91 ideas
19579 | The history of philosophy is just experiments in how to do philosophy [Novalis] |
Full Idea: The history of philosophy up to now is nothing but a history of attempts to discover how to do philosophy. | |
From: Novalis (Logological Fragments I [1798], 01) | |
A reaction: I take post-Fregean analytic metaphysics to be another experiment in how to do philosophy. I suspect that the experiment of Husserl, Heidegger, Derrida etc has been a failure. |
19583 | Philosophy only begins when it studies itself [Novalis] |
Full Idea: All philosophy begins where philosophizing philosophises itself. | |
From: Novalis (Logological Fragments I [1798], 79) | |
A reaction: The modern trend for doing metaphilosophy strikes me as wholly admirable, though I suspect that the enemies of philosophy (who are legion) see it as a decadence. |
22026 | Philosophy is homesickness - the urge to be at home everywhere [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Philosophy is actually homesickness - the urge to be everywhere at home. | |
From: Novalis (General Draft [1799], 45) | |
A reaction: The idea of home [heimat] is powerful in German culture. The point of romanticism was seen as largely concerning restless souls like Byron and his heroes, who do not feel at home. Hence ironic detachment. |
19588 | The highest aim of philosophy is to combine all philosophies into a unity [Novalis] |
Full Idea: He attains the maximum of a philosopher who combines all philosophies into a single philosophy | |
From: Novalis (Logological Fragments II [1798], 31) | |
A reaction: I have found the epigraph for my big book! Recently a few narrowly analytical philosophers have attempted big books about everything (Sider, Heil, Chalmers), and they get a huge round of applause from me. |
19598 | Philosophy relies on our whole system of learning, and can thus never be complete [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Now all learning is connected - thus philosophy will never be complete. Only in the complete system of all learning will philosophy be truly visible. | |
From: Novalis (Logological Fragments II [1798], 39) | |
A reaction: Philosophy is evidently the unifying subject, which reveals the point of all the other subjects. It matches my maxim that 'science is the servant of philosophy'. |
19586 | Philosophers feed on problems, hoping they are digestible, and spiced with paradox [Novalis] |
Full Idea: The philosopher lives on problems as the human being does on food. An insoluble problem is an indigestible food. What spice is to food, the paradoxical is to problems. | |
From: Novalis (Logological Fragments II [1798], 09) | |
A reaction: Novalis would presumably have disliked Hegel's dialectic, where the best food seems to be the indigestible. |
19587 | Philosophy aims to produce a priori an absolute and artistic world system [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Philosophy ...is the art of producing all our conceptions according to an absolute, artistic idea and of developing the thought of a world system a priori out of the depths of our spirit. | |
From: Novalis (Logological Fragments II [1798], 19) | |
A reaction: A lovely statement of the dream of building world systems by pure thought - embodying perfectly the view of philosophy despised by logical positivists and modern logical metaphysicians. The Novalis view will never die! I like 'artistic'. |
9108 | From an impossibility anything follows [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: From an impossibility anything follows ('quod ex impossibili sequitur quodlibet'). | |
From: William of Ockham (Summa totius logicae [1323], III.c.xxxvi) | |
A reaction: The hallmark of a true logician, I suspect, is that this opinion is really meaningful and important to them. They yearn to follow the logic wherever it leads. Common sense would seem to say that absolutely nothing follows from an impossibility. |
16676 | Why use more things when fewer will do? [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: It is pointless to do through more things something that can be done through fewer. | |
From: William of Ockham (Tractatus de corpore Christi [1323], Ch. 29), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 14.3 | |
A reaction: The more famous formulation isn't found in his works, so I'm delighted to find an authentic quotation from the man. |
6806 | Do not multiply entities beyond necessity [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: Do not multiply entities beyond necessity. | |
From: William of Ockham (works [1335]) | |
A reaction: This is the classic statement of Ockham's Razor, though it is not found in his printed works. It appears to be mainly aimed at Plato's Theory of Forms. It is taken to refer to types of entities, not numbers. One seraph is as bad as a hundred. |
19574 | If man sacrifices truth he sacrifices himself, by acting against his own convictions [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Man has his being in truth - if he sacrifices truth he sacrifices himself. Whoever betrays truth betrays himself. It is not a question of lying - but of acting against one's conviction. | |
From: Novalis (Miscellaneous Observations [1798], 038) | |
A reaction: Does he condone lying here, as long as you don't believe the lie? We would call it loss of integrity. |
9107 | A proposition is true if its subject and predicate stand for the same thing [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: If in the proposition 'This is an angel' subject and predicate stand for the same thing, the proposition is true. | |
From: William of Ockham (Summa totius logicae [1323], II.c.ii) | |
A reaction: An interesting statement of what looks like a correspondence theory, employing the idea that both the subject and the predicate have a reference. I think Frege would say that 'x is an angel' is unsaturated, and so lacks reference. |
19571 | Delusion and truth differ in their life functions [Novalis] |
Full Idea: The distinction between delusion and truth lies in the difference in their life functions. | |
From: Novalis (Miscellaneous Observations [1798], 008) | |
A reaction: Pure pragmatism, it seems. We might expect doubts about objective truth from a leading light of the Romantic movement. |
16300 | Ockham had an early axiomatic account of truth [William of Ockham, by Halbach] |
