) | |
A reaction: Two groups can be shown to be of equal cardinality, by one-to-one matching rather than by counting. They could get by using 'equals' (and maybe unequally bigger and unequally smaller), and intuitive feelings for sizes of groups. |
9998 | What is the relation of number words as singular-terms, adjectives/determiners, and symbols? [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: There are three different uses of the number words: the singular-term use (as in 'the number of moons of Jupiter is four'), the adjectival (or determiner) use (as in 'Jupiter has four moons'), and the symbolic use (as in '4'). How are they related? | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Number Determiners, Numbers, Arithmetic [2005], §1) | |
A reaction: A classic philosophy of language approach to the problem - try to give the truth-conditions for all three types. The main problem is that the first one implies that numbers are objects, whereas the others do not. Why did Frege give priority to the first? |
19584 | Whoever first counted to two must have seen the possibility of infinite counting [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Whoever first understood how to count to two, even if he still found it difficult to keep on counting, saw nonetheless the possibility of infinite counting according to the same laws. | |
From: Novalis (Logological Fragments I [1798], 84) | |
A reaction: Presumably it is the discerning of the 'law' which triggers this. Is the key concept 'addition' or 'successor' (or are those the same?). |
21665 | The fundamental theorem of arithmetic is that all numbers are composed uniquely of primes [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: The prime numbers are more fundamental than the even numbers, and than the composite non-prime numbers. The result that all numbers uniquely decompose into a product of prime numbers is called the 'Fundamental Theorem of Arithmetic'. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 13.4.2) | |
A reaction: I could have used this example in my thesis, which defended the view that essences are the fundamentals of explanation, even in abstract theoretical realms. |
21649 | How can words be used for counting if they are objects? [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Number words as singular terms seem to refer to objects; numbers words in determiner or adjectival position are tied to counting. How these objects are related to counting is what the application problem is about. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 06.1.3) | |
A reaction: You can't use stones for counting, so there must be more to numbers than the announcement that they are 'objects'. They seem to have internal relations, which makes them unusual objects. |
10003 | Why is arithmetic hard to learn, but then becomes easy? [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Why is arithmetic so hard to learn, and why does it seem so easy to us now? For example, subtracting 789 from 26,789. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Number Determiners, Numbers, Arithmetic [2005], §4.2) | |
A reaction: His answer that we find thinking about objects very easy, but as children we have to learn with difficulty the conversion of the determiner/adjectival number words, so that we come to think of them as objects. |
10008 | Arithmetic is not about a domain of entities, as the quantifiers are purely inferential [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: I argue for an internalist conception of arithmetic. Arithmetic is not about a domain of entities, not even quantified entities. Quantifiers over natural numbers occur in their inferential-role reading in which they merely generalize over the instances. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Number Determiners, Numbers, Arithmetic [2005], §6.3) | |
A reaction: Hofweber offers the hope that modern semantics can disentangle the confusions in platonist arithmetic. Very interesting. The fear is that after digging into the semantics for twenty years, you find the same old problems re-emerging at a lower level. |
10005 | Arithmetic doesn’t simply depend on objects, since it is true of fictional objects [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: That 'two dogs are more than one' is clearly true, but its truth doesn't depend on the existence of dogs, as is seen if we consider 'two unicorns are more than one', which is true even though there are no unicorns. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Number Determiners, Numbers, Arithmetic [2005], §6.2) | |
A reaction: This is an objection to crude empirical accounts of arithmetic, but the idea would be that there is a generalisation drawn from objects (dogs will do nicely), which then apply to any entities. If unicorns are entities, it will be true of them. |
10000 | We might eliminate adjectival numbers by analysing them into blocks of quantifiers [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Determiner uses of number words may disappear on analysis. This is inspired by Russell's elimination of the word 'the'. The number becomes blocks of first-order quantifiers at the level of semantic representation. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Number Determiners, Numbers, Arithmetic [2005], §2) | |
A reaction: [compressed] The proposal comes from platonists, who argue that numbers cannot be analysed away if they are objects. Hofweber says the analogy with Russell is wrong, as 'the' can't occur in different syntactic positions, the way number words can. |
21647 | Logicism makes sense of our ability to know arithmetic just by thought [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Frege's tying the objectivity of arithmetic to the objectivity of logic makes sense of the fact that can find out about arithmetic by thinking alone. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 06.1.1) | |
