265 ideas
11300 | Agathon: good [PG] |
Full Idea: Agathon: good, the highest good | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 01) |
11301 | Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness [PG] |
Full Idea: Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 02) |
11302 | Aitia / aition: cause, explanation [PG] |
Full Idea: Aitia / aition: cause, explanation | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 03) | |
A reaction: The consensus is that 'explanation' is the better translation, and hence that the famous Four Causes (in 'Physics') must really be understood as the Four Modes of Explanation. They then make far more sense. |
11303 | Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will [PG] |
Full Idea: Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 04) | |
A reaction: The whole Greek debate (and modern debate, I would say) makes much more sense if we stick to 'lack of control' as the translation, and forget about weakness of will - and certainly give up 'incontinence' as a translation. |
11304 | Aletheia: truth [PG] |
Full Idea: Aletheia: truth | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 05) |
11305 | Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance [PG] |
Full Idea: Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 06) | |
A reaction: This is used for Plato's doctrine that we recollect past lives. |
11306 | Ananke: necessity [PG] |
Full Idea: Ananke: necessity | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 07) |
11307 | Antikeimenon: object [PG] |
Full Idea: Antikeimenon: object | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 08) |
11375 | Apatheia: unemotional [PG] |
Full Idea: Apatheia: lack of involvement, unemotional | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 09) |
11308 | Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite [PG] |
Full Idea: Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 10) | |
A reaction: Key term in the philosophy of Anaximander, the one unknowable underlying element. |
11376 | Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction [PG] |
Full Idea: Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 11) |
11309 | Apodeixis: demonstration [PG] |
Full Idea: Apodeixis: demonstration, proof | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 12) |
11310 | Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly [PG] |
Full Idea: Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 13) |
11311 | Arche: first principle, the basic [PG] |
Full Idea: Arché: first principle, the basic | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 14) | |
A reaction: Interchangeable with 'aitia' by Aristotle. The first principle and the cause are almost identical. |
11312 | Arete: virtue, excellence [PG] |
Full Idea: Areté: virtue, excellence | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 15) | |
A reaction: The word hovers between moral excellence and being good at what you do. Annas defends the older translation as 'virtue', rather than the modern 'excellence'. |
11313 | Chronismos: separation [PG] |
Full Idea: Chronismos: separation | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 16) |
11314 | Diairesis: division [PG] |
Full Idea: Diairesis: division, distinction | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 17) |
11315 | Dialectic: dialectic, discussion [PG] |
Full Idea: Dialectic: dialectic, discussion | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 18) |
11316 | Dianoia: intellection [cf. Noesis] [PG] |
Full Idea: Dianoia: intellection, understanding [cf. Noesis] | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 21) |
11317 | Diaphora: difference [PG] |
Full Idea: Diaphora: difference | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 22) |
11318 | Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice [PG] |
Full Idea: Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 23) | |
A reaction: Usually translated as 'justice' in 'Republic', but it is a general term of moral approbation, not like the modern political and legal notion of 'justice'. 'Justice' actually seems to be bad translation. |
11319 | Doxa: opinion, belief [PG] |
Full Idea: Doxa: opinion, belief, judgement | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 24) |
11320 | Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity [PG] |
Full Idea: Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 25) |
11321 | Eidos: form, idea [PG] |
Full Idea: Eidos: form, idea | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 26) | |
A reaction: In Plato it is the word best translated as 'Form' (Theory of...); in Aritotle's 'Categories' it designates the species, and in 'Metaphysics' it ends up naming the structural form of the species (and hence the essence) [Wedin p.120] |
11322 | Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation [PG] |
Full Idea: Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 27) |
11323 | Empeiron: experience [PG] |
Full Idea: Empeiron: experience | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 28) |
11324 | Energeia: employment, actuality, power? [PG] |
Full Idea: Energeia: employment, actuality, power? | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 31) |
11325 | Enkrateia: control [PG] |
Full Idea: Enkrateia: control | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 32) | |
A reaction: See 'akrasia', of which this is the opposite. The enkratic person is controlled. |
11326 | Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end [PG] |
Full Idea: Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 33) |
11327 | Epagoge: induction, explanation [PG] |
Full Idea: Epagoge: induction, explanation, leading on | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 34) |
11328 | Episteme: knowledge, understanding [PG] |
Full Idea: Episteme: knowledge, understanding | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 35) | |
A reaction: Note that 'episteme' can form a plural in Greek, but we can't say 'knowledges', so we have to say 'branches of knowledge', or 'sciences'. |
11329 | Epithumia: appetite [PG] |
Full Idea: Epithumia: appetite | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 36) |
11330 | Ergon: function [PG] |
Full Idea: Ergon: function, work | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 37) |
11331 | Eristic: polemic, disputation [PG] |
Full Idea: Eristic: polemic, disputation | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 38) | |
A reaction: This is confrontational argument, rather than the subtle co-operative dialogue of dialectic. British law courts and the House of Commons are founded on eristic, rather than on dialectic. Could there be a dialectical elected assembly? |
11332 | Eros: love [PG] |
Full Idea: Eros: love, desire | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 41) |
11333 | Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment [PG] |
Full Idea: Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 42) | |
A reaction: Some people defend 'happiness' as the translation, but that seems to me wildly misleading, since eudaimonia is something like life going well, and certainly isn't a psychological state - and definitely not pleasure. |
11334 | Genos: type, genus [PG] |
Full Idea: Genos: type, genus, kind | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 43) |
11335 | Hexis: state, habit [PG] |
Full Idea: Hexis: state, habit | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 44) |
11336 | Horismos: definition [PG] |
Full Idea: Horismos: definition | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 45) |
11337 | Hule: matter [PG] |
Full Idea: Hule: matter | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 46) | |
A reaction: The first half of the 'hylomorphism' of Aristotle. See 'morphe'! |
11338 | Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing [cf. Tode ti] [PG] |
Full Idea: Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing, substratum [cf. Tode ti] | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 47) | |
A reaction: Literally 'that which lies under'. Latin version is 'substratum'. In Aristotle it is the problem, of explaining what lies under. It is not the theory that there is some entity called a 'substratum'. |
11339 | Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility [PG] |
Full Idea: Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 48) | |
A reaction: A revealing Greek word, which is not only our rather pure notion of 'beauty', but also seems to mean something like wow!, and (very suggestive, this) applies as much to actions as to objects. |
11340 | Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially [PG] |
Full Idea: Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 51) |
11341 | Kinesis: movement, process [PG] |
Full Idea: Kinesis: movement, process, change | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 52) |
11342 | Kosmos: order, universe [PG] |
Full Idea: Kosmos: order, universe | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 53) |
11343 | Logos: reason, account, word [PG] |
Full Idea: Logos: reason, account, word | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 54) |
11344 | Meson: the mean [PG] |
Full Idea: Meson: the mean | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 55) | |
A reaction: This is not the 'average', and hence not some theoretical mid-point. I would call it the 'appropriate compromise', remembering that an extreme may be appropriate in certain circumstances. |
11345 | Metechein: partaking, sharing [PG] |
Full Idea: Metechein: partaking, sharing | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 56) | |
A reaction: The key word in Plato for the difficult question of the relationships between the Forms and the particulars. The latter 'partake' of the former. Hm. Compare modern 'instantiation', which strikes me as being equally problematic. |
11377 | Mimesis: imitation, fine art [PG] |
Full Idea: Mimesis: imitation, fine art | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 57) |
11346 | Morphe: form [PG] |
Full Idea: Morphe: form | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 58) |
11347 | Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] [PG] |
Full Idea: Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 59) |
11348 | Nomos: convention, law, custom [PG] |
Full Idea: Nomos: convention, law, custom | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 61) |
11349 | Nous: intuition, intellect, understanding [PG] |