Full Idea: Theories structurally very similar to axiomatic compositional theories of truth can be found in Ockham's 'Summa Logicae'. | |
From: report of William of Ockham (Summa totius logicae [1323]) by Volker Halbach - Axiomatic Theories of Truth 3 |
19597 | Logic (the theory of relations) should be applied to mathematics [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Ought not logic, the theory of relations, be applied to mathematics? | |
From: Novalis (Logological Fragments II [1798], 38) | |
A reaction: Bolzano was 19 when his was written. I presume Novalis would have been excited by set theory (even though he was a hyper-romantic). |
9038 | We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans] |
Full Idea: There are two related but distinguishable questions concerning proper names: what the speaker denotes (upon an occasion), and what the name denotes. | |
From: Gareth Evans (The Causal Theory of Names [1973], §I) | |
A reaction: I don't think any account of language makes sense without this sort of distinction, as in my favourite example: the password is 'swordfish'. So how does language gets its own meanings, independent of what speakers intend? |
5824 | How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans] |
Full Idea: We need an account of what makes an expression into a name for something that will allow names to change their denotations. | |
From: Gareth Evans (The Causal Theory of Names [1973], §II) | |
A reaction: Presumably an example would be 'The Prime Minister is in the building'. Evans proposes to discuss communication, rather than strict meanings and descriptions. |
9042 | A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans] |
Full Idea: Intentions alone don't bring it about that a name gets a denotation; without the intention being manifest there cannot be the common knowledge required for the practice. | |
From: Gareth Evans (The Causal Theory of Names [1973], §II) | |
A reaction: Well, I might have a private name for some hated colleague which I mutter to myself whenever I see her. The way names, and language generally, becomes ossified is by joining the great impersonal sea of the language. ..waves of bones, |
9041 | The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans] |
Full Idea: Change of denotation is decisive against the Causal Theory of Names. Changes of denotation actually occur: a hearsay report misunderstood by Marco Polo transferred the name 'Madagascar' from a portion of the mainland to the African island. | |
From: Gareth Evans (The Causal Theory of Names [1973], §I) | |
A reaction: This doesn't sound decisive, as you could give an intermediate causal account of Marco Polo's mistake. I might take the famous name Winston, and baptise my son with it. And I might have done it because I thought Winston was a German dictator. |
9106 | The word 'every' only signifies when added to a term such as 'man', referring to all men [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: The syncategorematic word 'every' does not signify any fixed thing, but when added to 'man' it makes the term 'man' stand for all men actually. | |
From: William of Ockham (Summa totius logicae [1323], I.c.iv) | |
A reaction: Although quantifiers may have become a part of formal logic with Frege, their importance is seen from Aristotle onwards, and it is clearly a key part of William's understanding of logic. |
19581 | A problem is a solid mass, which the mind must break up [Novalis] |
Full Idea: A problem is a solid, synthetic mass which is broken up by means of the penetrating power of the mind. | |
From: Novalis (Logological Fragments I [1798], 04) |
19584 | Whoever first counted to two must have seen the possibility of infinite counting [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Whoever first understood how to count to two, even if he still found it difficult to keep on counting, saw nonetheless the possibility of infinite counting according to the same laws. | |
From: Novalis (Logological Fragments I [1798], 84) | |
A reaction: Presumably it is the discerning of the 'law' which triggers this. Is the key concept 'addition' or 'successor' (or are those the same?). |
9113 | Just as unity is not a property of a single thing, so numbers are not properties of many things [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: Number is nothing but the actual numbered things themselves. Hence just as unity is not an accident added to the thing which is one, so number is not an accident of the things which are numbered. | |
From: William of Ockham (Summa totius logicae [1323], I.c.xliv) | |
A reaction: [William does not necessarily agree with this view] It strikes me as a key point here that any account of the numbers had better work for 'one', though 'zero' might be treated differently. Some people seem to think unity is a property of things. |
9110 | The words 'thing' and 'to be' assert the same idea, as a noun and as a verb [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: The words 'thing' and 'to be' (esse) signify one and the same thing, but the one in the manner of a noun and the other in the manner of a verb. | |
From: William of Ockham (Summa totius logicae [1323], III,II,c,xxvii) | |
A reaction: Well said - as you would expect from a thoroughgoing nominalist. I would have thought that this was the last word on the subject of Being, thus rendering any need for me to read Heidegger quite superfluous. Or am I missing something? |
22025 | Novalis thought self-consciousness cannot disclose 'being', because we are temporal creatures [Novalis, by Pinkard] |
Full Idea: Novalis came to think that the kind of existence , or 'being', that is disclosed in self-consciousness remains, as it were, forever out of our reach because of the kind of temporal creatures we are. | |
From: report of Novalis (Logological Fragments I [1798]) by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 06 | |
A reaction: It looks here as if Novalis kicked Heidegger's Dasein into the long grass before it even got started, but maybe they have different notions of 'being', with Novalis seeking timeless being, and Heidegger, influenced by Bergson, accepting temporality. |
16129 | Evans argues (falsely!) that a contradiction follows from treating objects as vague [Evans, by Lowe] |