A reaction: This assumes that logic is entirely a priori. We might compare the geometry of land surfaces with 'pure' geometry. If numbers are independent objects, it is unclear how we could have any a priori knowledge of them. |
21648 | Neo-Fregeans are dazzled by a technical result, and ignore practicalities [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: A major flaw of the neo-Fregean program is that it is more impressed by the technical result that Peano Arithmetic can be interpreted by second-order logic plus Hume's Principle, than empirical considerations about how numbers come about. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 06.1.3) | |
A reaction: This doesn't sound like a problem that would bother Fregeans or neo-Fregeans much. Deriving the Peano Axioms from various beginnings has become a parlour game for modern philosophers of mathematics. |
10006 | First-order logic captures the inferential relations of numbers, but not the semantics [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Representing arithmetic formally we do not primarily care about semantic features of number words. We are interested in capturing the inferential relations of arithmetical statements to one another, which can be done elegantly in first-order logic. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Number Determiners, Numbers, Arithmetic [2005], §6.3) | |
A reaction: This begins to pinpoint the difference between the approach of logicists like Frege, and those who are interested in the psychology of numbers, and the empirical roots of numbers in the process of counting. |
22025 | Novalis thought self-consciousness cannot disclose 'being', because we are temporal creatures [Novalis, by Pinkard] |
Full Idea: Novalis came to think that the kind of existence , or 'being', that is disclosed in self-consciousness remains, as it were, forever out of our reach because of the kind of temporal creatures we are. | |
From: report of Novalis (Logological Fragments I [1798]) by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 06 | |
A reaction: It looks here as if Novalis kicked Heidegger's Dasein into the long grass before it even got started, but maybe they have different notions of 'being', with Novalis seeking timeless being, and Heidegger, influenced by Bergson, accepting temporality. |
22629 | Basic processes are said to be either physical, or organic, or psychological [Ingthorsson] |
Full Idea: Process philosophy is considered to include ideas of process as basically physical (Whitehead 1929), as basically organic (Bergson 1910), and as basically psychological (James 1890). | |
From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 7.4) | |
A reaction: I take Whitehead to be the only serious contender here. |
21664 | Supervenience offers little explanation for things which necessarily go together [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: The results from the use of supervenience in philosophical theorising are limited. In particular, modal notions can't distinguish between things which necessarily go together. For example, that truths about numbers are grounded in truths about sets. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 13.4.1) | |
A reaction: [compressed] |
22633 | Indirect realists are cautious about the manifest image, and prefer the scientific image [Ingthorsson] |
Full Idea: The indirect realist regards the manifest image with scepticism and contrasts it to the scientific image. | |
From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 8.13) | |
A reaction: This is why indirect realism is the best view for a realist who largely accepts the authority of science, Philosophers can wallow in the manifest image all they like (and most of them seem to love it), but truth is in the scientific image. |
21660 | Reality can be seen as the totality of facts, or as the totality of things [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Reality can be seen as everything that is the case - the totality of all facts that obtain - or reality can be seen as everything there is - the totality of all things that exist. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 10) | |
A reaction: Things are a lot easier to specify than facts, but on the whole I prefer facts, just in order to affirm that there is more to reality than the mere 'things' that compose it. Our ontology must capture the dynamic and relational character of reality. |
21661 | There are probably ineffable facts, systematically hidden from us [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: We do have reason to think that there are ineffable facts, and that these facts are systematically hidden from us. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 10.2.4) | |
A reaction: [Hofweber's Ch.10 is a lengthy and interesting discussion of ineffable facts] Things which are very very small, or very very remote in space seem obvious candidates. The most obvious candidates are tiny detail about the remote past. |
22606 | Neo-Humeans say there are no substantial connections between anything [Ingthorsson] |
Full Idea: Neo-Humean metaphysics holds the view that there are no substantial connections between anything in this world. | |
From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 1) | |
A reaction: A very illuminating comment. This exactly fits Lewis's great 'mosaic' of facts. The challenge is to say what 'substantial' relations there might be, but I'm quite happy to have a go at that. |