Full Idea: Nous: intuition, intellect | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 62) | |
A reaction: There is a condensed discussion of 'nous' in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics B.19 |
11350 | Orexis: desire [PG] |
Full Idea: Orexis: desire | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 63) |
11351 | Ousia: substance, (primary) being, [see 'Prote ousia'] [PG] |
Full Idea: Ousia: substance, (primary) being [see 'Prote ousia'] | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 64) | |
A reaction: It is based on the verb 'to be'. Latin therefore translated it as 'essentia' (esse: to be), and we have ended up translating it as 'essence', but this is wrong! 'Being' is the best translation, and 'substance' is OK. It is the problem, not the answer. |
11352 | Pathos: emotion, affection, property [PG] |
Full Idea: Pathos: emotion, affection, property | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 65) |
11353 | Phantasia: imagination [PG] |
Full Idea: Phantasia: imagination | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 66) |
11354 | Philia: friendship [PG] |
Full Idea: Philia: friendship | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 67) |
11355 | Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom [PG] |
Full Idea: Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 68) | |
A reaction: The point of the word is its claim only to love wisdom, and not actually to be wise. |
11356 | Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense [PG] |
Full Idea: Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 71) | |
A reaction: None of the experts use my own translation, which is 'common sense', but that seems to me to perfectly fit all of Aristotle's discussions of the word in 'Ethics'. 'Prudence' seems a daft translation in modern English. |
11357 | Physis: nature [PG] |
Full Idea: Physis: nature | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 72) |
11358 | Praxis: action, activity [PG] |
Full Idea: Praxis: action, activity | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 73) |
11359 | Prote ousia: primary being [PG] |
Full Idea: Prote ousia: primary being | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 74) | |
A reaction: The main topic of investigation in Aristotle's 'Metaphysics'. 'Ousia' is the central problem of the text, NOT the answer to the problem. |
11360 | Psuche: mind, soul, life [PG] |
Full Idea: Psuche: mind, soul, life | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 75) | |
A reaction: The interesting thing about this is that we have tended to translate it as 'soul', but Aristotle says plants have it, and not merely conscious beings. It is something like the 'form' of a living thing, but then 'form' is a misleading translation too. |
11361 | Sophia: wisdom [PG] |
Full Idea: Sophia: wisdom | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 76) |
11362 | Sophrosune: moderation, self-control [PG] |
Full Idea: Sophrosune: moderation, self-control | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 77) |
11363 | Stoicheia: elements [PG] |
Full Idea: Stoicheia: elements | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 78) |
11364 | Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism [PG] |
Full Idea: Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 81) |
11365 | Techne: skill, practical knowledge [PG] |
Full Idea: Techne: skill, practical knowledge | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 82) |
11366 | Telos: purpose, end [PG] |
Full Idea: Telos: purpose, end | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 83) |
11367 | Theoria: contemplation [PG] |
Full Idea: Theoria: contemplation | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 84) |
11368 | Theos: god [PG] |
Full Idea: Theos: god | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 85) |
11369 | Ti esti: what-something-is, essence [PG] |
Full Idea: Ti esti: the what-something-is, essence, whatness | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 86) |
11370 | Timoria: vengeance, punishment [PG] |
Full Idea: Timoria: vengeance, punishment | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 87) |
11371 | To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be [PG] |
Full Idea: To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 88) | |
A reaction: This is Aristotle's main term for what we would now call the 'essence'. It is still not a theory of essence, merely an identification of the target. 'Form' is the nearest we get to his actual theory. |
11372 | To ti estin: essence [PG] |
Full Idea: To ti estin: essence | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 91) |
11373 | Tode ti: this-such, subject of predication [cf. hupokeimenon] [PG] |
Full Idea: Tode ti: this-something, subject of predication, thisness [cf. hupokeimenon] | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 92) |
11461 | 323 (roughly): Euclid wrote 'Elements', summarising all of geometry [PG] |
Full Idea: Euclid: In around 323 BCE Euclid wrote his 'Elements', summarising all of known geometry. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030]) |
11390 | 1000 (roughly): Upanishads written (in Sanskrit); religious and philosophical texts [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 1000 BCE the Upanishads were written, the most philosophical of ancient Hindu texts | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0001) |
11391 | 750 (roughly): the Book of Genesis written by Hebrew writers [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 750 BCE the Book of Genesis was written by an anonymous jewish writer | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0250) |
11392 | 586: eclipse of the sun on the coast of modern Turkey was predicted by Thales of Miletus [PG] |
Full Idea: In 585 BCE there was an eclipse of the sun, which Thales of Miletus is said to have predicted | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0415) |
11395 | 570: Anaximander flourished in Miletus [PG] |
Full Idea: Anaximander: In around 570 BCE the philosopher and astronomer Anaximander flourished in Miletus | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0430) |
11396 | 563: the Buddha born in northern India [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 563 BCE Siddhartha Gautama, the Buddha, was born in northern India | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0437) |
11398 | 540: Lao Tzu wrote 'Tao Te Ching', the basis of Taoism [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 540 BCE Lao Tzu wrote the 'Tao Te Ching', the basis of Taoism | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0460) |
11400 | 529: Pythagoras created his secretive community at Croton in Sicily [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 529 BCE Pythagoras set up a community in Croton, with strict and secret rules and teachings | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0471) |
11403 | 500: Heraclitus flourishes at Ephesus, in modern Turkey [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 500 BCE Heraclitus flourished in the city of Ephesus in Ionia | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0500) |
11404 | 496: Confucius travels widely, persuading rulers to be more moral [PG] |
Full Idea: In 496 BCE Confucius began a period of wandering, to persuade rulers to be more moral | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0504) |
11408 | 472: Empedocles persuades his city (Acragas in Sicily) to become a democracy [PG] |
Full Idea: In 472 BCE Empedocles helped his city of Acragas change to democracy | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0528) |
11412 | 450 (roughly): Parmenides and Zeno visit Athens from Italy [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 450 BCE Parmenides and Zeno visited the festival in Athens | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0550) |
11414 | 445: Protagoras helps write laws for the new colony of Thurii [PG] |
Full Idea: In 443 BCE Protagoras helped write the laws for the new colony of Thurii | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0557) |
11417 | 436 (roughly): Anaxagoras is tried for impiety, and expelled from Athens [PG] |
Full Idea: In about 436 BCE Anaxagoras was tried on a charge of impiety and expelled from Athens | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0564) |
11535 | 170 (roughly): Marcus Aurelius wrote his private stoic meditations [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 170 CE the Emperor Marcus Aurelius wrote his 'Meditations' for private reading. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1170) |
11537 | -200 (roughly): Sextus Empiricus wrote a series of books on scepticism [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 200 CE Sextus Empiricus wrote a series of books (which survive) defending scepticism | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1200) |
11541 | 263: Porphyry began to study with Plotinus in Rome [PG] |
Full Idea: In 263 CE Porphyry joined Plotinus' classes in Rome | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1263) |
11545 | 310: Christianity became the official religion of the Roman empire [PG] |
Full Idea: In 310 CE Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1310) |
11549 | 387: Ambrose converts Augustine to Christianity [PG] |
Full Idea: In 387 CE Augustine converted to Christianity in Milan, guided by St Ambrose | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1387) |
11555 | 523: Boethius imprisoned at Pavia, and begins to write [PG] |
Full Idea: In 523 CE Boethius was imprisoned in exile at Pavia, and wrote 'Consolations of Philosophy' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1523) |
11557 | 529: the emperor Justinian closes all the philosophy schools in Athens [PG] |
Full Idea: In 529 CE the Emperor Justinian closed all the philosophy schools in Athens | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1529) |
11421 | 427: Gorgias visited Athens as ambassador for Leontini [PG] |
Full Idea: In 427 BCE Gorgias of Leontini visited Athens as an ambassador for his city | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0573) |
11425 | 399: Socrates executed (with Plato absent through ill health) [PG] |
Full Idea: In 399 BCE Plato was unwell, and was not present at the death of Socrates | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0601) |
11432 | 387 (roughly): Plato returned to Athens, and founded the Academy [PG] |