Full Idea: Evans tries to derive a contradiction from the supposition that a given identity statement is of indeterminate truth-value. (As it happens, I consider that this argument is flawed) | |
From: report of Gareth Evans (Can there be Vague Objects? [1978]) by E.J. Lowe - The Possibility of Metaphysics 1.3 | |
A reaction: A priori, I wouldn't expect to be able to settle the question of whether there are any vague objects simply by following some logical derivation. Empirical examination, and conceptual analysis (or stipulation) have to be involved. |
16459 | Is it coherent that reality is vague, identities can be vague, and objects can have fuzzy boundaries? [Evans] |
Full Idea: Maybe the world is vague, and vagueness is a necessary feature of any true description of it. Also identities may lack a determinate truth value because of their vagueness. Hence it is a fact that some objects have fuzzy boundaries. But is this coherent? | |
From: Gareth Evans (Can there be Vague Objects? [1978]) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Lewis quotes this introduction to the famous short paper, to show that Evans wasn't proposing a poor argument, but offering a reductio of the view that vagueness is 'ontic', or a feature of the world. |
16460 | Evans assumes there can be vague identity statements, and that his proof cannot be right [Evans, by Lewis] |
Full Idea: The correct interpretation is that Evans trusts his reader (unwisely) to take for granted that there are vague identity statements, that a proof of the contrary cannot be right, and that the vagueness-in-describing view affords a diagnosis of the fallacy. | |
From: report of Gareth Evans (Can there be Vague Objects? [1978]) by David Lewis - Vague Identity: Evans misunderstood p.319 | |
A reaction: [Lowe 199:11 is a culprit!] Lewis put this interpretation to Evans, who replied 'Yes, yes, yes!'. |
16457 | There clearly are vague identity statements, and Evans's argument has a false conclusion [Evans, by Lewis] |
Full Idea: One problem with Evans's argument that there are no such thing as vague identity statements is that its conclusion is plainly false. Example: 'Princeton = Princeton Borough', where it is unsettled what region 'Princeton' denotes. | |
From: report of Gareth Evans (Can there be Vague Objects? [1978]) by David Lewis - Vague Identity: Evans misunderstood p.319 | |
A reaction: Lewis endorses the view that vagueness is semantic. I certainly don't endorse Evans's argument, which hinges on a weird example of a property, as applied to Leibniz's Law. |
16608 | Ockham was an anti-realist about the categories [William of Ockham, by Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Ockham is the scholastic paradigm of anti-realism with respect to the categories. | |
From: report of William of Ockham (Summula philosophiae naturalis [1320]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 05.3 | |
A reaction: These are the ten categories mentioned in Aristotle's book 'Categories'. |
16654 | Our words and concepts don't always correspond to what is out there [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: It should not be said that as distinct words and intentions or concepts are distinct from one another, so too the corresponding things are distinct. Those distinctions do not always line up with distinctions among things that are signified. | |
From: William of Ockham (Predest.,God's foreknowledge and contingents [1320], 7.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.2 | |
A reaction: [compressed] This is the great nominalist opponent of the idea that Aristotle's ten categories give an accurate map of reality. He proposed just substance and accidents, and based categorisation on the questions we ask. |
18529 | Relations are expressed either as absolute facts, or by a relational concept [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: Socrates and Plato are similar if they are both white. Yet the mind can express this either by an 'absolute concept' (as 'Socrates is white' and 'Plato is white'), or by a 'relative concept', as 'Socrates is similar to Plato with respect to whiteness. | |
From: William of Ockham (Seven Quodlibets [1332], VI q.25), quoted by John Heil - The Universe as We Find It 7 | |
A reaction: Presumably he takes the facts of the matter to be the absolute concept, and the relative concept to be a contribution of the intellect. |
22132 | Species and genera are individual concepts which naturally signify many individuals [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: In his mature nominalism, species and genera are identified with certain mental qualities called concepts or intentions of the mind. Ontologically they are individuals too, like everthing else, ...but they naturally signify many different individuals. | |
From: William of Ockham (works [1335]), quoted by Claude Panaccio - William of Ockham p.1056 | |
A reaction: 'Naturally' is the key word, because the concepts are not fictions, but natural responses to encountering individuals in the world. I am an Ockhamist. |
9103 | A universal is not a real feature of objects, but only a thought-object in the mind [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: I maintain that a universal is not something real that exists in a subject [of inherence], either inside or outside the mind, but that it has being only as a thought-object in the mind. | |
From: William of Ockham (Ordinatio [1320], DII Qviii prima redactio) | |
A reaction: [A footnote says that William later abandoned this view] I don't see a clear distinction here between having real existence in the mind, and being a thought-object in the mind. Maybe we should say 'merely' a thought-object? |
15388 | Universals are single things, and only universal in what they signify [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: Every universal is one particular thing and it is not a universal except in its signification, in its signifying many thing. | |
From: William of Ockham (Summa totius logicae [1323]), quoted by Claude Panaccio - Medieval Problem of Universals 'William' | |
A reaction: Sounds as if William might have liked tropes. It seems to leave the problem unanswered (the 'ostrich' problem?). How are they able to signify in this universal way, if each thing is just distinct and particular? |