17989 | Since properties have properties, there can be a typed or a type-free theory of them [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Since properties themselves can have properties there is a well-known division in the theory of properties between those who take a typed and those who take a type-free approach. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Inexpressible Properties and Propositions [2006], 2.2) | |
A reaction: A typed approach would imply restrictions on what it can be a property of. 'Green' is a property of surfaces, 'dark' is a property of colours. My first reaction is to opt for type-free. |
22631 | Properties are said to be categorical qualities or non-qualitative dispositions [Ingthorsson] |
Full Idea: It is said that that properties divide into two mutually exclusive types—non-dispositional qualities (sometimes called 'categorical properties’) vs. non-qualitative dispositions—of which the qualities are more fundamental than dispositions. | |
From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 8) | |
A reaction: It is standardly understood that the qualitative categorical properties are more fundamental. Fans of powers (such as Ingthorsson and myself) either favour the dispositional properties, or reject the distinction. |
22632 | Physics understands the charge of an electron as a power, not as a quality [Ingthorsson] |
Full Idea: Is the negative charge of an electron a quality or power? It is clear that physics describes the nature of charge only in terms of what its bearer can do. | |
From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 8.06) | |
A reaction: The point is that an electron has properties, even though it has no observable qualities. Ingthorsson says the scientific concept of qualities is entirely about what something can do, and ot how it is perceived. |
22627 | Compound objects are processes, insofar as change is essential to them [Ingthorsson] |
Full Idea: Compound objects are to be considered processes, if by ‘process’ we mean any entity for which change is essential for its continued existence. | |
From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 7) | |
A reaction: This doesn't seem to matter much, except to challenge those who say that reality consists of processes, and therefore not of substances. |
22613 | Most materialist views postulate smallest indivisible components which are permanent [Ingthorsson] |
Full Idea: Most materialist ontologies of the past postulate that the world ultimately consists of smallest indivisible component parts that persist because they must; they are permanent. | |
From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 2.1) | |
A reaction: Van Inwagen is notable for this view. Ingthorsson says the theory is to explain medium-sized change, while denying that anything comes to be out of nothing. Theology may lurk in the background. Simple persistance won't explain compound persistance. |
21652 | Our perceptual beliefs are about ordinary objects, not about simples arranged chair-wise [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: The belief that there are simples arranged chair-wise is not a perceptual belief. Our perceptual beliefs have a content about ordinary objects, not simples arranged chair-wise. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 07.3.1) | |
A reaction: Hofweber gives ontological priority to 'perceptual beliefs'. I'm inclined to agree, but I hear the critical hordes swarming against the gate. |
19575 | Refinement of senses increasingly distinguishes individuals [Novalis] |
Full Idea: The more our senses are refined, the more capable they become of distinguishing between individuals. The highest sense would be the highest receptivity to particularity in human nature. | |
From: Novalis (Miscellaneous Observations [1798], 072) | |
A reaction: I adore this idea!! It goes into the collection of support I am building for individual essences, against the absurd idea of kinds as essences (when they are actually categorisations). It also accompanies particularism in ethics. |
22612 | Endurance and perdurance just show the consequences of A or B series time [Ingthorsson] |
Full Idea: Endurance and perdurance are not explanations, but are merely characterisations of persistance with the constraints imposed by either an A or a B view of time. | |
From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 2.1) | |
A reaction: This is 3-D asnd 4-D objects. A simple and illuminating observation. I love reading broad brush books that make all these simple connections between what seem isolated theories in philosophy. These links are the heart of the subject. |
22625 | Science suggests causal aspects of the constitution and persistance of objects [Ingthorsson] |
Full Idea: There are very obvious causal aspects to the constitution and continued existence of compound entities, especially in light of the scientific image of the world. | |
From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 6) | |
A reaction: I like this a lot. He aims to explain constitution and persistance, rather than just describing or characterising them, and causal binding seems the obvious thought. There are still intermittent and distributed objects, like a dismantled clock. |
22620 | If causation involves production, that needs persisting objects [Ingthorsson] |
Full Idea: If causation involves production, then things must endure rather than perdure, because perdurance is incompatible with production, if creation ex nihilo is ruled out. | |
From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 4.10) | |
A reaction: That is, objects must persist over time. Cannot an account of production be given in terms of time-sliceS (or whatever)? 3-D perdurantists obviously have an account of change. He says it also needs the A-series view of time. |