Full Idea: In about 387 BCE Plato returned to Athens and founded his new school at the Academy | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0613) |
11433 | 387 (roughly): Aristippus the Elder founder a hedonist school at Cyrene [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 387 BCE a new school was founded at Cyrene by Aristippus the elder | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0613) |
11440 | 367: the teenaged Aristotle came to study at the Academy [PG] |
Full Idea: In 367 BCE the seventeen-year-old Aristotle came south to study at the Academy | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0633) |
11443 | 360 (roughly): Diogenes of Sinope lives in a barrel in central Athens [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 360 BCE Diogenes of Sinope was living in a barrel in the Agora in Athens | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0640) |
11445 | 347: death of Plato [PG] |
Full Idea: In 347 BCE Plato died | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0653) |
11454 | 343: Aristotle becomes tutor to 13 year old Alexander (the Great) [PG] |
Full Idea: In 343 BCE at Stagira Aristotle became personal tutor to the thirteen-year-old Alexander (the Great) | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0657) |
11456 | 335: Arisotle founded his school at the Lyceum in Athens [PG] |
Full Idea: In 335 BCE Aristotle founded the Lyceum in Athens | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0665) |
11459 | 330 (roughly): Chuang Tzu wrote his Taoist book [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 330 BCE Chuang Tzu wrote a key work in the Taoist tradition | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0670) |
11465 | 322: Aristotle retired to Chalcis, and died there [PG] |
Full Idea: In 322 BCE Aristotle retired to Chalcis in Euboea, where he died | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0678) |
11468 | 307 (roughly): Epicurus founded his school at the Garden in Athens [PG] |
Full Idea: In about 307 BCE Epicurus founded his school at the Garden in Athens | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0693) |
11470 | 301 (roughly): Zeno of Citium founded Stoicism at the Stoa Poikile in Athens [PG] |
Full Idea: In about 301 BCE the Stoic school was founded by Zeno of Citium in the Stoa Poikile in Athens | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0699) |
11483 | 261: Cleanthes replaced Zeno as head of the Stoa [PG] |
Full Idea: In 261 BCE Cleanthes took over from Zeno as head of the Stoa. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0739) |
11486 | 229 (roughly): Chrysippus replaced Cleanthes has head of the Stoa [PG] |
Full Idea: In about 229 BCE Chrysippus took over from Cleanthes as the head of the Stoic school | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0771) |
11492 | 157 (roughly): Carneades became head of the Academy [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 157 BCE Carneades took over as head of the Academy from Hegesinus | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0843) |
11509 | 85: most philosophical activity moves to Alexandria [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 85 BCE Athens went into philosophical decline, and leadership moved to Alexandria | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0915) |
11513 | 78: Cicero visited the stoic school on Rhodes [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 78 BCE Cicero visited the school of Posidonius in Rhodes. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0922) |
11516 | 60 (roughly): Lucretius wrote his Latin poem on epicureanism [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 60 BCE Lucretius wrote his Latin poem on Epicureanism | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0940) |
11528 | 65: Seneca forced to commit suicide by Nero [PG] |
Full Idea: In 65 CE Seneca was forced to commit suicide by the Emperor Nero. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1065) |
11531 | 80: the discourses of the stoic Epictetus are written down [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 80 CE the 'Discourses' of the freed slave Epictetus were written down in Rome. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1080) |
11558 | 622 (roughly): Mohammed writes the Koran [PG] |
Full Idea: Mohammed: In about 622 CE Muhammed wrote the basic text of Islam, the Koran. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1622) |
11559 | 642: Arabs close the philosophy schools in Alexandria [PG] |
Full Idea: In 642 CE Alexandria was captured by the Arabs, and the philosophy schools were closed | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1642) |
11560 | 910 (roughly): Al-Farabi wrote Arabic commentaries on Aristotle [PG] |
Full Idea: Alfarabi: In around 910 CE Al-Farabi explained and expanded Aristotle for the Islamic world. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1910) |
11562 | 1015 (roughly): Ibn Sina (Avicenna) writes a book on Aristotle [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 1015 Avicenna produced his Platonised version of Aristotle in 'The Healing' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2015) |
11564 | 1090: Anselm publishes his proof of the existence of God [PG] |
Full Idea: Anselm: In about 1090 St Anselm of Canterbury publishes his Ontological Proof of God's existence | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2090) |
11566 | 1115: Abelard is the chief logic teacher in Paris [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 1115 Abelard became established as the chief logic teacher in Paris | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2115) |
11573 | 1166: Ibn Rushd (Averroes) wrote extensive commentaries on Aristotle [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 1166 Averroes (Ibn Rushd), in Seville, wrote extensive commentaries on Aristotle | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2166) |
11581 | 1266: Aquinas began writing 'Summa Theologica' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1266 Aquinas began writing his great theological work, the 'Summa Theologica' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2266) |
11586 | 1280: after his death, the teaching of Aquinas becomes official Dominican doctrine [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 1280 Aquinas's teaching became the official theology of the Dominican order | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2280) |
11591 | 1328: William of Ockham decides the Pope is a heretic, and moves to Munich [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1328 William of Ockham decided the Pope was a heretic, and moved to Munich | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2328) |
17916 | 1347: the Church persecutes philosophical heresies [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1347 the Church began extensive persecution of unorthodox philosophical thought | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2347) |
11593 | 1470: Marsilio Ficino founds a Platonic Academy in Florence [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 1470 Marsilio Ficino founded a Platonic Academy in Florence | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2470) |
11596 | 1513: Machiavelli wrote 'The Prince' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1513 Machiavelli wrote 'The Prince', a tough view of political theory. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2513) |
11599 | 1543: Copernicus publishes his heliocentric view of the solar system [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1543 Nicholas Copernicus, a Polish monk, publishes his new theory of the solar system. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2543) |
11601 | 1580: Montaigne publishes his essays [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1580 Montaigne published a volume of his 'Essays' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2580) |
11607 | 1600: Giordano Bruno was burned at the stake in Rome [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1600 Giordano Bruno was burnt at the stake in Rome, largely for endorsing Copernicus | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2600) |
11613 | 1619: Descartes's famous day of meditation inside a stove [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1619 Descartes had a famous day of meditation in a heated stove at Ulm | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2619) |
11614 | 1620: Bacon publishes 'Novum Organum' [PG] |
Full Idea: Francis Bacon: In 1620 Bacon published his 'Novum Organon', urging the rise of experimental science | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2620) |
11619 | 1633: Galileo convicted of heresy by the Inquisition [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1633 Galileo was condemned to life emprisonment for contradicting church teachings. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2633) |
11623 | 1641: Descartes publishes his 'Meditations' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1641 Descartes published his well-known 'Meditations', complete with Objections and Replies | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2641) |
11626 | 1650: death of Descartes, in Stockholm [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1650 Descartes died in Stockholm, after stressful work for Queen Christina | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2650) |
11627 | 1651: Hobbes publishes 'Leviathan' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1651 Hobbes published his great work on politics and contract morality, 'Leviathan' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2651) |
11633 | 1662: the Port Royal Logic is published [PG] |
Full Idea: Antoine Arnauld: In 1662 Arnauld and Nicole published their famous text, the 'Port-Royal Logic' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2662) |
11634 | 1665: Spinoza writes his 'Ethics' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1665 the first draft of Spinoza's 'Ethics', his major work, was finished, and published posthumously | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2665) |
11643 | 1676: Leibniz settled as librarian to the Duke of Brunswick [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1676 Leibniz became librarian to the Duke of Brunswick, staying for the rest of his life | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2676) |