16779 | Cut wood doesn't make a new substance, but seems to make separate subjects [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: When a piece of wood is divided in two halves, no new substance is generated. But there are now two substances, or the accidents of the two halves would be without a subject. They existed before hand, and were one piece of wood, but not in the same place. | |
From: William of Ockham (Seven Quodlibets [1332], IV.19), quoted by Richard S. Westfall - Never at Rest: a biography of Isaac Newton 26.2 | |
A reaction: A nice example, demonstrating that there are substances within substances, contrary to the view of Duns Scotus. If a substance is just a subject for properties, it is hard to know what to make of this case. |
14484 | If a=b is indeterminate, then a=/=b, and so there cannot be indeterminate identity [Evans, by Thomasson] |
Full Idea: We cannot accept the existence of vague objects, according to Evans's argument that there cannot be indeterminacy of identity. ...From the assumption that it is indeterminate whether a = b, we conclude, determinately, that it's not the case that a = b. | |
From: report of Gareth Evans (Can there be Vague Objects? [1978]) by Amie L. Thomasson - Ordinary Objects 05.6 | |
A reaction: I think we should keep intrinsic identity separate from identity between entities. A cloud can be clearly identified, while being a bit fuzzy. It is only when you ask whether we saw the same cloud that Evans's argument seems relevant. |
16757 | Hot water naturally cools down, which is due to the substantial form of the water [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: It is clear to the senses that hot water, if left to its own nature, reverts to coldness; this coldness cannot be caused by anything other than the substantial form of the water. | |
From: William of Ockham (Seven Quodlibets [1332], III.6), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.4 | |
A reaction: Unfortunately this is very bad science (even for its time), but it shows how many scholastics treated hylomorphism as a very physical and causal theory. |
16599 | Ockham says matter must be extended, so we don't need Quantity [William of Ockham, by Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Ockham regards Quantity as an entirely superfluous ontological category, …because matter is intrinsically extended. | |
From: report of William of Ockham (Summula philosophiae naturalis [1320]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 04.4 |
16681 | Matter gets its quantity from condensation and rarefaction, which is just local motion [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: Matter is made to have a greater or lesser quantity not through its receiving any absolute accident, but through condensation and rarefaction alone. Parts come more or less close together, which can happen with local motion. | |
From: William of Ockham (Summula philosophiae naturalis [1320], I.13), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 15.1 | |
A reaction: This is Ockham at his most modern, rejecting the odd idea of Quantity in favour of a modern corpuscular view of the mere motions of matter. |
19575 | Refinement of senses increasingly distinguishes individuals [Novalis] |
Full Idea: The more our senses are refined, the more capable they become of distinguishing between individuals. The highest sense would be the highest receptivity to particularity in human nature. | |
From: Novalis (Miscellaneous Observations [1798], 072) | |
A reaction: I adore this idea!! It goes into the collection of support I am building for individual essences, against the absurd idea of kinds as essences (when they are actually categorisations). It also accompanies particularism in ethics. |
9109 | If essence and existence were two things, one could exist without the other, which is impossible [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: If essence and existence were two things, then no contradiction would be involved if God preserved the essence of a thing in the world without its existence, or vice versa, its existence without its essence; both of which are impossible. | |
From: William of Ockham (Summa totius logicae [1323], III,II,c,xxvii) | |
A reaction: Not that William is using the concept of a supreme mind as a tool in argument. His denial of essence as something separable is presumably his denial of the Aristotelian view of universals, as well as of the Platonic view. |
16792 | If parts change, the whole changes [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: That is not the same whole that does not have the same parts. | |
From: William of Ockham (Commentary on the Sentences [1320], IV.13), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 29.2 | |
A reaction: In isolation, this is mereological essentialism (as Pasnau confirms), which is incredibly implausible, if I cease to be the same person when I cut one of my fingernails. |
16224 | There can't be vague identity; a and b must differ, since a, unlike b, is only vaguely the same as b [Evans, by PG] |
Full Idea: Two things can't be vaguely identical, because then a would have an indeterminacy which b lacks (namely, being perfectly identical to b), so by Leibniz's Law they can't be identical. | |
From: report of Gareth Evans (Can there be Vague Objects? [1978], 4.7) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: [my summary of Katherine Hawley's summary (2001:118) of Evans] Hawley considers the argument to be valid. I have grave doubts about whether b's identity with b is the sort of property needed for an application of Liebniz's Law. |
14895 | 'Superficial' contingency: false in some world; 'Deep' contingency: no obvious verification [Evans, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro] |
Full Idea: Evans says intuitively a sentence is 'superficially' contingent if the function from worlds to truth values assigns F to some world; it is 'deeply' contingent if understanding it does not guarantee that there is a verifying state of affairs. | |
From: report of Gareth Evans (Reference and Contingency [1979]) by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro - Introduction to 'Two-Dimensional Semantics' 2 | |
A reaction: This distinction is used by Davies and Humberstone (1980) to construct an early version of 2-D semantics (see under Language|Semantics). The point is that part comes from understanding it, and another part from assigning truth values. |