21663 | Counterfactuals are essential for planning, and learning from mistakes [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Counterfactuals are important for reasoning about the past and to plan for the future. If we want to learn from our mistakes, it is important to think about what would have happened if I had done things differently. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 13.4.1) | |
A reaction: A thought also found in Tim Williamson, but not the sort of thing you hear from Lewis or Stalnaker. It is a nice example of how highly abstract and theoretical problems need to be slotted into human psychology. |
22636 | Every philosophical theory must be true in some possible world, so the ontology is hopeless [Ingthorsson] |
Full Idea: Possible worlds ontology appears to be plentiful enough to allow every philosophical theory to be true in some world or other, and that is why I cannot consider it an ontologically serious theory. It admits everything and forbids nothing | |
From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 9.6) | |
A reaction: Nice. Be careful what you wish for. The theory would have to be consistent (unless we also accept impossible worlds). |
22638 | Worlds may differ in various respects, but no overall similarity of worlds is implied [Ingthorsson] |
Full Idea: Even if possible worlds could differ in many different respects, there is no useful way to combine these different respects into one measure of overall comparative similarity. | |
From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 9.7) | |
A reaction: [idea of Michael Moreau 2010] This is an objection to the use of 'close' possible worlds in causation theories. The idea is true in general of the concept of similarity. It makes sense of specific 'respects', but not really of two whole objects. |
22067 | Poetry is true idealism, and the self-consciousness of the universe [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Poetry is true idealism - contemplation of the world as contemplation of a large mind - self-consciousness of the universe. | |
From: Novalis (Logological Fragments I [1798], vol 3 p.640), quoted by Ernst Behler - Early German Romanticism | |
A reaction: It looks like the step from Fichte's idealism to the Absolute is poetry, which embraces the ultimate Spinozan substance through imagination. Or something... |
19572 | Experiences tests reason, and reason tests experience [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Experience is the test of the rational - and vice versa. | |
From: Novalis (Miscellaneous Observations [1798], 010) | |
A reaction: A wonderful remark. Surely we can't ignore our need to test claims of pure logic by filling in the variables with concrete instances, to assess validity? And philosophy without examples is doomed to be abstract waffle. Coherence is the combined aim. |
19590 | Empiricists are passive thinkers, given their philosophy by the external world and fate [Novalis] |
Full Idea: An empiricist is one whose way of thinking is an effect of the external world and of fate - the passive thinker - to whom his philosophy is given. | |
From: Novalis (Teplitz Fragments [1798], 33) | |
A reaction: Novalis goes on to enthuse about 'magical idealism', so he rejects empiricism. This is an early attack on the Myth of the Given, found in Sellars and McDowell. |
19594 | General statements about nature are not valid [Novalis] |
Full Idea: General statements are not valid in the study of nature. | |
From: Novalis (Last Fragments [1800], 17) | |
A reaction: This is his striking obsession with the particularity and fine detail of nature. Alexander von Humbolt was exploring nature in S.America in this year. It sounds wrong about physics, but possibly right about biology. |
10004 | Our minds are at their best when reasoning about objects [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Our minds mainly reason about objects. Most cognitive problems we are faced with deal with particular objects, whether they are people or material things. Reasoning about them is what our minds are good at. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Number Determiners, Numbers, Arithmetic [2005], §4.3) | |
A reaction: Hofweber is suggesting this as an explanation of why we continually reify various concepts, especially numbers. Very plausible. It works for qualities of character, and explains our tendency to talk about universals as objects ('redness'). |
19591 | Desire for perfection is an illness, if it turns against what is imperfect [Novalis] |
Full Idea: An absolute drive toward perfection and completeness is an illness, as soon as it shows itself to be destructive and averse toward the imperfect, the incomplete. | |
From: Novalis (General Draft [1799], 33) | |
A reaction: Deep and true! Novalis seems to be a particularist - hanging on to the fine detail of life, rather than being immersed in the theory. These are the philosophers who also turn to literature. |
19596 | The whole body is involved in the formation of thoughts [Novalis] |
Full Idea: In the formation of thoughts all parts of the body seem to me to be working together. | |
From: Novalis (Last Fragments [1800], 20) | |
A reaction: I can only think that Spinoza must be behind this thought, or La Mettrie. It seems a strikingly unusual intuition for its time, when almost everyone takes a spiritual sort of dualism for granted. |
19573 | The seat of the soul is where our inner and outer worlds interpenetrate [Novalis] |
Full Idea: The seat of the soul is the point where the inner and the outer worlds touch. Wherever they penetrate each other - it is there at every point of penetration. | |
From: Novalis (Miscellaneous Observations [1798], 020) | |
A reaction: I surmise that Spinoza's dual-aspect monism is behind this interesting remark. See the related idea from Schopenhauer. |