11649 | 1687: Newton publishes his 'Principia Mathematica' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1687 Newton published his 'Principia', containing his theory of gravity. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2687) |
11652 | 1690: Locke publishes his 'Essay' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1690 Locke published his 'Essay', his major work on empiricism | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2690) |
11654 | 1697: Bayle publishes his 'Dictionary' [PG] |
Full Idea: Pierre Bayle: In about 1697 Pierre Bayle published his 'Historical and Critical Dictionary' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2697) |
11659 | 1713: Berkeley publishes his 'Three Dialogues' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1713 Berkeley published a popular account of his empiricist idealism in 'Three Dialogues' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2713) |
11666 | 1734: Voltaire publishes his 'Philosophical Letters' [PG] |
Full Idea: Francois-Marie Voltaire: In 1734 Voltaire's 'Lettres Philosophiques' praised liberalism and empiricism | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2734) |
11667 | 1739: Hume publishes his 'Treatise' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1739 Hume returned to Edinburgh and published his 'Treatise', but it sold very few copies | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2739) |
11675 | 1762: Rousseau publishes his 'Social Contract' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1762 Rousseau published his 'Social Contract', basing politics on the popular will | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2762) |
11682 | 1781: Kant publishes his 'Critique of Pure Reason' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1781 Kant published his first great work, the 'Critique of Pure Reason' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2781) |
11683 | 1785: Reid publishes his essays defending common sense [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1785 Thomas Reid, based in Glasgow, published essays defending common sense. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2785) |
11687 | 1798: the French Revolution [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1789 the French Revolution gave strong impetus to the anti-rational 'Romantic' movement | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2789) |
11694 | 1807: Hegel publishes his 'Phenomenology of Spirit' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1807 Hegel published his first major work, the 'Phenomenology of Spirit' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2807) |
11701 | 1818: Schopenhauer publishes his 'World as Will and Idea' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1818 Schopenhauer published 'The World as Will and Idea', his major work | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2818) |
11710 | 1840: Kierkegaard is writing extensively in Copenhagen [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 1840 Kierkegaard lived a quiet life as a writer in Copenhagen | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2840) |
11713 | 1843: Mill publishes his 'System of Logic' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1843 Mill published his 'System of Logic' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2843) |
11715 | 1848: Marx and Engels publis the Communist Manifesto [PG] |
Full Idea: Karl Marx: In 1848 Marx and Engels published their 'Communist Manifesto' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2848) |
11717 | 1859: Darwin publishes his 'Origin of the Species' [PG] |
Full Idea: Charles Darwin: In 1859 Charles Darwin published his theory of natural selection in 'Origin of the Species'. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2859) |
11721 | 1861: Mill publishes 'Utilitarianism' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1861 Mill published his book 'Utilitarianism' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2861) |
11724 | 1867: Marx begins publishing 'Das Kapital' [PG] |
Full Idea: Karl Marx: In 1867 Karl Marx began publishing his political work 'Das Kapital' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2867) |
11733 | 1879: Peirce taught for five years at Johns Hopkins University [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1879 Peirce began five years of teaching at Johns Hopkins University | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2879) |
17907 | 1879: Frege invents predicate logic [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1879 Frege published his 'Concept Script', which created predicate logic | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2879) |
17909 | 1892: Frege's essay 'Sense and Reference' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1892 Frege published his famous essay 'Sense and Reference' (Sinn und Bedeutung) | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2882) |
17908 | 1884: Frege publishes his 'Foundations of Arithmetic' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1884 Frege published his 'Foundations of Arithmetic', the beginning of logicism | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2884) |
11735 | 1885: Nietzsche completed 'Thus Spake Zarathustra' [PG] |
Full Idea: In about 1885 Nietzsche completed his book 'Also Sprach Zarathustra' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2885) |
17911 | 1888: Dedekind publishes axioms for arithmetic [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1888 Dedekind created simple axioms for arithmetic (the Peano Axioms) | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2888) |
11740 | 1890: James published 'Principles of Psychology' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1890 James published his 'Principles of Psychology' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2890) |
11742 | 1895 (roughly): Freud developed theories of the unconscious [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 1895 Sigmund Freud developed his theories of the unconscious mind | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2895) |
11745 | 1900: Husserl began developing Phenomenology [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1900 Edmund Husserl began presenting his new philosophy of Phenomenology | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2900) |
11746 | 1903: Moore published 'Principia Ethica' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1903 G.E. Moore published his 'Principia Ethica', attacking naturalistic ethics. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2903) |
11747 | 1904: Dewey became professor at Columbia University [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1904 Dewey moved to Columbia University in New York. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2904) |
17910 | 1908: Zermelo publishes axioms for set theory [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1908 Zermelo published an axiomatisation of the new set theory | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2908) |
11752 | 1910: Russell and Whitehead begin publishing 'Principia Mathematica' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1910 Russell began publication of 'Principia Mathematica', with Whitehead | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2910) |
11756 | 1912: Russell meets Wittgenstein in Cambridge [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1912 Russell met Wittgenstein at Cambridge | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2912) |
11762 | 1921: Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' published [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1921 Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' was published | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2921) |
11765 | 1927: Heidegger's 'Being and Time' published [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1927 Heidegger's major work, 'Being and Time', was published | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2927) |
11768 | 1930: Frank Ramsey dies at 27 [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1930 Frank Ramsey died at the age of 27. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2930) |
11770 | 1931: Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems [PG] |
Full Idea: Kurt Gödel: In 1931 the mathematician Kurt Gödel publishes his Incompleteness Theorems. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2931) |
11773 | 1933: Tarski's theory of truth [PG] |
Full Idea: Alfred Tarski: In 1933 Alfred Tarski wrote a famous paper presenting a semantic theory of truth. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2933) |
11783 | 1942: Camus published 'The Myth of Sisyphus' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1942 Camus published 'The Myth of Sisyphus', exploring suicide and the absurd | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2942) |
11784 | 1943: Sartre's 'Being and Nothingness' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1943 Jean-Paul Sartre published his major work, 'Being and Nothingness' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2943) |
11787 | 1945: Merleau-Ponty's 'Phenomenology of Perception' [PG] |
Full Idea: Maurice Merleau-Ponty: In 1945 Maurice Merleau-Pont published 'The Phenomenology of Perception' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2945) |
17918 | 1947: Carnap published 'Meaning and Necessity' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1947 Carnap published 'Meaning and Necessity' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2947) |
11794 | 1950: Quine's essay 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1950 Willard Quine published 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', attacking analytic truth | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2950) |
17917 | 1953: Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1953 Wittgenstein's posthumous work 'Philosophical Investigations' is published | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2953) |
17919 | 1956: Place proposed mind-brain identity [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1956 U.T. Place proposed that the mind is identical to the brain | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2956) |
11804 | 1962: Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1962 Thomas Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions' questioned the authority of science | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2962) |