11881 | Rigid designators can be meaningful even if empty [Evans, by Mackie,P] |
Full Idea: Evans argues that there can be rigid designators that are meaningful even if empty. | |
From: report of Gareth Evans (Reference and Contingency [1979]) by Penelope Mackie - How Things Might Have Been 1.8 |
9089 | Knowledge is a quality existing subjectively in the soul [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: Knowledge is a certain quality which exists in the soul as its subject ('existens subiective in anima'). | |
From: William of Ockham (Expositio super viii libros [1340], Prologue) | |
A reaction: One might say here that knowledge is a property, and so it might not be susceptible to further analysis. It invites the question of how you could know by introspection that you have got it, which would be an extreme internalist view. |
9091 | Sometimes 'knowledge' just concerns the conclusion, sometimes the whole demonstration [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: Sometimes 'knowledge' means evident cognition of the conclusion alone, sometimes of the demonstration as a whole. | |
From: William of Ockham (Expositio super viii libros [1340], Prologue) | |
A reaction: 'Demonstration' will be something like Greek 'logos' - full understanding, ability to explain and give reasons. William is certainly right about normal usage. I know the answer in a quiz, without any requirement for justifications. |
9100 | Our intellect only assents to what we believe to be true [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: Our intellect does not assent to anything unless we believe it to be true. | |
From: William of Ockham (Prologue to Ordinatio [1320], Q 1 N sqq) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as being a much more accurate and commonsense view of belief than that of Hume, who simply views it phenomenologically. ...But then the remark appears to be circular. Belief requires a belief that it is true. Hm. |
9090 | Knowledge is certain cognition of something that is true [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: Knowledge is certain cognition of something that is true. | |
From: William of Ockham (Expositio super viii libros [1340], Prologue) | |
A reaction: This view has problems. William is not facing up to the sceptical questions which can shake any degree of certainty, and also that someone who lacked self-confidence might know many things while always feeling uncertain about them. 'Cognition' must go! |
22067 | Poetry is true idealism, and the self-consciousness of the universe [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Poetry is true idealism - contemplation of the world as contemplation of a large mind - self-consciousness of the universe. | |
From: Novalis (Logological Fragments I [1798], vol 3 p.640), quoted by Ernst Behler - Early German Romanticism | |
A reaction: It looks like the step from Fichte's idealism to the Absolute is poetry, which embraces the ultimate Spinozan substance through imagination. Or something... |
7639 | The Homunculus Fallacy explains a subject perceiving objects by repeating the problem internally [Evans] |
Full Idea: The 'homunculus fallacy' attempts to explain what is involved in a subject's being related to objects in the external world by appealing to the existence of an inner situation which recapitulates the essential features of the original situation. | |
From: Gareth Evans (Molyneux's Question [1978], p.397) | |
A reaction: This is obviously right, but we aren't forced to settle for direct realism. Inner perception may be very different, or we may employ the idea of Dennett and Lycan, that the homunculi don't regress, they deteriorate steadily down into mechanisms. |
12580 | Experiences have no conceptual content [Evans, by Greco] |
Full Idea: In Evans's work experiences are conceived of as not having a conceptual content at all. | |
From: report of Gareth Evans (The Varieties of Reference [1980]) by John Greco - Justification is not Internal | |
A reaction: I presume it is this view which provoked McDowell's contrary view in 'Mind and World'. I say this is a job for neuroscience, and I struggle to see what philosophical questions hang on the outcome. I think I side with Evans. |
7643 | We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour [Evans] |
Full Idea: Do we really understand the proposal that we have as many colour concepts as there are shades colour that we can sensibly discriminate? | |
From: Gareth Evans (The Varieties of Reference [1980], 7.5) | |
A reaction: This is the argument (rejected by McDowell) that experience cannot be conceptual because experience is too rich. We should not confuse lack of concepts with lack of words. I may have a concept of a colour between two shades, but no word for it. |
19572 | Experiences tests reason, and reason tests experience [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Experience is the test of the rational - and vice versa. | |
From: Novalis (Miscellaneous Observations [1798], 010) | |
A reaction: A wonderful remark. Surely we can't ignore our need to test claims of pure logic by filling in the variables with concrete instances, to assess validity? And philosophy without examples is doomed to be abstract waffle. Coherence is the combined aim. |
19590 | Empiricists are passive thinkers, given their philosophy by the external world and fate [Novalis] |
Full Idea: An empiricist is one whose way of thinking is an effect of the external world and of fate - the passive thinker - to whom his philosophy is given. | |
From: Novalis (Teplitz Fragments [1798], 33) | |
A reaction: Novalis goes on to enthuse about 'magical idealism', so he rejects empiricism. This is an early attack on the Myth of the Given, found in Sellars and McDowell. |
19594 | General statements about nature are not valid [Novalis] |
Full Idea: General statements are not valid in the study of nature. | |
From: Novalis (Last Fragments [1800], 17) | |
A reaction: This is his striking obsession with the particularity and fine detail of nature. Alexander von Humbolt was exploring nature in S.America in this year. It sounds wrong about physics, but possibly right about biology. |