19577 | Everything is a chaotic unity, then we abstract, then we reunify the world into a free alliance [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Before abstraction everything is one - but one as chaos is - after abstraction everything is again unified - but in a free alliance of independent, self-determined beings. A crowd has become a society - a chaos is transformed into a manifold world. | |
From: Novalis (Miscellaneous Observations [1798], 094) | |
A reaction: Personally I take (unfashionably) psychological abstraction to one of the key foundations of human thought, so I love this idea, which gives a huge picture of how the abstracting mind relates to reality. |
21654 | The "Fido"-Fido theory of meaning says every expression in a language has a referent [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: The picture of language often called the "Fido"-Fido theory of meaning says every expression in natural languages refers; they simply differ in what they refer to. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 08.2) | |
A reaction: It seems obvious that at least there are syncategorematic terms like 'not' and 'or' and 'maybe' that are internal to language. I'm inclining to the opposite view of Paul Pietroski. Hofweber says if all words are names, they can't add up to truth. |
21641 | Inferential role semantics is an alternative to semantics that connects to the world [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: An inferential role semantics is generally seen as a large-scale alternative to a semantics based on reference and other language-world relations. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 03.4.5) | |
A reaction: Presumably the other obvious language-world relation is truth. Being a robust realist, I take it I have to be strongly committed to semantics which connects to the world - or do I? Reality is robust, but our talk about it is evasive? |
21638 | Syntactic form concerns the focus of the sentence, as well as the truth-conditions [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Syntactic form is not only related to the truth conditions of a sentence; it is also related to what focus an utterance of a sentence will have. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 02.5.2) | |
A reaction: Hofweber has commendably studied some linguistics. The idea of mental and linguistic 'focus' increasingly strikes me as of importance in many areas of philosophy. E.g. in the scope of ethics, on whom should you focus? |
21658 | Properties can be expressed in a language despite the absence of a single word for them [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Simply because there is no single word in a certain language for a certain property doesn't mean that it isn't expressible in that language. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 09.1.1) | |
A reaction: Good. For example a shade of blue for which there is no label might be 'the next darkest discriminable shade of blue adjacent to the one we are looking at'. And then the one after that... But 'tastes better than Diet Pepsi' in ancient Greek? |
21659 | 'Being taller than this' is a predicate which can express many different properties [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: It is said that not every property can be expressed because there are more properties than there are predicates. ...But the same predicate can be used to express many different properties: 'being taller than this' depends on what 'this' refers to. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 09.2) | |
A reaction: A good example, but being a comparative and relying on a demonstrative indexical makes it a favourable example. 'Being made of iron' doesn't have much scope for expressing many properties. |
21655 | Compositonality is a way to build up the truth-conditions of a sentence [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Compositional semantics assigns semantic values to various expressions in order to generate the truth conditions of the sentences in which they can occur correctly, ...thus leading to the truth-conditions of the sentence. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 08.3) | |
A reaction: I favour both the compositional and the truth-conditional accounts of semantics, but I am not sure how to fit the pragmatic and contextual ingredient into that picture. You can't leave out psychology. |
21656 | Proposition have no content, because they are content [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: If there propositions then they do not have content, because they are content. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 08.4) | |
A reaction: This sounds right. A rather obvious regress threatens if you say otherwise. |
21635 | Without propositions there can be no beliefs or desires [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: If there are no propositions, then there are no contents, and thus there are no beliefs and desires. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 01.4.3) | |
A reaction: A simple but powerful point. Those who claim that there are only sentences (and no propositions) can hardly claim that you must formulate a sentence every time you have a specific belief or desire. |
21662 | Do there exist thoughts which we are incapable of thinking? [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Might there be some thought token that has a different content than any such token we can in principle have? | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 10.3.3) | |
A reaction: For me the idea that a thought might exist which can never be thought is an absurdity, but people who believe in the external existence of parts of reality called 'propositions' seem committed to it. A baffling view. |