17921 | 1967: Putnam proposed functionalism of the mind [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1967 Putname proposed the functionalist view of the mind | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2967) |
11808 | 1971: Rawls's 'A Theory of Justice' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1971 John Rawls published his famous defence of liberalism in 'A Theory of Justice' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2971) |
11810 | 1972: Kripke publishes 'Naming and Necessity' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1972 Saul Kripke's 'Naming and Necessity' revised theories about language and reality | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2972) |
11813 | 1975: Singer publishes 'Animal Rights' [PG] |
Full Idea: Peter Singer: In 1975 Peter Singer's 'Animal Rights' turned the attention of philosophers to applied ethics. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2975) |
17920 | 1975: Putnam published his Twin Earth example [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1975 Putnam published 'The Meaning of 'Meaning'', containing his Twin Earth example | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2975) |
11820 | 1986: David Lewis publishes 'On the Plurality of Worlds' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1986 David Lewis published 'On the Plurality of Worlds', about possible worlds. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2986) |
4465 | Note that "is" can assert existence, or predication, or identity, or classification [PG] |
Full Idea: There are four uses of the word "is" in English: as existence ('he is at home'), as predication ('he is tall'), as identity ('he is the man I saw'), and as classification ('he is British'). | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
A reaction: This seems a nice instance of the sort of point made by analytical philosophy, which can lead to horrible confusion in other breeds of philosophy when it is overlooked. |
4686 | Fallacies are errors in reasoning, 'formal' if a clear rule is breached, and 'informal' if more general [PG] |
Full Idea: Fallacies are errors in reasoning, labelled as 'formal' if a clear rule has been breached, and 'informal' if some less precise error has been made. | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
A reaction: Presumably there can be a grey area between the two. |
7415 | Question-begging assumes the proposition which is being challenged [PG] |
Full Idea: To beg the question is to take for granted in your argument that very proposition which is being challenged | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
A reaction: An undoubted fallacy, and a simple failure to engage in the rational enterprise. I suppose one might give a reason for something, under the mistaken apprehension that it didn't beg the question; analysis of logical form is then needed. |
7414 | What is true of a set is also true of its members [PG] |
Full Idea: The fallacy of division is the claim that what is true of a set must therefore be true of its members. | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
A reaction: Clearly a fallacy, but if you only accept sets which are rational, then there is always a reason why a particular is a member of a set, and you can infer facts about particulars from the nature of the set |
6696 | The Ad Hominem Fallacy criticises the speaker rather than the argument [PG] |
Full Idea: The Ad Hominem Fallacy is to criticise the person proposing an argument rather than the argument itself, as when you say "You would say that", or "Your behaviour contradicts what you just said". | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
A reaction: Nietzsche is very keen on ad hominem arguments, and cheerfully insults great philosophers, but then he doesn't believe there is such a thing as 'pure argument', and he is a relativist. |
4687 | Minimal theories of truth avoid ontological commitment to such things as 'facts' or 'reality' [PG] |
Full Idea: Minimalist theories of truth are those which involve minimum ontological commitment, avoiding references to 'reality' or 'facts' or 'what works', preferring to refer to formal relationships within language. | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
A reaction: Personally I am suspicious of minimal theories, which seem to be designed by and for anti-realists. They seem too focused on language, when animals can obviously formulate correct propositions. I'm quite happy with the 'facts', even if that is vague. |
14240 | The empty set is something, not nothing! [Oliver/Smiley] |
Full Idea: Some authors need to be told loud and clear: if there is an empty set, it is something, not nothing. | |
From: Oliver,A/Smiley,T (What are Sets and What are they For? [2006], 1.2) | |
A reaction: I'm inclined to think of a null set as a pair of brackets, so maybe that puts it into a metalanguage. |
14241 | We don't need the empty set to express non-existence, as there are other ways to do that [Oliver/Smiley] |
Full Idea: The empty set is said to be useful to express non-existence, but saying 'there are no Us', or ¬∃xUx are no less concise, and certainly less roundabout. | |
From: Oliver,A/Smiley,T (What are Sets and What are they For? [2006], 1.2) |
14239 | The empty set is usually derived from Separation, but it also seems to need Infinity [Oliver/Smiley] |
Full Idea: The empty set is usually derived via Zermelo's axiom of separation. But the axiom of separation is conditional: it requires the existence of a set in order to generate others as subsets of it. The original set has to come from the axiom of infinity. | |
From: Oliver,A/Smiley,T (What are Sets and What are they For? [2006], 1.2) | |
A reaction: They charge that this leads to circularity, as Infinity depends on the empty set. |
14242 | Maybe we can treat the empty set symbol as just meaning an empty term [Oliver/Smiley] |
Full Idea: Suppose we introduce Ω not as a term standing for a supposed empty set, but as a paradigm of an empty term, not standing for anything. | |
From: Oliver,A/Smiley,T (What are Sets and What are they For? [2006], 1.2) | |
A reaction: This proposal, which they go on to explore, seems to mean that Ω (i.e. the traditional empty set symbol) is no longer part of set theory but is part of semantics. |
14243 | The unit set may be needed to express intersections that leave a single member [Oliver/Smiley] |
Full Idea: Thomason says with no unit sets we couldn't call {1,2}∩{2,3} a set - but so what? Why shouldn't the intersection be the number 2? However, we then have to distinguish three different cases of intersection (common subset or member, or disjoint). | |
From: Oliver,A/Smiley,T (What are Sets and What are they For? [2006], 2.2) |
14650 | Maybe proper names involve essentialism [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: Perhaps the notion of a proper name itself involves essentialism. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (De Re and De Dicto [1969], p.43) | |
A reaction: This is just before Kripke's announcement of 'rigid designation', which seems to have relaunched modern essentialism. The thought is that you can't name something, if you don't have a stable notion of what is (and isn't) being named. |
14234 | If you only refer to objects one at a time, you need sets in order to refer to a plurality [Oliver/Smiley] |
Full Idea: A 'singularist', who refers to objects one at a time, must resort to the language of sets in order to replace plural reference to members ('Henry VIII's wives') by singular reference to a set ('the set of Henry VIII's wives'). | |
From: Oliver,A/Smiley,T (What are Sets and What are they For? [2006], Intro) | |
A reaction: A simple and illuminating point about the motivation for plural reference. Null sets and singletons give me the creeps, so I would personally prefer to avoid set theory when dealing with ontology. |
14237 | We can use plural language to refer to the set theory domain, to avoid calling it a 'set' [Oliver/Smiley] |
Full Idea: Plurals earn their keep in set theory, to answer Skolem's remark that 'in order to treat of 'sets', we must begin with 'domains' that are constituted in a certain way'. We can speak in the plural of 'the objects', not a 'domain' of objects. | |
From: Oliver,A/Smiley,T (What are Sets and What are they For? [2006], Intro) | |
A reaction: [Skolem 1922:291 in van Heijenoort] Zermelo has said that the domain cannot be a set, because every set belongs to it. |
14245 | Logical truths are true no matter what exists - but predicate calculus insists that something exists [Oliver/Smiley] |
Full Idea: Logical truths should be true no matter what exists, so true even if nothing exists. The classical predicate calculus, however, makes it logically true that something exists. | |
From: Oliver,A/Smiley,T (What are Sets and What are they For? [2006], 5.1) |
6516 | Monty Hall Dilemma: do you abandon your preference after Monty eliminates one of the rivals? [PG] |
Full Idea: The Monty Hall Dilemma: Three boxes, one with a big prize; pick one to open. Monty Hall then opens one of the other two, which is empty. You may, if you wish, switch from your box to the other unopened box. Should you? | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
A reaction: The other two boxes, as a pair, are more likely contain the prize than your box. Monty Hall has eliminated one of them for you, so you should choose the other one. Your intuition that the two remaining boxes are equal is incorrect! |
14648 | Could I name all of the real numbers in one fell swoop? Call them all 'Charley'? [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: Can't I name all the real numbers in the interval (0,1) at once? Couldn't I name them all 'Charley', for example? | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (De Re and De Dicto [1969], p.40) | |
A reaction: Plantinga is nervous about such a sweeping move, but can't think of an objection. This addresses a big problem, I think - that you are supposed to accept the real numbers when we cannot possibly name them all. |
14246 | If mathematics purely concerned mathematical objects, there would be no applied mathematics [Oliver/Smiley] |
Full Idea: If mathematics was purely concerned with mathematical objects, there would be no room for applied mathematics. | |
From: Oliver,A/Smiley,T (What are Sets and What are they For? [2006], 5.1) | |