9101 | Abstractive cognition knows universals abstracted from many singulars [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: Abstractive cognition (in one sense) relates to something abstracted from many singulars; and in this sense abstractive cognition is nothing else but cognition of a universal which can be abstracted from many things. | |
From: William of Ockham (Prologue to Ordinatio [1320], Q 1 N sqq) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as being correct common sense, even though it has become deeply unfashionable since Frege. We may not be able to see quite how the mind manages to see universals in a bunch of objects, but there is no better story. |
9102 | If an animal approached from a distance, we might abstract 'animal' from one instance [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: It seems possible that the concept of a genus could be abstracted from one individual, let us say, the concept 'animal', as in the case of one approaching from a distance, when I see enough to judge that I am seeing an animal. | |
From: William of Ockham (Seven Quodlibets [1332], I Q xiii) | |
A reaction: This is a rather individualistic view of abstraction, ignoring the shared language and culture. It is hard to imagine a truly virgin mind coming up with the concept after one encounter. The concept 'mind-boggling' seems more likely. |
19591 | Desire for perfection is an illness, if it turns against what is imperfect [Novalis] |
Full Idea: An absolute drive toward perfection and completeness is an illness, as soon as it shows itself to be destructive and averse toward the imperfect, the incomplete. | |
From: Novalis (General Draft [1799], 33) | |
A reaction: Deep and true! Novalis seems to be a particularist - hanging on to the fine detail of life, rather than being immersed in the theory. These are the philosophers who also turn to literature. |
19596 | The whole body is involved in the formation of thoughts [Novalis] |
Full Idea: In the formation of thoughts all parts of the body seem to me to be working together. | |
From: Novalis (Last Fragments [1800], 20) | |
A reaction: I can only think that Spinoza must be behind this thought, or La Mettrie. It seems a strikingly unusual intuition for its time, when almost everyone takes a spiritual sort of dualism for granted. |
9114 | There are no secure foundations to prove the separate existence of mind, in reason or experience [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: The existence of an immaterial 'intellective soul' ..cannot be demonstrated; for every reason by which we try to prove it assumes something that is doubtful for a man who follows only his natural reason. Neither can it be proved by experience. | |
From: William of Ockham (Seven Quodlibets [1332], I Q x) | |
A reaction: This is splendid honesty from a medieval monk. How would such a clear thinker have responded to modern brain research? Colin McGinn still maintains William's view, despite modern knowledge. Our ignorance produced conceptual dualism. |
19573 | The seat of the soul is where our inner and outer worlds interpenetrate [Novalis] |
Full Idea: The seat of the soul is the point where the inner and the outer worlds touch. Wherever they penetrate each other - it is there at every point of penetration. | |
From: Novalis (Miscellaneous Observations [1798], 020) | |
A reaction: I surmise that Spinoza's dual-aspect monism is behind this interesting remark. See the related idea from Schopenhauer. |
23794 | Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual [Evans, by Schulte] |
Full Idea: Evans introduced the idea that there are some representational states, for example perceptual experiences, which have content that is nonconceptual. | |
From: report of Gareth Evans (The Varieties of Reference [1980]) by Peter Schulte - Mental Content 3.4 | |
A reaction: McDowell famously disagree, and whether all experience is inherently conceptualised is a main debate from that period. Hard to see how it could be settled, but I incline to McDowell, because minimal perception hardly counts as 'experience'. |
16366 | The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything [Evans] |
Full Idea: If a subject can be credited with the thought that a is F, then he must have the conceptual resources for entertaining the thought that a is G, for every property of being G of which he has conception. This condition I call the 'Generality Constraint'. | |
From: Gareth Evans (The Varieties of Reference [1980], p.104), quoted by François Recanati - Mental Files 5.3 | |
A reaction: Recanati endorses the Constraint in his account of mental files. Apparently if I can entertain the thought of a circle being round, I can also entertain the thought of it being square, so I am not too sure about this one. |
12575 | Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them [Evans, by Peacocke] |
Full Idea: Evans's 'Generality Constraint' says that if a thinker is capable of attitudes to the content Fa and possesses the singular concept b, then he is capable of having attitudes to the content Fb. | |
From: report of Gareth Evans (The Varieties of Reference [1980], 4.3) by Christopher Peacocke - A Study of Concepts 1.1 | |
A reaction: So having an attitude becomes the test of whether one possesses a concept. I suppose if one says 'You know you've got a concept when you are capable of thinking about it', that is much the same thing. Sounds fine. |
9104 | A universal is the result of abstraction, which is only a kind of mental picturing [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: A universal is not the result of generation, but of abstraction, which is only a kind of mental picturing. | |
From: William of Ockham (Ordinatio [1320], DII Qviii prima redactio) | |
A reaction: The phrase 'mental picturing' works very plausibly for the universal 'giraffe', but not so well for 'multiplication' or 'contradiction'. Though we might broaden 'picturing' to being a much less visual concept. Mapping seems basic. |
19577 | Everything is a chaotic unity, then we abstract, then we reunify the world into a free alliance [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Before abstraction everything is one - but one as chaos is - after abstraction everything is again unified - but in a free alliance of independent, self-determined beings. A crowd has become a society - a chaos is transformed into a manifold world. | |