19585 | Every person has his own language [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Every person has his own language. Language is the expression of the spirit. | |
From: Novalis (Logological Fragments I [1798], 91) | |
A reaction: Nice to see someone enthusiastically affirming what was later famously denied, and maybe even disproved. |
21645 | 'Semantic type coercion' is selecting the reading of a word to make the best sense [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: 'Semantic type coercion' is where an expression of variable type is forced to take a particular type on a particular occasion so that the sentence as a whole in which it occurse is semantically interpretable. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 05.4.4) | |
A reaction: He compares 'and' in 'John sang and Mary danced' with 'John and Mary danced together', where 'and' can vary in type, and we adopt the reading that makes sense. Hofweber says we do this with number language. He favours 'cognitive need'. |
21639 | 'Background deletion' is appropriately omitting background from an answer [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: 'Background deletion' is the pheomenon that what isn't focused in an answer, what is the background, can be left out of the answer, with the resulting sub-sentential answer nonetheless being appropriate. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 02.6.2) | |
A reaction: [I'm struck by the verbosity of this sentence, from an over-long book] It is not unreasonable to think that each conversational exchange has an implicit and agreed domain of quantification. Well, 'focus', then. |
17991 | Holism says language can't be translated; the expressibility hypothesis says everything can [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Holism says that nothing that can be said in one language can be said in another one. The expressibility hypothesis says that everything that can be said in one language can be said in every other one. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Inexpressible Properties and Propositions [2006], 6.4) | |
A reaction: Obviously expressibility would only refer to reasonably comprehensive languages (with basic logical connectives, for example). Personally I vote for the expressibility hypothesis, which Hofweber seems to favour. |
19578 | Only self-illuminated perfect individuals are beautiful [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Everything beautiful is a self-illuminated, perfect individual. | |
From: Novalis (Miscellaneous Observations [1798], 101) | |
A reaction: It is a commonplace to describe something beautiful as being 'perfect'. Unfinished masterpieces are interesting exceptions. Are only 'individuals' beautiful? Is unity a necessary condition of beauty? Bad art fails to be self-illuminated. |
19582 | Morality and philosophy are mutually dependent [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Without philosophy there is no true morality, and without morality no philosophy. | |
From: Novalis (Logological Fragments I [1798], 21) | |
A reaction: Challenging! Maybe unthinking people drift in a sea of vague untethered morality, and people who seem to have a genuine moral strength are always rooted in some sort of philosophy. Maybe. Is the passion for philosophy a moral passion? |
22027 | Life isn't given to us like a novel - we write the novel [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Life must not be a novel that is given to us, but one that is made by us. | |
From: Novalis (Logological Fragments I [1798], 99) | |
A reaction: The roots of existentialism are in the Romantic movement. Sartre seems to have taken this idea literally. |
19589 | The whole point of a monarch is that we accept them as a higher-born, ideal person [Novalis] |
Full Idea: The distinguishing character of the monarchy lies precisely in the fact of belief in a higher-born person, of voluntary acceptance of an ideal person. I cannot choose a leader from among my peers. | |
From: Novalis (Fath and Love, or the King and Queen [1798], 18) | |
A reaction: Novalis was passionately devoted to the new king and queen of Prussia, only a few years after the French Revolution. This attitude seems to me unchanged among monarchists in present day Britain. Genetics has undermined 'higher-born'. |
19580 | If the pupil really yearns for the truth, they only need a hint [Novalis] |
Full Idea: If a pupil genuinely desires truth is requires only a hint to show him how to find what he is seeking. | |
From: Novalis (Logological Fragments I [1798], 02) | |
A reaction: The tricky job for the teacher or supervisor is assessing whether the pupil genuinely desires truth, or needs motivating. |
19593 | Persons are shaped by a life history; splendid persons are shaped by world history [Novalis] |
Full Idea: What is it that shapes a person if not his life history? And in the same way a splendid person is shaped by nothing other than world history. Many people live better in the past and in the future than in the present. | |
From: Novalis (Last Fragments [1800], 15) | |
A reaction: Clearly there is a lot to be said for splendid people who live entirely in the present (such as jazz musicians). Some people do have an awesomely wide historical perspective on their immediate lives. Palaeontology is not the master discipline though! |
19595 | Nature is a whole, and its individual parts cannot be wholly understood [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Nature is a whole - in which each part in itself can never be wholly understood. | |
From: Novalis (Last Fragments [1800], 18) | |
A reaction: This doesn't seem right when studying some item in a laboratory, but it seems undeniable when you consider the history and future of each item. |