A reaction: Love it! Of course, they are using 'objects' in the rather Fregean sense of genuine abstract entities. I don't see why fictionalism shouldn't allow maths to be wholly 'pure', although we have invented fictions which actually have application. |
14247 | Sets might either represent the numbers, or be the numbers, or replace the numbers [Oliver/Smiley] |
Full Idea: Identifying numbers with sets may mean one of three quite different things: 1) the sets represent the numbers, or ii) they are the numbers, or iii) they replace the numbers. | |
From: Oliver,A/Smiley,T (What are Sets and What are they For? [2006], 5.2) | |
A reaction: Option one sounds the most plausible to me. I will take numbers to be patterns embedded in nature, and sets are one way of presenting them in shorthand form, in order to bring out what is repeated. |
14664 | Necessary beings (numbers, properties, sets, propositions, states of affairs, God) exist in all possible worlds [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: A 'necessary being' is one that exists in every possible world; and only some objects - numbers, properties, pure sets, propositions, states of affairs, God - have this distinction. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976], 2) | |
A reaction: This a very odd list, though it is fairly orthodox among philosophers trained in modern modal logic. At the very least it looks rather parochial to me. |
16435 | Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Plantinga, by Stalnaker] |
Full Idea: Plantinga proposes surrogates for nonexistent things - individual essences that are themselves necessary existents and that correspond one-to-one with all the 'things' that might exist. | |
From: report of Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 1 | |
A reaction: There are an awful lot of competing concepts of essence flying around these days. This one seems to require some abstract 'third realm' (or worse) in which these essences can exist, awaiting the arrival of thinkers. Not for me. |
14655 | The 'identity criteria' of a name are a group of essential and established facts [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: What we might call 'identity criteria' associated with a name such as 'Aristotle' are what the users of the name regard as essential and established facts about him. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], I) | |
A reaction: The problem here is that identifying something is superficial, whereas essences run deep. Plantinga is, in fact, talking about Lockean 'nominal essence' (and seems unaware of the fact, and never mentions the Lockean real/nominal distinction). |
14647 | Surely self-identity is essential to Socrates? [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: If anything is essential to Socrates, surely self-identity is. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (De Re and De Dicto [1969], p.37) | |
A reaction: This is the modern move of Plantinga and Adams, to make 'is identical with Socrates' the one property which assures the identity of Socrates (his 'haecceity'). My view is that self-identity is not a property. Plantinga wonders about that on p.44. |
14658 | 'Being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterise Socrates, so they are among his properties [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: Surely it is true of Socrates that he is Socrates and he is identical with Socrates. If these are true of him, then 'being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterize him; they are among his properties or attributes. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], II) | |
A reaction: As far as I can see (if you insist on accepting self-identity as meaningful) the most you get here is that these are predicates that can attach to Socrates. If you identify predicates with properties you are in deep metaphysical trouble. |
13132 | A snowball's haecceity is the property of being identical with itself [Plantinga, by Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: Plantinga assumes that being identical with that snowball names a property which is that snowball's haecceity. | |
From: report of Alvin Plantinga (De Essentia [1979]) by Jan Westerhoff - Ontological Categories §52 | |
A reaction: Only a philosopher would suggest such a bizarre way of establishing the unique individuality of a given snowball. You could hardly keep track of the snowball with just that criterion. How do you decide whether something has Plantinga's property? |
14666 | Socrates is a contingent being, but his essence is not; without Socrates, his essence is unexemplified [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: Socrates is a contingent being; his essence, however, is not. Properties, like propositions and possible worlds, are necessary beings. If Socrates had not existed, his essence would have been unexemplified, but not non-existent. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976], 4) | |
A reaction: This is a distinctive Plantinga view, of which I can make little sense. I take it that Socrates used to have an essence. Being dead, the essence no longer exists, but when we talk about Socrates it is largely this essence to which we refer. OK? |
14656 | Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: Does Socrates have, in addition to his essential properties, an 'essence' or 'haecceity' - a property essential to him that entails each of his essential properties and that nothing distinct from him has in the world? | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], II) | |
A reaction: Plantinga says yes, and offers 'Socrateity' (borrowed from Boethius) as his candidate. This is a very odd use of the word 'essence'. I take an essence to be a complex set of fundamental properties. I am also puzzled by his use of the word 'entails'. |
14646 | An object has a property essentially if it couldn't conceivably have lacked it [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: An object has a property essentially just in case it couldn't conceivably have lacked that property. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (De Re and De Dicto [1969], p.35) | |
A reaction: Making it depend on what we can conceive seems a bit dubious, for someone committed to real essences. The key issue is how narrowly or broadly you interpret the word 'property'. The word 'object' needs a bit of thought, too! |
14653 | X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not ¬P elsewhere) [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: Socrates has P essentially if he has P in every world, or has it in every world in which he exists, or - most plausible of all - has P in the actual world and has its complement [non-P] in no world. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], Intro) | |
A reaction: These strike me as mere necessary properties, which are not the same thing at all. Essences give rise to the other properties, but Plantinga offers nothing to do the job (and especially not 'Socrateity'!). Essences must explain, say I! |
14660 | If a property is ever essential, can it only ever be an essential property? [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: Is it the case that any property had essentially by anything is had essentially by everything that has it? | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], III) | |
A reaction: Plantinga says it is not true, but the only example he can give is Socrates having the property of 'being Socrates or Greek'. I take it to be universally false. There are not two types of property here. Properties sometimes play an essential role. |
14661 | Essences are instantiated, and are what entails a thing's properties and lack of properties [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: E is an essence if and only if (a) 'has E essentially' is instantiated in some world or other, and (b) for any world W and property P, E entails 'has P in W' or 'does not have P in W'. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], IV) | |
A reaction: 'Entail' strikes me as a very odd word when you are talking about the structure of the physical world (or are we??). Why would a unique self-identity (his candidate for essence) do the necessary entailing? |
14654 | Properties are 'trivially essential' if they are instantiated by every object in every possible world [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: Let us call properties that enjoy the distinction of being instantiated by every object in every possible world 'trivially essential properties'. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], I) | |
A reaction: These would appear to be trivially 'necessary' rather than 'essential'. This continual need for the qualifier 'trivial' shows that they are not talking about proper essences. |
14657 | Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: Is there any reason to suppose that 'being identical with Socrates' names a property? Well, is there any reason to suppose that it does not? I cannot think of any, nor have I heard any that are at all impressive. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], II) | |
A reaction: Is there any reason to think that a planet somewhere is entirely under the control of white mice? Extraordinary. No wonder Plantinga believes in God and the Ontological Argument, as well as the existence of 'Socrateity' etc. |
14642 | Expressing modality about a statement is 'de dicto'; expressing it of property-possession is 'de re' [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: Some statements predicate modality of another statement (modality 'de dicto'); but others predicate of an object the necessary or essential possession of a property; these latter express modality 'de re'. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (De Re and De Dicto [1969], p.26) | |
A reaction: The distinction seems to originate in Aquinas, concerning whether God knows the future (or, how he knows the future). 'De dicto' is straightforward, but possibly the result of convention. 'De re' is controversial, and implies deep metaphysics. |
14643 | 'De dicto' true and 'de re' false is possible, and so is 'de dicto' false and 'de re' true [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: Aquinas says if a 'de dicto' statement is true, the 'de re' version may be false. The opposite also applies: 'What I am thinking of [17] is essentially prime' is true, but 'The proposition "what I am thinking of is prime" is necessarily true' is false. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (De Re and De Dicto [1969], p.27) | |
