Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Numenius, Roger Crisp and Samuel Alexander

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6 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
3534 To be is to have causal powers [Alexander,S]
     Full Idea: To be is to have causal powers.
     From: Samuel Alexander (works [1927], §4), quoted by Jaegwon Kim - Nonreductivist troubles with ment.causation
     A reaction: This is sometimes called Alexander's Principle. It is first found in Plato, and is popular with physicalists, but there are problem cases... A thing needs to exist in order to have causal powers. To exist is more than to be perceived.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
3398 Epiphenomenalism makes the mind totally pointless [Alexander,S]
     Full Idea: Epiphenomenalism supposes something to exist in nature which has nothing to do and no purpose to serve.
     From: Samuel Alexander (works [1927]), quoted by Jaegwon Kim - Philosophy of Mind p.129
     A reaction: An objection, but not, I think, a strong one. The fact, for example, that sweat is shiny is the result of good evolutionary reasons, but I cannot think of any purpose which it serves. All events which are purposeful are likely to have side-effects.
14494 Epiphenomenalism is like a pointless nobleman, kept for show, but soon to be abolished [Alexander,S]
     Full Idea: Epiphenomenalism supposes something to exist in nature which has nothing to do, no purpose to serve, a species of noblesse which depends on the work of its inferiors, but is kept for show and might as well, and undoubtedly would in time be abolished.
     From: Samuel Alexander (Space, Time and Deity (2 vols) [1927], 2:8), quoted by Jaegwon Kim - Nonreductivist troubles with ment.causation IV
     A reaction: Wonderful! Kim quotes this, and labels the implicit slogan (to be real is to have causal powers) 'Alexander's Dictum'. All the examples given of epiphenomena are only causally inert within a defined system, but they act causally outside the system.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
6853 Consequentialism wrongly assumes a clear line between an act and its consequences [Crisp,R]
     Full Idea: What is wrong with consequentialism is that it assumes that there is agreement about when an act ends and when its consequences begin.
     From: Roger Crisp (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.31)
     A reaction: I certainly agree that this is a mistake in consequentialism, which has a crude idea of what an action is, though I am not convinced that this is the key fault in the theory. The theory doesn't distinguish acts by people from those by machines.
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 4. Ecology
6854 Does the environment have value in itself? [Crisp,R]
     Full Idea: The debate which dominates environmental ethics is whether the environment has value in itself.
     From: Roger Crisp (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.37)
     A reaction: I say the answer has to be 'yes'. If it only has value in relation to conscious or human life, it will be difficult to demonstrate that they have value. Pleasure and pain, or wisdom, can't imply value on their own; a bigger picture is needed.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 1. God
6011 There is a remote first god (the Good), and a second god who organises the material world [Numenius, by O'Meara]
     Full Idea: Numenius argues that material reality depends on intelligible being, which depends on a first god - the Good - which is difficult to grasp, but which inspires a second god to imitate it, turning to matter and organizing it as the world.
     From: report of Numenius (fragments/reports [c.160]) by Dominic J. O'Meara - Numenius
     A reaction: The interaction problem comes either between the two gods, or between the second god and the world. The argument may have failed to catch on for long when people scented an infinite regress lurking in the middle of it.