19592 | The basic relations of nature are musical [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Musical relations seem to me to be actually the basic relations of nature. | |
From: Novalis (Last Fragments [1800], 10) | |
A reaction: Novalis shows no signs of being a pythagorean, and then suddenly comes out with this. I suppose if you love music, this thought should float into your mind at regular intervals, because the power of music is so strong. Does he mean ratios? |
22605 | Humeans describe the surface of causation, while powers accounts aim at deeper explanations [Ingthorsson] |
Full Idea: Humeans attempt to describe causation without any deeper ontological commitments, while powers based accounts attempt to explain why causation occurs in the way it is described. | |
From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 1) | |
A reaction: Exactly the view I have reached. The Humean view is correct but superficial. A perfect example of my allegiance to Explanatory Empiricism. |
22607 | Time and space are not causal, but they determine natural phenomena [Ingthorsson] |
Full Idea: Time and space are significant determinants of natural phenomena, and yet are not (typically) regarded as causal determinants | |
From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 1.4) | |
A reaction: I like the word 'determinants'. Metaphysics largely concerns what determines what. I'm struggling to think of examples of this (which he does not give). Decay takes time, but isn't determined by time. Is a light cone a determinant? |
22608 | Casuation is the transmission of conserved quantities between causal processes [Ingthorsson] |
Full Idea: Causal process theories state that causation needs to be understood in terms of causal processes and their interactions, in which conserved quantities are transmitted between causal processes. | |
From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 1.5) | |
A reaction: Sounds a bit circular, but the idea of transmission of something is obviously the main point. I like this idea a lot (because it is so naturalistic), but rarely find it taken seriously. Energy is usually the quantity picked out. |
22621 | Causation as transfer only works for asymmetric interactions [Ingthorsson] |
Full Idea: The transference model of causation only works for asymmetric interactions. | |
From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 4.11) | |
A reaction: This is usually the transfer of energy. I liked the theory until I read this. |
22614 | Interventionist causal theory says it gets a reliable result whenever you manipulate it [Ingthorsson] |
Full Idea: The core of agency and interventionist theories of causation is that c counts as the cause of e iff E reliably appears and disappears when you manipulate C. | |
From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 2.1) | |
A reaction: [C is the type of c; E is the type of e] James Woodward champions this view. Ingthorsson objects that the theory offers no explanation of the appearances and disappearances. You can't manipulate black holes… |
22639 | Causal events are always reciprocal, and there is no distinction of action and reaction [Ingthorsson] |
Full Idea: I accept the reciprocity of interactions, and abandon the Agent vs.Patient distinction, so we can no longer talk of the contribution of each as ontologically different types of cause. In interactions, neither action nor reaction can be separated. | |
From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 10.3) | |
A reaction: His point is that we are misled by real world happenings, where one component is usually more powerful than the other (such as ball dropped onto a pillow). Modern science endorses his view. Mumford and Anjum seem to agree, and so do I. |
22615 | One effect cannot act on a second effect in causation, because the second doesn't yet exist [Ingthorsson] |
Full Idea: Hobbes implies that a Kim-style event e1 existing at t1 cannot possibly act on an effect e2 at t2, because that effect does not exist until the Agent has worked its effect on the Patient to provoke a change, thus bringing the effect into existence. | |
From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 3.08) | |
A reaction: [Hobbes Elements of Phil 1656 II.IX.1] Ingthorsson says that the Hobbes view is the traditional 'standard' view, that objects (and not events) are the causal relata. A strong objection to events as the causal relata. Realists need objects. |
22616 | Empiricists preferred events to objects as the relata, because they have observable motions [Ingthorsson] |
Full Idea: It is the empiricists' refusal to deal with anything other than observable events that motivated the shift in conception of efficient causation …to influence by an event on another event (one motion on another) rather than by an object on an object. | |
From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 3.10) | |
A reaction: I suppose events supply the necessary activity, whereas objects seem to be too passive for the job - because that's how they look. Ingthorsson persuades that objects are the correct causal relata, for those of us who believe in powers. |
22617 | Science now says all actions are reciprocal, not unidirectional [Ingthorsson] |
Full Idea: It is now accepted as a fact of modern science that unidirectional actions do not exist, and that all interactions are instead thoroughly reciprocal. | |
From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 3.10) | |
A reaction: Ingthorsson says this undermines the standard traditional view (Hobbes etc) of Agent and Patient, with A having active powers and P having passive powers. All influences are mutual, it seems. Passive powers are active structures? |
22619 | Causes are not agents; the whole interaction is the cause, and the changed compound is the effect [Ingthorsson] |