A reaction: In his examples the first is 'de re' (about the number), and the second is 'de dicto' (about that proposition). |
14649 | Can we find an appropriate 'de dicto' paraphrase for any 'de re' proposition? [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: To explain the 'de re' via the 'de dicto' is to provide a rule enabling us to find, for each de re proposition, an equivalent de dicto proposition. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (De Re and De Dicto [1969], p.41) | |
A reaction: Many 'de dicto' paraphrases will change the modality of a 'de re' statement, so the challenge is to find the right equivalent version. Plantinga takes up this challenge. The 'de dicto' statement says the object has the property, and must have it. |
14652 | 'De re' modality is as clear as 'de dicto' modality, because they are logically equivalent [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: The idea of modality 'de re' is no more (although no less) obscure that the idea of modality 'de dicto'; for I think we can see that any statement of the former type is logically equivalent to some statement of the latter. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], Intro) | |
A reaction: If two things are logically equivalent, that doesn't ensure that they are equally clear! Personally I am on the side of de re modality. |
24054 | Everything has a probability, something will happen, and probabilities add up [PG] |
Full Idea: The three Kolgorov axioms of probability: the probability of an event is a non-negative real number; it is certain that one of the 'elementary events' will occur; and the unity of probabilities is the sum of probability of parts ('additivity'). | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
A reaction: [My attempt to verbalise them; they are normally expressed in terms of set theory]. Got this from a talk handout, and Wikipedia. |
14659 | We can imagine being beetles or alligators, so it is possible we might have such bodies [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: We easily understand Kafka's story about the man who wakes up to discover that he now has the body of a beetle; and in fact the state of affairs depicted is entirely possible. I can imagine being an alligator, so Socrates could have had an alligator body. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], III) | |
A reaction: This really is going the whole hog with accepting whatever is conceivable as being possible. I take this to be shocking nonsense, and it greatly reduces Plantinga in my esteem, despite his displays of intelligence and erudition. |
11984 | Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: To say than x has a property in a possible world is simply to say that x would have had the property if that world had been actual. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals? [1973], I) | |
A reaction: Plantinga tries to defuse all the problems with identity across possible worlds, by hanging on to subjunctive verbs and modal modifiers. The point, though, was to explain these, or at least to try to give their logical form. |
14662 | Possible worlds clarify possibility, propositions, properties, sets, counterfacts, time, determinism etc. [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: The idea of possible worlds has delivered insights on logical possibility (de dicto and de re), propositions, properties and sets, counterfactuals, time and temporal relations, causal determinism, the ontological argument, and the problem of evil. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976], Intro) | |
A reaction: This date (1976) seems to be the high-water mark for enthusiasm about possible worlds. I suppose if we just stick to 'insights' rather than 'answers' then the big claim might still be acceptable. Which problems are created by possible worlds? |
18383 | Plantinga says there is just this world, with possibilities expressed in propositions [Plantinga, by Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Plantinga rejects other possible worlds, but adds to our world an uncountable multitude of sets of propositions, each set a way that the world might have been, but is in fact not. (Roughly, for each Lewis world, Plantinga has such a set). | |
From: report of Alvin Plantinga (The Nature of Necessity [1974]) by David M. Armstrong - Truth and Truthmakers 07.2 | |
A reaction: To me it seems as ontologically extravagant to postulate unexpressed propositions as to postulate concrete possible worlds. I think the best line is that there is just the actual world, with the possibilities implied in its dispositions. |
16472 | Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia [Stalnaker on Plantinga] |
Full Idea: Plantinga's critics worry that the metaphysics is actualist in name only, since it is achieved only by populating the actual world with entities whose nature is explained in terms of merely possible things that would exemplify them if anything did. | |
From: comment on Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 4.4 | |
A reaction: Plantinga seems a long way from the usual motivation for actualism, which is probably sceptical empiricism, and building a system on what is smack in front of you. Possibilities have to be true, though. That's why you need dispositions in actuality. |
11980 | A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: A possible world is just a maximal possible state of affairs. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals? [1973], I) | |
A reaction: The key point here is that Plantinga includes the word 'possible' in his definition. Possibility defines the worlds, and so worlds cannot be used on their own to define possibility. |
14651 | What Socrates could have been, and could have become, are different? [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: Is there a difference between what Socrates could have been, and what he could have become? | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (De Re and De Dicto [1969], p.44) | |
A reaction: That is, I take it, 1) how different might he have been in the past, given how he is now?, and 2) how different might he have been in the past, and now, if he had permanently diverged from how he is now? 1) has tight constraints on it. |
11982 | If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: If the Socrates of the actual world has snubnosedness but Socrates-in-W does not, this is surely inconsistent with the Indiscernibility of Identicals, a principle than which none sounder can be conceived. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals? [1973], I) | |
A reaction: However, we allow Socrates to differ over time while remaining the same Socrates, so some similar approach should apply here. In both cases we need some notion of what is essential to Socrates. But what unites aged 3 with aged 70? |
11983 | It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: We may say it makes no sense to say that Socrates exists at a world, if there is in principle no way of identifying him. ...But this is confused. To suppose Agnew was a precocious baby, we needn't be able to pick him from a gallery of babies. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals? [1973], I) | |
A reaction: This seems a good point, and yet we have a space-time line joining adult Agnew with baby Agnew, and no such causal link is available between persons in different possible worlds. What would be the criterion in each case? |
11985 | If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: The Theory of Worldbound Individuals contends that no object exists in more than one possible world; this implies the outrageous view that - taking properties in the broadest sense - no object could have lacked any property that it in fact has. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals? [1973], II) | |
A reaction: Leibniz is the best known exponent of this 'outrageous view', though Plantinga shows that Lewis may be seen in the same light, since only counterparts are found in possible worlds, not the real thing. The Theory does seem wrong. |
11891 | Possibilities for an individual can only refer to that individual, in some possible world [Plantinga, by Mackie,P] |
Full Idea: Plantinga says for an individual to exist with certain properties in some possible world is simply for it to be true that, had that possible world obtained, that individual would have existed with those properties. | |
From: report of Alvin Plantinga (The Nature of Necessity [1974]) by Penelope Mackie - How Things Might Have Been 5.1 | |
A reaction: This is intended to dissolve the problem of transworld identity, and is certainly a flat rejection of counterparts. I take the point to be that the individual is the key element in defining the possible world, so can't possibly be different. |
11986 | The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: While Socrates has no counterparts that lack self-identity, he does have counterparts that lack identity-with-Socrates. He alone has that - the property, that is, of being identical with the object that in fact instantiates Socrateity. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals? [1973], II) | |
A reaction: I am never persuaded by arguments which rest on such dubious pseudo-properties. Whether or not a counterpart of Socrates has any sort of identity with Socrates cannot be prejudged, as it would beg the question. |
11987 | Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: It makes no sense to say I could have been someone else, yet Counterpart Theory implies not merely that I could have been distinct from myself, but that I would have been distinct from myself had things gone differently in even the most miniscule detail. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals? [1973], II) | |
A reaction: A counterpart doesn't appear to be 'me being distinct from myself'. We have to combine counterparts over possible worlds with perdurance over time. I am a 'worm' of time-slices. Anything not in that worm is not strictly me. |
3875 | If reality is just what we perceive, we would have no need for a sixth sense [PG] |
Full Idea: Reality must be more than merely what we perceive, because a sixth sense would enhance our current knowledge, and a seventh, and so on. | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) |