From: Novalis (Miscellaneous Observations [1798], 094) | |
A reaction: Personally I take (unfashionably) psychological abstraction to one of the key foundations of human thought, so I love this idea, which gives a huge picture of how the abstracting mind relates to reality. |
5825 | Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans] |
Full Idea: In general, a speaker intends to refer to the item that is the dominant source of his associated body of information. | |
From: Gareth Evans (The Causal Theory of Names [1973], §II) | |
A reaction: This sounds like a theory of reference which fully preserves the spirit of traditional empiricism. Speakers refer to ideas which connect to the source of their underlying impressions. |
5823 | The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans] |
Full Idea: A necessary (but not sufficient) condition for x's being the intended referent of S's use of a name is that x should be the source of the causal origin of the body of information that S has associated with the name. | |
From: Gareth Evans (The Causal Theory of Names [1973], §I) | |
A reaction: This is Evans's adaptation of Kripke's causal theory of names. This cries out for a counterexample. I say something about General Montgomery, having just listened to 'Monty's Double' give a talk, believing it was Montgomery? |
9039 | If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans] |
Full Idea: The strong thesis (that descriptions are sufficient for reference) is outrageous. It would mean that if Mr X is wrongly introduced to me as Mr Y, then I truly say 'this is Mr Y' if X overwhelmingly satisfies descriptions of Y. | |
From: Gareth Evans (The Causal Theory of Names [1973], §I) | |
A reaction: [I omit some qualifying phrases] Evans says that probably no one ever held this view. It seems right. In the case of an electron it would seem that all the descriptions could be the same, except space-time location. Same electron as yesterday? |
9105 | Some concepts for propositions exist only in the mind, and in no language [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: Conceptual terms and the propositions formed by them are those mental words which do not belong to any language; they remain only in the mind and cannot be uttered exteriorly, though signs subordinated to these can be exteriorly uttered. | |
From: William of Ockham (Summa totius logicae [1323], I.c.i) | |
A reaction: [He cites Augustine] A glimmer of the idea of Mentalese, and is probably an integral part of any commitment to propositions. Quine would hate it, but I like it. Logicians seem to dislike anything that cannot be articulated, but brains are like that. |
19585 | Every person has his own language [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Every person has his own language. Language is the expression of the spirit. | |
From: Novalis (Logological Fragments I [1798], 91) | |
A reaction: Nice to see someone enthusiastically affirming what was later famously denied, and maybe even disproved. |
9043 | We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans] |
Full Idea: Sometimes we use expressions with the overriding intention to conform to the use made of them by some other person or persons. I shall say we use the expression 'deferentially'; examples might be 'viol' or 'minuet'. | |
From: Gareth Evans (The Causal Theory of Names [1973], §II) | |
A reaction: I presume Evans wasn't very musical. This label sounds useful, if you wish to connect Grice's account of meaning with Putnam's externalist account of concepts, where deference to experts is crucial. Is all linguistic usage deferential? |
9040 | Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans] |
Full Idea: I think the Principle of Charity (maximise true beliefs) is unacceptable. The acceptable principle enjoins minimizing the attribution of inexplicable error and cannot be operated without a theory of the causation of belief for the creatures investigated. | |
From: Gareth Evans (The Causal Theory of Names [1973], §I) | |
A reaction: The normal principle of charity certainly seems on shaky ground if you think you have encountered a fairly normal tribe, when they in fact are in possession of the weirdest belief system on the entire planet. |
19578 | Only self-illuminated perfect individuals are beautiful [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Everything beautiful is a self-illuminated, perfect individual. | |
From: Novalis (Miscellaneous Observations [1798], 101) | |
A reaction: It is a commonplace to describe something beautiful as being 'perfect'. Unfinished masterpieces are interesting exceptions. Are only 'individuals' beautiful? Is unity a necessary condition of beauty? Bad art fails to be self-illuminated. |
19582 | Morality and philosophy are mutually dependent [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Without philosophy there is no true morality, and without morality no philosophy. | |
From: Novalis (Logological Fragments I [1798], 21) | |
A reaction: Challenging! Maybe unthinking people drift in a sea of vague untethered morality, and people who seem to have a genuine moral strength are always rooted in some sort of philosophy. Maybe. Is the passion for philosophy a moral passion? |
22027 | Life isn't given to us like a novel - we write the novel [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Life must not be a novel that is given to us, but one that is made by us. | |
From: Novalis (Logological Fragments I [1798], 99) | |
A reaction: The roots of existentialism are in the Romantic movement. Sartre seems to have taken this idea literally. |
19589 | The whole point of a monarch is that we accept them as a higher-born, ideal person [Novalis] |
Full Idea: The distinguishing character of the monarchy lies precisely in the fact of belief in a higher-born person, of voluntary acceptance of an ideal person. I cannot choose a leader from among my peers. | |
From: Novalis (Fath and Love, or the King and Queen [1798], 18) | |
A reaction: Novalis was passionately devoted to the new king and queen of Prussia, only a few years after the French Revolution. This attitude seems to me unchanged among monarchists in present day Britain. Genetics has undermined 'higher-born'. |
19580 | If the pupil really yearns for the truth, they only need a hint [Novalis] |