Full Idea: By abandoning the standard view that causes are ‘extrinsic motive Agents’, an idea from pre-Newtonian physics, we are free to conceive of the interaction as a whole as the cause, and the change in the compound whole of interacting things as the effect. | |
From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 4.06) | |
A reaction: Ingthorsson persuasively presents this as the correct account, as understood by modern science. It is not cause-then-effect. It is kerfuffle, then aftermath. |
22635 | People only accept the counterfactual when they know the underlying cause [Ingthorsson] |
Full Idea: I doubt that anyone will accept any counterfactual as true unless they believe they know the underlying causality. | |
From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 9.3) | |
A reaction: Correct. Almost any example will support it. Compare coincidences and true causes. |
22634 | Counterfactuals don't explain causation, but causation can explain counterfactuals [Ingthorsson] |
Full Idea: I cannot identify any prima facie reason to think that causation can be explained in counterfactual terms, but plenty to think that causation can explain counterfactuals. | |
From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 9.1) | |
A reaction: Love it. Treating causation as counterfactual dependency is hopelessly superficial. What is the reality that is involved? He cites the second law of motion. |
22637 | Counterfactual theories are false in possible worlds where causation is actual [Ingthorsson] |
Full Idea: if there are worlds where there are causal powers and/or lawful connections, then they are worlds in which the counterfactual theory of causation is false, because there causes produce the effects, regardless of any possible world. | |
From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 9.6) | |
A reaction: A nice modern instance of turning the tables. Come to think of it, possible worlds theories are just asking for that. Are there possible worlds in which there are no other possible worlds? Or the possible worlds are inaccessible? |
22624 | A cause can fail to produce its normal effect, by prevention, pre-emption, finks or antidotes [Ingthorsson] |
Full Idea: Counterexamples involving prevention and/or interference have come to be roughly divided into four main categories: (i) prevention, (ii) pre-emption, (iii) finks and (iv) antidotes. | |
From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 5.3) | |
A reaction: These are the reasons why necessity is denied in causation. i) is in the initial circumstances, ii) is another cause getting there first, iii) is a defusing action in the agent, iv) is a defusing action in the patient. No necessity if one is possible. |
22622 | Any process can go backwards or forwards in time without violating the basic laws of physics [Ingthorsson] |
Full Idea: Because it makes no difference to exchange the time variable t with its contrary -t, in the fundamental laws of physics, any process can be described as going either backwards or forwards in time, without violating those laws. | |
From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 4.13) | |
A reaction: A few philosophers read a lot into this, but I don't. The inverse scenario may not breach the laws of physics, but it does involve time going backwards, which I think we can skip for now. Entropy would be interesting. Can information flow backwards? |
22618 | In modern physics the first and second laws of motion (unlike the third) fail at extremes [Ingthorsson] |
Full Idea: While the first and second laws of motion are known to fail in the domain of very fast-moving and massive objects (i.e. where relativity deviates from classical mechanics) as well as in the quantum realm, the third law is still assumed to hold good. | |
From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 4.04) | |
A reaction: This implies a universal status for the third law (equal and opposite reactions), which the other two lack. Ingthorsson sees this as crucial for our understanding of causation. |
22630 | If particles have decay rates, they can't really be elementary, in the sense of indivisible [Ingthorsson] |
Full Idea: We may wonder whether the fact that physics has calculated (and for some, confirmed) the decay rate of elementary particles can be a reason to think that they cannot really be ‘elementary’ in the philosophical sense of ‘indivisible’. | |
From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 7.6) | |
A reaction: I don't think anything can ever conclusively be labelled as 'elementary', but this idea offers a reason for doubting whether a candidate particle is so basic. Does decay imply having parts? |
22610 | It is difficult to handle presentism in first-order logic [Ingthorsson] |
Full Idea: Contemporary philosophers are not comfortable with presentism, because it is difficult to deal with presentism in the language of first-order predicate logic. | |
From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 1.8) | |
A reaction: Presumable that logic relies on objects which endure through time, or at least have a past. Second-order logic is better able to deal with processes, which only exist in the present, but nevertheless have an integral past and future. ? |
19576 | Religion needs an intermediary, because none of us can connect directly to a godhead [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Nothing is more indispensable for true religious feeling than an intermediary - which connects us to the godhead. The human being is absolutely incapable of sustaining an immediate relation with this. | |
From: Novalis (Miscellaneous Observations [1798], 073) | |
A reaction: I take this to be a defence of priests and organised religion, and an implied attack on protestants who give centrality to private prayer and conscience. |