3876 | If my team is losing 3-1, I have synthetic a priori knowledge that they need two goals for a draw [PG] |
Full Idea: If my football team is losing 3-1, I seem to have synthetic a priori knowledge that they need two goals to achieve a draw | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) |
6356 | Maybe a reliable justification must come from a process working with its 'proper function' [Plantinga, by Pollock/Cruz] |
Full Idea: A modified version of reliabilism proposes that a belief is justified in case it is the product of a process that is working according to its 'proper function' in the environment for which it is appropriate. | |
From: report of Alvin Plantinga (Warrant and Proper Function [1993]) by J Pollock / J Cruz - Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) §1.5.4 | |
A reaction: Something might infallibly indicate something without that being its proper function (e.g. 'Red sky at night/ Shepherds' delight'). An inaccurate clock is fulfilling its proper function (telling the time), but not very well. |
7734 | Maybe a mollusc's brain events for pain ARE of the same type (broadly) as a human's [PG] |
Full Idea: To defend type-type identity against the multiple realisability objection, we might say that a molluscs's brain events that register pain ARE of the same type as humans, given that being 'of the same type' is a fairly flexible concept. | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
A reaction: But this reduces 'of the same type' to such vagueness that it may become vacuous. You would be left with token-token identity, where the mental event is just identical to some brain event, with its 'type' being irrelevant. |
7735 | Maybe a frog's brain events for fear are functionally like ours, but not phenomenally [PG] |
Full Idea: To defend type-type identity against the multiple realisability objection, we might (also) say that while a frog's brain events for fear are functionally identical to a human's (it runs away), that doesn't mean they are phenomenally identical. | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
A reaction: I take this to be the key reply to the multiple realisability problem. If a frog flees from a loud noise, it is 'frightened' in a functional sense, but that still leaves the question 'What's it like to be a frightened frog?', which may differ from humans. |
9086 | The idea of abstract objects is not ontological; it comes from the epistemological idea of abstraction [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: The notion of an abstract object comes from the notion of abstraction; it is in origin an epistemological rather than an ontological category. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (Why Propositions cannot be concrete [1993], p.232) | |
A reaction: Etymology doesn't prove anything. However, if you define abstract objects as not existing in space or time, you must recognise that this may only be because that is how humans imaginatively created them in the first place. |
9087 | Theists may see abstract objects as really divine thoughts [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: Theists may find attractive a view popular among medieval philosophers from Augustine on: that abstract objects are really divine thoughts. More exactly, propositions are divine thoughts, properties divine concepts, and sets divine collections. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (Why Propositions cannot be concrete [1993], p.233) | |
A reaction: Hm. I pass this on because we should be aware that there is a theological history to discussions of abstract objects, and some people have vested interests in keeping them outside of the natural world. Aren't properties natural? Does God gerrymander sets? |
16469 | Plantinga has domains of sets of essences, variables denoting essences, and predicates as functions [Plantinga, by Stalnaker] |
Full Idea: The domains in Plantinga's interpretation of Kripke's semantics are sets of essences, and the values of variables are essences. The values of predicates have to be functions from possible worlds to essences. | |
From: report of Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 4.4 | |
A reaction: I begin to think this is quite nice, as long as one doesn't take the commitment to the essences too seriously. For 'essence' read 'minimal identity'? But I take essences to be more than minimal, so use identities (which Kripke does?). |
16470 | Plantinga's essences have their own properties - so will have essences, giving a hierarchy [Stalnaker on Plantinga] |
Full Idea: For Plantinga, essences are entities in their own right and will have properties different from what instantiates them. Hence he will need individual essences of individual essences, distinct from the essences. I see no way to avoid a hierarchy of them. | |
From: comment on Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 4.4 | |
A reaction: This sounds devastating for Plantinga, but it is a challenge for traditional Aristotelians. Only a logician suffers from a hierarchy, but a scientist might have to live with an essence, which contains a super-essence. |
14663 | Are propositions and states of affairs two separate things, or only one? I incline to say one [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: Are there two sorts of thing, propositions and states of affairs, or only one? I am inclined to the former view on the ground that propositions have a property, truth or falsehood, not had by states of affairs. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976], 1) | |
A reaction: Might a proposition be nothing more than an assertion that a state of affairs obtains? It would then pass his test. The idea that a proposition is a complex of facts in the external world ('Russellian' propositions?) quite baffles me. |
9085 | If propositions are concrete they don't have to exist, and so they can't be necessary truths [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: Someone who believes propositions are concrete cannot agree that some propositions are necessary. For propositions are contingent beings, and could have failed to exist. But if they fail to exist, then they fail to be true. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (Why Propositions cannot be concrete [1993], p.230) | |
A reaction: [compressed] He implies the actual existence of an infinity of trivial, boring or ridiculous necessary truths. I suspect that he is just confusing a thought with its content. Or we might just treat necessary propositions as hypothetical. |
9084 | Propositions can't just be in brains, because 'there are no human beings' might be true [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: If propositions are brain inscriptions, then if there had been no human beings there would have been no propositions. But then 'there are no human beings' would have been true, so there would have been at least one truth (and thus one proposition). | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (Why Propositions cannot be concrete [1993], p.229) | |
A reaction: This would make 'there are no x's' true for any value of x apart from actual objects, which implies an infinity of propositions. Does Plantinga really believe that these all exist? He may be confusing propositions with facts. |
3877 | Utilitarianism seems to justify the discreet murder of unhappy people [PG] |
Full Idea: If I discreetly murdered a gloomy and solitary tramp who was upsetting people in my village, if is hard to see how utilitarianism could demonstrate that I had done something wrong. | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) |
6126 | Life is Movement, Respiration, Sensation, Nutrition, Excretion, Reproduction, Growth (MRS NERG) [PG] |
Full Idea: The biologists' acronym for the necessary conditions of life is MRS NERG: that is, Movement, Respiration, Sensation, Nutrition, Excretion, Reproduction, Growth. | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
A reaction: How strictly necessary are each of these is a point for discussion. A notorious problem case is fire, which (at a stretch) may pass all seven tests. |
3873 | An omniscient being couldn't know it was omniscient, as that requires information from beyond its scope of knowledge [PG] |
Full Idea: God seems to be in the paradoxical situation that He may be omniscient, but can never know that He is, because that involves knowing that there is nothing outside his scope of knowledge (e.g. another God) | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) |
3874 | How could God know there wasn't an unknown force controlling his 'free' will? [PG] |
Full Idea: How could God be certain that he has free will (if He has), if He couldn't be sure that there wasn't an unknown force controlling his will? | |
From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) |
20704 | A possible world contains a being of maximal greatness - which is existence in all worlds [Plantinga, by Davies,B] |
Full Idea: Plantinga reformulates Malcolm's argument thus: 1) There is a possible world in which there exists a being with maximal greatness, 2) A being has maximal greatness in a world only if it exists in every world. | |
From: report of Alvin Plantinga (The Nature of Necessity [1974], p.213) by Brian Davies - Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 4 'b Descartes' | |
A reaction: This is only Plantinga's starting point, which says nothing about the nature of God, but only that this 'great' being exists in all worlds. I would like to know why it is a 'being' rather than a 'thing'. Malcolm says if it is possible it is necessary. |
1474 | Moral evil may be acceptable to God because it allows free will (even though we don't see why this is necessary) [Plantinga, by PG] |
Full Idea: Moral evil may be acceptable to a benevolent God because it is the only way to allow genuine free will, which may have a supreme value in creation (even if we are unsure what it is). | |
From: report of Alvin Plantinga (Free Will Defence [1965], Pref.) by PG - Db (ideas) |
1475 | It is logically possible that natural evil like earthquakes is caused by Satan [Plantinga, by PG] |
Full Idea: Physical evil (e.g. earthquakes) may be attributable to a fallen angel (Satan), who is the enemy of God, and this is enough to retain the idea that God is omnipotent and benevolent, and yet evil exists. | |
From: report of Alvin Plantinga (Free Will Defence [1965], III) by PG - Db (ideas) |