Full Idea: If a pupil genuinely desires truth is requires only a hint to show him how to find what he is seeking. | |
From: Novalis (Logological Fragments I [1798], 02) | |
A reaction: The tricky job for the teacher or supervisor is assessing whether the pupil genuinely desires truth, or needs motivating. |
19593 | Persons are shaped by a life history; splendid persons are shaped by world history [Novalis] |
Full Idea: What is it that shapes a person if not his life history? And in the same way a splendid person is shaped by nothing other than world history. Many people live better in the past and in the future than in the present. | |
From: Novalis (Last Fragments [1800], 15) | |
A reaction: Clearly there is a lot to be said for splendid people who live entirely in the present (such as jazz musicians). Some people do have an awesomely wide historical perspective on their immediate lives. Palaeontology is not the master discipline though! |
19595 | Nature is a whole, and its individual parts cannot be wholly understood [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Nature is a whole - in which each part in itself can never be wholly understood. | |
From: Novalis (Last Fragments [1800], 18) | |
A reaction: This doesn't seem right when studying some item in a laboratory, but it seems undeniable when you consider the history and future of each item. |
19592 | The basic relations of nature are musical [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Musical relations seem to me to be actually the basic relations of nature. | |
From: Novalis (Last Fragments [1800], 10) | |
A reaction: Novalis shows no signs of being a pythagorean, and then suddenly comes out with this. I suppose if you love music, this thought should float into your mind at regular intervals, because the power of music is so strong. Does he mean ratios? |
16675 | Every extended material substance is composed of parts distant from one another [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: Every extended material substance is composed of substantial parts distant from one another in place or location. | |
From: William of Ockham (Tractatus de corpore Christi [1323], Ch. 12) | |
A reaction: Pasnau glosses this as that 'bodies have corpuscular structure', meaning that they are made up of parts of matter (rather than just enformed matter, I think). |
19381 | The past has ceased to exist, and the future does not yet exist, so time does not exist [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: Time is composed of non-entities, because it is composed of the past which does not exist now, although it did exist, and of the future, which does not yet exist; therefore time does not exist. | |
From: William of Ockham (works [1335], 6:496), quoted by Richard T.W. Arthur - Leibniz 7 'Nominalist' | |
A reaction: I've a lot of sympathy with this! I favour Presentism, so the past is gone and the future is yet to arrive. But we have no coherent concept of a present moment of any duration to contain reality. We are just completely bogglificated by it all. |
9111 | God is not wise, but more-than-wise; God is not good, but more-than-good [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: God is not wise, but more-than-wise; God is not good, but more-than-good. | |
From: William of Ockham (Reportatio [1330], III Q viii) | |
A reaction: [He is quoting 'Damascene'] I quote this for interest, but I very much doubt whether Damascene or William knew what it meant, and I certainly don't. There seems to have been a politically correct desire to invent super-powers for God. |
8010 | William of Ockham is the main spokesman for God's commands being the source of morality [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: The most notable philosopher who makes God's commandment the basis of goodness, rather than God's goodness a reason for obeying him, is William of Occam. | |
From: William of Ockham (works [1335]), quoted by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.9 | |
A reaction: Either view has problems. Why choose God to obey? Obey anyone who is powerful? But how do you decide that God is good? How do we know the nature of God's commands, or the nature of God's goodness? Etc. |
9112 | We could never form a concept of God's wisdom if we couldn't abstract it from creatures [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: What we abstract is said to belong to perfection in so far as it can be predicated of God and can stand for Him. For if such a concept could not be abstracted from a creature, then in this life we could not arrive at a cognition of God's wisdom. | |
From: William of Ockham (Reportatio [1330], III Q viii) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the germ of an important argument. Without the ability to abstract from what is experienced, we would not be able to apply general concepts to things which are beyond experience. It is a key idea for empiricism. |
9115 | To love God means to love whatever God wills to be loved [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: To love God above all means to love whatever God wills to be loved. | |
From: William of Ockham (Seven Quodlibets [1332], III Q xiii) | |
A reaction: A striking thought, which could be meaningful to the non-religious. Is it possible to form an image of what a perfect and ideal mind would love most? This might generate a set of universal values. It is tricky to find out what an actual God loves. |
16679 | Even an angel must have some location [William of Ockham, by Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Ockham dismisses the possibility of non-location out of hand, remarking that even an angel has some location. | |
From: report of William of Ockham (works [1335]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 14.4 |
19576 | Religion needs an intermediary, because none of us can connect directly to a godhead [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Nothing is more indispensable for true religious feeling than an intermediary - which connects us to the godhead. The human being is absolutely incapable of sustaining an immediate relation with this. | |
From: Novalis (Miscellaneous Observations [1798], 073) | |
A reaction: I take this to be a defence of priests and organised religion, and an implied attack on protestants who give centrality to private prayer and conscience. |